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
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
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Sir Charles Wolseley, Bart.







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**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**PENINSULAR WAR.**



**LONDON:**  
**PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.**

**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**PENINSULAR WAR.**

---

“ Unto thee  
“ Let thine own times as an old story be.”  
DONNE.

---

**BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.**

**POET LAUREATE,**

**HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE  
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL  
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE  
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.**

**A NEW EDITION.**

***IN SIX VOLUMES.***

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**MDCCCXXVIII.**



Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις το διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν  
ἐπράχθη, καὶ το πραχθὲν ποτερα ἔυλογον ἔσχε το τέλος, το κατα-  
λειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ  
παραυτικά μὲν τερπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδεν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παρά-  
παν.

POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.

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# HISTORY

## OF THE

# PENINSULAR WAR.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

IMPORTANT as the battle of Baylen was in its direct and immediate consequences to the Spaniards, their cause derived greater celebrity and more permanent strength from the defence of Zaragoza.

CHAP.  
IX.

1808.  
June.

Order had been restored in that city from the hour when Palafox assumed the command. Implicit confidence in the commander produced implicit and alert obedience, and preparations were made with zeal and activity proportioned to the danger. When the new Captain-General declared war against the French, the troops which he mustered amounted only to 220 men, and the public treasury could furnish him with no more than an hundred dollars; sixteen ill-mounted guns were all the artillery in the place, and the arsenal contained but few muskets.

*Preparations at  
Zaragoza.*



CHAP.  
IX.

---

1808.  
*June.*

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Fowling-pieces were put in requisition, pikes were forged, powder was supplied from the mills at Villafeliche, which were some of the most considerable in Spain, . . for every thing else Palafox trusted to his country and his cause. And his trust was not in vain; the Zaragozans were ready to endure any suffering and make any sacrifice in the discharge of their duty; the same spirit possessed the whole country, and from all those parts of Spain which were under the yoke of the enemy officers and soldiers repaired to Zaragoza as soon as it was seen that an army was collecting there; many came from Madrid and from Pampluna, and some officers of engineers from the military academy at Alcala. And the spirits of the people were encouraged by the discovery of a depôt of fire arms walled up in the Aljafaria; they had probably been secreted there in the succession war, when one party resigned that city to its enemies, and their discovery in this time of need was regarded by the Zaragozans as a manifestation of divine Providence in their favour. The defeats which their undisciplined levies sustained at Tudela, Mallen, and Alagon abated not their resolution; and in the last of these actions a handful of regular troops protected their retreat with great steadiness. The French general, Lefebvre Desnouettes, pursuing his hitherto uninterrupted success, advanced, and took up a position very near the city, and covered by a rising ground planted with olive trees.

Zaragoza was not a \*fortified town ; the brick wall which surrounded it was from ten to twelve feet high, and three feet thick, and in many places it was interrupted by houses, which formed part of the inclosure. The city had no advantages of situation for its defence, and would not have been considered capable of resistance by any men but those whose courage was sustained by a virtuous and holy principle of duty. It stands in an open plain, which was then covered with olive grounds, and is bounded on either hand by high and distant mountains ; but it is commanded by some high ground called the Torrero, about a mile to the south-west, upon which there was a convent, with some smaller buildings. The canal of Aragon divides this elevation from another rising ground, where the Spaniards had erected a battery. The Ebro bathes the walls of the city, and separates it from the suburbs ; it has two bridges, within musket-shot of each other ; one of wood, said to be more beautiful than any other of the like materials in Europe ; the other of freestone, consisting of seven arches, the largest of which is 122 feet in diameter ; the river is fordable above the city. Two smaller rivers, the Galego and the Guerva, flow at a little distance from the city, the one on the east, the other on the west ; the latter being

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Description  
of the city.

\* “ Elle est sans defense et sans fortification,” said Colmenar, writing a century ago, “ fermée d’une simple muraille ; mais ce défaut est réparé par la bravoure des habitans.” After the proofs which the inhabitants have given of their patriotism, this praise appears like prophecy.

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separated from the walls only by the breadth of the common road: both are received into the Ebro. Unlike most other places of the peninsula, Zaragoza has neither aqueduct nor fountains, but derives its water wholly from the river. The people of Tortosa, (and probably of the other towns upon its course,) drink also of the Ebro, preferring it to the finest spring; the water is of a dirty red colour, but, having stood a few hours, it becomes perfectly clear, and has a softness and pleasantness of taste, which soon induces strangers to agree with the natives in their preference of it. The population was stated in the census of 1787 at 42,600; that of 1797, excellent as it is in all other respects, has the fault of not specifying the places in each district; later accounts computed its inhabitants at 60,000, and it was certainly one of the largest cities in the peninsula. It had twelve gates, four of them in the old wall of Augustus, by whom the older town of Salduba upon the same site was enlarged, beautified, and called Cæsarea-Augusta, or Cæsaraugusta; a word easily corrupted into its \* present name.

The whole city is built of brick; even the convents and churches were of this coarse material, which was bad of its kind, so that there were cracks in most of these edifices from top to bottom. The houses are not so high as they usually are in old Spanish towns, their general

\* The Spaniards, by a more curious corruption, call Syracuse, Zaragoza de Sicilia.

height being only three stories ; the streets are, as usual, very narrow and crooked ; there are, however, open market-places ; and one very wide, long, and regularly built street, formerly called the Calle Santa, having been the scene of many martyrdoms, but now more commonly known by the name of the Cozo. The people, like the rest of the Aragonese, and their neighbours, the Catalans, have been always honourably distinguished in Spanish history for their love of liberty ; and the many unavailing struggles which they have made during the last four centuries, had not abated their attachment to the good principles of their forefathers. Within the peninsula, (and once indeed throughout the whole of Catholic Europe,) Zaragoza was famous as the city of our Lady of the Pillar, whose legend is still so firmly believed by the people, and most of the clergy in Spain, that it was frequently appealed to in the proclamations of the different generals and Juntas, as one of the most popular articles of the national faith. The legend is this : when the apostles, after the resurrection, separated and went to preach the gospel in different parts of the world, St. James the elder, (or Santiago, as he may more properly be called in his mythological history,) departed for Spain, which province Christ himself had previously commended to his care. When he went to kiss the hand of the Virgin, and request her leave to set off, and her blessing, she commanded him, in the name of her Son, to build a church to her honour in

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*Our Lady  
of the  
Pillar.*

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that city of Spain wherein he should make the greatest number of converts, adding, that she would give him farther instructions concerning the edifice upon the spot. Santiago set sail, landed in Galicia, and, having preached with little success through the northern provinces, reached Cæsarea-Augusta, where he made eight disciples. One night, after he had been conversing and praying with them as usual on the banks of the river, they fell asleep, and just at midnight the apostle heard heavenly voices sing, *Ave Maria gratia plena!* He fell on his knees, and instantly beheld the Virgin upon a marble pillar in the midst of a choir of angels, who went through the whole of her matin service. When this was ended, she bade him build her church around that pillar, which his Lord, her blessed Son, had sent him by the hands of his angels; there, she told him, that pillar was to remain till the end of the world, and great mercies would be vouchsafed there to those who supplicated for them in her name. Having said this, the angels transported her back to her house at Jerusalem, (for this was before the Assumption) and Santiago, in obedience, erected upon that spot the first church which was ever dedicated to the Virgin\*.

\* *Hist. Apparitionis Deiparæ supra Columnam, Beato Jacobo apud Cæsaragustam prædicante. Ex cod. membraneo, qui in Archivo Sanctæ Maria de Pilari asservatur. Espana Sagrada, t. xxx. p. 426.* Risco adds to this account, the Collect, which, from time immemorial, has been

used in the Church of the Pillar. It may be added here as a curiosity for those who are not accustomed to such things. *Omnipotens æternæ Deus, qui Sacratissimam Virginem matrem tuam inter choros Angelorum super columna mar-morea a te ab alto emissa venire, dum adhuc viveret, dignatus est,*

Cathedral service was performed both in this church and in the see, and the meetings of the chapter were held alternately in each. The interior of each was of the most imposing\* kind. When the elder of these joint cathedrals was erected, Pope Gelasius granted indulgencies to all persons who would contribute toward the work, and thus introduced a practice which contributed as much to the grandeur and magnificence of ecclesiastical architecture, as to laxity of morals and the prevalence of superstition.

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Many mournful scenes of bigotry and superstition have been exhibited in Zaragoza; but, in these fiery trials which Buonaparte's tyranny was preparing for the inhabitants, the dross and tinsel of their faith disappeared, and its pure gold re-

Contempt  
of the  
French for  
the Zارا-  
gozans.

*ut Basilica de Pilari in ejus honorem a Protomartyre apostolorum Jacobo suisque sanctissimis discipulis ædificaretur; præstamus ut ejus meritis et intercessione fiat impetrabile quod fida mente poscimus. Qui vivas et regnas, &c.*

The French, as may be supposed, ridicule this fable; but, it is worthy of remark, that, in the early part of the last century, the Spanish annalist, Ferreras, represented the story as of doubtful authority; his book passed through the hands of the usual censors, and was printed; and then Philip V. the first of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, a Frenchman by birth and education, personally interfered, commanded Ferreras to cancel the heretical leaf, and sent the edict in which this was decreed to Zaragoza, there to be deposited

among the archives of the Virgin's church, in proof of his especial devotion to our Lady of the Pillar.

\* "Here," says Mr. Townsend, "I forgot all the hardships and fatigues which we had suffered in this long journey: nay, had I travelled all the way on foot, I would have freely done it to enjoy the sight of these cathedrals. That which is called *El Aseu* is vast, gloomy, and magnificent; it excites devotion, inspires awe, and inclines the worshipper to fall prostrate, and to adore in silence the God who seems to veil his glory. The other, called *El Pilar*, spacious, lofty, light, elegant, and cheerful, inspires hope, confidence, complacency, and makes the soul impatient to express its gratitude for benefits received."

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mained. The French, accustomed as they were to undervalue the Spanish character, had spoken with peculiar contempt of the Zaragozans. "Few persons," they said, "are to be seen among them who distinguish themselves by their dress ; there is little of that elegant attire so observable in large cities. All is serious and regular, . . dull and monotonous. The place seems without any kind of resource, because the inhabitants use no effort to obtain any ; . . accustomed to a state of apathy and languor, they have not an idea of the possibility of shaking it off\*." With this feeling, equally despising the strength of the place, and the character of the people, the French proceeded to besiege the capital of Aragon. A party of their cavalry entered the town on the 14th, perhaps in pursuit of the retreating patriots ; they thought to scour the streets, but they were soon made to feel, that the superiority of disciplined soldiers to citizens exists only in the field.

*June 15.  
The French  
attempt to  
storm the  
city.*

On the following morning, the French, with part of their force, attacked the outposts upon the canal, and, with their main body, attempted to storm the city by the gate called Portillo. A desperate conflict ensued. The Aragonese fought with a spirit worthy of their cause. They had neither time, nor room, nor necessity for order. Their cannon, which they had hastily planted before the gates, and in the best situations without the town, were served by any per-

\* Laborde.



sons who happened to be near them ; any one gave orders who felt himself competent to take the command. A party of the enemy entered the city, and were all slain. Lefebvre perceived that it was hopeless to persist in the attack with his present force, and drew off his troops, having suffered great loss. The patriots lost about 2000 men killed, and as many wounded. In such a conflict the circumstances are so materially in favour of the defendants, that the carnage made among the French must have been much greater. Some part of their baggage and plunder was abandoned in their retreat. The conquerors would have exposed themselves by a rash pursuit, but Palafox exhorted them not to be impatient, telling them, that the enemy would give them frequent opportunities to display their courage. While he thus restrained their impetuosity, he continued to excite their zeal. This victory, he said, was but the commencement of the triumphs which they were to expect under the powerful assistance of their divine patrons. The precious blood of their brethren had been shed in the field of glory, . . on their own soil. Those blessed martyrs required new victims ; let us, he added, prepare for the sacrifice !

The Zaragozans had obtained only a respite ; defeated as he was, Lefebvre had only removed beyond the reach of their guns ; his troops were far superior to any which they could bring against him ; and it was not to be doubted that he would soon return in greater force, to take vengeance

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*Palafox goes out to collect reinforcements.*

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for the repulse and the disgrace which he had suffered. A regular siege was to be expected ; how were the citizens to sustain it with their brick walls, without heavy artillery, and without troops who could sally to interrupt the besiegers in their works? In spite of all these discouraging circumstances, confiding in God and their own courage, they determined to defend the streets to the last extremity. Palafox, immediately after the repulse of the enemy, set out to muster reinforcements, to provide such resources for the siege as he could, and to place the rest of Aragon in a state of defence, if the capital should fall. He was accompanied by Colonel Butron, his friend and aide-de-camp ; Lieut.-Colonel Beillan, of the engineers ; Padre Basilio, and Tio Jorge. With these companions and a small escort he left the city by the suburbs, crossed the Ebro at Pina, and collecting on the way about 1400 soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, formed a junction at Belchite with Baron Versage and some newly raised troops from Calatayud. Their united numbers amounted to some 7000 men, with 100 horse and four pieces of artillery. Small as this force was, and still more inefficient for want of discipline than of numerical strength, Palafox resolved upon making an attempt with it to succour the city. The prudence of this determination was justly questioned by some ; others proposed the strange measure of marching to Valencia : this probably originated with some of the stray soldiers who

were at liberty to seek their fortune where they pleased, and the proposal was so well received that a considerable party prepared to set off in that direction, without orders. But Palafox called them together, exhorted them to do their duty, and offered passports to as many as chose to leave him in the moment of danger. The consequence of this offer was that not a man departed. From Almunia, where he had rested a day, he then marched towards Epila, thinking to advance to the village of La Muela, and thus place the invaders between his little army and the city, in the hope of cutting them off from their reinforcements. Lefebvre prevented this, by suddenly attacking him at Epila, on the night of the 23d : after a most obstinate resistance, the superior arms and discipline of the French were successful. The wreck of this gallant band retreated to Calatayud, and afterwards, with great difficulty, threw themselves into Zaragoza.

The besiegers' army was soon reinforced by General Verdier, with 2500 men, besides some battalions of Portugeze, who, according to the devilish system of Buonaparte's tyranny, had been forced out of their own country, to be pushed on in the foremost ranks, wherever the first fire of a battery was to be received, a line of bayonets clogged, or a ditch filled, with bodies. They occupied the best positions in the surrounding plain, and, on the 27th, attacked the city and the Torrero ; but they were repulsed with the loss of 800 men, six pieces of artillery, and five

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June.*G. Verdier  
joins Le-  
febvre with  
reinforce-  
ment.*

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*The Tor-  
rero taken.*

carts of ammunition. By this time, they had invested nearly half the town. The next morning they renewed the attack at both places; from the city they were again repulsed, losing almost all the cavalry who were engaged. But the Torrero was lost through the alleged misconduct of an artillery officer, who was charged with having made his men abandon the batteries at the most critical moment. For this he was condemned to run the gauntlet six times, the soldiers beating him with their ramrods, and after this cruelty he was shot.

*The French  
bombard the  
city.*

The French, having now received a train of mortars, howitzers, and twelve-pounders, which were of sufficient calibre against mud walls, kept up a constant fire, and showered down shells and grenades from the Torrero. About twelve hundred were thrown into the town, and there was not one building that was bomb proof within the walls. After a time, the inhabitants placed beams of timber together, endways, against the houses, in a sloping direction, behind which those who were near when a shell fell, might shelter themselves. The enemy continued also to invest the city more closely, while the Aragonese made every effort to strengthen their means of defence. They tore down the awnings from their windows, and formed them into sacks, which they filled with sand, and piled up before the gates, in the form of a battery, digging round it a deep trench. They broke holes for musketry in the walls and intermediate buildings, and

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stationed cannon where the position was favourable for it. The houses in the environs were destroyed. "Gardens and olive grounds," says an eye-witness, "that in better times had been the recreation and support of their owners, were cheerfully rooted up by the proprietors themselves, wherever they impeded the defence of the city, or covered the approach of the enemy."

Women of all ranks assisted; they formed themselves into companies, some to relieve the wounded, some to carry water, wine, and provisions, to those who defended the gates. The Countess Burita instituted a corps for this service; she was young, delicate, and beautiful.

*Exertions  
of the  
women.**Countess  
Burita.*

In the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells, she was seen coolly attending to those occupations which were now become her duty; nor throughout the whole of a two months' siege did the imminent danger, to which she incessantly exposed herself, produce the slightest apparent effect upon her, or in the slightest degree bend her from her heroic purpose. Some of the monks bore arms; others exercised their spiritual offices to the dying: others, with the nuns, were busied in making cartridges which the children distributed.

Among threescore thousand persons there will always be found some wicked enough for any employment, and the art of corrupting has constituted great part of the French system of war. During the night of the 28th the powder magazine, in the area where the bull-fights were per-

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*June.*

*Augustina  
Zaragoza.*

formed, which was in the very heart of the city; was blown up, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and about 200 persons killed. This was the signal for the enemy to appear before three gates which had been sold to them. And while the inhabitants were digging out their fellow-citizens from the ruins, a fire was opened upon them with mortars, howitzers, and cannons, which had now been received for battering the town. Their attack seemed chiefly to be directed against the gate called Portillo, and a large square building near it, without the walls, and surrounded by a deep ditch; though called a castle, it served only for a prison. The sand-bag battery before this gate was frequently destroyed, and as often reconstructed under the fire of the enemy. The carnage here throughout the day was dreadful. Augustina Zaragoza, a handsome woman of the lower class, about twenty-two years of age, arrived at this battery with refreshments, at the time when not a man who defended it was left alive, so tremendous was the fire which the French kept up against it. For a moment the citizens hesitated to reman the guns. Augustina sprung forward over the dead and dying, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a six-and-twenty pounder; then, jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege. Such a sight could not but animate with fresh courage all who beheld it. The Zaragozans rushed into the battery, and

renewed their fire with greater vigour than ever, and the French were repulsed here, and at all other points, with great slaughter. On the morning of this day a fellow was detected going out of the city with letters to Murat. It was not till after these repeated proofs of treasonable practices, that the French residents in Zaragoza, with other suspected persons, were taken into custody.

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Lefebvre now supposing that his destructive bombardment must have dismayed the people, and convinced them how impossible it was for so defenceless a city to persist in withstanding him, again attempted to force his way into the town, thinking that, as soon as his troops could effect a lodgement within the gates, the Zaragozans would submit. On the 2d of July, a column of his army marched out of their battery, which was almost within musket-shot of the Portillo, and advanced towards it with fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. But when they reached the castle, such a discharge of grape and musketry was opened upon their flank, that, notwithstanding the most spirited exertions of their officers, the column immediately dispersed. The remainder of their force had been drawn up to support their attack, and follow them into the city; but it was impossible to bring them a second time to the charge. The general, however, ordered another column instantly to advance against the gate of the Carmen, on the left of the Portillo. This entrance was defended by a sand-bag battery, and by mus-

*The French again repulsed in an attempt to take the city by storm.*



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keteers, who lined the walls on each side, and commanded two out of three approaches to it; and here also the French suffered great loss, and were repulsed.

*They invest  
the city.*

The military men in Zaragoza considered these attacks as extremely injudicious. Lefebvre probably was so indignant at meeting with any opposition from a people whom he despised, and a place which, according to the rules and pedantry of war, was not tenable, that he lost his temper, and thought to subdue them the shortest way, by mere violence and superior force. Having found his mistake, he proceeded to invest the city still more closely. In the beginning of the siege, the besieged received some scanty succours; yet, however scanty, they were of importance. Four hundred soldiers from the regiment of Estremadura, small parties from other corps, and a few artillerymen got in. Two hundred of the militia of Logrono were added to these artillerymen, and soon learnt their new service, being in the presence of an enemy whom they had such righteous reason to abhor. Two four-and-twenty-pounders and a few shells, which were much wanted, were procured from Lerida. The enemy, meantime, were amply supplied with stores from the magazine in the citadel of Pamplona, which they had so perfidiously seized on their first entrance, as allies, into Spain. Hitherto they had remained on the right \* bank of the

\* In military language, you always describe the country by the current of water, and speak as if you were looking down the stream. It was requisite to ex-

plain this to the court upon Whitelocke's trial, and therefore the explanation cannot be thought unnecessary here.

Ebro. On the 11th of July they forced the passage of the ford, and posted troops enough on the opposite side to protect their workmen while forming a floating bridge. In spite of all the efforts of the Aragonese, this bridge was completed on the 14th; a way was thus made for their cavalry, to their superiority in which the French were mostly indebted for all their victories in Spain. This gave them the command of the surrounding country; they destroyed the mills, levied contributions on the villages, and cut off every communication by which the besieged had hitherto received supplies. These new difficulties called out new resources in this admirable people and their general, . . a man worthy of commanding such a people in such times. Corn mills, worked by horses, were erected in various parts of the city; the monks were employed in manufacturing gunpowder, materials for which were obtained by immediately collecting all the sulphur in the place, by washing the soil of the streets to extract its nitre, and making charcoal from the stalks of hemp, which in that part of Spain grows to a magnitude that would elsewhere be thought very unusual\*.

By the end of July the city was completely invested, the supply of food was scanty, and the inhabitants had no reason to expect succour.

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*They form  
a bridge  
over the  
Ebro.*

*Distress of  
the inhabit-  
ants.*

\* "On this simple foundation," says Mr. Vaughan, "a regular manufactory of gunpowder was formed after the siege, which produced 13 arrobas of Castille per day; that is, 325 lb. of 12 ounces."

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Their exertions had now been unremitted for forty-six days, and nothing but the sense of duty could have supported their bodily strength and their spirit under such trials. They were in hourly expectation of another general attack, or another bombardment. They had not a single place of security for the sick and the children, and the number of wounded was daily increased by repeated skirmishes, in which they engaged for the purpose of opening a communication with the country. At this juncture they made one desperate effort to recover the Torrero. It was in vain ; and convinced by repeated losses, and especially by this last repulse, that it was hopeless to make any effectual sally, they resolved to abide the issue of the contest within the walls, and conquer or perish there.

*Foundling  
Hospital  
burnt.*

On the night of the second of August, and on the following day, the French bombarded the city from their batteries opposite the gate of the Carmen. A foundling hospital, which was now filled with the sick and wounded, took fire, and was rapidly consumed. During this scene of horror, the most intrepid exertions were made to rescue these helpless sufferers from the flames. No person thought of his own property or individual concerns, . . every one hastened thither. The women were eminently conspicuous in their exertions, regardless of the shot and shells which fell about them, and braving the flames of the building. It has often been remarked, that the wickedness of women

exceeds that of the other sex ; . . for the same reason, when circumstances, forcing them out of the sphere of their ordinary nature, compel them to exercise manly virtues, they display them in the highest degree, and, when they are once awakened to a sense of patriotism, they carry the principle to its most heroic pitch. The loss of women and boys, during this siege, was very great, fully proportionate to that of men ; they were always the most forward, and the difficulty was to teach them a prudent and proper sense of their danger.

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On the following day, the French completed their batteries upon the right bank of the Guerva, within pistol-shot of the gate of St. Engracia, so called from a splendid church and convent of Jeronimites, situated on one side of it. This convent was, on many accounts, a remarkable place. Men of letters beheld it with reverence, because the excellent historian Zurita spent the last years of his life there, observing the rules of the community, though he had not entered into the order ; and because he was buried there, and his countryman and fellow-labourer, Geronymo de Blancas, after him. Devotees revered it, even in the neighbourhood of our Lady of the Pillar, for its relics and the saint to whom it was dedicated. According to the legend, she was the daughter of Ont Comerus, a barbarian chief, in the pay of the Romans, by whom the city of Norba Cæsarea, (situated near the Tagus, between the present towns of Portalegrè and Al-

Convent  
of St. En-  
gracia.  
August 3.

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cantara) was given him, together with its district, for his service in recovering it from Cathelius, a chief of the Alemanni. His daughter, Encratis, or Encratide, (for from one of these names Engracia has been formed) was brought up a Christian, and espoused to a governor on the Gallic side of the Pyrenees, to whom she was sent with a suitable escort. Their way lay through Cæsarea-Augusta, where the Præses, or Governor of Spain, Publius Dacianus, the bloodiest minister of the tenth persecution, was at that time endeavouring to extirpate Christianity. Engracia, either preferring martyrdom to her unknown spouse, or imagining that her rank would be her safeguard, visited the governor for the purpose of interceding in behalf of the Christians, and remonstrating against his cruelty. Thus much of the legend is probably fabulous; but certain it is, that a virgin of that name was tortured under that persecution; and, though she survived, was venerated as a \* martyr

- *Martyrum nulli, remanente vitâ,  
Contigit terris habitare nostris;  
Sola tu morti propriæ superstes,  
          Vivis in orbe,  
Vivis ac pœnæ seriem retexis,  
Carnis et cæsæ spoliū retentans,  
Tetra quam sulcos habeant amaros,  
          Vulnera narras.*

Prudentius Περὶ Στεφάνων. Hym. 4.

The poet goes on describing her torments with his usual love of live-anatomy... I know not whether it be possible that any person should have survived them; but that some may be found wicked enough to inflict equal tortures under the pretext, and others conscientious enough to endure them for the sake of religion, has been too often proved, and in few places more frequently than in Zaragoza itself, from which city many an

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in that city, before the close of the century in which she suffered. Just, however, as her claim is to pious remembrance, her church, and the divine honours which have been paid to her, were procured by fraud. Angels are said to have descended at her death, and to have officiated at her funeral, bearing tapers and thuribules, and singing hymns of triumph. During the Moorish captivity, her relics disappeared; they were discovered towards the close of the fourteenth century, which was the great age for inventions of this kind. There stood at that time, upon the site of this memorable convent, an old church, dedicated to the Zaragozaan martyrs, of the tenth persecution, and called the *Iglesia de las Masas*, in memory of an early specimen of Catholic ingenuity: Dacianus, holding relic-worship in as much contempt as the Christians did his idolatry, in order to prevent them from indulging in it, burnt the bodies of the martyrs, together with those of some malefactors, thinking that their ashes would be undistinguishable; nevertheless, the Christians found their own, which had collected together in white balls or masses, separate from the rest. In 1389, the regular canons, to whom the church belonged, resolved to rebuild a part of it: in digging the foundation, two

inquisitor has gone to keep com- the heart and the liver, in company with Dacianus. St. En- sequence of the circumstances of gracia is invoked in diseases of her martyrdom.

Vidimus partem jecoris revulsam,  
Ungulis longe jacuisse pressis;  
Mors habet pallens aliquid tuorum,  
Te quoque vivâ.

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marble chests were discovered. The lid of the smaller was fastened down very firmly with a sort of pitch; when this was taken off, two sets of human bones were found in different compartments; over the one were the words *Lupercii Martyris*, sculptured in the marble; over the other, *Engratiæ Virginis*: these latter were of rose-colour, which was admitted as proof of their authenticity. The larger chest contained a great assortment of anonymous bones, ashes, and the white masses, which had disappeared for so many centuries. The mine was very rich; the workmen went on till they had invented thirteen chests, and at last, a whole pit full of relics, not the less efficacious because it could not be ascertained to whom they had belonged. Seventy years afterwards, Juan II. of Aragon, one of the wickedest and most perfidious of men, fancied or feigned, that by St. Engracia's intercession, he was cured of a complaint in his eyes; in consequence of which, he resolved to enlarge this church, and build a monastery adjoining it for the Jeronimites, . . an order which, during that and the succeeding age, was in great favour at the three courts of the Peninsula. He began his work, but died without completing it, leaving that charge by will to his son, Ferdinand, the Catholic king. He continued the building, but it was not finished till the reign of Charles the Fifth.

Both the church and convent were splendidly adorned, but the most remarkable part of the

whole edifice was a subterranean church, formed in the place where the relics were discovered, and having the pit, or well, as it was called, in the middle. It was divided by a beautiful iron grating, which excluded laymen from the interior of the sanctuary. There were three descents; the widest flight of steps was that which was for public use, the two others were for the religioners, and met in one behind the three chief altars, within the grating. Over the midst of these altars were two tombs, placed one upon the other in a niche; the under one containing the relics of Engracia's companions and fellows in martyrdom; the upper, those of the saint herself, her head excepted, which was kept in a silver shrine, having a collar of precious stones, and enclosed in crystal. The altars on either side had their respective relics; and several others, equally rich in such treasures, were ranged along the walls, without the grating. The roof was of an azure colour, studded with stars to represent the sky. The breadth of the vault considerably exceeded its length; it was sixty feet wide, and only forty long. Thirty little columns, of different marbles, supported the roof. On the stone brink of the well, the history of the Zaragozan martyrs was represented in bas-relief; and an iron grating, reaching to the roof, secured it from being profaned by idle curiosity, and from the pious larcenies which it might otherwise have tempted. Within this cage-work, a silver lamp was suspended. Thirty such lamps were burning

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there day and night; and, though the roof was little more than twelve feet high, it was never in the slightest degree sullied with smoke. The fact is certain \*; but the useful and important secret, by which oil was made to burn without producing smoke, was carefully concealed; and the Jeronimites continued till this time to exhibit a miracle, which puzzled all who did not believe it to be miraculous.

*The hospital set on fire.*

On the 4th of August, the French opened batteries within pistol-shot of this church and convent. The mud walls were levelled at the first discharge; and the besiegers rushing through the opening, took the batteries before the adjacent gates in reverse. Here General Mori, who had distinguished himself on many former occasions, was made prisoner. The street of St. Engracia, which they had thus entered, leads into the Cozo, and the corner buildings where it thus terminated, were on the one hand the convent of St. Francisco, and on the other the

\* The Bollandists relate this miracle with a candid admission of doubt, because the writer, in whom they found it related, spoke upon the testimony of others, instead of boldly asserting it on his own authority. There are, however, testimonies in abundance, and that of M. Bourgoing will be admitted to be decisive. "The roof," he says, "though very low, is certainly not smoked. They invite those who are doubtful of it, to put a piece of white paper over one of these lamps. I tried this

experiment, and I must confess, I saw, or thought I saw, that my paper was not blackened. I had still my doubts, but I took care to conceal them from my bigoted conductors. I was, however, tempted to say to them, God has not thought proper to work any striking miracle to accelerate the end of the French revolution, or to calm the passions which it has roused; and do you think that he would condescend to perform here a miracle as obscure as your cavern, and as useless as your own existence?"

General Hospital. Both were stormed and set on fire; the sick and the wounded threw themselves from the windows to escape the flames, and the horror of the scene was aggravated by the maniacs, whose voices raving or singing in paroxysms of wilder madness, or crying in vain to be set free, were heard amid the confusion of dreadful sounds. Many fell victims to the fire, and some to the indiscriminating fury of the assailants. Those who escaped were conducted as prisoners to the Torrero; but when their condition had been discovered, they were sent back on the morrow, to take their chance in the siege. After a severe contest and dreadful carnage, the French forced their way into the Cozo, in the very centre of the city, and, before the day closed, were in possession of one half of Zaragoza. Lefebvre now believed that he had effected his purpose, and required Palafox to surrender, in a note containing only these words: "Head-quarters, St. Engracia. Capitulation\*!" The heroic Spaniard immediately returned this reply: "Head-quarters, Zaragoza. War at the knife's point†!"

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The contest which was now carried on is un-  
 exemplified in history. One side of the Cozo, a  
 street about as wide as Pall-mall, was possessed  
 by the French; and, in the centre of it, their  
 general, Verdier, gave his orders from the Fran-  
 ciscan convent. The opposite side was main-

*War in the  
streets.*

\* Quartel-general, Santa En-  
gracia. *La capitulation.*

† Quartel-general, Zaragoza.  
*Guerra al cuchillo.*

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August 5.

*The city re-  
ceives a re-  
inforce-  
ment.*

*P. Santiago  
Sass.*

tained by the Aragonese, who threw up batteries at the openings of the cross streets, within a few paces of those which the French erected against them. The intervening space was presently heaped with dead, either slain upon the spot, or thrown out from the windows. Next day the ammunition of the citizens began to fail; . . the French were expected every moment to renew their efforts for completing the conquest, and even this circumstance occasioned no dismay, nor did any one think of capitulation. One cry was heard from the people, wherever Palafox rode among them, that, if powder failed, they were ready to attack the enemy with their knives, . . formidable weapons in the hands of desperate men. Just before the day closed, Don Francisco Palafox, the general's brother, entered the city with a convoy of arms, and ammunition, and a reinforcement of three thousand men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers of Aragon, . . a succour as little expected by the Zaragozans, as it had been provided against by the enemy.

The war was now continued from street to street, from house to house, and from room to room; pride and indignation having wrought up the French to a pitch of obstinate fury, little inferior to the devoted courage of the patriots. During the whole siege, no man distinguished himself more remarkably than the curate of one of the parishes, within the walls, by name P. Santiago Sass. He was always to be seen in the

streets, sometimes fighting with the most determined bravery against the enemies, not of his country alone, but of freedom, and of all virtuous principles, wherever they were to be found; at other times, administering the sacrament to the dying, and confirming, with the authority of faith, that hope, which gives to death, under such circumstances, the joy, the exultation, the triumph, and the spirit of martyrdom. Palafox reposed the utmost confidence in this brave priest, and selected him whenever any thing peculiarly difficult or hazardous was to be done. At the head of forty chosen men, he succeeded in introducing a supply of powder into the town, so essentially necessary for its defence.

This most obstinate and murderous contest was continued for eleven successive days and nights, more indeed by night than by day; for it was almost certain death to appear by daylight within reach of those houses which were occupied by the other party. But under cover of the darkness, the combatants frequently dashed across the street to attack each other's batteries; and the battles which began there, were often carried on into the houses beyond, where they fought from room to room, and floor to floor. The hostile batteries were so near each other, that a Spaniard in one place made way under cover of the dead bodies, which completely filled the space between them, and fastened a rope to one of the French cannons; in the struggle which ensued, the rope broke, and the Zara-

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*Number of  
the dead.*

gozans lost their prize at the very moment when they thought themselves sure of it\*.

A new horror was added to the dreadful circumstances of war in this ever memorable siege.

In general engagements the dead are left upon the field of battle, and the survivors remove to clear ground and an untainted atmosphere; but here..in Spain, and in the month of August, there where the dead lay the struggle was still carried on, and pestilence was dreaded from the enormous accumulation of putrifying bodies. Nothing in the whole course of the siege so much embarrassed Palafox as this evil. The only remedy was to tie ropes to the French prisoners, and push them forward amid the dead and dying, to remove the bodies, and bring them away for interment. Even for this necessary office there was no truce, and it would have been certain death to the Aragonese who should have attempted to perform it; but the prisoners were

\* It is asserted by the French, in their official account, that, after many days fighting, they won possession of many cloisters which had been fortified, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all the magazines; and that the peaceable inhabitants, encouraged by these advantages, hoisted a white flag, and came forward to offer terms of capitulation; but that they were murdered by the insurgents; for this is the name which the French, and the tyrant whom they served, applied to a people fighting in defence of their country, and of whatever could be dear to them.

Unquestionably, if any traitors had thus ventured to show themselves in the heat of the contest, they would have been put to death as certainly as they would have deserved it; and, if the thing had occurred, it would be one fact more to be recorded in honour of the Zaragozans; but there is no other authority for it than the French official account, in which account the result of the siege is totally suppressed. The circumstance, had it really taken place, would not have been omitted in Mr. Vaughan's Narrative, and in the accounts published by the Spaniards.

in general secured by the pity of their own soldiers, and in this manner the evil was, in some degree, diminished.

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*August.*

*Retreat of  
the enemy.*

A council of war was held by the Spaniards on the 8th, not for the purpose which is too usual in such councils, but that their heroic resolution might be communicated with authority to the people. It was, that in those quarters of the city where the Aragonese still maintained their ground, they should continue to defend themselves with the same firmness: should the enemy at last prevail, they were then to retire over the Ebro into the suburbs, break down the bridge, and defend the suburbs till they perished. When this resolution was made public, it was received with the loudest acclamations. But in every conflict the citizens now gained ground upon the soldiers, winning it inch by inch, till the space occupied by the enemy, which on the day of their entrance was nearly half the city, was gradually reduced to about an eighth part. Meantime, intelligence of the events in other parts of Spain was received by the French, . . . all tending to dishearten them; the surrender of Dupont, the failure of Moncey before Valencia, and the news that the Junta of that province had dispatched six thousand men to join the levies in Aragon, which were destined to relieve Zaragoza. During the night of the 13th, their fire was particularly fierce and destructive; after their batteries had ceased, flames burst out in many parts of the buildings which they had won;

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their last act was to blow up the church of St. Engracia ; the powder was placed in the subterranean church, ..and this remarkable place, .. this monument of fraud and of credulity, .. the splendid theatre wherein so many feelings of deep devotion had been excited, .. which so many thousands had visited in faith, and from which unquestionably many had departed with their imaginations elevated, their principles ennobled, and their hearts strengthened, was laid in ruins. In the morning the French columns, to the great surprise of the Spaniards, were seen at a distance, retreating over the plain, on the road to Pamplona.

The history of a battle, however skilfully narrated, is necessarily uninteresting to all except military men ; but in the detail of a siege, when time has destroyed those considerations, which prejudice or pervert our natural sense of right and wrong, every reader sympathizes with the besieged, and nothing, even in fictitious narratives, excites so deep and animating an interest. There is not, either in the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing more than a short respite from their fate ? Woe be to the slavish heart that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it utterance ! They

purchased for themselves an everlasting remembrance upon earth, . . . a place in the memory and love of all good men in all ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty ; they redeemed their souls from the yoke ; they left an example to their country, never to be forgotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to and hasten its deliverance.

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One of the first cares of Palafox, after the delivery of the city, was, to establish a board of health to provide against the effects of putrefaction, . . . such was the number of French who were left dead in the houses and in the streets. Pamplona, whither the wreck of their army retreated, was for many days filled with carts full and horse-loads of wounded, who arrived faster and in greater number than they could be lodged in the hospitals and convents. It was equally shocking to humanity to behold their sufferings, and the cruel regardlessness of their comrades, who, while these wretches were fainting for want of assistance and of food, and literally dying in the streets, were exposing their booty to sale, and courting purchasers for church plate, watches, jewels, linen, and apparel, the plunder which they had collected in Navarre and Aragon ; and which, in their eagerness to convert into money, they were offering at a small part of their value. There were, however, scarcely any purchasers except for the church-plate, which was bought for the purpose of restoring it, at the same cost, to the churches and monasteries from whence it had been stolen.



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The temper of the Zaragozans after their victory was not less heroic than their conduct during the struggle. It might have been expected that some degree of exhaustion would have succeeded the state of excitement to which they had been wrought; and that the widowed, the childless, and they who were left destitute, would now have lamented what they had lost, or, at least, that they themselves had not perished also. This, however, was not so. Mr. Vaughan visited Zaragoza a little while after the siege, and remained there during several weeks: he saw (they are his own impressive words) “many a parent who had lost his children, and many a man reduced from competence to poverty, but he literally did not meet with one human being who uttered the slightest complaint: every feeling seemed to be swallowed up in the memory of what they had recently done, and in a just hatred of the French.” These are the effects of patriotism, aided and strengthened by religion: its influence, thus elevated and confirmed, made women and boys efficient in the time of action, and the streets of a city not less formidable to an invader than the best constructed works of defence. Let not the faith which animated the Aragonese be called superstition, because our Lady of the Pillar, Santiago, and St. Engracia, were its symbols. It was virtually and essentially religion in its inward life and spirit; it was the sense of what they owed equally to their forefathers and their children; the knowledge that their cause was as righteous as any for which an injured and in-

sulted people ever rose in arms; the hope that by the blessing of God upon that cause they might succeed; the certain faith that if they fell, it was with the feeling, the motive, and the merit of martyrdom. Life or death therefore became to the Zaragozans only not indifferent, because life was useful to the cause for which they held it in trust, and were ready to lay it down: they who fell expired in triumph, and the survivors rather envied than regretted them. The living had no fears for themselves, and for the same reason they could have no sorrows for the dead. The whole greatness of our nature was called forth, . . . a power which had lain dormant, and of which the possessors themselves had not suspected the existence, till it manifested itself in the hour of trial.

When the dead were removed, and the ruins sufficiently cleared, Ferdinand was proclaimed with all the usual solemnities; a ceremony, at other times attended with no other feeling than such as sports and festivity occasion, now made affecting by the situation of Ferdinand himself, and the scene which surrounded the spectators; walls blackened with fire, shattered with artillery, and stained with blood. The obsequies of the Spaniards who had fallen were next performed with military honours, and their funeral oration pronounced from the pulpit. The brave priest Santiago Sass was made chaplain to the commander in chief, and Palafox gave him a captain's commission.

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*August.*

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*Sept. 20.*

These were times when the religion of Mattathias and the Maccabees was required; and the priest of the altar was in the exercise of his duty, when defending it, sword in hand, in the field. A pension was settled upon Augustina, and the daily pay of an artilleryman. She was also to wear a small shield of honour embroidered upon the sleeve of her gown, with Zaragoza inscribed upon it. Tio Jorge was killed during the siege. Other persons, who had distinguished themselves, were rewarded; and the general reward which Palafox conferred upon the Zaragozan people, is strongly characteristic of Spanish feeling. By his own authority, and in the name of Ferdinand, he conferred upon all the inhabitants of the city and its districts, of both sexes and of all ranks, the perpetual and irrevocable privilege of never being adjudged to any disgraceful punishment by any tribunal for any offence, except for treason or blasphemy.

## CHAPTER X.

## INSURRECTION IN PORTUGAL.

WHILE these events were passing in Spain, Portugal also was convulsed by this political earthquake. The first insurrection in Madrid had been no sooner known at Badajoz, than an anonymous proclamation from that city was circulated on the Portuguese border; and a lieutenant of the Walloon Guards, by name Moretti, was sent to consult at Lisbon with General Carraffa upon the means of withdrawing the Spanish troops. Carraffa thought it too hazardous to declare himself at that time; but though in other respect acting altogether in subservience to Junot, he did not make him acquainted with the transaction, and Moretti returned in safety.

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*An agent sent from Badajoz to the Spaniards at Lisbon.*

*Neves, t. iii. 7.*

Junot was now disturbed from his dreams of royalty; yet his head lay as uneasily as if it had worn a crown. Like the other French commanders, when the insurrectionary movement became general throughout Spain, he thought it impossible that any continued or formidable resistance could be opposed to the power of France: but his own situation was exposed to peculiar danger; he was farther removed from assistance than any of the other commanders in the Peninsula; there was an English squadron

*Difficulties of Junot's situation.*

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1808.  
May.

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*Neves*, iii.  
66.

in sight, watching the course of events, and in defiance of all his vigilance, well informed of whatever was going on ; and it was not to be doubted, that if a favourable opportunity offered, Great Britain would make an effort for the deliverance of Portugal. Pursuant to his instructions from Madrid, he had sent into Galicia the remains of Taranco's division, so that Carraffa's was now the only one which remained ; some 4000 of these were at Porto, the rest were in detachments at Lisbon, Mafra, Santarem, and on the other side the Tagus at Setubal, Cezimbra, and other places. In the hope of exciting a national feeling against them, and thereby counteracting that sympathy which their common language, manners, and religion, and now a sense of their common interest, were producing between them and the Portuguese, rumours were spread, that by an arrangement made with Buonaparte, Portugal was to be governed by Spain till its fate should be determined at a general peace. But this artifice failed. The Spaniards were not to be deceived ; from the time when they knew that Ferdinand had been inveigled to Bayonne, there was an end of all good understanding between them and the French ; and they were so ready to engage in personal quarrels, from the national indignation which possessed them, that it was found necessary to confine them to their quarters at an early hour in the evening. Care was taken to divide them into small detachments, and station every where with them a

superior number of French. Many deserted, especially of those who were quartered beyond the Tagus. Some made their way to the Spanish frontiers in strong parties. The regiment of Murcia marched for Spain in a body, in defiance of its colonel; a detachment of 600 French was sent from Lisbon to intercept them; they met at Os Pegoens; this was a case in which individual strength and determination were of more avail than military discipline; the Spaniards were victorious, and proceeded on their way, receiving the utmost kindness from the people, and nearly two hundred wounded French were landed at Lisbon.

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May.

*Neves, iii.  
67.  
Observador  
Portuguez,  
287.*

Badajoz was the point to which the Spaniards repaired from Alem-Tejo and the south of Portugal, and the numbers who were collected there made such an addition to the strength of the garrison, that General Kellermann, who was then at Elvas, felt himself ill at ease in the neighbourhood. That general had taken the command in Alem-Tejo upon Solano's departure, and so different was the spirit of his administration, that one of his first measures was by his own authority to impose an extraordinary contribution upon the exhausted province. Evora was to pay 10,000 *cruzados novos*, Elvas and Portalegre 8000 each, Villa Viçosa 6000, and other places in proportion. The sum was exacted within six hours after the demand: but it was restored without delay, in consequence of peremptory orders from Junot, when complaint was made to him of this

*Kellermann  
takes the  
command  
in Alem-  
Tejo.*

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
p. 277.*

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May.

May 22.

*He attempts  
to conciliate  
the Spaniards at  
Badajoz.*

June 1.

unauthorized exaction. He was displeased with Kellermann for presuming to levy money at his own pleasure, and this was no time for exasperating the people by farther acts of oppression. Already they were in so perturbed a state, that it was deemed expedient to order all absent bishops and beneficed priests to return to their dioceses and cures, and there exert themselves in preserving order, and exhorting the people to submission. Buonaparte had reckoned upon the good services of the clergy; experience, he said, had shown him that countries where there were many friars were easily conquered; . . he was undeceived of both errors in the Peninsula.

In the hope of reviving old animosities, and exciting the Portugeze to act against the Spaniards, Kellermann called out the *Ordenanças*, and required the people of Elvas to take arms for the defence of their city, which, he said, the Spaniards, eternal enemies to the name and independence of Portugal, were preparing to attack from Badajoz. At the same time he sent a letter to the Spaniards of that place, exhorting them to return to their duty, and promising intercession, and pardon and protection. No answer was returned; he then put forth an argumentative address to the Commandant and the Representatives of Extremadura, asking them what end they could propose to themselves from the revolt in which they had blindly engaged? The House of Bourbon had renounced all its rights to Spain; Ferdinand was in France, and the right of ap-

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*June.*

pointing a king for the Spaniards had been transferred to the Emperor. Did they wish to draw upon themselves the evils by which France had been ravaged during so many years? If that country had come with glory out of a struggle which would for ever be celebrated, it was owing to her internal strength, her valour, and above all the talents of that extraordinary man whom Heaven had sent to reign over her, for her happiness, and for the happiness of the Spaniards also, if they chose it. Could they expect a like issue? Would valour alone suffice to effect it? What was their position? Half Spain had declared for the new order of things. Their own countrymen would take the field against them. The French armies were in the midst of the land, under the greatest generals, without enemies, and abundantly supplied with all the means of war. On their part they had only some soldiers who had murdered their chiefs; a populace vain of their own strength, because they had met with no resistance; and a few miserable English, the eternal artists of discord, active in stirring up enemies to the French, and always ready, like cowards, to abandon the victims of their infernal policy. Nor was there any thing in the change which had taken place to provoke their opposition. At the commencement of the preceding century Spain had called Philip V. to the throne, for the purpose of establishing an invariable union with France. The establishment upon that throne of a prince of the new French dynasty was no-



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June.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
288.

thing more than a consequence of the system which Spain had then adopted, and which was now confirmed. There was yet time to choose. The sword was not yet drawn, the door was still open for reconciliation, . . and he requested that they would not close the gate of their city against his communications. To this also no answer was vouchsafed. He made a third effort, telling them that he would suspend hostilities till they should be better informed, and desiring the Junta to meet him at the Caya, the little stream which there divides the kingdoms. No persons were there to meet him ; and he then began to store the forts of Elvas, and to devise plans for attacking Badajoz, expecting, no doubt, that some of the troops in Spain would be ordered upon that service. Believing too that fêtes and rejoicings would have as much effect in Portugal as in France, he appointed a day of public thanksgiving for the benefits which Napoleon had promised to confer upon the Portugeze. They were not a people to be thus deceived. Their hearts were with the Spaniards, and so many repaired to Badajoz, where D. Joseph Galluzo, with great activity, was forming a camp, that they were incorporated in a legion of foreign volunteers, the command of which was given to Moretti. Many artillerymen escaped thither from Elvas ; some hundred of the Portugeze troops whom the French had ordered away for foreign consumption, had been collected there ; promotion was offered to all officers of that nation

*Neves, iii.*  
75.

who should join them, and Kellermann's vigilance could not prevent the emigration which took place in consequence.

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June.

A considerable garrison was required in Elvas, as being the strongest fortress in the kingdom, and now of more importance because of the hostile attitude which the Spaniards at Badajoz had assumed. Strong garrisons were placed at Peniche and Setubal, for fear of the English.

*Distribution of the French troops in Portugal.*

Almeida also had been occupied by the French.

*Neves, iii. 77.*

Except the troops in that place there were no other French in the whole north of Portugal than the small parties stationed upon the military road, a weak detachment at Figueira, and some fifty men at Coimbra. The great body of the French was collected at Lisbon, and in the adjacent country, where, in case of sudden danger, they might be brought to act promptly and with effect.

Porto was in possession of the Spaniards, who had occupied it by virtue of the secret treaty of Fontainebleau. General Bellesta, however, upon whom the command had devolved, had been placed under the orders of the French General Quesnel, when the abortive kingdom of Northern Lusitania was no longer held out as a lure to the court of Spain. Quesnel had with him about seventy dragoons, and a few other French, holding military or civil situations. When news arrived of the movements in Galicia, Bellesta, obeying without hesitation the voice of his country, arrested the French and their general, and convoking the military, judicial, and civil autho-

*The Spaniards at Porto declare against the Intruder, and march into Spain.*

*June 6.*

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X.

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*June.*

re-established, he had not; he and his officers had proclaimed their beloved Sovereign, he had invited the English commander, in the Prince's name, to assist him; and if any person disputed the propriety of what he had done, he would make that person know what the power of the royal name was, and that that port was open for the English. Raymundo's means, however, were not commensurate with his will; the people of Porto were disheartened by the departure of the Spaniards, and the city remained to all appearance in perfect submission to the French government, while the Portuguese flag was flying at S. Joam da Foz. A lieutenant-colonel, by name Manoel Ribeiro de Araujo, now presented himself in that fortress with an order from Oliveira to take the command. Raymundo told him, that if it were taken for the service of the Prince, he was ready to resign it into his hands; but if it were his intention to follow the French part, he might return to the place from whence he came, for within those walls no other name should be acknowledged than that of the lawful sovereign, and not a shot should be fired from them against the English. Araujo returned in the evening with fair words, and invited Raymundo to the governor's house, there to confer with him upon the best mode of proceeding in the present critical circumstances. The treacherous invitation was accepted, and he had no sooner set foot within Oliveira's apartment than he was arrested as a disturber of the people. The next step would

the anniversary of that day by a festival to her honour. At daybreak the Quinas were once more seen flying upon the fortress, a royal salute was fired, and returned from the castles of Queijo and Matozinhos, the bells were rung, rockets were discharged, and the people gave themselves up to joy. The Spaniards without delay marched for Coruña, taking with them their prisoners. An English brig of war, which was cruising off the river, hearing an unusual stir in the city, drew near in hopes of ascertaining the cause; Raymundo went on board, he was received with due honours, and an officer returned to shore with him, and was sent to Luiz de Oliveira da Costa, who commanded at Porto during the absence of General Bernardim Freire de Andrada.

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X.1808.  
June.*Neves, iii.*  
85—91.

Luiz de Oliveira had been present at the meeting which Bellesta convened, and assented to the resolution which had there been taken. Whether his heart was with his voice on that occasion, or whether he had submitted to the prevailing opinion only while it was dangerous to oppose it, the fear of the French returned upon him, now that the Spaniards had left Porto to its own means of defence; and instead of receiving the English officer with open arms, he wrote to Raymundo, calling him to account for having opened a communication with the English brig, and saying that he knew nothing of the business. Raymundo replied with great spirit, that if the governor had forgotten what passed when the government of the Prince Regent was

*The governor adheres to the French, and suppresses the insurrection.*

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*June.*

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re-established, he had not; he and his officers had proclaimed their beloved Sovereign, he had invited the English commander, in the Prince's name, to assist him; and if any person disputed the propriety of what he had done, he would make that person know what the power of the royal name was, and that that port was open for the English. Raymundo's means, however, were not commensurate with his will; the people of Porto were disheartened by the departure of the Spaniards, and the city remained to all appearance in perfect submission to the French government, while the Portuguese flag was flying at S. Joam da Foz. A lieutenant-colonel, by name Manoel Ribeiro de Araujo, now presented himself in that fortress with an order from Oliveira to take the command. Raymundo told him, that if it were taken for the service of the Prince, he was ready to resign it into his hands; but if it were his intention to follow the French part, he might return to the place from whence he came, for within those walls no other name should be acknowledged than that of the lawful sovereign, and not a shot should be fired from them against the English. Araujo returned in the evening with fair words, and invited Raymundo to the governor's house, there to confer with him upon the best mode of proceeding in the present critical circumstances. The treacherous invitation was accepted, and he had no sooner set foot within Oliveira's apartment than he was arrested as a disturber of the people. The next step would

have been to deliver him up to the French, and to certain death; but though he had with strange want of circumspection walked into the snare, neither his courage nor his presence of mind forsook him. Oliveira, with Araujo and another officer, went out into the varanda to give directions concerning him; Raymundo, who was left alone in the apartment, quietly locked the varanda door, and lost no time in gaining a place of concealment.

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X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
91—97.

Bellesta had left a letter for Junot, which the Chamber of Porto, as soon as his departure left them to the sense of their own weakness, dispatched to Lisbon, with assurance of their continued submission to the French. The news reached him at the close of an entertainment given by the French officers at the theatre, where, though the Russian admiral and his officers were present, the portrait of Buonaparte was displayed, with the Russian flag lying among other trophies at his feet. A sense of insecurity was manifested amid their festivities; the avenues to the theatre were occupied by armed troops, fire engines were made ready, and all the watermen were ordered to be at hand with their barrels full. The entertainment continued till four in the morning, and immediately afterward movements were observed which indicated that some important intelligence had arrived; couriers were sent off, troops crossed the Tagus, and detachments marched to Mafra, Santarem, and other places. A body of Spaniards who were stationed in the Campo de

*Junot dis-  
arms and  
seizes the  
Spaniards  
at Lisbon.*

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
292.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
295.*

Ourique were ordered to the Convent of S. Francisco da Cidade, an unfinished pile of enormous magnitude, which the French occupied as barracks, and where a thousand men were waiting to disarm them as soon as they should enter. The Spaniards, when they drew nigh, suspected some ill design, and fixing their bayonets, declared they would not be quartered there. They were allowed to return without interruption; and in the evening they and their countrymen at Val de Pereiro, being in all 1200, were ordered to assemble at two in the morning, in the Terreiro do Paço, there to embark and cross the river on their way to Spain. Thither they repaired joyfully, and found 3000 troops awaiting them, with cannon placed under the arcades of that great square, and at the mouths of the streets which open into it; and they were summoned to lay down their arms and baggage, and surrender. In the course of that and the succeeding day, the Spaniards from Mafra and other parts were brought in as prisoners, in a condition which excited the compassion of the people, their women exhausted with the fatigue of marching in the burning heat of summer, some carrying children at the breast, and some, who were unable to walk, tied upon the baggage carts, lest they should be thrown off. The whole number of Spaniards thus arrested was somewhat above 4500; they were confined in hulks upon the Tagus. The officers were left at liberty upon their parole; but after a few days, when several

had broken an engagement, which, considering the manner in which they had been seized, they did not think themselves bound in honour to observe, they were placed under the same confinement as the men. Junot then informed his army, in public orders, that the infamous conduct of the Spanish General Bellesta, the revolt of two regiments, the arrest of some of his officers at Badajoz and at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the inability of the Spanish commanders to control their men, had compelled him to this severe measure. Happily it had been executed without shedding blood. These Spaniards were not enemies; they should receive pay and provisions as heretofore, and their actual situation in no degree altered his good disposition toward them. He expressed his satisfaction at the conduct of his soldiers; and said, that if the English thought proper to make an attack, they were now fully at leisure to receive them.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Neves, iii.*  
99—109.  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
300.

He addressed a proclamation also to the Portuguese, wherein with incautious effrontery he avowed the double treachery which had been practised upon them and upon the Spaniards. After six months of tranquillity, he said, the peace of the kingdom had been in danger of being disturbed by the Spanish troops, who entered the country apparently as allies, but in reality with the intention of dismembering it. No sooner had he in the Emperor's name taken possession of the whole government, than they had begun to show their dissent: and at length

*Junot's pro-*  
*clamation*  
*to the Por-*  
*tuguese.**June 11.*



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
297.*

June 14.

their conduct at Porto, and in other places, had compelled him to disarm all who were within his reach. “Portugueze,” he continued, “I have hitherto been satisfied with your good disposition. You have known how to appreciate the advantages which must result to you from the protection of Napoleon the Great. You have had confidence in me. Continue it, and I will guarantee your country from all invasion, from all dismemberment. If the English, who know not how to do any thing except fomenting discord, choose to seek us, they will find us ready to defend you. Some of your militia and your remaining troops shall make part of my army to cover your frontiers; they will be instructed in the art of war, and if I may be fortunate enough to put in practice the lessons which I learnt from Napoleon, I will teach you how to conquer.” Junot seems at this time to have aimed at conciliating the Portugueze soldiers, and making them act with his army. For this purpose he announced certain new regulations by which they were placed upon the same footing with the French as to their pay and provisions. Hitherto four-fifths of their pay had been in paper money, which was at a great discount; the proportion was now reduced to two-thirds. A promise was made that the first item in the monthly military expenses should be for the allowance of the Portugueze prisoners in Algiers. The manner in which it was notified that the troops were to be under French command, was not in the imperious tone

which the Duke of Abrantes, as he styled himself, heretofore had used; they were to form part of the divisions, it was said, within whose districts they were stationed; consequently the French commanders were to include them in their reports, and inspect and review them, to see that they received what was their due, and to perfect and accelerate their instruction. The artillery, cavalry, engineers, and marine, were to be immediately under the orders of the respective French generals, who by this means would know their force, watch over their instruction, and see to their welfare: the intention of his majesty being, that the Portuguese troops should be treated in the same manner as his own in all respects.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
303.

But it was too late for conciliation and flattery, after so many acts of insolent oppression: and an accident at this time occurred to manifest with what suspicious apprehensions the French and the inhabitants of Lisbon mutually regarded each other. The day arrived for the annual procession of the Corpo de Deos. In the days of Joam V. this had been the most splendid display which the Catholic religion exhibited in Europe; and though in latter years the management had been less perfect, and there had been some diminution of its splendour, it was still a spectacle of unrivalled magnificence and riches. The streets of the capital on that occasion, and that only, were cleaned and strewn with fine gravel; the houses were hung with damask; the troops

*Festival of  
the Corpo  
de Deos at  
Lisbon.*

June 16.

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X.

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1808.  
*June.*

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in their new uniforms, the various companies and brotherhoods, civil and religious, each with their banners, the knights of the military orders, and all the monks and friars of Lisbon, moved in the procession; which was closed by the dignitaries of the patriarchal church, the Prince in person, and the chief persons of his court, following the great object of Catholic adoration, which on that day, and that day only, was actually carried abroad. The most remarkable object in this pompous display used to be an image of St. George in complete armour, upon a beautiful horse, led by a squire and supported by pages on each side, and accompanied by the finest horses from the royal stables, with rich housings, and escutcheons thrown across their saddles. These horses and the saint had formed part of the procession from the year 1387, with one interruption only, early in the seventeenth century, when, at the instigation of a certain Mordomo, the Archbishop of Lisbon excluded the horses, as thinking it irreverent that the Real Presence should be preceded by unreasonable creatures. St. George's charger alone was excepted from the prohibition; but in the midst of the procession that charger suddenly stopped, and could neither be induced nor compelled to proceed; it was not doubted that the rider had chosen this means to manifest his displeasure at the privation of his accustomed train; the Archbishop revoked his order upon the spot, and when the horses were introduced as usual, St. George consented to

move forward, and the ceremony of the day was concluded with more than wonted satisfaction. The profane Mordomo, however, was not forgiven; on the following Sunday, when he was saying mass at the saint's altar, St. George let his spear drop from his hand upon the offender's head.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Mappa de  
Portugal,  
t. ii. 257.*

The image which performed this miracle, after appearing annually in the procession during more than 350 years, was destroyed by fire at the time of the great earthquake. A new one, however, had been substituted, which succeeded to all the honours and miraculous properties of its predecessor. One of the finest horses which could be found in Portugal was selected to bear the saint in the great procession, and reserved for that single purpose, as if any other would have desecrated it. Junot, however, had taken St. George's horse for himself, and rode it every Sunday when he reviewed his troops. And this year, for the first time, St. George was not to bear a part in the pageant: the reason which the French assigned for excluding him was, that he could not appear with his usual splendour, because the jewels of the Cadaval family, which he always wore in his hat on that day, had been taken to Brazil when the court emigrated. Other motives were imagined by the Portuguese: when the saint returned, after the fatigues of the day, a royal present had always been allotted him; it was thought that the French wished to spare themselves this expense. They were carrying

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
257.

*The proces-  
sion inter-  
rupted by a  
panic fear.*

on works within the circuit of the castle which were designed to command the city, and render the place defensible against the English and the Portuguese themselves; these works were carried on secretly, but it was part of the ceremony that St. George should enter the castle, and in that case his retinue would have observed what was going on. Lastly, the people said that the French did not choose to let St. George go into public because he was an English saint.

In all other things Junot wished the Lisboners to see that the spectacle had lost nothing of its wonted splendour. The procession had performed half its course when a sudden alarm arose, occasioned, it is said, by a thief, who being detected in some petty larceny, cried out, in the hope of exciting confusion and effecting his escape, that the English were crossing the bar. A general tumult ensued; some of the French formed as if expecting immediately to be attacked, . . others hurried to their posts with a celerity which was absurdly attributed to fear instead of promptitude; a crowd rushed into the church of S. Domingos for sanctuary, from whence the chapter of the patriarchal church were just about to proceed with the pix, in which the Romish mystery of impanation, the object of that day's superstition, was contained. Some of the insignia which were to form a part of the show were thrown down and broken in the rush, and the clergy hastened to secure themselves each where he could. Not the mob alone, but the persons who

were to form the procession, priests, monks, ministers, and knights, in the habiliments of their orders, took to flight; communities and brotherhoods forsook their banners and their crosses; here and there only an aged friar or sacristan was seen in whom the sense of devotion was stronger than fear, and who remained in his place, thinking that if he were now to die, it were best to perish at his station and in his duty. Wherever a door was open, the terrified people ran in, as if flying from an actual massacre; the great streets and the Rocio were presently deserted, and the pavement was strewn with hats, cloaks, and shoes, lost in the confusion. Fewer accidents occurred than might have been expected in such a scene; the alarm abated when it was ascertained that the British fleet was not entering; and when the cause of the \* disturbance

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
306.*Neves, iii.*  
256—262.*Thiebault,*  
122—124.

\* General Thiebault says, “ *On attribua d’abord ce mouvement, si brusque et si general, à des causes peu significantes, à des terreurs paniques, &c.; mais on apprit depuis qu’il tenoit à des grands projets, et on en eut la preuve, quand on sut que dans presque toutes les provinces il avoit été tenté ce même jour avec plus ou moins d’audace ou de succès; et que, s’il avoit manqué à Lisbonne, il avoit (et toujours par le moyen des prêtres) eu tout son succès à Oporto, Braga, Chaves, ou ce jour même, une insurrection générale avoit éclaté, fait prendre les armes contre nous à tous les habitans des provinces d’Oporto, du Tras-los-Montes, d’une partie du Beira, et fait arrêter ou assassiner tous les Français isolés qui s’y trouvoient.*”—*Relation de l’Expedition du Portugal*, p. 124.

General Thiebault is certainly wrong. Had there been any combination against the common enemy, the persons by whom it was concerted would eagerly have pleaded it afterwards as a claim to honour if not to reward. The Portuguese have preserved the most minute details of a national insurrection so honourable to the nation, and the merit of priority has been contested by different places: but from all that has been published it appears, in direct contradiction to the French general’s statement, that no combination existed, (indeed it was impossible that it should exist,) and that no tumult broke out on the day which he has specified as the commencement of a general and concerted movement, except at a village of fishermen in Algarve.

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X.

1808.  
June.

*Junot fortifies the castle.*

June 24.

*Edict for disarming the people.*

*Observador Portuguez, 314.*

was discovered, the broken parts of the procession were brought together as soon as possible, and Junot with his generals closed it, in place of the Prince Regent and his court.

Though the tidings of the insurrection at Porto had soon been followed by news that submission had been restored in that city, intelligence of insurrectionary movements or designs was now arriving every day, and Junot thought it necessary to take farther precautions for holding Lisbon in subjection. The water-carriers were employed to fill the cisterns in the Castle, which was now strongly fortified; stores and fodder were laid in there, it was garrisoned with 800 men, and all the swords and small arms from the arsenal were removed thither. An edict was issued commanding all persons to deliver up their fire-arms, swords, and hunting-spears, those Portuguese alone whose legal privilege it was to wear a sword being allowed still to retain one. If within forty-eight hours after the publication of that edict arms should be found in the possession of a Portuguese, he was to be imprisoned, and fined according to his means from 100 franks to 1000 cruzados; if the offender were a native of Great Britain, and delayed obedience half the time, his fine was to be from 100 cruzados to 10,000, and greater punishment inflicted if the case required it: for other foreigners the same time was appointed as for the natives, and the extent of their fine was to be 2000 cruzados, but, like the English, they were liable to any farther punishment which the French might think proper to in-

flict. It was the custom in Portugal, as formerly in England, to celebrate the eve of certain festivals, and especially those of St. John the Baptist, and St. Peter, with bonfires : the custom of kindling festal fires at that season of the year is as old as the worship of the Kelts, even perhaps before their entrance into Europe ; and it is one of the many pagan rites which Romish Christianity adopted. The use of gunpowder made it a dangerous custom even among a people so little addicted to mischief as the Portuguese : and at the pretended desire of certain pious persons, who deemed such rejoicings incompatible with that calm and collected state of mind which the church required at such times, all these demonstrations of festivity were prohibited. Any person letting off fire-works or fire-arms, as had been usual, making any use of gunpowder, or kindling a bonfire, was to be imprisoned eight days, and pay a fine proportioned to his means : parents were made answerable for their children, schoolmasters for their boys, masters for their servants, tradesmen for those in their employ ; the public walk was not to be open in the evening, and any concourse of people in the streets was forbidden. Orders were given to clear the Campo de Ourique immediately, though the crops were not ripe, that troops might be encamped there, from whence, and from the Castle, the city would be completely under their command. Detachments were sent north and south to keep down a people, who were now every

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*June.*

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
311.



CHAP. X. where beginning to manifest their long suppressed indignation. The men marched out of Lisbon with provisions and kettles upon their backs, and each with a loaf fixed upon his bayonet.

1808.  
June.  
*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
317.

*Movements  
at Braga.*

*Neves, iii.*  
124—6.

*Insurrec-  
tion at Mel-  
gaço.*

The news of the first insurrection at Porto produced considerable effect in the north of Portugal before it was known that that city, through the treachery or timidity of the persons in power, had again submitted to the intrusive government. At Braga the Archbishop gave orders for taking the cover from the royal arms upon his palace, and reciting in the service the collect for the Prince Regent and Royal Family. The restoration of the legitimate government was proclaimed by the better part of the people; but the public performance of that duty was prevented by some of those persons who are to be found in all countries, whose sole object is to advance themselves, they care not by what means. They, putting their trust in Buonaparte and his fortune, drew up formal charges against the primate, and dispatched them to Junot. Had the French remained masters of Portugal, this process would have terminated in his deposition, perhaps in his death; . . . but the fire was now spreading on all sides, and breaking out, as in Spain, every where, simultaneously. A Galician gentleman, by name Mosqueira de Lira, having concerted measures at the house of his brother-in-law, who was an inhabitant of Melgaço, with the Corregedor of that place, and with a retired

magistrate, entered the town with some other Galicians of the border and their armed followers, on a day when the people from the adjacent country were assembled there at a fair.

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X.

1808.  
*June.*

Encouraged by their appearance, the Portuguese broke out into execrations against Napoleon and his instruments, and proclaimed their lawful Prince. The Quinas, which, during the usurpation, had been covered upon all public buildings and monuments where they had not been destroyed, were presently exposed again to the eyes of a people whose belief it was that Christ himself had in person commanded the founder of their monarchy to bear upon his shield those symbols of his passion. The next day the acclamation was performed with the same formalities as at the commencement of a new reign, the magistrates and persons in office taking the lead; and the joyful inhabitants sallied out to indulge their overflowing loyalty by repeating the scene in the neighbouring villages. Their hilarity was interrupted by a sudden report that a French army had landed on the coast of Galicia, and that a corps of that army had already arrived at Caniza, meaning to cross the Minho, and attack Melgaço. That town had been founded by the first King of Portugal, and refortified by King Diniz: his works had long since fallen to decay, and the place was open to an enemy. The bells rang the alarm, and the people, resolving rather to meet the danger than to wait for it, set off with two pieces of cannon, tumultuously, and in

*June 9.*

CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
June.

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that state of heated spirits and insubordination which such calamitous times produce. The falsehood of the report was soon ascertained; a fellow then boldly proposed that they should nevertheless march forward and collect forces, and because the *Capitam Mor* ordered the countrymen to return peaceably to their homes, this man attempted to pistol him; the mischief was prevented by a resolute and right-minded peasant, who seized the ruffian and threw him to the ground. Other indications of the disposition in the populace to abuse their power as soon as they feel it, soon appeared. A rumour went about that the *Juiz de fora* had struck the red flag which had been planted in the town; a tumultuous sentence of death was passed upon him, and a party set out to execute it. But when they approached the town they saw the flag still flying: it was however true that the Juiz had been advised to strike it, because, if the French arrived, the sight of the bloody flag might provoke them to put all to the sword. The advice was given by an officer, and with no ill intention, for no man exerted himself more actively: but his military prudence on this occasion had well nigh cost him his life, and he only escaped by the swiftness of his horse. Warned by these indications how dangerous any act would be which the people could interpret into an intention of intimidating them or checking their ardour, the Juiz, when he received Junot's proclamation, communicated it to none but those on whom he could rely; he prepared

for action as well as the means of the place would afford, and applied to the Junta of Orense for assistance in men, arms, and ammunition. Some troops accordingly were sent by them to Mil-  
 manda and Cellanova, whence they might enter Portugal to assist Melgaço, whenever their assistance was required.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
126—135.

While the national feeling was thus displayed in one of the remotest corners of the kingdom, similar scenes occurred in places of more importance, and more exposed to the vengeance of the enemy. The post-office in the city of Braganza was at the house of the Abbot of Carrazedo. A letter brought him news of the insurrection at Porto ; he read it aloud to the persons who happened to be present ; their letters confirmed the welcome tidings, and added the flattering expectation that by that time Junot would have been made prisoner at Lisbon. Readily believing what they wished, they set up a shout of rejoicing ; the news spread ; the multitude joined in exulting acclamations, and the parties from the post-office hastened to a church, where the governor of the province, General Manoel Jorge Gomes de Sepulveda, was attending a service in honour of St. Antonio. This general, though oppressed with age and infirmities, hesitated not as to the course which he should pursue. He left the church to issue such orders as were expedient without delay. The bells of the cathedral were ordered to strike up, and those of all the churches joined

*The Prince  
Regent pro-  
claimed at  
Braganza.*

June 11.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

presently in expressing and heightening the public joy. There were, however, men in authority who had no generous hopes or feelings to mislead their judgement on this occasion ; and they, like others of the same stamp at Braga, thinking to obtain favour with the intrusive government, hastened to the general, and asked him what was the meaning of all this stir. Sepulveda took them to the window, and showed them the streets swarming with people, who were crying out, The Prince and the Royal House of Braganza for ever ! the General for ever ! Down with the French ! “ There,” said he, “ you hear what is the meaning ; . . and you may quiet that multitude if you dare.” He illuminated his house, which was the signal for a general illumination : he ordered such arms as were in the city to be made ready for service, sent to Chaves for more, offered pardon to deserters upon their repairing to Braganza, called upon all reduced officers to come forward, and issued orders to all the governors and *Capitaens mores* within his jurisdiction to proclaim their lawful Prince, and enrol the peasantry for the service of their country. A solemn mass was celebrated the next day in the cathedral as a thanksgiving service, a sermon was preached upon the occasion, and all who were present mounted the national cockade, the clergy wearing it upon the breast.

Neves, iii.  
136—141.

*The Braganzans intimidated by the news from Porto.*

These festive days were of short duration. The next post, which was expected to confirm the promises of the last, and bring news of Junot’s over-

throw and capture, arrived with intelligence that all was tranquil at Lisbon, and that Porto had returned to subjection. It brought also circular letters from the French government, requiring the Portuguese to continue in obedience, and threatening severe vengeance to all who should disturb the public tranquillity. The danger was now deemed as imminent as the triumph had before seemed certain. Loison would hasten from Almeida to punish Braganza for its revolt; and Marshal Bessieres also, they thought, was about to descend upon them from Castille. The time-servers now obtained an ascendancy, and were about to draw up a formal accusation against Sepulveda, and the persons who had taken the lead in this precipitate insurrection. They proposed to him, however, that he should join with them in a representation soliciting pardon for the city, saying that all which had been done, had been submitted to by him because it was not possible at that moment to oppose the populace, and that the illuminations and other demonstrations of joy were only in honour of St. Antonio. Letters were accordingly written to this effect. Sepulveda's object was to gain time by dissimulation, while he took measures for securing a retreat into Spain, unless affairs in Portugal should take a fortunate turn; and while he let the promoters of this submission send his letter with their own to the post-office, he secretly instructed the post-master not to forward it.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Neves, iii.*  
141—146.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

Second in-  
surrection  
at Porto.

As the first declaration of the people at Porto had occasioned these movements in the north of Portugal, so these secondary movements, reported and exaggerated in like manner, re-acted upon the public spirit in that city. Oliveira, who had acted under fear of the French, was now in fear of his own countrymen, and soon found himself in such a situation, that he was in danger of being regarded as an enemy by both. On the day of the Corpo de Deos he wished the soldiers to carry the French eagles in the procession instead of the national banner, and this they resolutely refused to do; the end was, that only a few companies, without any colours, appeared in the train. The temper of the people was shown at this time by the groups which collected in the streets, and the agitation which every countenance expressed. Raymundo, consulting at once his own safety, and the furtherance of his country's cause, had conveyed letters to the city, dated from Vianna and from Valença, saying that he was on his way to Spain, there to solicit succours, with which he should presently return: and the ignorant people, ready to believe any thing, were fully persuaded that he would soon appear at the head of a Spanish army. A report, with more appearance but as little reality of truth, accelerated the success of his stratagem, though it was intended to intimidate the people. The *Juiz de fora* at Oliveira de Azemeis received orders to provide rations for a French detachment on the way from Coim-

Neves, iii.  
97.

bra to Porto. It was part of Junot's policy to alarm the people by such reports, for the purpose of keeping them in submission. The means of that place were not equal to the sudden demand; the Juiz represented this to the governor of Porto, and bread was ordered from that city, in obedience to the requisition. A few Frenchmen, who had concealed themselves during the first insurrection, and re-appeared when Oliveira restored the usurped authority, imprudently assisted in loading the carts with loaves for this purpose; a crowd collected at the sight, burning with indignation; a native Portuguese artilleryman remarked, that bread enough could be found for the French, though not for the Portuguese; one of the Frenchmen returned an answer which provoked a blow; the mob immediately took part, seized the French, and delivered them to a guard of soldiers, who took charge of them, without knowing for what end, or inquiring by whose authority.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
163—168.

This second insurrection had been prepared, though the occasion upon which it broke out was accidental. The Portuguese flag was displayed, Joam Manoel de Mariz brought out from the barracks at Santo Ovidio four field-pieces ready for service, with thirty artillerymen to serve them; the arsenal was opened, and arms and cartridges distributed to all who applied for them. And Raymundo, who had concealed himself in a country-house only two miles from Porto, made his appearance by the convent of S. Do-

*Formation  
of a Junta  
in that city.*



CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
*June.*

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mingos, with nineteen Spaniards, armed with blunderbusses like himself, and covered with dust, and with their cloaks upon their backs, like men arriving from a long march. They declared that a Spanish army was on the way, and the people, in full expectation of this support, prepared to defend the city against the French. Some guns were placed upon the bridge, others on the heights of Villa-nova. There was some difficulty in conveying them to the latter position; a Dominican, who had sallied from his convent sword in hand, and with his sleeves tucked up, laid hold of the ropes; friars, priests, and women, followed his example, and the work was presently accomplished. While they were thus exerting themselves to provide for the defence of the city, the rabble exercised their authority in the usual way, discharging fire-arms in the streets, beating drums, blowing trumpets, ordering the bells to be rung in all the churches and convents, breaking open houses to search for Frenchmen and suspected persons. They threw Oliveira and many others into prison, but happily no murders were committed. The mob were restrained in their ferocity by the expectation that traitors would be brought to condign punishment as soon as the lawful authority was re-established, which it soon would be. Till that time it was resolved that a local and provisional government should be formed after the manner of the Spaniards. The authors of the movement had concerted this, and fixed upon persons to constitute the

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.*

Junta; but while they were engaged in the ceremony of nominating and appointing them, a report arrived that the French were actually at Grijó, within twelve miles of Porto. The question then was, should they wait upon the defensive on the heights of Villa-nova, or hasten to attack them, in the hope of surprising them by night, and finding them exhausted by a long march? The bolder opinion prevailed; and a volunteer party set off for Grijó, and hurried there so fast, that they would have been in worse condition, as well as worse order, than the enemy, if any enemy had been there. But instead of the French they found a few travellers on the way from Coimbra, who assured them that there was no rumour of the advance of any troops along the road. Even a victory would hardly have elevated their spirits more. This was about daybreak; they hastened back to the city. The soldiers in the Campo de S. Ovidio swore upon their swords to defend the independence of Portugal, their religion, and their King. A public meeting was convoked, the bells of the chamber rung, the soldiers led the way in military order, with two field-pieces; the people followed to the episcopal palace; the Bishop came forth into the varanda, and gave the assembled multitude his blessing; then he descended among them, kissed their banner, and led the way to the cathedral, there to implore the divine assistance in their meritorious undertaking. This done, they returned to the palace, and proceeded

CHAP. X. to appoint what they called the Provisional Junta  
 1808. of Supreme Government; the list which had  
 June. been prepared was shortened, as being inconveniently numerous; eight members were appointed, in equal numbers, from the clergy, the magistracy, the military, and the citizens, and the Bishop was placed at their head with the title of President Governor.

*Neves, iii.*  
 169—176.

*Measures of  
 the Junta.*

The Bishop, D. Antonio de S. José e Castro, immediately published a manifesto, in the name of the Prince Regent, declaring that the French Government was abolished and exterminated in that country, and the royal authority restored and to be exercised plenarily and independently by the Provisional Junta of Porto, till the government instituted by his Royal Highness should be re-established. The Junta therefore gave orders, that in all places the Prince should be proclaimed, and the royal arms uncovered and respected as heretofore they always had been, and now again hereafter were to be; and they called upon all constituted authorities to act accordingly. His next business was to dispatch a messenger to General Sepulveda at Braganza, requesting succours, especially in cavalry, and an officer capable of taking the command, whether for attack or defence. The Visconde de Balsamam was sent to the British brig, which was still hovering off the bar, and a communication was thus opened with England. Voluntary contributions were liberally made, the pay of the soldiers was raised, and as a measure not less popular, a *Tribunal de*

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.Arrest of  
Cardoso.

*Inconfidencia* was instituted, to take cognizance of causes in which treason was suspected. The prevalence of suspicion is indeed one of the many dreadful evils in such calamitous times. An example of this occurred before the close of the day. Colonel José Cardoso de Menezes Soutomaior had been that day appointed to the chief command, as being the senior officer. Happening to send a messenger that evening with letters upon public business to the *Juizes de fora* at Oliveira de Azemeis and Recardaens, he forgot to provide him with the passport which was now necessary for crossing the bridge. The messenger was therefore stopped by the guards, and either from the confusion occasioned by fear, or from a confidence of protection, refused to declare whither he was going, or by whom he was sent. Upon this the guards searched him, and found the two letters. These would have explained the matter and cleared him; but perceiving that a third letter which he carried more secretly about his person was in danger of being found, he drew it out, tore it in pieces with his teeth, and threw it over the bridge. A few fragments were saved, but not enough to give any indication of its contents. The messenger was immediately arrested as a traitor, and carried before José Cardoso, who thought at first to end the business by desiring that the man might be left with him, and saying that he would answer for him. The people (for a crowd had collected on the way) transferred at this their suspicions

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*June.*

upon Cardoso himself; and to satisfy them, he found it necessary to open the two letters, and thus acquaint the mob with arrangements which it had not been intended that they should know. But he could give no account of the paper which had been torn; and therefore the mob, having thrown his messenger into prison, returned to arrest him and carry him before the Bishop. Protestations of innocence were vain, and it was evident that his life would be in danger on the way; some of his friends, however, bethought themselves of a happy stratagem; they rung the alarm bells, and raised a cry that the enemy was approaching. Evening was now closing; the populace left their intended victim to go in quest of the invaders, and passed the night in hurrying here and there upon the false report. Cardoso meantime got in safety to the Bishop's palace, and related all that had passed. As far as he was concerned his justification was clear, but of the third letter he could give no account. The messenger, however, gave a plain and credible one; he had not long since been at Lisbon, where a Frenchman had given him this letter for one of his countrymen in Porto; on his arrival in that city he found that the person to whom it was addressed had been carried away prisoner by the Spaniards; and his intention was, when he returned to Lisbon, to deliver it again to the writer. He had torn it in a moment of fear, lest he should be considered a partizan and agent of the French, if it were found upon him. The

*Neves, iii.*  
186—192.

Bishop was satisfied; but he advised Cardoso not to appear in public till this unlucky accident should be forgotten.

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About noon, on the ensuing day, the alarm bells were rung again, drums beat, trumpets sounded, and preparations were again made for an immediate engagement with the enemy. They were at Os Carvalhos, it was said, eight miles off. There was some foundation for this report. The Juiz at Oliveira de Azemeis was in expectation and fear of the French, and not having received the bread from Porto which he had been ordered to have in readiness for them, had sent to this town and to the adjacent villages, to embargo all that could be found. Troops and volunteers now hurried forward with the utmost alacrity, and in the utmost disorder. This was a critical moment for Cardoso: if he went abroad, to put himself at the head of the forces, as his duty required, there was the risk of being again accused and endangered as a traitor: if, on the other hand, he forbore to appear, the very forbearance would be interpreted as a proof of disaffection to his country. After some hours of indecision, he could not bear to remain inactive, and incur the reproach to which it must needs subject him at such a time, and forth he went. He had not gone far before a poor fellow, whom a party of *Ordenanças* upon some suspicion had seized, met him, and implored his protection. Cardoso inquired into the case, and finding the man innocent, gave orders to release him. His

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authority was disputed, and presently he himself was reproached and seized as a traitor. Some were for putting him to death upon the spot; and though others insisted upon carrying him before the Bishop, it appeared very doubtful whether he would reach the palace alive. When they met a priest upon the way, the mob called upon him to confess this traitor, who was about to die, and Cardoso himself cried out for absolution, seeing nothing but death before his eyes. The Bishop was convinced of his innocence, but could neither persuade the populace, nor command them; nor could he save Cardoso's life by any other expedient than that of allowing him to be thrown into one of the worst dungeons of a Portuguese prison. In that miserable confinement he remained till the heat of these tumults had abated; he was then released, and honourably distinguished himself afterwards.

*Neves, iii.*  
192—196.

*Disturbed  
state of the  
people.*

Meantime Porto was in a frightful state of insubordination. The people readily enrolled themselves, but, as if intoxicated with joy, they celebrated their deliverance instead of labouring to secure it: and men who ought to have been practising the drill, or erecting batteries and throwing up trenches, were beating drums, ringing the bells, and wasting powder in empty demonstrations of bravery. The city was illuminated during three successive nights, and they seemed so little aware of the tremendous conflict in which they were engaged, that they were about to march to war as to a festival. From

this delusion the Bishop roused them by an appeal well adapted to those for whom it was intended. “Portugueze,” he said, “in the name of Heaven and of Jesus Christ, listen to a government which loves you, which desires your happiness, and is labouring for it! Their turbulence, he told them, their insubordination, their waste of powder, only exposed them to the enemy, who would come upon them by surprise, and surely destroy them, if they would not listen to their rulers and obey orders. Strength without order was like the bull, who, strong as he is, is brought to the ground by a weak hand, with the aid of dexterity and a cloak. Their endeavour should be to be unseen and unheard, that they might the more fatally be felt;..to conceal their movements, that they might strike when the blow was not expected. The government conjured them, by every thing which was most sacred in heaven and earth, to subject themselves to discipline, and obey their officers. Where they were posted there they were adjured to remain till the time for action arrived: they who were first in the field would diminish the number of the enemy when they engaged them; the second body, when they arrived, would weaken the French still farther; the third would complete their destruction. But if all hurried on tumultuously, all would be lost.” The populace by this time had fired away so much powder, and spent so much of their animal spirits in rioting, and hurrying here and there upon so many false

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.*



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*Neves, iii.*  
196—198.

alarms, that they were disposed to listen to this advice. Tranquillity was produced by exhaustion; and to preserve it, order was given that the alarm bells should not be rung till the cathedral began, and that whenever that was necessary, a flag should be hoisted on the tower by day, and a torch by night, to distinguish it from the fire-bell.

*The Junta  
conclude an  
alliance  
with the  
Junta of  
Galicia.*

Subordination being now in some degree restored, the Junta entered with alacrity upon their arduous duties. They raised a loan, and imposed new taxes, as the exigencies of the time required; among others a duty of four *mil reis* upon every pipe of wine which was exported. Two deputies were sent to England; and an alliance was concluded with the Supreme Junta of Galicia, the nearest of the newly constituted authorities in Spain; Galicia engaging first to assist in liberating Portugal, and Portugal promising, after her own deliverance should be accomplished, to co-operate in expelling the French from every part of the Peninsula. Wild as this promise appeared to the French, and to those shallow statesmen by whom the French were regarded as invincible, and the power of Buonaparte not to be resisted, it was faithfully performed by the Portuguese, and fulfilled to the letter of the bond. The Junta of Porto had another object to accomplish, more difficult, and at that time not less important, than an alliance with Spain. Other Juntas were now springing up in the north of Portugal at the first hope of

*Neves, iii.*  
199.

deliverance, and unless these were induced to acknowledge that at Porto as supreme, all plans of defence would be frustrated by the jealousy of contending authorities. One had been formed at Viana on the same day; others at Torre de Moncorvo, Miranda, and other places of less note; all these submitted readily to the superiority which was claimed. Braganza was not so willing to resign its pretensions. The intrusive government had not been re-established in that city, notwithstanding the efforts of its adherents, and the apparent assent of General Sepulveda. Their penitent letters to the French ministry were stopped at Villa Real, where the people proclaimed their lawful Prince; and when the Braganzans, upon tidings of the second insurrection at Porto, formed a Junta, and required obedience to its edicts, its authority was disowned there. Sepulveda was so offended at this, that he sent Brigadier Manoel Pinto Bacellar to arrest Francisco da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, then a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, who had taken the lead at Villa Real. Bacellar acted with more prudence than the general who sent him, and endeavoured by amicable means to bring about a good understanding; and Silveira, disregarding the orders of one who had so far been found wanting, that he had at least professed submission to the French after having once thrown off their yoke, crossed the Douro, to spread the revolution in the province of Beira. Sepulveda found as little obedience in Torre de Moncorvo and some other

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Its authority is acknowledged throughout the north of Portugal.*

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X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
151—162.  
180—185.

*The insur-  
rection ex-  
tends to-  
wards Co-  
imbra.*

Juntas in that district, when he issued a circular order requiring that every town which was entitled to a voice in the Cortes should send a deputy to assist at the provincial Junta of Tras os Montes, the title which that of Braganza had assumed. Opposed in their pretensions on that side, after contesting the authority of the Porto Junta, concluding a treaty with it, and then again disputing with it, and arraigning its measures, the Junta of Braganza ended at length in obeying the advice of the Bishop of Porto, which was repeated in strong terms by Sepulveda, and dissolving itself.

The whole of Tras os Montes and of the province between the rivers had now declared against the intrusive government, and acknowledged the Junta of Porto. The same spirit was spreading in Beira. Aveiro declared itself, and a plan was formed for surprising the French in Coimbra, an undertaking of more importance than danger. The details are curious, as showing the disposition of the people, the insignificance of their means, and the disorderly manner of their proceedings. A patrol of armed peasants had been sent out from Porto upon the Coimbra road, to obtain intelligence of the enemy, concerning whom nothing certain was known. Dr. José Bernardo de Azevedo, of the order of Avis, hearing upon what service these persons had been sent, represented to the Junta how little likely it was that such a set of men should act with discretion; upon the first news of the

enemy they would hurry back without ascertaining their numbers, position, and probable movements; or if they ventured to approach them, would most probably fall into their hands. He offered to obtain the desired information himself, knowing the country well, and accordingly laying aside his habit, set off with one servant on horseback. When he arrived at Oliveira de Azemeis, he met the greater part of the patrol on their return in triumph; they had failed to arrest the Juiz as they intended, but they had caught a lawyer, and were dragging him to Porto as a suspected person. They had however sent four of their party forward on the Coimbra road, in pursuance of their original object, and José Bernardo proceeding on his journey, overtook them at Mealhada, a village about twelve miles from Coimbra. Exulting that they had advanced so far without meeting the French, and encouraged by what they heard from the people of Mealhada, that the enemy had only a handful of men in Coimbra, and most of them invalided, they resolved to fall upon them, by surprise if possible, that very day. A reformed colonel of militia at Ois undertook to bring thirty armed men; the people of Mealhada volunteered their services, and the two parties were to meet at Carquejo, half way on their march.

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X.

1808.  
June.

June 22.

*Neves, iii.*  
200—205.

When the men of Mealhada began to prepare for their expedition, there were some whose hearts failed them, and the contagion spread. José Bernardo, however, by reproaching and

*Scheme for surprising the enemy in Coimbra.*

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X.

1808.  
June.

threatening some, encouraging and praising others, with the seasonable administration of fruit and wine, and the zealous help of a serjeant of the *Ordenança*, mustered some thirty peasants, with about twenty muskets, the rest were armed with pikes and sickles and other such instruments; and when they set off many of the others followed, ashamed to be left behind. The party from Ois not having arrived when they reached Carquejo, José Bernardo ordered his people to halt for them there, and suffer no person to pass toward Coimbra, while he and two others went on to reconnoitre and form the plan of attack. He found no difficulty in entering the city and obtaining all the information he desired. The French soldiers in Coimbra did not amount to an hundred men, and of these not more than forty were capable of service. There was a rumour that 1200 Spaniards were on the way against them. This the inhabitants were more likely to believe than the French, who, relying upon their Emperor's fortune, the terror of the French name, and the submission of the Portugueze, were living to all appearance in full confidence of security. Satisfied with this intelligence, and without venturing to concert any co-operation in the city, José Bernardo returned as far as the Bridge of Agua de Maias, and sent to hasten the march of his motley volunteers.

*The French  
in that city  
are made  
prisoners.*

When they were not far from this bridge, they were seen by a patrole of four horsemen, two

French and two Portugeze, who clapped spurs to their horses, in order to cross the bridge before them and give the alarm. The insurgents, however, equally on the alert, got between them and the bridge, and addressed them with the *quem vive?* Napoleon, was the answer, and two pistols were fired upon them without effect. A general discharge was returned, which killed two of the patrole and mortally wounded another. The fourth, who escaped unhurt, was a Portugeze; he threw himself off his horse, cried out, *Viva o Principe de Portugal!* and joined his countrymen. The wounded man was a Frenchman: the insurgents, with a humanity not to have been expected at such a moment, left one of their number to assist him, and he was afterwards removed into the city, and there humanely and carefully attended; but to his latest breath he reviled the Portugeze, and the last hope which he expressed was, that ample vengeance would be taken for his blood. The French guard at the gate of S. Sophia hearing the guns, and seeing a number of men approach, fired among them, and fled to their quarters in the College of S. Thomas. The Portugeze followed close: they were fired upon from the windows without effect, for the French were too sensible of their own weakness to make any regular defence; the doors were forced, and they quietly laid down their arms, and suffered themselves to be bound, happy to receive no worse treatment from such an assemblage, . . for by this time the whole rabble of Coimbra had collected.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.Neves, iii.  
207-212.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*The Juiz  
do Povo  
takes the  
command.*

Having thus easily succeeded, the first thought of José Bernardo and his comrades was to obtain the sanction and assistance of some legal authority for their future proceedings. The courage, and perhaps the disposition, of the magistrates was doubted; but the *Juiz do Povo* was an officer whom tumultuous times had heretofore forced into importance, and the *Juiz do Povo* was now called for. José Pedro de Jesus, a cooper by trade, who held the office, happened to possess a rare union of upright character, activity, and good sense. He came forward, assumed a power which was willingly recognized, and exercised it in a manner which at once gratified the populace and satisfied the wishes of cooler minds. First he lodged the French safely in prison, then distributed among the people the arms of those cavalry regiments belonging to the northern provinces, which Junot had disbanded. In the depôt with these weapons a flag was found with the royal arms. It was carried in triumph through the streets, while the exulting people hastened to uncover the shield of Portugal upon the public buildings. The bells from all the colleges and convents and churches of that populous city pealed in with the acclamations of the people, and heightened the excitement and agitation of their spirits. Bonfires were kindled, as in old times, in defiance of Junot's prohibition: the night of St. John's had always been a festival in Coimbra, but never before had it been celebrated with such uproar and overflowing joy. Some barks on the river, laden with provisions for

the French in Figueira, were seized during the night; and in the morning it was deemed prudent to march off the prisoners to Porto, under a strong escort, lest the magistracy, in their fear, should release them, and again reduce the city to submission.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

Neves, iii.  
214—217.

This apprehension, however, was ill founded. The *Juiz de fora* came forward to act in the national cause; the students and lecturers formed themselves into an academical corps; and the Vice-Rector of the university, Manoel Paes de Aragam Trigoso, took upon himself the civil authority, in compliance with the wish of the inhabitants. They would have vested the military command in General Bernardim Freire de Andrade, whom the Prince, before his departure for Brazil, had appointed to the command at Porto. Not choosing to exercise it under the intrusive government, he was living privately at Coimbra; but being now summoned by the Bishop and Junta of Porto to his proper station, he declined for that reason the present nomination. The people next thought of D. Miguel Pereira Forjas, but he chose rather to follow Bernardim as his quarter-master general. They then chose Bernardim's brother, Nuno Freire de Andrade, making him, however, subordinate to Trigoso. The men who thus accepted offices of authority discharged a most perilous duty to their country. They were not, like their countrymen in Tras os Montes and between the rivers, secured in some degree by distance from the French, and

Order re-  
stored in  
Coimbra.



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
219—223.

*Prepara-  
tions for  
defence.*

*Neves, iii.*  
223—225.

within reach of assistance from Spain, or, if need were, of an asylum in that kingdom. Nor would Coimbra be like some of the smaller towns, overlooked as unworthy of vengeance. Next to the capital itself there was no place in Portugal where a terrible example would so deeply impress and intimidate the nation : it was within easy reach of the enemy, from Almeida as well as from Lisbon, and all military means of defence were wanting : a few pounds of powder were all that could be found in the city, and not one piece of cannon.

On the other hand, more talents and enterprise, such as the times required, might reasonably be expected in Coimbra than in any other of the Portuguese towns. It was a populous and flourishing university, the only one in the kingdom : here therefore the flower of the Portuguese youth would be found, just at that age when they would be most willing and fit for service ; and of that rank, and in that place, where national and generous feelings would have their strongest influence. If any where heads to plan and hands to execute might be found, it would be here. Accordingly no exertions were wanting. Chemists made gunpowder, geometers directed works of defence, old soldiers were employed, some in making cartridges, others in training volunteers ; mechanics were set to work in whatever manner they might be most useful ; bridges were broken down, roads broken up, means made ready for defending the

streets, if the enemy should enter the city, and a strict police established.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Successful  
expedition  
against Fi-  
gueira.*

When one day had been passed in these arrangements and preparations an expedition was planned against Figueira da Foz, a small town and fort at the mouth of the Mondego, on the right bank, seven leagues from Coimbra. The French had a garrison of an hundred men there. Forty volunteers, who were almost all students, under the command of Bernardo Antonio Zagalo, a student also, set out at evening, in hope of capturing this important point: they relied upon increasing their numbers on the way, and they took with them authority from the governor to raise the country as they went. Zagalo, with four horsemen, took the right bank, the rest of the party the left: they met at Monte-mor o Velho, and marching all night, appeared with the reinforcements which they had gathered, now some 3000 in number, before Figueira, at seven in the morning. The enemy were taken by surprise; they were dispersed about the town, when they saw this multitude approach; but immediately retiring into the fort, they prepared for defence. The place might have been easily defended against a crowd of peasants, more of whom were armed with pikes and reaping-hooks than with fowling-pieces, and who were likely, upon the slightest loss or disgust, to abandon their enterprise as precipitately as they had engaged in it. But the French, relying too confidently upon the submission of the Portu-

June 25.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*June.*

gueze, had neglected to store the fort with provisions ; and Zagalo summoned them, saying he knew they had not food for more than four-and-twenty hours, and that if they did not surrender they should all be put to the sword. Contrary to his usual policy, Junot had given the command of this fort to a Portuguese lieutenant of engineers ; this person demurred at surrendering, because his family were at Peniche, in the power of the French. But, wanting either the will or the ability to exert himself in the enemy's service, he remained inactive and confounded, till the following day, when Zagalo received positive orders from Coimbra to return immediately with all his people. This enabled the commander to obtain terms which might be pleaded to save his credit ; and he capitulated on condition that the garrison should be allowed to cross the river with their arms and knapsacks, but without powder and ball ; and to march unmolested to Peniche, the nearest strong place in possession of the French. Upon these terms the fort was given up ; but the peasantry searched the men when they were embarking, and finding that some of them had concealed a few cartridges, declared that the conditions were broken : they themselves were desirous of breaking them, and therefore gladly found this pretext ; and the French would have been massacred if the students had not exerted themselves to protect them, and lodged them safely as prisoners at Coimbra.

*Neves, iii.*  
226—233.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
Junc.*Loison or-  
dered to  
march from  
Almeida to  
Porto.*

A report of Loison's sudden approach had occasioned the order for recalling Zagalo. General Count Loison had been sent in the latter end of May, with 4000 troops, to Almeida, in pursuance of positive and repeated instructions from Murat when exercising the command in Madrid. He was to concert his movements with Bessieres, and, if necessary, to join him; he was to observe Salamanca, and secure Ciudad Rodrigo, if that were practicable. But the Spaniards were too much awakened to be again deceived or surprised by the French; and Loison having remained at Almeida from the 5th of June till the 16th, received orders from Junot to march upon Porto, take the command in that city, and keep the northern provinces in subjection. He had previously got possession of Fort Conceiçam. Each party seems at this time to have been strangely ignorant of the movements and means of the other: Loison apprehended that an enemy's force might render it impossible for the French to maintain this fort; he therefore directed General Charlot, whom he left with the command at Almeida, to remove thither the guns from Conceiçam, keep it as long as he could, and destroy the works if he should be forced to evacuate it. He then began his march with two regiments of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery. A battalion of light infantry was to set out from Torres Vedras, and reach Porto at the same time.

*June 17.**Thiebault,  
148—150.*

On the fourth day he reached Lamego with-

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*June.*

*He turns  
back from  
Mezam-  
frio.*

out the slightest resistance, and on the following morning crossed the Douro by the ferry at Regoa, and reached Mezam-frio, meaning to sleep there. His advanced guard was on the way to Amarante, which is only forty miles from Porto, when news was brought him while he was at dinner that the mountaineers were defending the pass at Os Padroens da Teixeira; and presently a second ill messenger arrived with intelligence that his baggage was attacked at Regoa. These operations had been ably planned by Silveira, and were well executed. In so strong a country he deemed it better to turn back than to proceed at the risk of being surrounded by an armed population. An ambuscade among the vineyards at Santinho annoyed him greatly on his way toward the Douro, and he himself was slightly hurt. The Portuguese, when they were dislodged, retreated to the heights; the French took up a position for the night, and in the morning sacked the villages of Pezo and Regoa, where neither age, nor infirmity, nor sex, nor childhood, were spared by them; for Loison was one of those men after Buonaparte's own heart, who, being equally devoid of honour and humanity, carried on war in the worst spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring without shame and without remorse. He now understood that Porto, which he had expected to find discontented indeed, but passive and in subjection, had thrown off the yoke; that a Portuguese officer, with whom he maintained a secret cor-

CHAP. X.  
 1808.  
 June.  
*The peasantry harass his retreat.*

respondence, had been fain to abscond from that city; that the disbanded soldiers had reassembled; and that the insurgent peasantry, in such numbers as to be truly formidable, were moving against him from all parts of the two northern provinces. The news of his retreat was presently known throughout the whole country between the Tua and the Cavado; expresses and telegraphs could not have communicated it more rapidly than it was spread by the voluntary bearers of good tidings. One column came from Villa Real, one from Amarante, a third from Guimaraens; a motlier assemblage had never taken the field; . . the commonest weapons were pikes and long poles armed with reaping-hooks at the end; and there were as many abbots, monks, friars, and parochial clergy in command, as officers. The three columns united at Regoa, too late to impede or molest the French in their passage of the river. The enemy halted for part of the night at Lamego, and resumed their retreat at two in the morning. The Portuguese came up with them that day at Juvantes, and harassed them during three days. The total want of discipline, order, and authority, rendered their great superiority of numbers unavailing; and after they had reached Castro d'Airo, dispersing as irregularly as they had collected, they gave up the pursuit, less in consequence of the loss which they sustained in a few brisk encounters, than because they were too numerous to find sustenance, and every man was eager to

*Neves, iii. 235—248. Thiebault, 150-1.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

report the retreat of the enemy and the share he had borne in the success. F. José Joaquim de Assumpçam, a friar of orders gray, distinguished himself in this expedition, by his activity, his strength, and his unerring aim.

*He goes to  
Viscu.*

The loss on either side, in this pursuit, appears not to have been great; the pursuers were too disorderly and too ill armed to make any serious impression upon the enemy, and the French were not strong enough to act upon the offensive with effect. They lost two pieces of artillery, and some of their ammunition and baggage; and a few rich uniforms which fell into the hands of the Portugueze were suspended as trophies in the churches of N. Senhora da Oliveira at Guimaraens, and of S. Gonçalo de Amarante, in the town which was under his peculiar patronage. Being freed from his pursuers, Loison, sending part of his force by the road of Moimenta da Beira, which was the shorter but rougher line to Almeida, took himself the way of Viseu. This

*Alarm at  
Coimbra in  
consequence  
of his move-  
ments.*

was the movement which alarmed the people at Coimbra, and induced them to recall Zagalo from Figueira. It was not improbable that his intention was to march upon that important city, and there place himself in communication with Lisbon: his own judgement would dispose him to this, and indeed no fewer than five-and-twenty dispatches, instructing him so to do, had been sent, not one of which had reached him. But he had received an exaggerated report of the proceedings in Coimbra, brought by some par-

*Thiebault,  
152.*

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Nevcs, iii.*  
217.*He returns  
to Almeida.*

tizans of the French, who had fled to save their lives, on the night of the insurrection, when their houses were broken open, during the suspension of all order and authority. Their testimony concerning the temper and unanimity of the inhabitants could not be doubted; it was added, that they were busy in constructing formidable works of defence, and that an auxiliary force of 12,000 Spaniards was expected there. Such strange events were now every day occurring, that nothing seemed too extraordinary to be believed; and Loison, it is thought, in consequence of these rumours, judged it best to change his purpose, and return to Almeida. The Portuguese general who commanded in Beira resided at Viseu; upon the approach of the French he summoned the magistrates and members of the *Camara*, and they determined not to oppose a premature and unavailing resistance. Loison, though notorious for rapacity, in the most rapacious army that ever disgraced its profession and its country, was at this time sensible how desirable it was, if possible, to obtain a character for moderation and equity. He encamped his troops for the night without the city, in the open space where the fairs were held, took up his own lodging in the general's house, and on his departure the next day, paid for every thing with which the men had been supplied. He also released three or four prisoners, who, in the late skirmishes, had fallen into his hands. At Celorico, where an insurrectionary movement



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Thiebault,*  
152.

*Neves, iii.*  
249—253.

*Insurrec-  
tion at Ol-  
ham.*

had commenced, it was suspended by the prudence of the magistrates and the just fears of the people, till the enemy had passed by. The peasantry of the adjacent country were less cautious; they appeared in arms upon the heights, and Loison therefore sent two companies to burn the village of Souropires. Being now within easy reach of Almeida, and knowing that the country about Trancoso and Guarda was in a state of insurrection, his intention was to employ himself in reducing it to submission; but here the only one of the numerous dispatches from Lisbon which reached its destination found him, and, in pursuance of its orders to draw nearer the capital, he hastened to Almeida, to make the necessary arrangements for his march. On the way he began to sack the city of Pinhel, which the inhabitants had deserted at his coming; but upon the tidings that a corps from Tras os Montes had arrived at Trancoso, and that Viseu was now in arms, he hastened forward, and on the 1st of July re-entered Almeida.

When Loison, upon the first apprehension of danger, was sent to occupy Porto, General Avril was instructed, at the same time, to take possession of Estremoz and Evora, for the purpose of holding Alem-Tejo in subjection, and to give orders for securing Algarve. General Maurin commanded for the French in this kingdom, as it is designated, the smallest but richest province in Portugal: owing to his illness the command had devolved upon Col. Maransin, who received

instructions to occupy Mertola as well as Alcoutim, for guarding the Guadiana against the Spaniards; and to protect the coast from Faro, the greatest port in that province, to Villa Real, the frontier town; at the mouth of the river. Maransin, however, was not left at leisure to do this. Junot's proclamation, announcing the seizure of the Spanish troops, expressing his satisfaction with the Portuguese for their peaceable deportment, and promising to instruct them in the art of war, had been fixed upon the church door at Olham, a small fishing village about four miles from the city of Faro. The governor of Villa Real, Col. José Lopes de Sousa, happening to be in that village on the day of the Corpo de Deos, as he was going into the church stopped to see what the people were reading. The language of that proclamation proved how little Junot understood the character of the nation to which it was addressed; it wounded that high sense of national honour for which the Portuguese are remarkable, and Lopes, giving way to an honourable feeling of indignation, tore the paper down, and trampled upon it; then turning to the bystanders, exclaimed, "Ah, Portuguese, we no longer deserve that name . . . we are nothing now!" But they answered, that they were still Portuguese, and swore that they were ready to lay down their lives for their religion, their Prince, and their country. Though the impulse had thus been given, and the determination of the parties formed, they did not neglect the re-

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

ligious duties of the day, but entered the church peaceably, and attended mass. That done, they proclaimed the Queen and Prince Regent in the porch, and called upon Lopes to be their general. He without delay prepared an address to the people, and sent for two pieces of artillery and some powder from an island at the bar of Armona, and from Fort Lorenzo on the bar of Faro. These were secured before the French in Faro could hear of the projected insurrection. Two agents also went off to the English squadron; the means which were at the commandant's disposal had probably been all disposed of to the Spaniards; they proceeded therefore to Ayamonte, and performed their errand with such good speed, that on the following night they returned to Olham with 130 muskets from the Junta of that city.

*Neves, iii.  
270—275.*

*Success of  
the insur-  
gents.*

The greater part of Maransin's force was stationed at Mertola, the rest was at Tavira and Villa Real, except 200 men at Faro. But before the news reached Faro a larger body of fishermen and peasantry had collected than 200 men could with any prudence have attacked. The French therefore sent for reinforcements from Villa Real and Tavira. From the latter place fourscore men embarked for Faro in three caics. The fishermen of Olham, confident in their skill upon the water, set out to intercept them under Captain Sebastiam Martins Mestre, one of those persons who had opened a communication with the English fleet and with Ayamonte. So little

were the French prepared for such an encounter, that they surrendered without resistance, and thus the insurgents obtained a seasonable supply of arms. They were not long allowed to enjoy their victory; about 200 French arrived from Villa Real to assist their countrymen at Faro, and they marched against Olham. The Portuguese met them half way, and disposed an ambuscade to receive them: their own eagerness prevented its success; but they behaved so well in a skirmish which ensued, that the enemy thought it not prudent to advance. This was the third day of the insurrection, and the people of Faro had as yet made no manifestation in its favour. The chamber of that city had, on the contrary, issued an edict against the insurgents, for what it denominated a riotous and scandalous attempt against the security of the nation, saying that their conduct would brand the Portuguese with the infamous stain of ingratitude, and warning them against the severe punishment which awaited them if they persisted in their frantic and desperate attempt. This edict was posted up in Olham; and it so evidently affected the people, in whom great excitement and fatigue had now produced proportionate exhaustion, that Lopes and Mestre, who had been hurt in the skirmish, thought it prudent to carry their prisoners to Spain, and go themselves to solicit aid from the Juntas at Ayamonte and at Seville.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.

*The Chamber of Faro issue an edict against them.*

*Neves, iii. 275—281. Observador Portuguez, 332, 333.*

Maransin, not aware of their departure, and anxious to lose no time in suppressing a spirit

*Insurrection at Faro.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*June.*

the consequences of which he had so much reason to dread, sent out three pieces of cannon to his detachment, and for want of French troops, a party of fifty Portuguese artillerymen, under Lieutenant Belchior Drago, an officer much more inclined to act against the enemies of his country than with them. Meantime the commander of the French, having learnt that the people of Olham were wavering, succeeded in obtaining a conference with some of them, and proposed terms. He promised them a free pardon, if they would return to their obedience; said that they should be protected in their fishery, and that even Lopes himself should be no otherwise punished than by forbidding him to appear in that place. The persons to whom these conditions were propounded listened to them willingly, and expressed an opinion that the people would probably assent, if the Portuguese authorities in Faro gave their sanction to the proposals. Some of the magistrates accordingly went to conclude this agreement with the Prior of Olham, a zealous Portuguese, to whom, in the absence of Lopes and Mestre, the insurgents looked as their proper counsellor and ruler. But at this moment, when the French by mere authority had nearly quelled the insurrection, the spell was broken, and they were made sensible that they had relied too confidently upon the terror of their name. A few Faro-men met in the shop of one Bento Alvares da Silva Canedo, and determined, while the French troops were

absent, to raise the city against them. They hired a fellow for a few moidores to give the signal, by chiming the bells of the Carmo church at a certain hour, in the manner usual in that country when prayers are solicited for a woman in labour. They who had concerted the scheme sallied into the streets, and proclaimed their native Prince; the populace gathered together at that welcome acclamation; a colonel of artillery joined them, and sent advice to Belchior Drago, who immediately returned to the city with his detachment; two of his brothers, both in the Portuguese service, appeared in the same cause, and the rest of the native troops without hesitation did the same. The French, when they would have re-entered the city to restore order, found cannon planted against them by men who knew how to use them; and, being repulsed in two attempts, retreated towards Tavira. Their magazines, their military chest, and all their papers, were taken\*, General Maurin, sick in bed, was necessarily left to his fate; and the populace would have killed him in their first use and abuse of power, if some humaner spirits had not interfered to preserve him. The Bishop also exerted himself to prevent this inhumanity, and had him transferred to the episcopal palace for security.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*The French  
excluded  
from that  
city.**Observador  
Portuguez,  
333—335.  
Neves, iii.  
282—289.*

\* Baron Thiebault ascribes the success of the insurgents, and the loss of Faro, to the news of Dupont's surrender, and to the landing of troops, arms, ammunition, and money, at Faro, from the English squadron. Not a man nor a musket had been landed

from that squadron, and the surrender of Dupont did not take place till a month afterwards! With so little accuracy do the French relate the circumstances of their ill success, even where no military misconduct is imputable.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*A Junta  
formed at  
Faro.*

On the following morning an assembly of the people was held in the Alto da Esperança. The magistrates, the Bishop and his chapter, the clergy, the monks and friars, (who had all taken arms), the troops and the nobles, met and solemnly proclaimed their lawful Prince; the *Quinas* were hoisted, and an oath was taken that they would each to the last drop of his blood defend the rights of the house of Braganza. Circular letters were dispatched to all the towns and villages in Algarve. The next day some instances of insubordination, and the reasonable apprehension of an attack, induced one of the canons to propose, and the people to consent, to the appointment of a Junta. The Chamber nominated seven electors for the nobles, and as many for the people, the chapter seven for the clergy, and the army seven for themselves. By these electors eight members were chosen, two for each of the four orders, and the Conde de Castro-Marim was appointed president. This nobleman had been governor and captain-general of Algarve at the time of the invasion; under the intrusive government he resided as a private individual at Tavira, and the popular desire of re-establishing the order of things to which they had been accustomed, was shown in nominating him to the presidency, as it was indeed in all the circumstances of the insurrection throughout Portugal. Emissaries were now sent to the east and west: in the west there were no enemies, and within eight-and-forty hours the acclamation was effected in Loule, Sylves, Lagos, at the fort

*The insur-  
rection  
spreads  
through  
Algarve.*

of Sagres, and in the little towns to the north of Cape St. Vincent. From the east there was reason to apprehend an attack; the enemy, who had been compelled to retire from Faro, had retreated to Tavira, and had been joined there by a detachment from Mertola. But the English squadron was in sight; and the French commander, knowing how inadequate his whole force was to the dangers which menaced it, knew also that Algarve might, with little inconvenience, be left to itself, and that his business was to place himself in communication with the troops in Alem-Tejo. He therefore withdrew to Mertola, and the people of Tavira, rising as soon as the enemy retired, harassed them on the way. Juntas, subordinate to that of Faro, were now formed in Tavira, and in other smaller places; a red riband upon the right arm was assumed as the badge of patriotism, and they who ventured to appear without it were in no small danger from the people; but though many persons were insulted and menaced, and some imprisoned as partizans of the French, the better orders exerted their influence with such effect, that no blood was shed. Preparations were made for defending the passes of the mountains which divide Algarve from Alem-Tejo; and accredited agents were sent to Ayamonte, Seville, and Gibraltar. Arms were without delay supplied from all these places, and from Gibraltar a considerable quantity of ammunition. A circumstance, however, occurred, which seemed likely at first to occasion

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*The French  
retreat to  
Mertola.*



CHAP. a misunderstanding with the Spaniards; for the  
 X. Portugueze, upon the retreat of the French,  
 1808. having thrown up some works at Castro-Marim,  
 June. the Spaniards crossed the river and destroyed  
 them. This measure, so rash, and in appearance  
 so hostile, was occasioned by an apprehension  
 that the French might return there, which they  
 had made a demonstration of doing before they  
 abandoned 'Tavira. It was soon explained, when  
 each people had so strong an interest in being  
 upon the best terms with each other, and a formal  
 treaty was concluded with the Junta of Seville.

*The people  
 of Algarve  
 form a  
 treaty with  
 Seville.*

*Neves, iii.  
 290—303.*

*Insurrec-  
 tion at  
 Villa-  
 Viçosa.*

Before the insurrection in Algarve had suc-  
 ceeded, and even before it was known beyond  
 the mountains, the same national feeling had  
 manifested itself in Alem-Tejo at Villa-Viçosa,  
 the place of all others where the national and  
 loyal feelings of a Portugueze would be most  
 elevated by local associations, having been the  
 residence of the Braganzan family during the  
 Spanish usurpation. Early in the month the in-  
 habitants had been exasperated by the passage of  
 a French escort through the town, with the con-  
 tributions that had been levied in that *Comarca*  
 and the plate of the churches. They were farther  
 irritated by an order for the militia to repair to  
 Elvas at a time when Kellermann hoped to em-  
 ploy them against the Spaniards at Badajoz. But  
 Elvas, where the main body of the French in  
 Alem-Tejo were stationed, was only four leagues  
 distant; there was a strong detachment still  
 nearer, at Estremoz, and a French company

was quartered among them, in the castle: they knew not that any movement for the recovery of their country's independence had been made; nor, owing to their peculiar situation, were there any people in Portugal by whom it could be made with so little hope or possibility of success. Thus they had borne oppression, and might have continued to bear it, if their oppressors, in the wantonness of power, had not added insult to wrong. There was an image of N. Senhora dos Remedios, which, after having by a supernatural declaration of its own pleasure, changed its name, made sundry voyages to and from India, and travelled from one place to another in Portugal during more than fourscore years, had at length obtained a settlement at Villa-Viçosa, in a chapel of its own, where, being in high odour for its miraculous powers, it was visited with peculiar devotion on its own holyday, the 19th of June, by the people of that town, and the adjacent country. The history of this idol might excite a mournful smile for human weakness, not without indignation at the systematic frauds which have been practised upon a religious people. The French were too irreligious to see any thing in it but matter of mockery; and some of the soldiers, placing themselves in a gateway near the chapel, amused themselves with deriding the Portuguese, who were going there to worship, in ignorance indeed, and in delusion, but in simplicity and sincerity of heart. Some of the peasants resented this insult by manual

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Santuario  
Muriano,  
t. vii. 571,  
579.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Naves*, iii.  
305—309.

force; more Frenchmen came to help their comrades, more Portuguese to support their countrymen; the scuffle became serious, for life or death, . . the bell of the *Camara* was rung, the French retired into the Castle, and succeeded in closing the gate, which had been so well secured with iron in old times, that the people were neither able to break it open, nor to hew it in pieces. This was towards evening, and the riot continued all night.

*The French  
enter the  
town.*

The town was now in open insurrection. Messengers set off to solicit succour from Badajoz, and General Francisco de Paula Leite, who had lately governed the province, was called upon to take the command, which he absolutely refused, knowing that this tumult must inevitably end in the destruction of those who engaged in it. Antonio Lobo Infante de Lacerda, an old officer, and then Sargento-Mor of the militia, regarding consequences less, set his life fairly upon the die; he took the lead, and stationed marksmen upon the top of the Conceiçam church, and in other points which commanded the Castle. Owing to these dispositions several of the French fell. Meantime the news reached Estremoz, where Kellermann and Avril both happened to be: fifty dragoons, with half a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, were immediately dispatched to rescue their fellows. A poor countryman, by name Ignacio da Silva, was in Estremoz at the time; seeing their movements, he easily divined their intention; good will gave him good

speed, and running the ten miles, he brought intelligence of their march to Villa-Viçosa in time for Antonio Lobo to make preparations for receiving them. He stationed some forty men, all for whom fire-arms could be found, upon the walls, and towers, and houses, at the entrance from the Borba road; the enemy, informed of, or divining this design, took another entrance. The way was soon cleared by their field-pieces. General Avril and Colonel Lacroix entered the town in pursuit of the routed multitude, the bayonet was used, with little mercy or discrimination, 200 persons were killed in the streets, many more in the country, twelve prisoners were put to death as ringleaders in what the French called rebellion, and the place was given up to pillage for one hour.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
335.  
*Neves, iii.*  
309—315.

The messengers from this unfortunate town had been joyfully received at Badajoz; and Moretti, the officer who had performed the perilous service of conferring with General Carraffa in Lisbon, was dispatched with a corps of Portuguese refugees which had been formed under protection of the Spanish fortress. They had arrived at Olivença on their way, when Antonio Lobo arrived there also, escaping with about a score companions from the carnage. Instead of returning with ill news, as a man of ordinary spirit would have done, Moretti inquired whether some useful enterprise might not be attempted; and they determined upon

*Lobo gets  
possession of  
Jurumenha.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*June.*

getting possession of Jurumenha, knowing how important it was that the Portuguese loyalists should possess a place within their own border, which had the name of being fortified, when the French were in no condition to attack it. It was occupied by a Portuguese garrison, but the governor partook so little in the honourable feelings of his nation, that he had that day seized some fugitives from Villa-Viçosa, and sent them prisoners to Elvas, requesting at the same time a French garrison for his security and that of the place. He understood the temper of his own people ; but Moretti and Lobo knew it also, and calculated upon it. Sixteen Portuguese, concealing their arms, entered as if upon ordinary business ; eight proceeded to seize the governor, the others took their station in the gates, and admitted their party just in time to point the artillery of the place against the French, who had been ordered from Elvas to occupy it without delay. Moretti now obtained farther assistance from Badajoz, and discretionary powers : on the other hand, Kellermann sent a second party to recover Jurumenha ; but supposing the force which defended it to be much stronger than in reality it was, they returned without venturing to attack it. This greatly encouraged the Portuguese, and more than counterbalanced the effect of their slaughter at Villa-Viçosa. Emissaries and proclamations were sent from hence throughout the province ; and the people, exaggerating the

importance of the place, looked to it with confidence as a strong point of support in their own country.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

The news from Algarve, spreading at the same time, elevated their spirits ; and the state of the country soon became such, that the French couriers were every where intercepted. Colonel Maransin, with his troops, had now effected his retreat to Mertola, from whence, for the purpose of restoring a communication with Estremoz and with Lisbon, he sent a detachment of 100 foot and thirty dragoons to Beja. That city was originally a settlement of the Kelts, possessed next by the Carthaginians, afterwards the Pax Julia of the Romans, a Moorish corruption of which name has been euphonized to its present form. It was taken from the Moors by the first king of Portugal, restored from its ruins and fortified in the thirteenth century by Affonso III. and beautified by his son, King Diniz, with his characteristic magnificence, of which the walls with their forty towers, and the fine castle, bore testimony in their ruins. Here, as in all the other cities of Alem-Tejo, there was a melancholy air of decay, less owing to the long and destructive struggle with Spain, in which that province had been the great scene of action, than to the peculiar circumstances which depressed its agriculture, and that inhuman persecution of the New-Christians, by which the largest part of the commercial capital in Portugal had either been annihilated by confiscations, or driven out of the

*A French detachment sent from Mertola to Beja.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

kingdom. Still, however, it contained some ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, and was a place of considerable importance in that thinly peopled province. It stood on the highest part of an elevated and extensive plain, conspicuous from a distance, and commanding a wide prospect on all sides, the heights of Palmella and even of Cintra being distinctly visible. The immediate country, where it is cultivated, is fertile, and the situation in high repute for its salubrity. Eventful as the history of Beja had been, it was now to undergo as severe a calamity as any with which it had been visited in the unhappiest ages of Spain.

June 23.

*The people  
rise against  
them.*

The French detachment entered the city without opposition, passed the night there, and on the next day ordered quarters and provisions to be made ready for the whole body of troops in Mertola, who, they said, were about to follow them. Their demand was received in such a manner by the people of Beja, who were now acquainted not only with the state of Spain, but with the nearer events in Algarve and at Jurumenha, that the French deemed it prudent to march out, and take a position in the open country, not far from the walls. This encouraged the populace; and, like all mobs, becoming cruel as they felt themselves strong, they murdered two soldiers whom the French indiscreetly sent into the city for provisions. Ignorant of their fate, the commander supposed they had been imprisoned, and threatened, if they were not immediately set free, to

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.

June 25.

*Neves, iii.*  
323—327.

release them by force. The people then riotously demanded arms, that they might rush out and attack the enemy. The magistrates remonstrated with them in vain, and on the following morning the Corregidor, finding that farther delay would only endanger his own life, distributed among them such weapons as could be collected, and taking the safest course for himself, set off to solicit aid from the Junta of Ayamonte, the nearest authority by which it could be supplied. The Provedor and the Juiz de Fora thought it their duty to avert, if possible, the immediate danger: they went out to the French, entreated them not to attack the town, and promised them supplies; the enemy were easily entreated, because they were not strong enough in reality for any such attempt: the magistrates then endeavoured to make the people ratify what they had undertaken for them; all reasoning was in vain, and to save their own lives they left the city. But here also private malice availed itself of public troubles to effect its own ends; a messenger recalled them, upon the plea that they were wanted to give orders for collecting provisions, in fulfilment of their agreement; for the Corregidor having departed, there was no person to take upon himself that business. Deceived by this treacherous message, they returned, and were butchered by a ferocious mob, who knew not that they were made the brutal instruments of individual revenge.



CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*Beja sacked  
by the  
French,  
and set on  
fire.*

June 26.

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
341.  
Neves, iii.  
327—332.*

By this time, however, the ardour of the people had so far cooled, that they no longer talked of sallying against the French, they contented themselves with keeping a tumultuous watch through the night; and when the morning dawned, and there appeared no enemy, they fancied themselves secure. The French commander had merely retired out of sight: his dispatches reached Mertola at eleven on the preceding night; at midnight Maransin, with 950 men, began his march, and at four the next evening the united force arrived before Beja. They were opposed by a mere multitude without order, leader, or plan of defence, every man acting for himself as he thought best. Yet the victory was not gained without a brave resistance, and some loss to the assailants. According to the French account they lost eighty in killed and wounded, while 1200 of the Portuguese were slain in the action, and all who were taken in arms were put to death. The worst excesses followed by which humanity can be disgraced and outraged, and the \* city was sacked and set on fire.

\* Baron Thiebault represents this as a great exploit on the part of his fellow-soldiers. He says, *Le Colonel Maransin auroit pu éviter Beja, mais il crut devoir ramener, par un grand exemple, ce pays à l'obeissance. Il forme ses colonnes en marchant, et sans artillerie attaque cette ville, enceinte de hautes murailles, dont toutes les portes étoient barricadées, dont les murs, les tours,*

*étoient défendus par des forces quintuples des siennes, et par des hommes qui, dans leur fureur, défioient nos bataillons.* Who would suppose, from this description, that these high walls and towers were in ruins, and that they were defended by a mob of three or four thousand men, not a third part of whom were armed with firelocks! After killing 1200 men in action, and

In this whole merciless proceeding Maransin acted upon his own judgement, well knowing that such was the system which Napoleon had laid down, and which his generals felt no reluctance in executing. He proceeded to Evora, and Kellermann, approving of his conduct, held out the fate of Beja in a proclamation, as a warning to the province. "Inhabitants of Alem-Tejo," he said, "Beja had revolted, and Beja exists no longer. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the edge of the sword, and its houses delivered up to pillage and to the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and with a senseless hatred take arms against us. Thus shall those bands of smugglers and criminals be treated, who have collected in Badajoz, and put arms into the hands of the unhappy Lusitanians, but dare not themselves march against us. Who, indeed, can resist our invincible troops? Ye who have precipitated yourselves into rebellion, prevent, by prompt submission, the inevitable chastisement that awaits you! And ye who have hitherto

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.Keller-  
mann's pro-  
clamation  
to the peo-  
ple of Alem-  
Tejo.

all who were found in arms after it, sacking the city, and setting it on fire, it seems difficult to understand what the mercy was which the surviving inhabitants are said to have sent to Lisbon to solicit. According to Baron Thiebault, *un brave religieux*, after the assault, moved all his auditors to tears, by representing to them how much they had provoked their own misfortunes: he was consequently deputed unanimously to implore Junot's cle-

meny. Junot received him graciously, and rewarded him with a canonry; LA RECONNOISSANCE FUT EXTREME, . . . *et Beja n'en reprit pas moins les armes peu de jours après.* In the bulletin published at Lisbon upon this occasion, and signed by this same General Thiebault, it is said, the inhabitants expressed their contrition by their deputy, acknowledged that they had been justly punished, and confessed that they had been seduced by the English!

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
347.

*Junot's pro-  
clamation  
to the Por-  
tugueze.*

been happy or prudent enough to continue in your duty, profit by this terrible example! Our general in chief has not told you in vain that clouds of rebels shall be dispersed before us like the sands of the desert before the impetuous breath of the south wind."

The bombastic sentence which Kellermann thus quoted, was from a proclamation that Junot had just sent forth, in that spirit of shameless falsehood and remorseless tyranny which characterised the intrusive government. He asked the Portugueze what madness possessed them? What reason they could have, after seven months of the most perfect tranquillity, of the best understanding, to take arms; . . . and against whom? against an army which was to secure their independence and maintain the integrity of their country! Was it their wish, then, that ancient Lusitania should become a province of Spain? Could they regret a dynasty which had abandoned them, and under which they were no longer counted among the nations of Europe? What more could they desire than to be Portugueze, and independent? and this Napoleon had promised them. They had asked him for a king, who, under his all-powerful protection, might restore their country to its rank. At this moment their new monarch was expecting to approach them. "I hoped," said Junot, "to place him in a peaceable and flourishing kingdom; am I to show him nothing but ruins and graves? Will he reign in a desert? assuredly not; and you will not be any thing

but a wretched province of Spain. Your customs and laws have been maintained; your holy religion, which is ours also, has not suffered the least insult; it is you who violate it, suffering it to be influenced by heretics, who only wish for its destruction. Ask the unhappy Roman-catholics of Ireland under what oppression they are groaning! If these perfidious islanders invade your territory, leave me to fight them; . . . your part is to remain peaceably in your fields." He then attempted to soothe them, saying, that if any abuses in the administration still existed, every day's experience would diminish them. The Emperor, satisfied with the reports which he had received of the public spirit, had graciously remitted half the contribution. He was fulfilling all their wishes. And would they let themselves be dragged on by the influence of a banditti, at the very moment when they should be happy? "Portugueze," said he, "you have but one moment to implore the clemency of the Emperor and disarm his wrath. Already the armies of Spain touch your frontiers at every point; . . . you are lost if you hesitate. Merit your pardon by quick submission, or behold the punishment that awaits you! Every village or town in which the people have taken arms, and fired upon my troops, shall be delivered up to pillage, and destroyed, and the inhabitants shall be put to the sword. Every individual found in arms shall instantly be shot."

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.**Observador  
Portuguez,  
317—320.*

The French had dealt largely in false pro-

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
June.*National  
feeling of  
the Portu-  
guese.*

mises; they were sincere in their threats, and on the very day when this proclamation was issued at Lisbon, that sincerity was proved at Beja. But as the Portuguese had not been deceived, neither were they now to be intimidated. Their character had been totally mistaken by their insolent oppressors. They, like the Spaniards, had a deep and ever-present remembrance of their former greatness. It was sometimes expressed with a vanity which excited the contempt of those who judge hastily upon that imperfect knowledge which is worse than ignorance; more generally it produced a feeling of dignified and melancholy pride. The kingdom had decayed, but the degeneracy of the people was confined to the higher ranks, whom every possible cause, physical and moral, combined to degrade. Generation after generation, they had intermarried, not merely within the narrow circle of a few privileged families, but oftentimes in their own; uncles with their nieces, nephews with their aunts. The canonical law was dispensed with for these alliances; but no dispensing power could set aside the law of nature, which rendered degeneracy the sure consequence. Thus was the breed deteriorated; and education completed the mischief. The young fidalgo was never regarded as a boy: as soon as the robes, or rather bandages of infancy were laid aside, he appeared in the dress of manhood, was initiated in its forms and follies, and it was rather his misfortune than his fault, if, at an early age, he became familiar

with its vices. When he arrived at manhood, no field for exertion was open to him, even if he were qualified or disposed to exert himself. The private concerns of embellishing and improving an estate were as little known in Portugal as those public affairs in which the nobility of Great Britain are so actively engaged: if not in office, he was in idleness, and his idleness was passed in the capital. A wasteful expenditure made him a bad landlord, and a bad paymaster; a deficient education made him a bad statesman; and well was it if the lax morality which the casuists had introduced into a corrupt religion, did not make him a bad man. Exceptions there were, because there are some dispositions so happily tempered, that their original goodness can never be wholly depraved, however unpropitious the circumstances in which they are placed; but men, for the most part, are what circumstances make them, and these causes of degeneracy were common to all of the higher class. On the other hand, the middle classes were improved, and the peasantry uncorrupted. Their occupations were the same as those of their forefathers; nor did they differ from them in any respect, except what was a most important one at this time, that a long interval of peace, and their frequent intercourse with the Spaniards, had effaced the old enmity between the two nations, so that along the border the languages were intermingled, and intermarriages so common, as to have produced a natural and moral

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Their ha-  
tred of the  
French.*

*Neves, iii.  
210.*

union. They were a fine, hospitable, noble-minded race, respected most by those who knew them best. The upper boughs were scathed, but the trunk and the root were sound.

Their ignorance as well as their superstition, contributed at this time to excite and sustain a national resistance. They expected miracles in their favour; the people of Coimbra actually believed that a miracle had been wrought, because when the French fired upon them from the windows of their quarters, no person was hurt. Of the relative strength of nations they knew nothing, nor of the arrangements which are necessary for carrying on war, nor of the resources by which it must be maintained. Spain filled a larger space in their imagination than France, and Portugal than either; and they were not erroneous in believing that Spain and Portugal together possessed a strength which might defy the world. The threats of the intrusive government therefore excited indignation instead of dismay; such language addressed to minds in their state of exaltation, was like water cast upon a fire intense enough to decompose it, and convert its elements into fuel for the flames. The fate of Beja excited hatred and the thirst of vengeance instead of fear, and the insurrection continued to spread in the very province where the experiment had been made upon so large a scale of putting an end to it by fire and sword.

*The Juiz de  
Fora at  
Marvao.*

A Portuguese of the old stamp, by name An-

tonio Leite de Araujo Ferreira Bravo, held the office of Juiz de Fora at Marvam, a small town about eight miles from Portalegre, surrounded with old walls. Of the many weak places upon that frontier it was the only one which, in the short campaign of 1801, resisted the Spaniards in their unjust and impolitic invasion, and was not taken by them; and this was in great measure owing to his exertions. When the French usurped the government, a verbal order came from the Marquez d'Alorna, at that time general of the province, to admit either French or Spanish troops as friends, and give them possession of the place. Antonio Leite protested against this, maintaining that no governor ought to deliver up a place intrusted to his keeping without a formal and authentic order: proceedings were instituted against him for his opposition, and he was severely reprehended, this being thought punishment enough at that time, and in a town where no commotion was dreamt of. When the decree arrived at Marvam, by which it was announced that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, Antonio Leite sent for the public notaries of the town, and resigned his office, stating, in a formal instrument, that he did this because he would not be compelled to render that obedience to a foreign power which was due to his lawful and beloved Sovereign, and to him alone. Then taking with him these witnesses to the church of the Misericordia, he deposited his wand of office in the hands of an image of N. Senhor dos

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.*



CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
*June.*

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*Neves, ii.*  
109—122.

*He flies the  
town.*

Passos, and in the highest feeling of old times called upon the sacred image to keep it till it should one day be restored to its rightful possessor. He then returned to his house, and put himself in deep mourning. The order arrived for taking down the royal arms. He entreated the *Vereador* not to execute it, upon the plea that the escutcheon here was not that of the Braganza family, but of the kingdom, put up in the reign of Emanuel, and distinguished by his device; and when this plea was rejected, he took the shield into his own keeping, and laid it carefully by, to be preserved for better days.

The Juiz seems to have been a man who had read the chronicles of his own country till he had thoroughly imbibed their spirit. These actions were so little in accord with the feelings and manners of the present age, that they were in all likelihood ascribed to insanity, and that imputation saved him from the persecution which he would otherwise have incurred. But when the national feeling began to manifest itself, such madness was then considered dangerous, and the Corregidor of Portalegre received orders from Lisbon to arrest him. Before these orders arrived he had begun to stir for the deliverance of his country, and had sent a confidential person with a letter to Galluzo, the Spanish commander at Badajoz, requesting aid from thence to occupy Marvam; men could not be spared; and the messenger returned with the unwelcome intelligence that before he left Badajoz the busi-

ness on which he went had transpired, and was publicly talked of. Perceiving now that his life was in danger, his first care was that no person might suffer but himself, and therefore he laid upon his table a copy of the letter which he had written, from which it might be seen that the invitation was his single act and deed; having done this, he seemed rather to trust to Providence than to take any means for securing himself. It was not long before, looking out at the window, he saw the Corregedor with an adjutant of Kellermann's and a party of horse coming to his house. He had just time to bid the servant say he was not within, and slip into the street by a garden door. He had got some distance, when the Corregedor saw him, and called after him, saying he wanted to settle with him concerning the quartering of some troops. Antonio Leite knew what his real business was too well to be thus deceived, and quickened his pace. The town has two gates, one of which was fastened, because the garrison was small: toward that however he ran, well knowing that if he were not intercepted at the other, he should be pursued and surely overtaken. Joaquim José de Matos, a Coimbra student, then at home for the vacation, met him, and offered to conceal him in his house; but the Juiz continued to run, seeing that the soldiers were in pursuit, dropt from the wall, escaped with little hurt, and then scrambled down the high and steep crag upon which it stands. Matos, think-

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
June.

*Neves, iii.*  
333—337.

ing that he had now involved himself, ran also, and being of diminutive stature, squeezed himself through a hole in the gate; they then fled together toward Valencia de Alcantara, and had the satisfaction, at safe distance, of seeing a Swiss escort come round the walls to the place where the Juiz had dropt.

*He returns,  
and seizes  
the town.*

The Spanish frontier being so near, their escape was easy; but when they had been a few days at Valencia de Alcantara, Matos determined upon returning to his family, knowing that there was no previous charge against him, and thinking that the act of having spoken to the Juiz could not be punished as a crime. In this he was mistaken. The governor of Marvam was a worthy instrument of the French. He not only arrested Matos, but his father also, an old man who was dragged from his bed, where he lay in a fit of the gout, to be thrown into a Portugueze prison; and a physician, whom he suspected of being concerned in the scheme of an insurrection. This news reached the Juiz; it was added, that his own property had been sequestered, he himself outlawed, and all persons forbidden to harbour him, and that a French escort had arrived to carry the three prisoners to Elvas. He could not endure to think that he should be, however innocently, the occasion of their death, and therefore determined to attempt at least their deliverance at any hazard. It was not difficult to find companions at a time when all usual occupations were at a stand, and every man eager to be in

action against an odious enemy. With a few Spanish volunteers he crossed the frontier, and there raised the peasantry, who knew and respected him: with this force he proceeded to a point upon the road between Marvam and Elvas; the escort had passed, .. but he had the satisfaction to learn that it had not gone for the prisoners, only to bring away the ammunition and spike the guns. This raised their spirits; they directed their course to Marvam, climbed the walls during the night, opened the prison, seized the governor, and without the slightest opposition from two hundred Portugueze troops, whom he had just obtained from Elvas to secure the place, and who, if they knew what was passing, did not choose to notice it, the adventurers returned to Valencia in triumph with their friends, and with the governor prisoner. The Junta of Valencia did not now hesitate, in conformity to an order from Badajoz, to give the Juiz regular assistance; he entered Marvam in triumph with this auxiliary force, and the Prince Regent was proclaimed there by the rejoicing inhabitants, at the very time when Beja was in flames. A few days afterwards a Spanish detachment from Albuquerque entered Campo-Mayor with the same facility. Some jealousies which arose there, as well as at Marvam, from the inconsiderate conduct of the Spanish officers in issuing orders as if they were in their own territories, were put an end to by the formation of a Junta, of which the Spanish commander at Campo-Mayor was

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*June.**June 26.**Insurrec-  
tion at  
Campo-  
Mayor.**July 2.*

CHAP. made president. The example of these places  
 X. was immediately followed at Ouguela, Castello  
 1808. de Vide, Arronches, and Portalegre; and the  
 June. insurrection thus extended throughout all that  
 Neves, iii. part of the province which is to the north of  
 337—360. Elvas.

*Measures of  
 the French.*

*June 28.*

*Thiebault,  
 Relation,  
 128.*

Junot meantime was in a state of great anxiety at Lisbon. It was not known what was become of Maransin and the troops in Algarve; there was no news of Loison; the insurrection in the north had reached Coimbra, and was spreading in Estremadura, and there was a report, probable enough to obtain credit, that an expedition of 10,000 English was off the bar. He called a council, at which the generals of division, Comte de Laborde and Travot, were present, the chief of the staff, General Thiebault, Baron de Margaron, and other officers. The result of their conference was, that the army should be collected in and near Lisbon, leaving garrisons in only the three important places of Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche; that Setubal and the left bank of the Tagus should be maintained as long as possible; that when the English appeared they should occupy in succession three positions; one from Leiria to Ourem and Thomar; a second from Santarem to Rio-Mayor, Obidos, and Peniche; lastly, one from Saccavem to Cintra: finally, that they should defend Lisbon till the utmost extremity, and only leave it to retire upon Elvas, rest the troops there, and then force their way either to Madrid, Segovia, or Valladolid. In

pursuance of this resolution, Kellermann was summoned from Alem-Tejo, and courier after courier dispatched to recall Loison from Beira. Junot's next measure was to put the church plate which he had secured in a portable form, and for this purpose what there was no time for coining was melted into ingots. To counteract the rumours, true and false, by which the Portuguese were encouraged, it was affirmed that Napoleon had entered Spain, and that 20,000 men had reached the frontiers of Portugal to reinforce the French. Alarmed and harassed by contradictory rumours, and dreading from the temper of the people an insurrection, which would be punished by a massacre, many families removed from Lisbon; those who had country estates to their *Quintas*, the greater number to the different places on the opposite side of the river, particularly Almada and Casilhas. They were however ordered to return; every head of a family who did not within four days obey this order was to be arrested, and all persons were prohibited from leaving Lisbon, unless they were provided with a passport from the police, . . . an institution to which the Portuguese at this time applied the name of the Inquisition. It was of importance, the decree said, that good citizens should be secured against the ridiculous rumours which were promulgated, and that all notions of danger to the city of Lisbon should be put an end to; the French army would know how to maintain tranquillity there. This, however, was less a mea-

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
321.*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
343. n.  
July 1.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
345.

*They en-  
deavour to  
avail them-  
selves of the  
clergy's in-  
fluence.*

sure of policy than of extortion; those families who had retired were made to pay, in proportion to their means, for permission to remain where they were. They who had nothing to give suffered the whole inconvenience of this oppressive law.

The French commander tried to suppress the national feeling by the influence of religion. In the village of Varatojo, near Torres Vedras, there was a famous seminary for itinerant preachers of the Franciscan order, instituted by Fr. Antonio das Chagas, a man remarkable alike for his genius, for the profligacy of his youth, and the active, austere, enthusiastic piety of his after life. Junot sent for the Guardian of this seminary, requiring his immediate attendance; the old man, in strict adherence to the rule of his order, which forbade him to travel by any other means, obeyed the summons on foot, and arrived four-and-twenty hours later than the time appointed. He was then ordered to dispatch some of his preachers, as men who possessed great authority over the people, to Leiria and into Alem-Tejo, to preach the duty of submission and tranquil obedience. The Guardian excused himself by representing that his brethren who were qualified for such a mission were already on their circuits, and that there were then in the seminary none but youths engaged in preparing for the ministry, and old men, who, being past all service, rested there from their labours, in expectation of their release. The dignitaries of the patriarchal church could

*Neves, iv.*  
61—63.

*July 2.*

not so well evade his commands; a pastoral letter was obtained from them denouncing ex-communication against all persons who should, directly or indirectly, either by writing, speaking, or acting, encourage the spirit of insurrection which had gone abroad. This was sent into the provinces, with a letter from the French intendant of police, Lagarde, in which the clergy and the heads of convents were informed, that wherever public tranquillity might be disturbed, they would be held responsible, because no disturbance would break out if they exerted themselves to prevent it, as the true spirit of religion required. The fate of Beja, he said, should be that of every city in Portugal which should have the guilty imprudence to revolt against the Emperor, now the sole sovereign of that country. And he asked the Portugeze, wherefore they would bring upon themselves the heavy weight of power at a moment when the Almighty authority (such was the blasphemous expression) thought only of putting in oblivion the rights of conquest, and of governing with mildness? Is it, said he, before a few handfuls of factious men in Portugal that the star of the great Napoleon is to be obscured, or the arm of one of his most valiant and skilful captains to be deadened? Deeply as the baneful superstition of the Romish church has rooted itself in that country, the threat of excommunication excited nothing but contempt. The French could not derive any assistance from ecclesiastical interference while

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.

July 4.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
348—353.



CHAP. it was remembered that they had robbed the  
X. churches.

1808.  
July.

*Insurrec-  
tion at Tho-  
mar.*

It is not extraordinary that the intrusive government should have failed to deceive the people by its addresses; but that it should have attempted so to do; that it should have talked of benefits intended and conferred upon a nation on whom it had brought such wide and general misery, and inflicted injuries as unprovoked as they were enormous, indicated indeed an effrontery of which none but the agents of Buonaparte were capable. Their insolent language exasperated the Portuguese. One of these papers was lying upon a tradesman's counter in Thomar, and one of their very few partizans vindicated the manner in which the Prince was there spoken of, saying, that the country was now rid of him and of the Inquisition. A Franciscan who was present immediately took a knife from his sleeve, and struck it through the paper into the board, saying, that in that manner he would serve any one who dared speak against his Prince and his religion: and producing a pistol, he was only withheld by force from giving murderous proof of his sincerity. An information was laid against him, and a party of Portuguese soldiers sent from Abrantes to arrest him: he absconded in time, and the Guardian of the convent, who was suspected of favouring his escape, was taken in his stead. Before they could carry him out of the town, the people rose and rescued him, and the restoration of the legitimate government was pro-

*Neres, iv.  
3-8.*

claimed with the same ceremonies as in other places. CHAP.  
X.

About the same time a handful of students from Coimbra, collecting volunteers as they went, spread the insurrection at Condeixa, Ega, and Pombal, and approached Leiria, from which city a small party of the French retired before them. This place was within easy reach of the enemy, and troops, arms, and ammunition were wanting to defend it. The people sent to Coimbra for all, as if Coimbra could supply either: the Bishop exerted himself to forward the preparations; and the people mustered tumultuously with that confidence which an ignorant multitude always feels of its own untried strength. The French had some small garrisons upon the coast, about twenty miles off, in the little forts of Nazareth, S. Giam, and S. Martinho, which communicated with each other by telegraphs, and drew rations every day from the adjoining country. The Juiz of Pederneira was compelled to furnish these; in this time of alarm he was called upon to store them with a convenient stock beforehand, and because this was not, and could not be done in a few hours, they began to pillage the neighbourhood. Provoked at this, the fishermen fell upon a Frenchman, who was going with dispatches from S. Martinho to Nazareth, and murdered him, crying, Down with the French! The sentinel at the signal-post had the same fate.. the signal-post was broken, and the country round about was presently in insurrection. The enemy with-

1808.  
July.

*Insurrec-  
tion at  
Leiria.*

*Success of  
the insur-  
gents at  
Nazareth.*

- CHAP. drew from S. Giam and S. Martinho, having  
 X. hastily spiked two guns at the former place, and  
 1808. buried two barrels of powder. They fell back  
 July. upon a detachment under General Thomieres,  
 which watched the country between the Caldas,  
 Obidos, and Peniche. Nazareth was blockaded  
 by the insurgents; the report was, that a con-  
 siderable Spanish army had arrived at Leiria,  
 and incredible as this was, it was believed, and  
 gave full confidence to these ignorant and zeal-  
 ous people. They sent thither for assistance,  
 and the Coimbra students came with a party of  
 peasants, those who could muster the best arms.  
 The cannon were brought from S. Giam, and  
 rendered serviceable; the two barrels of pow-  
 der were discovered; a Portuguese artilleryman  
 escaped from the fort to join his countrymen;  
 and direct their operations; and the French,  
 finding themselves now in serious danger, capi-  
 tulated to save their lives. The victorious stu-  
 dents and their party were far advanced on their  
 return to Leiria, when they heard news of that  
 miserable city, which rendered it necessary for  
 them to strike into the pine forest, and conduct  
 their prisoners by unfrequented ways to Figueira.
- July 5.
- Neves, iv.  
14—30.
- Margaron  
approaches  
Leiria.
- General Margaron had been sent from Lisbon  
 with between 4000 and 5000 men, to check the  
 progress of the insurrection in Estremadura, and  
 learn some intelligence of Loison, from whom  
 nothing had been heard for a considerable time.  
 Though the disposition of the people was every  
 where the same, they were kept down by the

presence or by the neighbourhood of the enemy, every where within reach of the capital ; and he met with no opposition till he approached Leiria. That city, which is the most considerable place on the road to Coimbra, is built upon the little rivers Liz and Lena, in a beautiful country, an hundred miles from Lisbon. It is believed to have been built from the ruins of Colippo, a Lusitanian city which the Romans destroyed ; and it has been asserted, that Sertorius planted a colony there whom he brought from Liria in Spain. Affonso Henriquez fortified it as a strong hold against the Moors, who then possessed Santarem, and recovered it after they had captured it. Some of his successors occasionally resided there, and its fine castle was enlarged and beautified by Queen St. Isabel, wife of the magnificent King Diniz. At the beginning of the last century it contained 900 houses and 2150 communicants. Its population had increased, and might at this time have been estimated at about 5000. The adjacent country has been made the scene of pastoral romance by Francisco Rodriguez Lobo, for which it is precisely adapted by its wild yet beautiful and peaceful character.

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CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
*July.*

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The people of Leiria and the peasantry who had collected there had had little time for preparation when they heard that the French were approaching. They had paraded through their streets the banner of the city, bearing for its device a crow upon a pine tree ; in memory of one which, when Affonso Henriquez attacked

*Preparation for  
defence.*

CHAP.  
X:

1808.  
July.

the city, perched there in the midst of his camp, and clapped its wings and croaked in a manner that was accepted as a good omen. They had proclaimed the Prince, restored and repainted the royal arms, and assisted at the performance of *Te Deum* in the cathedral; but school-boys in a rebellion could not have been more unprepared with any plan of defence, or unprovided with means for it. They were in an open city. They had not a single piece of cannon. Of some 800 men who were stationed at outposts and other points of danger, scarcely a fourth part were armed with muskets, and for these three or four round of cartridges were all that could be found. To persons unacquainted with the character and condition of the Portuguese it might appear almost incredible that resistance should have been attempted under circumstances thus absolutely hopeless. But the people were goaded by insult, and stung by the feeling of insupportable wrong. They had been wantonly invaded, .. grievously, inhumanly, and remorselessly oppressed. They knew that the nation was rising against its oppressors: they felt instinctively what the strength of a nation is; and were too much exasperated to consider, or too little informed to understand, that without order and discipline numbers are of little avail, and even courage not to be relied on.

*Nèves, iv:*  
31—36.

*The French  
enter the  
city.*

The higher orders were perfectly sensible of their imminent danger, but they would have exposed themselves to certain destruction if they

had attempted to reason with the infuriated multitude. The magistrates therefore, and the person who had been appointed to the command, withdrew secretly from the city during the night, and fled. In the morning five Frenchmen, who had been surprised upon a marauding party, were brought in prisoners. A short-lived and senseless exultation was excited at their appearance. At noon it was known that the enemy were close at hand; they sent forward a peasant who had fallen into their hands, and whom, contrary to their custom, they had spared, to offer pardon to the people if they would return to their obedience; that offer being refused, they attacked the insurgents. By their own account the resistance was so momentary, that there was no time for the artillery, nor for half the troops to take part in the action. The insurgents threw away their arms, like terrified villagers, imploring the clemency of an irritated conqueror. From 800 to 900 were left upon the field. The city was entered on all sides. But, by their own account, the moment the action was over, General Margaron restrained the indignation of his troops; their moderation was equal to their valour, and victory was immediately followed by order. Margaron, in a proclamation to the inhabitants, dwelt upon his clemency. "A decree had been issued," he said, "commanding that every town where the French were fired upon should be burnt, and its inhabitants put to the sword. They had incurred that penalty, and his duty required him

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.

July 5.

3d Bulletin.  
Observador  
Portuguez,  
357.  
Thiebault,  
143.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

*Thiebault,  
Pièces Jus-  
tificatives,  
No. 10.*

*Massacre  
of the pri-  
soners.*

*Neves, iv.  
48.*

to inflict it. Nevertheless he had prevented the massacre and the conflagration; not a house, not a cottage had been burnt; he had protected their persons and their property, as far as was possible under such circumstances; and instead of seeking for the guilty, he repeated to them his offers of peace and union. He called upon them to learn who were their real friends, and lay aside their arms. Leave," said he, "the noble task of protecting and defending you to the soldiers of the great nation. Submit yourselves to the power which Heaven supports, and obey our holy church as I do, . . . you in renouncing your projects of exterminating the French, I in forgiving all that you have done against them."

This is what the French relate of their conduct at Leiria. "Sepulchres of Leiria," exclaims the Portuguese historian of these events, "prove ye the falsehood with which these robbers, as cruel as they are perfidious, have deceived the world!" What they have not related is now to be recorded. It is not dissembled by the Portuguese that the defence was as feeble and as momentary as the enemy describe it. They entered the city on all sides, and began an indiscriminate butchery; old and young, women and babes, were butchered, in the streets, in the houses, in the churches, in the fields. The most atrocious acts of cruelty were committed, and not by the common soldiers only. One of the superior officers related of himself, that a feeling of pity came over him when

upon entering the town he met a woman with an infant at her breast, but calling to mind that he was a soldier, he pierced mother and child with one thrust! Free scope was given to every abominable passion; and in the general pillage the very graves were opened, upon the supposition that treasure might have been hidden there, as in a place where no plunderer would look to find it. When the slaughter in the streets had ceased, they began to hunt for prisoners, and all who were found were taken to an open space before the Chapel of S. Bartholomew, there to be put to death like the prisoners at Jaffa. The greater number of these poor wretches fell on their knees, some stretching their hands in unavailing agony toward their murderers for mercy; others, lifting them to heaven, directed their last prayers where mercy would be found. The murderers, as if they delighted in the act of butchery, began their work with the sword and bayonet and the but-end of the musket, and finished it by firing upon their \* victims.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

*Memoir of  
the early  
Campaigns  
of the Duke  
of Wellington,  
p. 8.*

*Neves, iv.  
37—42.*

On the same day actions of the same devilish

*Loison's  
march from  
Almeida to  
Abrantes.*

\* Two persons were left alive when the French thought their accursed work was done. One of them lingered three days before he was relieved by death. Feliz Lourenco, the surveyor of the high road, was the other. "He," says Neves, (writing in 1811,) "still lives . . . but in what a condition! With his body and face disfigured by the marks of powder, and the scars of eight and twenty bayonet wounds; . .

with his left eye struck out by a ball, the bones of his right shoulder broken, the tendons rendered useless, and the hand paralyzed. It is from himself that I have received the details of this frightful transaction, of which there exists no other witness, except the murderers themselves."—*Historia Geral da Invasam dos Francezes em Portugal*, t. iv. p. 42.



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

character were committed by Loison's division on their way from Almeida. Leaving a garrison of 1250 men in that place, and having blown up the works of Fort Conception, he set out towards Lisbon, in pursuance to the orders which he had received, with between 3000 and 4000 troops. The next day he approached the city of Guarda; it happened to be Sunday, and also the annual festival of Queen St. Isabel, whose name, stripped of all fable and idolatrous observances, deserves always to be held in dear and respectful remembrance by the Portuguese. The assemblage of people was therefore much greater than at other times; but they were assembled to keep holy-day, not to provide for their defence. A Junta had been constituted there two days before; and with that miscalculation of strength, or ignorance of the state of things, which prevailed so generally among their countrymen, they seem not to have considered themselves as in danger of an attack till Loison was within two miles of the city. An old iron gun, rusty and dismantled, and lying useless in the ruins of the castle, was their whole artillery; . . a few peasants mounted it upon a cart, and so carried it to a rising ground near the road, as if the sight of it would deter the French from advancing. According to the French official account, the rebels, as they insolently styled the Portuguese, drew up in two lines, having their flanks well supported, and two pieces of cannon to protect their centre; their lines were forced at all points, their guns

*Bulletin 4.*  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
366.  
*Thiebault,*  
153.

taken, themselves surrounded as well as routed; the disorder was general, the slaughter dreadful; more than a thousand dead were left upon the field, and Loison in pursuit of the fugitives entered the city. The truth is, that a disorderly multitude fled as soon as they were attacked; and that, as all who could not escape were cut down, the number of the slain has not perhaps been much exaggerated. A night of licentiousness and pillage followed, and Loison then proceeded. The ancient and flourishing town of Covilham escaped a similar visitation, because it lay somewhat out of the line of his march, and he had no time to spare. Alpedrinha, a place containing between two and three thousand inhabitants, was not so fortunate. On the same day that Margaron entered Leiria, and with as little resistance, General Charlot entered this unhappy town; that General was one of the few commanders who had hitherto obtained a character for honour and humanity, . . here, however, all horrible crimes and cruelties were committed; one inoffensive old man was taken out of the town, and burnt alive within sight and hearing of the fugitives upon the mountains; and the French, having carried off every thing that was portable, set the place on fire. They proceeded, plundering as they went, by Sarzedas, Cortiçada, and Sardoad to Abrantes.

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July.*Neves, iv.  
77.*

The French stated in their bulletin that they had lost upon their march twenty killed, and from thirty to forty wounded, whereas the rebels

*Language  
of the  
French  
bulletins.*

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had left at least three thousand upon the different fields of battle\*. The character of the intrusive government would be imperfectly understood hereafter, if its language as well as its acts were not faithfully recorded. The bulletin which announced this statement to the Portuguese, and to that great portion of the civilized world in which the events of the war were anxiously observed, proceeded to say, "this is the mournful result of a frenzy which nothing can justify, which nothing can excuse, and which obliges us to multiply the number of victims who excite sorrow and compassion, but upon whom a terrible necessity compels us to inflict the strokes of just vengeance. Thus it is that the Portuguese people, blind instruments of the unfeeling calculations of the British cabinet, destroy with their own hands the happiness which we with all our power were endeavouring to make them enjoy! Thus it is that from the bosom of tranquillity, of good order, and of repose, they draw upon themselves the destructive scourge of war, and bring devastation even upon the very fields where God had given abundance! Thus it is that deluded men, ungrateful children as well as guilty citizens, change all the claims which they had to the benevolence and protection of government, for deserved misfortune and wretchedness, ruin their families, carry de-

\* General Thiebault, by whom the bulletin was signed, gives a different statement in his book (p. 155). The French loss is there given at sixty men killed, and from 130 to 140 wounded; that of the Portuguese as at least 4000 left upon the field.

solation, flames, and death, into their dwellings, transform flourishing cities into heaps of ashes and vast tombs, and by their fatal union draw upon the whole country the calamities which they provoke, which they deserve, and from which (weak victims as they are) they cannot escape, covering themselves with shame, and completing her destruction. Thus it is that no other resource remains to them than the clemency of those whom they sought to assassinate, . . . a clemency which they do not implore in vain, when, acknowledging their crime, they ask pardon from the French, who, incapable of belying their noble character, are always as full of generosity as of valour." This was the \* language of Buonaparte's governor in

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*Bulletin 4.*  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
368.

\* As another example of the arts used to impose upon the Portuguese people by the intrusive government, the following extract from the fifth bulletin of the army of Portugal may be read with feelings very different from what the detail in the text must excite. "On the 10th of July forty English disembarked at the foot of the village of the Costa, to take in water and provisions. That point was defended by only five carabineers of the thirty-first regiment of light infantry. Notwithstanding this disproportion of numbers, these five men, in sight of all the inhabitants, attacked the forty English, repulsed them, forced them to abandon upon the beach all that they had purchased, and pursued them to the sea." Yet even this is outdone in the same bulletin. "Three conscript lads (it is farther said), of the sixty-sixth regiment, occupied a small

post on the sea-shore, in front of Cascaes, when they saw a boat put off from the English squadron, and make towards them. Immediately these three lads placed themselves in ambush, to wait till the boat should draw near: as soon as it reached the shore they rose from their ambush, fired upon the boat, killed the pilot (who was the master of Admiral Cotton's ship), obliged two English officers, and six seamen or soldiers, who were in the said boat, to come on shore, and lay down their arms upon the beach, and then conducted them as prisoners of war to the quarters-general of General Solignac at Cascaes. This fact discovers a presence of mind, a degree of intelligence, and a vigour, which do honour to the three lads." To complete the story, it should have been added, that the three lads ate the eight Englishmen.

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Portugal! "To be the victim," says Mr. Wordsworth, commenting upon these things and words at the time, in that strain of profoundest feeling and philosophy by which his higher compositions are so eminently distinguished, "to be the victim of such bloody-mindedness, is a doleful lot for a nation; and the anguish must have been rendered still more poignant by the scoffs and insults, and by that heinous contempt of the most awful truths, with which the perpetrator of those cruelties has proclaimed them. Merciless ferocity is an evil familiar to our thoughts; but these combinations of malevolence historians have not yet been called upon to record; and writers of fiction, if they have ever ventured to create passions resembling them, have confined, out of reverence for the acknowledged constitution of human nature, those passions to reprobate spirits. Such tyranny is, in the strictest sense, intolerable; not because it aims at the extinction of life, but of every thing which gives life its value, . . of virtue, of reason, of repose in God, or in truth."

*Loison  
ordered  
towards  
Coimbra.*

Loison, for the sake of intimidating the country, and thereby preventing the danger of such resistance as he had experienced in *Tras os Montes*, had sent before him a report that he had been reinforced by 16,000 men from the army of Marshal Bessieres; and this news was officially transmitted to Junot by the Corregedor of *Abrantes*. At first the French received the tidings with entire belief, and with a joy proportionate to the danger from which they now thought themselves delivered. A comparison of

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dates and distances occasioned some uncomfortable doubts, and the next day advices came that Loison had arrived at Abrantes with no other force than his own. But even this was of no inconsiderable importance: it relieved them from their anxiety concerning him, it brought the whole of their disposable force within reach and within command, for Kellermann had now arrived with the troops from Alem-Tejo; and Junot determined upon striking a great blow before the English should appear. Kellermann had been sent to Alcobaça, where the troops under General Thomières, who covered Peniche, and those of Margaron (who had received the submission of the people of Thomar, and exacted from them 20,000 cruzados) were to be under his orders. Loison was now instructed to form a junction with them and take the command; crush the insurgents in that part of the country, march against Coimbra, subdue and chastise that city, thus quenching one great furnace of the insurrection, and return to Lisbon. Before he reached Alcobaça part of these instructions had been fulfilled by Thomières.

*Neves, in.*  
64.*Thiebault,*  
146.

That General had advanced with a few hundred men to Obidos, with the intention of relieving the fort at Nazareth; but a reconnoitring party which he sent forward to Barquinha was driven back, four of his scouts were made prisoners and sent on board an English vessel, and a report that a considerable body of English had landed there to assist the insurgents deterred him from

*Nazareth*  
*sacked and*  
*burnt by*  
*the French.*

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*July.*

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proceeding in time. The Portugeze themselves raised this report; in reality they had applied for aid to the English, who, some time before, had taken possession of the Berlengs; a few pieces of cannon were given them, but the garrison was so scanty that no men could be spared; and the short respite which they obtained by deceiving the enemy would have been better employed in providing for escape, than for a feeble and disorderly resistance. Nine days after their triumph Thomières proceeded against them with 3000 men, in the belief that some English had joined them. One column, under cover of the darkness, got under the ill-served guns of the insurgents before they were perceived; the Portugeze fired in haste without aim and without effect, and then took to flight. A few drunken fellows, who had undertaken to serve the guns, remained by them, with a woman and a few old men, and these were put to death. The town of Nazareth was sacked, and set on fire. The jewels which they took from the church of N. Senhora de Nazareth were estimated at more than £20,000; for of the innumerable and many-named idols of Our Lady in Portugal, this was the most celebrated. It is the very image which, according to the legend, St. Jerome sent from Bethlehem to St. Augustine, and St. Augustine to his monks at the Caulian monastery, from whence, at the destruction of the Goths, it was brought by King Roderick and Romano to this spot. It is said, that during the last century the idol has some-

times been visited by not less than 20,000 devotees on the day of its festival. The enemy then descending to the beach, burnt the lower town, consisting of some 300 houses, of which only four escaped the flames; they burnt also the nets and vessels, upon which the inhabitants, being fishermen, depended for their subsistence: they then plundered Pederneira, and set it on fire, and returned with their booty to Alcobaça\*.

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*Neves, iv.*  
84—87.

Loison having taken the command, proceeded, in pursuance of his instructions, towards Coimbra; but he had hardly got beyond Leiria when he was recalled, in consequence of an alteration in Junot's plans, which the events in Alem-Tejo had rendered necessary. In the north of that province the insurrection was spreading far and wide, while Beja was in flames; and when Kellermann marched for Lisbon, leaving only a garrison in Elvas, it spread with equal rapidity in the south. Beja had not been destroyed by the fire; houses with little furniture and little wood-work are not easily burnt. The Corregedor returned there from Ayamonte with a supply of arms; a Junta was formed, which assumed great authority, and acted with unusual promptitude and vigour.

*A Junta  
established  
at Beja.*

\* Neves relates that Kellermann demanded for his own use 50,000 cruzados from the prior of Alcobaça at this time, letting him know, without circumlocution, that what the French generals wanted was money. He accepted a hundred moidores after hard bargaining. Loison heard of this on his arrival, and, being on bad terms with Kellermann,

made him refund the money, charging the prior, if any such extortion were practised upon him in future, to complain to him, wherever he might be. Kellermann, however, coming there again when Loison had marched to the south, redemanded the money, and laid on ten per cent. for interest. T. iv. p. 82, 88.



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*Neves, iv.*  
92—95.

*Junta of*  
*Estremoz.*

Men were raised, the regular taxes claimed in the name of the rightful government, and a detachment under Sebastiam Martins Mestre, who had taken an active part in Algarve, was sent to guard against the French at Setubal, by forming a cordon to guard the river Sadam. Having raised a few men for this purpose in the districts of Grandolo and Santiago de Cacem, he proceeded to Alcacer do Sal, established a Junta there, and brought four iron guns from Melides for the defence of this town, a point of great importance to the province while there was an enemy's force at Setubal: Setubal and Palmella were the only places which they now occupied on that side the Tagus.

Lobo meantime, leaving Moretti in Jurumenha, formed Juntas at Borba and at Villa-Viçosa, where he placed the palace and park upon their former establishment. These Juntas readily acknowledged the supremacy of Estremoz, where one was at this time formed, which endeavoured to make its authority recognized as supreme in Alem-Tejo, and was supported in its pretensions by the Spanish government at Badajoz. The claim was admitted by all the smaller places in the surrounding country, but not at Beja nor at Campo-Mayor, in which latter place considerable activity had been displayed. Instead of doubling the soldiers' pay, which had been rashly done at Porto, the officers who assembled at Campo-Mayor resolved that those whose means rendered it possible should serve for half-pay, or without

pay; they raised loans and donatives, levied a third of the rent upon the entailed estates, and took from the property of the church contributions in kind; and having thus acquired considerable funds, they undertook, and for a time sustained, the improvident expense of paying their Spanish allies. The ready obedience shown to its authority, when these imposts were demanded, and the power which it derived from the distribution of the money thus raised, gave the Junta of Campo-Mayor exaggerated notions of its own importance, and when tidings arrived that a Junta of higher or equal pretensions had been formed at Estremoz, that of Campo-Mayor sent to propose a reciprocal alliance, as if one sovereign power were treating with another. But in reply a paper in the form of a decree was sent, declaring, that the primacy of the Junta of Estremoz should be acknowledged by all others in the province, because of the position of that place, and because it was a fortified town; that the members of that Junta should have the title of Highness, because they represented the august person of the Sovereign; and that there should be a subordinate Junta in every town, and one deputy from each sent as a representative to assist in the Supreme Junta of Estremoz. Obedience to this decree was required from Campo-Mayor, till a Supreme Junta should be established, as it was about to be, at Evora, whither head-quarters were to be removed.

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July.*Neves, iv.*  
92—116.

The transfer of the supreme provincial au-

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 A Supreme Junta formed at Evora.

thority to Evora was concerted by Moretti and by the Portuguese General Francisco de Paula Leite, who had refused to concur in the first hasty tumult at Villa-Viçosa, but who now, when the insurrection had become general throughout the province, felt himself bound to resume the charge with which the Prince Regent had intrusted him. The object of this transfer seems to have been a persuasion, that as Evora was the most populous city in the province, and the seat of the Archbishop, its authority would at once be acknowledged, and all disputes for precedence, which might otherwise prove so prejudicial to the common cause, would thus be terminated. This object was effected: in other respects the measure was incautious, and contrary to the judgement of the most judicious inhabitants; for when Moretti had by letter proposed it to them, they replied, that the richest city of Alem-Tejo, lying as it did so near Elvas, ought not to declare itself, unless it could reckon upon a force of 8000 men for its defence. It was not that the will was wanting; this General Leite knew; and without farther demur, he and Moretti and Lobo, with 200 foot soldiers and 100 cavalry, entered Evora. They were received with enthusiasm; a Junta was formed under two presidents, Leite being one, and the Archbishop, D. Fr. Manoel do Cenaculo Villas Boas, the other, a man then in extreme old age, distinguished for his erudition and his exemplary virtues. Circular letters were dispatched to all the other Juntas in Alem-Tejo,

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requiring a recognition, and the troops which had been embodied were ordered to Evora. Before the new machine of government could be put in motion, Loison had crossed the Tagus on his way to destroy it.

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*Neves, iv.*  
118—126.

Notwithstanding the contempt with which the French government, and its agents in Portugal, regarded the Portuguese, Junot knew how easily brave men might be made good soldiers, under due instruction; and he seems to have apprehended, that better officers would be found to train and command them than either Portugal or Spain at that time could supply. He apprehended that the force in Alem-Tejo would soon become strong enough not only to seize Setubal, but to occupy the heights of Almada, and render useless all the batteries on the left bank of the Tagus; while at the same time another division of their troops, acting higher up the river, would co-operate with the insurgents from Coimbra. To prevent this combination, he resolved to attack the weaker and nearer body first. For this purpose Loison had been recalled from Leiria, Solignac and Margaron were placed under his command, with 5000 men, and it was thought, that after quelling the insurgents in Alem-Tejo, he might send a supply of food to Lisbon, especially of meat, . . victual Elvas, strike a blow against the Spaniards at Badajoz, and then, recrossing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes, proceed against Coimbra; operations from which,

*Loison sent  
into Alem-  
Tejo.*

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X.1808.  
July.*Thiebault,*  
156.

at any time, in case of need, he could speedily turn back to join the main body of the French at Lisbon. There was, in fact, so little combination among the Portuguese at this time, that the insurgents in the northern provinces, and those in Alem-Tejo, knew nothing whatever of each other's proceedings, and the first news which reached the latter of the insurrection at Porto was communicated to the people of Sines by an English frigate.

*He advances  
against  
Evora.*

The first tidings of Loison's movement which reached Evora were, that he had crossed the Tagus, and was in full march towards that city. No time was lost in transmitting this from Aldea Gallega; any previous intelligence had been rendered impossible by the secrecy with which the French prepared their measures. Moretti applied for reinforcements to Badajoz; orders were sent for the forces from Campo-Mayor and the other places in the north of the province, to hasten to Evora, and General Galluzo was requested to occupy the posts which would be left unprotected by their absence; but no assistance came from Badajoz, and Galluzo, instead of acting as was expected, forbade the Portuguese to leave Campo-Mayor. An advanced guard of 700 men had been stationed at Montemor o Novo, twenty miles from the city. General Leite ordered 400 men to reinforce this post. They met the corps which they had been sent to support in full retreat, the commander, not

knowing that succours were on the way to him, having thought himself too weak to await\* an attack. Instead of deriving confidence or hope from the meeting, they hastened to Evora, and entered the city in alarm, exclaiming that they were betrayed. That cry, in such miserable times, is sure to be eagerly taken up. The people had been assured that the French who were coming against them did not exceed 800 men; this had been said either in a most erroneous policy, to keep up the spirits of the inhabitants, by deceiving them as to the extent of their danger; or more probably in good faith, all ranks being credulous in believing what they wished; the natural effect, when the truth now became known, was to give the populace apparent ground for believing the vague charge of treason; their tumultuous movements were with difficulty suppressed, and the Corregedor found himself so marked an object of suspicion, that, in the hope of securing himself, he secretly left the city. Order being in some degree restored, piquets of cavalry and patroles were stationed for the night. In the morning a company of Miquelets arrived from Villa-Viçosa (that term having been borrowed from the Catalans), and the legion of Foreign Volunteers in the Spanish service, under Sargento-Mor D. Antonio Maria Gallego: both

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\* General Thiebault says, there was an action at Montemor, in which the Portugeze lost fifty men, and that Loison also took prisoners there some hundred

peasants, *que les lois de la guerre condamnoient à la mort, mais qu'il se borna à desarmer et renvoya chez eux.*

CHAP. came by forced marches ; the latter had left Ju-  
 X. rumenha the preceding evening, a distance of  
 1808. four-and-forty miles. With these succours the  
 July. whole force collected then amounted to 1770  
 Neves, iv. men, of whom about half were regular troops,  
 126—131. the others being volunteers newly-raised and undisciplined.

*Evora.*

The city of Evora is so ancient, that fabulous history has laid its foundation more than two thousand years before the Christian era. Certain it is, that it was a flourishing city in the days of Viriatus. Sertorius chose it for his residence ; some of the buildings with which he adorned it are still remaining, and the inhabitants are still supplied with water by his aqueduct, which Joam III. repaired. Cæsar made it a municipal town, and from him it was called Liberalitas Julia. Under the Visigoths it continued to flourish, and Sisebut coined money there. It was recovered from the Moors in the reign of Affonso Henriquez, the first king, by the romantic enterprise of Giraldo the Fearless, then an outlaw. King Fernando rebuilt or repaired its walls ; and Cardinal Henrique founded an university and established an Inquisition there ; but the university had been suppressed. In the war of the Restoration it was besieged and taken by D. Juan de Austria, but it was soon recovered, and the Spaniards in retreating toward their own frontier suffered one of the most signal defeats which they sustained during that long contest. Its population, once amounting to 40,000, had de-

clined to about half that number at the beginning of the eighteenth century; since which time it had varied so little, that there had neither been any apparent diminution nor increase. The city was populous enough to have defeated the force which was now marching against it, if it had been prepared for a Zaragozan defence. There is courage enough for any thing in the Portuguese character; but that individual and commanding genius was wanting by which alone the inhabitants of a large city can be made to act steadily with one will, and thereby capable of heroic valour. They prepared for a military defence in the field, which was exposing peasantry and half-disciplined troops to certain defeat.

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About seven in the morning the vedettes announced that the enemy were in sight, and the Portuguese took their ground in better order than might have been expected, considering the alarm and insubordination which had lately prevailed, and the real inequality of the contest. Their right rested upon the Mill of S. Bento, about a mile from the city, the centre was posted upon the hill of S. Caetano, the left rested upon the Quinta dos Cucos. Having reconnoitred this position, Loison directed General Solignac to attack the enemy's right, and Margaron to break the centre with one part of his brigade, while the other attacked the left; they were to unite behind the city, occupy the roads to Arrayolos and Estremoz, and thus cut off the fugitives from all retreat, the cavalry

*Action before the city.*  
July 29.



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X.

1808.  
July.

*Inhumanity  
of the con-  
querors.*

the fugitives without, as the infantry did to the inhabitants within. The convents and churches afforded no asylum; not those who had borne arms alone, but children and old men, were massacred, and women were violated and slaughtered. The lowest computation makes the number of these victims amount to 900. The clergy and religioners were especial objects of vengeance: they were literally hunted from their hiding-places like wild beasts: eight-and-thirty were butchered; among them was the Bishop of Maranhão. The Archbishop's intercession with Loison obtained only a promise that a stop should be put to these enormities; no attempt was made to restrain them that day, nor during the whole night, nor till eleven on the following morning, and then by an order of the General, what he called the lawful pillage was declared to be at an end; but he contented himself with issuing the order; no means for enforcing it were taken, and the soldiers continued their abominations till every place had been ransacked, and their worst passions had been \* glutted.

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
387.  
Neves, iv.  
138—142.*

\* These facts are notorious in Portugal, and circumstantial accounts, too horrible to be repeated, are published of them. General Thiebault only says in his text, that there was a desperate conflict in the streets, and that "all who were found in arms were exterminated." He annexes the following note: "*Si l'on ne put de suite arrêter ces terribles représailles, si l'on ne put éviter le pillage de beaucoup de maisons, les officiers-géné-*

*raux, supérieurs, et d'état-major, parvinrent du moins à faire respecter les églises, où les femmes, les vieillards, et les habitants paisibles s'étoient retirés, avec ce qu'ils avoient de plus précieux; ils firent plus, ils allèrent rassurer eux-mêmes tous ceux qui s'y trouvoient, et dès que l'ordre commença à se rétablir, ils firent escorter les femmes jusques chez elles, afin de les préserver de toute insulte."* P. 164.

That there were some men of

Spaniards to Jurumenha, the company from Villa-Viçosa to their own town; others dispersed; time was gained for them by the resistance which Lieutenant-Colonel Franco made at one of the gates, and the brave conduct of the foreign volunteers under \* Gallego, who fought desperately in the streets, and suffered great loss.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.*Neves, iv.*  
132—138.  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
382—387.  
*Thiebault,*  
158—165.

The horrors which ensued will be remembered in Portugal while any record of past times shall be preserved there. Though even a military pretext was wanting for delivering up the city and the inhabitants to the will of the soldiers, the whole proceedings of the Portugeze and their Spanish allies having been those of regular war, to them it was abandoned. A resolution had been taken in the Junta that those persons who feared the event should provide for their safety by retiring in time; . . from some unexplained cause, most probably from a well-grounded fear that any persons who attempted to remove would be regarded as traitors by the furious populace, few or none availed themselves of this ominous warning; when it was too late great numbers got over the walls, but the French horse surrounded the city, and showed as little mercy to

*The city*  
*taken.*

\* General Thiebault says, that after their defeat in the field the Portugeze wished to capitulate, but that the Spaniards shot those persons who by timely submission would have saved the town: whereas the fact is, that immediately after the defeat the Spaniards made the best of their way towards their own country. During the action, he says that several men dropt down dead, owing to the excessive heat, the blood gushing from their ears, nose, and mouth. He is mistaken in saying that General Leite (whom he calls Loti) fell in this action.

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1808.  
July.

*Inhumanity  
of the con-  
querors.*

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
387.  
Neves, iv.  
138—142.*

the fugitives without, as the infantry did to the inhabitants within. The convents and churches afforded no asylum; not those who had borne arms alone, but children and old men, were massacred, and women were violated and slaughtered. The lowest computation makes the number of these victims amount to 900. The clergy and religioners were especial objects of vengeance: they were literally hunted from their hiding-places like wild beasts: eight-and-thirty were butchered; among them was the Bishop of Maranhão. The Archbishop's intercession with Loison obtained only a promise that a stop should be put to these enormities; no attempt was made to restrain them that day, nor during the whole night, nor till eleven on the following morning, and then by an order of the General, what he called the lawful pillage was declared to be at an end; but he contented himself with issuing the order; no means for enforcing it were taken, and the soldiers continued their abominations till every place had been ransacked, and their worst passions had been \* glutted.

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That there were some men of

According to the statement of the French, 8000 of the allies were killed or wounded in the battle and in the capture of the city, and 4000 made prisoners, the latter being chiefly peasants. Their own loss they stated at 90 killed, and more than 200 wounded. The intimidation of that part of the country which was within the immediate reach of the victors was such as might be expected after such a blow. At the first rumour that reached Estremoz, the populace became ungovernable; their first impulse was that of rage, which would willingly have found any victim on which to sate itself. An officer had just arrived from Portalegre; they fancied that he had prevented the coming of some regular troops, which they had looked for; an attempt was made to murder him in the hall of the Junta, whither he

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X.1808.  
July.*Alarm at  
Estremoz.*

honour and humanity, who protected the inhabitants as far as they could, must be believed for the sake of human nature. But the Revolution and the school of Buonaparte had done all that was possible for eradicating both humanity and honour; and I affirm, on the testimony of the Portuguese, and of those British officers who have had full opportunities of ascertaining the truth, that the conduct of the French in Evora was marked with deliberate and sportive cruelty of the most flagitious kind. Concerning the conduct of the general officers, as respects their sense of honour, I happen to possess some rather curious information. Loison promised the Archbishop that his property should not be touched. After this promise, Loison him-

self, with some of his officers, entered the Archbishop's library, which was one of the finest in Portugal; they took down all the books, in the hope of discovering valuables behind them, they broke off the gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings of the rarest part of the collection, and in their disappointment at finding so little plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and every jewel and bit of the precious metals with which the relics were adorned, or which decorated any thing in his oratory. Loison was even seen in noon-day to take the Archbishop's episcopal ring from the table and pocket it. These circumstances are stated on the authority of the Archbishop himself.

CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
*July.*

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fled for refuge, and in the presence of the members; and there was no other means of saving him but by concealing him from the ferocious rabble. Presently a dispatch came, announcing the total defeat at Evora, the capture of the city, and the loss of every thing. Such was the temper of the people, that it was a service of the utmost danger to communicate this news; and the member who attempted to read the dispatch to them from a varanda found his life in danger, and drew back. But it was not possible either to conceal the fatal intelligence or to delay it. Estremoz would assuredly be the next object of the enemy, and Evora was only six leagues distant; if they had hitherto dreamt of defending the town, the fate of Evora was now before their eyes: they knew that even the unreasonable multitude would feel this near and imminent danger, though they would not endure to be told of it; and the members of the Junta determined to take measures for immediate submission. The melancholy manner with which they passed through the crowd confirmed the worst apprehensions of the people; and as they went along they spake each to those persons on whose prudence he could rely, telling them what had occurred, and what must now of necessity be done; thus they thought the news might pass from one to another with the least danger, and every one take such measures for himself as he deemed best. There was a cry of treason at first, when it was seen that of the three guns which had been mounted to defend the

walls, one was cast into the ditch, and the other two sent off to Olivença. The Juiz de Fora became the object of suspicion, and could he have been found at that moment, would have been murdered; . . so fickle is popular feeling, that this very man was presently sought for as the fittest person to give counsel. A meeting was held, and a messenger deputed to solicit Loison's clemency.

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X.

1808.  
July.

*Neves, iv.*  
145—149.

Loison received the messenger well, thinking that severity enough had been shown to secure the submission of Alem-Tejo. He constituted a provisional government in Evora, at the head of which the Archbishop was compelled to act, and he set off for Estremoz on the fourth day after the action. He raised no contributions there, permitted no pillage, and paid for every thing which the troops consumed; he also set at liberty some of his prisoners. But when he proceeded to Elvas he ordered two Swiss prisoners to be shot, condemned four others to work in chains for five years, threw the Spanish commander Gallego into a dungeon, and condemned the Portuguese Lieut.-Colonel Franco to death, for bearing arms against the French. The Bishop of Elvas interceded earnestly for this officer, and finding all intercession vain, concluded by saying, if this favour were refused him, he had still one to ask, which was, that the General would sentence him to the same fate, seeing life would be hateful to him if he could not save his countryman under such circumstances. Loison was

*Loison proceeds to Elvas.*

*August 2.*

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*August.**Neves, iv.*  
149, 156—  
158.  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
397.

touched at this, and revoked the order for execution. That General has left a name in Portugal which will be execrated to the latest generations; here, however, is an instance which evinces some sense of generosity, as if his heart had not been naturally bad; but it was the tendency of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte's system, to make men wicked whom it did not find so.

*Loison enters*  
*Portalegre.*

The less portable part of the plunder of Evora was sold at Elvas, a sort of fair being held for the purpose; and many persons purchased church vessels for the sake of restoring them to the altars from whence they had been taken. Loison made a movement upon Badajoz, and believing that the troops in that city had been called off to the Spanish armies, and that his recent success had occasioned great consternation there, endeavoured to introduce officers under a flag of truce, for the purpose of observing the state of the place; but they were refused admittance. The commandant of Elvas, Colonel Miquel, had made himself odious in that city, especially for executing a German as an emissary of the Spaniards, the main proof against him being some thirty pieces of gold which were found in his possession. Some fugitives from Elvas, with a few comrades from Campo-Mayor, waylaid this commandant as he went from the city, intending to sleep in Fort La Lippe, for greater security; they fired upon him and an officer in his company; the officer escaped, but Miquel lay all

night upon the ground, the soldiers not venturing to seek him in the darkness, and being removed to Lisbon, he died there of his wounds. This was some days before Loison's arrival. That General appointed M. Girod de Novilard of the engineers to succeed him, and marched upon Portalegre. The Spaniards had already retired from thence, and the Bishop, with most of the principal persons, withdrew also in time. The city was plundered, and a contribution of 100,000 cruzados demanded from the district; about 40,000 were raised, and six persons were carried away as pledges for the remainder. He then marched for Abrantes, having received dispatches which ordered him to hasten his return toward Lisbon by that route, it being now certain that an expedition from England was off the coast.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
August.

*He is recalled to the neighbourhood of Lisbon.*

*Neves, iv.  
156—164.  
Thiebault,  
168—172.*

Those provinces, meantime, which had not felt the vengeance of the French were in a state of anarchy. The temporary dissolution of order, even though no revolutionary opinions were at work, produced evils little less alarming than the actual presence of the enemy. The cry of an inflamed multitude is always for blood. The Intendant of Police at Porto addressed a manly proclamation to the people, reproving them for eagerly demanding the death of a few suspected persons, who were already in the hands of justice, and from whom they had nothing to fear. In the processes against them, he said, there ought to be nothing precipitate, nothing that could be accused of inhumanity; he must see that all the

*Insubordination of the people at Porto.*



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
August.

proofs of their guilt were brought forward, that his own honour might suffer no stain. If they were dissatisfied with him, he would gladly lay down an office which he had never solicited; more willingly would he accompany his son to the army, than occupy a station for which, even in quiet times, he should have thought himself unqualified; and though life was dear to him, he would rather lose it in the service of his country than in a tumult. But mobs are as seldom capable of reason as of compunction. It was necessary, for the sake of preventing wider evils, to accelerate the processes, and to promise blood. No person, however innocent of any connexion with the French, however distinguished for his exertions against them, was safe from suspicion; no place, however sacred, was secure from search. Upon a report that a suspected person had concealed himself in a burial-vault, it was proposed to open all the vaults in the church till he was found. Upon another rumour that he was concealed in a nun's habit in a Carmelite nunnery, the mob proposed to break in and examine the sisterhood. Raymundo exerted himself to prevent this scandalous outrage. Some one charged him also with treason, and his life was for a moment in danger. But Raymundo, who knew how little in such times any popularity, however deserved, was to be trusted, had provided himself with a crucifix in case of need. He displayed it in this emergency, and by an exclamation according with the display, induced the

rabble to join with him in a shout of loyalty, and succeeded in dissuading them from entering the convent.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
August.

Even in this early stage of popular commotions a military usurpation is said to have been projected by Luiz Candido Cordeiro Pinheiro Furtado, in conjunction with Joam Manoel de Mariz. Both were esteemed good officers; the latter was a member of the Junta, the former offended that he had not been nominated, and still more so that another person had been made commander-in-chief. They designed to erect a military Junta under their own direction, and they proposed to raise a corps under the name of the Loyal Porto Legion, of which Candido was to have the command; the officers were named, the uniform designed, and worn by Candido with some of his associates; he took to himself also a guard of honour, which, from a small beginning, was gradually increased, till at length the armed attendance with which he always appeared in public was such as to excite reasonable apprehension. The city was in this state when Bernardim Freire arrived from Coimbra to take upon himself the command. He was received with great joy by the people; but Luiz Candido was evidently displeased at his coming, and Bernardim was soon apprised that a conspiracy was formed against him and against the Junta. He was careful therefore to keep Candido and Mariz as much about his person as possible. Among other precautions for preserving tranquillity in the city, he ordered

*Design of  
a military  
usurpation  
in that city.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*August.*

*Neves, iv.*  
225—229.

*The con-  
spirators  
are seized.*

the guns to be unloaded; persons were not wanting to represent this as being done with a treacherous design; and a priest, notorious for irregularities, at the head of a mob seized his bridle, and exclaimed that the people would have no such General. A dangerous stir had already begun, when some men of better mind came resolutely forward; one of them felled the priest to the ground; Bernardim spake to the crowd in a manner which conciliated their good will, the priest was thrown into prison, and the day was closed with an illumination in honour of the General.

Upon the arrival of D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz to assist his brother-in-law Bernardim, an attempt was made to establish a military Junta, in aid of the provisional government, and as a check upon the designs of Candido and his associates. This, however, proved ineffectual; and they proceeded so rapidly in organizing an armed party, that it was deemed necessary to secure Candido and Mariz without delay, lest the city should become a scene of bloodshed. They were accordingly summoned to a consultation at the Bishop's palace, and there arrested. Their escort, which, as usual, had accompanied them, began to express displeasure at this; and three of the men entering the palace, demanded insolently that their commander should be delivered to them; if he were innocent, they said, they would set him at liberty; if he were a traitor, they would blow him to pieces from the mouth of a cannon.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
*August.*

These men were secured, and Raymundo, with some other officers to whom this service had been assigned, disarmed their fellows. The agitation, however, continued the whole day, though this was at an early hour; and it was not till after midnight that the prisoners could be conducted without danger of a rescue to the jail. They were immediately proceeded against according to the forms of Portuguese law, and the evidence against them appeared so conclusive, that Candido was condemned to death, and Mariz to be degraded to Angola. The gallows accordingly was erected, Candido was led into the oratory to perform the last religious duties, the brethren of the Misericordia went out to attend the execution, and the crowd collected to witness it; when, after a while, it was announced that the two prisoners were removed to the fortress of S. Joam da Foz, to be embarked for Brazil, and there placed at the Prince's disposal. So fickle is a multitude, that the crowd, which a few days before had almost mutinied because of the arrest of this man, became riotous now because he was not put to death. They were pacified by the personal exertions of the Bishop and two of his dignitaries, and by an official notification that the Junta having pronounced sentence of death against Luiz Candido upon full proof of a most atrocious crime, had thought it proper to lay the proceedings before the Prince, and remit the criminal to his mercy.

*Neves, iv.*  
229—237.

The populace at Porto were kept in some de-

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.*Disturb-  
ances at  
Braganza.*

gree of submission by the vigorous measures of the provisional government, the respect which was paid to the episcopal character, and by the influence which men of property possess in a flourishing commercial town. In remoter parts the local authorities were weaker, and tumults of the most disgraceful nature occurred. After the provinces beyond the mountains and between the rivers had been delivered from their first danger, by the failure of Loison's expedition from Almeida, they were more seriously alarmed from the side of Castille and Leon; and indeed had it not been for the success of the Spaniards in Andalusia, Junot would probably have received powerful reinforcements from Marshal Bessieres after the battle of Rio Seco. The first disturbances arose at Braganza upon a rumour that this army was approaching. The people gathered together tumultuously, and when they learnt that no enemies were near, directed their vengeance against all whom they suspected; and in such times it is in the power of any wretch, however vile and worthless, to throw suspicion upon the object of his envy or resentment. The Junta, in hope of appeasing them, convoked a popular meeting, . . the readiest means of showing them their power, and teaching them how to abuse it; and the result was, that most of the members of the Junta were turned out, and such as the mob thought fit elected in their places. A shoemaker, and the keeper of a wine-house, who, because he was maimed in one arm, called himself

*o Loison Portuguez*, were the kings of the rabble. The latter took upon himself the office of general, and was actually obeyed by the troops. Their chief vengeance was directed against the New-Christians, for Pombal's law (the redeeming act of that tyrannical statesman) had not even in half a century produced a feeling of toleration in the populace. Any accusation, however preposterous, was believed; they gutted the house of one man, and threw him into prison, upon a charge of witchcraft, for having, it was said, made an image of General Sepulveda, and placed it over the fire in a frying-pan. When the city had thus continued three days under mob-rule, the magistrates took courage from despair, arrested the ruling demagogues during the night, and sent them prisoners to Chaves. Troops came from Villa-Real, where Sepulveda at that time was, and tranquillity was restored; but it was necessary to gratify the people by making useless preparations for defence; and the popular opinion was, that nothing but what was right had been done, that the persons whose property had been destroyed, and their lives endangered, deserved the usage they had suffered, and that the magistrates were bribed by the Jews.

CHAP.  
X.1808.  
July.*Neves, iv.*  
238—245.

More serious disturbances occurred at Villa Nova de Foz-Coa, arising from the same popular intolerance and love of rapine. That town, one of the most flourishing in Beira Alta, owed in great part its prosperity to its position at the confluence of the Coa with the Douro. A con-

*The New-Christians  
plundered  
at Villa  
Nova de  
Foz-Coa.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

siderable trade in silk, and in rice, salt-fish, and other articles of foreign importation, brought thither by the river from Porto, was carried on with the adjacent country, and with the Spaniards of the border. This trade was mostly in the hands of persons who, because they were of Jewish extraction, were believed by the vulgar to be still attached in heart to the Mosaic law. The cry of Down with the French, was coupled here with Kill the Jews; . . their houses were attacked, their goods plundered, their persons abused, their lives threatened and seriously endangered, and more than twenty of the wealthiest families in that country reduced to utter ruin by the complete destruction of their property. Some of these unhappy persons effected their escape to Moncorvo; and, because they were protected there, and the Junta of that town endeavoured to restore order at Villa Nova, hostilities ensued between the two townships. The evil spread; and if the Junta of Moncorvo had not arrested during the night some movers of sedition in their town, and seized also some of the ringleaders from Villa Nova, who had crossed the Douro, the province of Tras os Montes would soon have suffered all the evils of civil war, exasperated by a spirit of fanaticism, such as existed in the worst ages of superstition and ignorance. The New-Christians were accused of assisting the French with money, blaspheming God, cursing the Prince, defiling the crucifix, and finally, of Manicheism! When a judicial inquiry was afterwards instituted

concerning the riots, depositions to this effect were made against them upon oath! CHAP. X.

1808.  
July.

*Troubles at  
Viscu.*

The troubles at Viseu, though less destructive in their consequences, assumed a more revolutionary character. The mob insisted upon having a Juiz do Povo, and elected a demagogue to that office, which had not before been known among them, which in quiet times is useless, and in turbulent ones dangerous. Florencio José Correa de Mello, the general of the province, and the Bishop, a good but timid man, instead of refusing to acknowledge this tumultuous and illegal appointment, ratified it by administering an oath to the chosen favourite of the mob, who from that moment became a person of more authority than either Bishop or General. The latter offended the military by refusing to double their pay, as had been so imprudently done at Porto; on this account they became mutinous, and a riot broke out in the city upon an absurd report that Loison was come to visit him. The demagogue, who was lord of the day, obtained from the intimidated Bishop an order for his arrest, his house was sacked, and he and the Juiz de Fora were thrown into prison amid the insults of a multitude who knew not what they did. A meeting of the people was then held, at which the magistrates were deposed, new ones appointed, and the Bishop was declared Generalissimo, with Silveira, who happened to be passing through Viseu, for his adjutant-general.

*Neves, iv.  
263—273.*

Proceedings equally outrageous, and of more



CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

*Riotous  
proceedings  
at Arcos de  
Val de Vez.*

perilous tendency, occurred in the town of Arcos de Val de Vez. The bells in that town and in the surrounding villages rung the alarm upon a report that 20,000 French had landed at Espozende, and were entering Ponte de Lima. A disorderly multitude collected, and set out in search of the enemy; their courage was easily roused, and soon spent; for when they had ascertained that the report was without foundation, and were returning home, they learnt that a body of men from the north were in possession of their town, and instead of hastening thither to protect their property, and restore order, they took to flight, each seeking a place of refuge where he thought best. The people in fear of whom they fled were peasantry, who, like themselves, had set out to fight the French, in utter disorder; hurrying along in scattered parties, some with a soldier for their leader, some with an abbot, provided neither with ammunition nor bread, increasing their numbers as they went along, and expecting that the magistrates were to issue orders for supplying them wherever they came. The *Vereadores* exerted themselves to feed this rabble, and be rid of them; the Juiz de Fora, dismayed at such a visitation, and in despair of satisfying such visitors, absconded, and his disappearance was imputed to a consciousness of treason. While they were seeking him every where, an unlucky messenger entered the town with dispatches from the Corregedor of Barcellos, and as he happened to have lost an arm,

the senseless multitude took him for Loison; and even when they had examined his papers were still so possessed with this preposterous notion, that they placed him in confinement. Another messenger with letters fell into their hands, and was seized in like manner; and they were demanding a warrant for the apprehension of the Juiz de Fora, when he was brought in from the country, by an inhuman rabble, in a condition which would have excited pity in the poor unthinking wretches themselves who were his tormentors, if they had beheld him separately, and if men did not seem to be divested of all compassion when they act in mobs. With great difficulty they were prevailed upon not to finish killing him, but to lodge him in prison. Presently the thirst for blood returned, and they ordered a young priest to go and prepare him for death. The priest objected that he had not yet received that order in the church which empowered him to officiate in the sacrament of confession; upon which they replied, that they conferred the order. The young man then entered the prison, and with great presence of mind advised the Juiz to feign himself dead; then going out, he asked the mob, with a tone of anger, why they had sent him to confess a man whom they had already killed? They made no farther inquiry; . . the bells tolled for his death, and by this artifice his life was saved.

The rabble now took upon themselves to reform the state; they began by turning out the

*The rabble  
enact laws.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
*July.*

members of the Camara, throwing the chairs out of window, demolishing the seat of the Judge, and burning the public papers. They displaced officers, deposed two or three abbots, and nominated a Capuchin friar to be their General. They appointed a Junta, and made laws whereby they abolished the recruiting system, fixed the prices of milk, meat, and wine, prohibited the exportation of bread, forbade all processes for debt, suspended all law-suits during the war, abolished the fees of the parochial priests, and were hardly persuaded to spare the tithes, and, finally, exempted all tenants from payment of manorial rights; and these laws were enacted not for their own district alone, but for the whole kingdom. This was the only indication of a revolutionary disposition which manifested itself during these unhappy times. By good hap the persons whom they had chosen to form their Junta were prudent and well-intentioned men, who temporized with them, and accepted an illegal authority in the hope of restoring order. The anniversary of a religious procession occurred at this time, and they took advantage of it. The Host was borne through the streets, a sermon adapted to the circumstances was preached with good effect, and the reformers, tired of their work, and willing to secure what they had gained by pillage, broke up, and returned to their own part of the country. The people of the land then enrolled themselves, established patroles, and subjected themselves to good discipline; so that when a second visit of

the same kind was attempted, they seized the ringleaders. Troops at length came from Viana, and many of the criminals were apprehended and sent prisoners to Porto.

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

The authority of the provisional government at Porto would not have been generally acknowledged, and with so little reluctance, throughout these provinces, if that city had not been looked to as a capital, because of its great commercial importance. But so little intercourse was there between the north and south of Portugal, that both had been in insurrection against the French more than a month, before it was known in one part that any resistance had commenced in the other. Vague reports indeed were in circulation, which could be traced to no authentic source; but no intelligence upon which any reliance was placed arrived in Alem-Tejo, till a student from Coimbra, who had enlisted in the academic corps, came to Campo-Mayor on his own concerns, and gave a clear account of the transactions in which he had borne a part. The news was immediately July 18. dispatched to Badajoz; tidings of the battle of Baylen reached that city at the same time; and messengers, accredited by the governors of Badajoz and Campo-Mayor, were sent to Coimbra, to communicate the joyful accounts from Spain. They were received not merely with transports of exultation, but with as much surprise, says the Portuguese historian of these events, as if they had come from another world, . . in such utter ignorance were the people of Beira of

*Communi-  
cation be-  
tween Alem-  
Tejo and the  
northern  
provinces.*

CHAP.  
X.

1808.  
July.

what had been going on in Alem-Tejo, though the two provinces, along an extent of some forty miles, are only separated by the Tagus. The messengers on their part with equal surprise learnt that the legitimate government was restored in Tras os Montes, and Entre Douro e Minho. Being thus referred to Porto, thither they proceeded; and returned from thence with letters from the Bishop and the General to the Archbishop of Evora and the Junta of Badajoz, recommending the establishment of a provisional government under the Archbishop, similar to that at Porto, that the same system might be pursued in the south as in the north. When they reached Coimbra on their way, they learnt the fate of Evora, that news having been circulated by the French without delay. Proceeding on their journey, when they drew near Castello-Branco they found the roads full of fugitives, removing with their children and families, and such goods as they could carry away, in fear of Loison, so far had the terror of his name extended. It was not then known that he had marched toward Abrantes; and the messengers, to avoid the danger of falling in with his troops, entered Spain by Zebreira, and so proceeded to Badajoz and Campo-Mayor.

*Neves, iv.*  
197—205.

Things were in this state when a British expedition arrived upon the north coast. General Leite was collecting at Olivença the troops which had escaped from Evora. The Conde de Castro-Marim was raising and embodying forces in

Algarve; and the Junta of Porto were hardly less perplexed by the perilous spirit of insubordination which prevailed both in the city and in the remoter parts of the provinces, than by the deficiency of money and means for the men who willingly came forward to serve against the invaders. There were numbers, and courage, and good will, but every thing else was wanting.

CHAP.  
X.

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1808.  
*July.*

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## CHAPTER XI.

## FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

1808.

*State of  
public feel-  
ing in Eng-  
land.*

THESE transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest in the English people; not so much for the hope, which had thus unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on. Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be co-operating with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for foreign service, and the country with one voice called for an effort equal to the occasion. But the Government was not prepared for such exertions. Our military operations had never yet been carried on upon a scale such as was now required, and since the peace of Amiens they had been almost wholly suspended. Though great and most essential improvements in the army had been steadily and unostentatiously carried into effect by the Duke

of York, much remained to be done; and it wanted that efficiency which nothing but experience could give it. That our troops were able to beat the enemy wherever they should meet on equal terms, or even with considerable advantage of numbers on the enemy's side, no Englishman doubted, unless he wished the enemy success; but the public confidence went no farther. The war had on our part so long been almost exclusively maritime, that the army had suffered something in reality and more in reputation. The French, always fond of war, had become a military people; their military establishment was supposed to be perfect in all its branches, their troops experienced, their officers excellent, their commanders of the highest celebrity: to oppose them we had generals very few of whom had ever been tried in command, and officers of whom the far greater number, like their men, had never seen an enemy in the field. A great effort, however, was now called for by our new allies. The Spanish Juntas with which the British Government had hitherto communicated, preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force; they had a brave but undue confidence in their own strength, and perhaps they foresaw that mutual ill will might probably arise between combined armies whose habits and prejudices were widely dissimilar. What they desired was, that a British expedition should be employed against the French in Portugal; this would act as a powerful diversion in favour of



CHAP.  
XI.

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1808.

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*An expedi-  
tion ordered  
to the coast  
of Portugal.*

Spain; thither we were called by the wishes and groans of the Portuguese people; and it was believed, that when the deliverance of that kingdom should have been effected, a plan of co-operation with the Spaniards might be arranged.

When the insurrection of the Spaniards began, an armament was preparing at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been supposed to be intended at one time against Ceuta, at another for South America. Its destination was now fixed for the Peninsula, and the command was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His instructions were, while the fleet proceeded off Cape Finisterre, to make for Coruña himself, and consult there with the Provisional Government of Galicia. He was authorized to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish and Portuguese people, that his Majesty, in sending a force to their assistance, had no other object in view than to afford them his most unqualified and disinterested support. In all questions respecting their provisional government, should any such arise, he was as far as possible to avoid taking any part; maintaining only these principles, that no act done by Charles or Ferdinand could be considered valid, unless they returned to their own country, and were absolutely free agents there; and that the entire evacuation of the Peninsula by the French was the only basis upon which the Spaniards should be induced to treat. In any arrangements he was directed to act with the utmost liberality

and confidence, the object of Great Britain being to assist the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their respective monarchies.

CHAP.  
XI.

1808.

Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of Viscount Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, was born in the year 1769, at Dangan Castle, in Ireland, the seat of his ancestors. After having been a short time at Eton, he was removed, while very young, to the military academy at Angers; for there was not at that time any institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were taught, and the youth who meant to follow the military profession was obliged to go to France if he wished to learn the elements of war. He obtained his first commission about the age of eighteen, in the 41st regiment; and after a series of exchanges and promotions, his elder brother, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, purchased for him the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 33rd, in 1793. He conducted himself in the disastrous retreat from Holland so as to obtain much praise from military men. In 1795 he embarked for service in the West Indies, but being providentially driven back by storms, his destination was altered. In 1797 he went out to India with his brother Lord Mornington, then Governor General; there he distinguished himself in the war against Tippoo, and being appointed Governor of Seringapatam after the capture of that city, and one of the commissioners for disposing of the conquered

*Former services of Sir A. Wellesley.*

CHAP.  
XI.

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territories, he discharged his arduous duties in such manner as to deserve and obtain the gratitude of the conquered people. In the subsequent war against the Mahrattas he commanded at the battle of Assye, against an army exceeding his own number in the proportion of ten to one; and whose disciplined troops, under French officers, more than doubled the British force. The action was severe beyond all former example in India: having won the enemy's artillery, consisting of an hundred pieces, which were served with perfect skill, he had to take them a second time with the bayonet, when men who had feigned death rose from the ground and turned them upon the conquerors as they pressed forward in pursuit. The victory was decisive; the success was followed up, and at the close of that triumphant war a monument in honour of the battle was erected at Calcutta; the inhabitants of that city presented him with a sword, and his own officers with a golden vase; the thanks of parliament were voted him, and he was made a Knight Companion of the Bath. He returned to England in 1805; took his seat in the House of Commons the ensuing year, as member for Newport in the Isle of Wight, and in 1807 was appointed Chief Secretary in Ireland. But his military services were soon required; he accompanied Lord Cathcart in the expedition against Copenhagen, and commanded in the only affair of importance which took place. He was now to be tried in more arduous undertakings;

and such was the repute in which his talents were held, that when the armament for the Peninsula was placed under his command, the opinion both of the army and of the public entirely accorded with the choice which Government had made.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley, having about ten thousand men under his command, sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as he had seen it clear of the coast, made sail in a frigate for Coruña, and arrived there on the 20th. There the Junta of Galicia informed him of the battle of Rio Seco; and that the French, being, in consequence, masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the communication between that province and the country to the south and east. The French in Portugal they estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portuguese troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000 had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to arrive there about the 25th. Sir Arthur consulted with them concerning the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money:.. this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from England that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his forces against the enemy in Portugal, because while that army remained unbroken the Spaniards

*Sir Arthur  
lands at  
Coruña.*

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could never make any simultaneous effort to drive the French out of the Peninsula; and they advised him to land in the north, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the Portuguese troops in that quarter.

*He proceeds  
to Porto.*

Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that night with the Bishop and the general officers. From them, and from Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had previously joined them, he learnt that the regular Portuguese troops who had been collected amounted to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were about 1200 peasants in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portuguese and 300 Spanish infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly equipped and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the Spanish corps, then, so the Spaniards had informed him, on its way from Galicia; and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence of his victory at Rio Seco. Sir Arthur stated, that he should want cattle for draught, and for the supply of his army; the Bishop took pen and ink, wrote down the number which would be required, and replied immediately that they were ready.

Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir

Charles Cotton, advising him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego, and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. The fleet accordingly was ordered to Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles. There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville; but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castaños, thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, for the purpose of acting with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for Castaños, in case of defeat, and from whence he could re-embark in eight-and-forty hours: and he supposed that Sir Arthur would begin his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being convinced by the Junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without injury to the Spaniards.

General Spencer represented Junot's force as exceeding 20,000 men: the admiral, according to the reports of the Portuguese, estimated them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to 18,000, of whom about 12,000

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*He goes to  
the Tagus  
to confer  
with Sir C.  
Cotton.*

*The Mondego the  
only place  
where a  
landing  
could be  
effected.*

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were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and 2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered impracticable: it would be equally so at Cascaes: it was at all times difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy: Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland, and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden, the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple; but he was directed to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being now formidable.

*Troops  
landed in  
the Mon-  
dego.*

This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached him; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and because he knew that the Portuguese, who were much discouraged at

seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred. It was now found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of real importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and ability of the navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial assistance of the Portuguese. They began to disembark on the first of August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high, that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army were in readiness to advance: the march of the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the Portuguese general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry arrived at Coimbra,

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having effected their escape from Lisbon. This hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho. A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered, was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command, followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their dangerous march in safety.

*They advance to Leiria.*

Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as this communication must needs be very precarious, both as depending upon the state of the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the Portuguese army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña, informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to act offensively

against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier, than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices, therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portuguese force, consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several monks who had been murdered by the French; the murderers had amused themselves with dipping their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark upon the wall. *Early Campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, p. 8.*

The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the immediate effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already produced so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people looking every where for deliverance, believed that an army from Morocco was coming to their aid. The trick of the egg was

*Joy of the Portuguese in Lisbon.*

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*Neves*, v.  
67.

*Thiebault*,  
170.

*Neves*, v.  
62, 65.

*Thiebault*,  
172.

repeated, not as before, with mysterious initials, referring to King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation that the French were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed was found upon the high altars of the Patriarchal Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same fashion, were to be seen upon the high altar in every church in Lisbon: at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining the trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very soon intelligence came that the only foe of which he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portuguese commanders at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment was not possible; .. the news came to Lisbon at the same time from General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters, and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of his dispatches, all doubt would have been removed by the altered appearance of the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth their deliverance was at hand.

Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-

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*August.**Measures of  
the French.**Thiebault,  
175.*

Tejo, and Laborde, who was supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two brigades of Generals Brenier and Thomieres to manœuvre and delay the enemy till Loison could arrive, Travot being appointed to the command at Lisbon in Laborde's stead; . . . this general was chosen because having demeaned himself as a man of honour and humanity, he had deserved and obtained the respect and good opinion of the Portuguese. The castle at Lisbon, which had now been strongly fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores. The fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up in obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless, . . . the bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast, and the other portable plunder, packed for removal, and deposited on board one of the Portuguese ships of war. Whole piles of rich hangings and vestments, the spoils of palaces and churches, were burnt in a building erected for the purpose near head-quarters, and in the sight of the people, for the sake of the gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered. In order to counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was confidently asserted, that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on the side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of provoking their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought a stain upon their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans to fight against the French, who, like themselves, professed the

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*Observador  
Portuguez,  
402.  
Neves, v.  
65, 118.*

true religion. It was indeed actually believed by the Portuguese that the British had brought with them a Moorish force: the Portuguese Consul in Barbary had in fact obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 *cru-sados* for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the Highlanders: . . . their dress was immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries.

*Movements  
of Laborde  
and Loison.*

The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon the Zezere and the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison's detachment and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from Rio-Maior he might either take the direction of Alcobaca, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he proceeded to Alcobaca, where he found Thomieres. Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; . . the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also with English aid,) had achieved her

*Thiebault,  
175.*

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own deliverance in the battle of Aljubarrota, one of the most signal and important victories in the age of chivalry. The country was too open for his force, and he therefore remained at Alcobaca, watching the movements of the enemy, and hoping to be joined by Loison. That general, meantime, had suffered much on his march through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and the want of water. Though there were none to oppose them in the field or harass them, the French felt what it was to be in a country where every inhabitant regarded them with a deadly hatred. Wherever they went the towns and villages were deserted; . . . meat, wine, and even bread, were wanting; and the persons who fell into their hands, or perhaps remained in their line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them out of their way in search of springs or rivulets, which when they reached them were dry; . . . or of stagnant waters, wherein hemp was steeped, and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was, the men could not be prevented from drinking greedily. Many died of heat and exhaustion on the way; and they who from fatigue or sickness fell behind, were killed by the peasantry.

*Thiebault,*  
172.

Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing the Tagus by the bridge of boats at that city. He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached Leiria, the two cities being about thirty

*G. Freire  
separates  
from the  
English.*

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miles from each other. Laborde was at Alcobaca, six leagues from the latter city, on the road to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaca, Loison could only effect a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de Freire, the Portuguese commander, in his former conferences with Sir Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however, that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portuguese were to be fed by the English commissariat, he would sepa-

rate them from the English army, and march for Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur's command only the day preceding.

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There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portuguese officers during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew, would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information of the utmost importance, that Laborde's orders were to amuse the Portuguese army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him. General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that he

*Motives for  
his separation.*



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*Neves, v.*  
79—81.

was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies. The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400 light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur, considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portuguese troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them, if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained, was so ill \*composed, as to be incapa-

\* Sir Arthur, upon the court of inquiry, begged leave, in justice to the individuals composing this commissariat, to state, that he did not intend to complain of want of zeal, nor of any deficiency of exertion on their part. "The fact is," said he, "that I wished to draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained are probably to be

ble of distributing, even to the British troops, the ample supplies which had been procured for them. Freire's conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were too weak for the service upon which they were advancing; it was not suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed him, and which he had withheld from the British commander. He was, however, wise enough to follow the advice which he had at first refused, and remained at Leiria.

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On the 14th, Sir Arthur reached Alcobaça, from which the French fell back the preceding night: the next day he arrived at Caldas. Laborde and Thomieres were now at Roliça, about ten miles off, and their advanced posts were within a league of the Caldas. Four companies of riflemen were ordered to drive them back; they were tempted to an incautious pursuit; a superior body of the enemy endeavoured to cut them off, and would have succeeded, had not General Spencer come to their support. A trifling loss was sustained in this affair, but the village was won, and the French retired entirely from the neighbourhood; their picquets having been driven from Obidos.

*Skirmish  
near Caldas.*

The country between the Caldas and Obidos is a sandy level, with an open pine wood. Obidos

*Laborde  
takes a po-  
sition at  
Roliça.*

attributed to the nature of our political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of serious consideration and difficulty, and these evils

consisted in the inexperience of almost every individual belonging to the commissariat, of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies." He requested that this explanation might stand upon the minutes.

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itself stands finely upon an insulated hill, and a little beyond a mountainous or hilly region begins, the ascent from the low country being abrupt and difficult. Laborde had retired thither, knowing the strength of the ground, and expecting to be joined there by Loison, who, he knew, would make every exertion to effect his junction in time. That junction had once already been prevented by the timely arrival of the British at Leiria, and Sir Arthur now advanced for the purpose of a second time preventing it. The enemy were drawn up at the foot of the hill, in front of their position; they retired to the heights, and Sir Arthur, having reconnoitred the ground, and seen how difficult the attack in front would be, determined to attack both flanks. He therefore directed Major-General Ferguson, with 3000 men, to turn the enemy's right, and Major-General Hill to attack the left, while the Portuguese troops, under Colonel Trant, by a wider movement on that side, were to penetrate to his rear. Meanwhile columns under Major-Generals Crawford, Nightingale, and Fane, were to assemble in the plain, ready to force their way up the passes as soon as it should be seen that the enemy were shaken. This plan, which would have ensured success with the least possible loss, was frustrated by some mistake in the delivery of an order. Ferguson's brigade was, in consequence of this error, brought into the plain to support the central movement; and the attack was made in front, upon the strength of the

position, before the enemy apprehended any danger on the flanks or in the rear, and consequently while they were able to apply their whole force and undivided attention where they were strongest.

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Roliça was at that time a large and beautiful village, with more appearance of comfort and welfare about it than was usual in Portuguese villages. The place, with its five dependent hamlets, contained about three hundred families, the larger half of the population being in Roliça itself. Most of the houses had an inclosed garden or orchard, and the country is full of olive grounds, vineyards, and gardens, with stone inclosures. A little beyond Roliça is the hamlet of N. Senhora de Misericordia, a place of fewer houses, but of the same description: just without this village the British artillery was well placed, on a rising ground, where there stood some of those strong and well-built windmills which are common in Portugal; below were olive grounds, and an open grove of ilex or cork, under cover of which our troops were enabled to approach and deploy with little loss, though the French kept up a constant fire from the heights. Laborde had planted his eagle on the highest point of Monte S. Anna, near a wooden cross, which marked the spot of some murder or accidental death. The view from those heights is singularly beautiful, presenting just such objects as Gaspar Poussin delighted in painting, and in such combination as he would have placed them; rocks and

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hills rising in the valley, open groves, churches with their old galilees, and houses with all the picturesque varandas and porticos which bespeak a genial climate; Obidos with its walls and towers upon an eminence in middle distance, and its aqueduct stretching across the country as far as the eye could follow it; Monte Junto far to the east, and on the west the Atlantic. And till the iniquitous invasion of the country by France, there had been something in the condition of the people here which accorded with the loveliness of the scene wherein they were placed. Such as their lot was, they were contented with it; three and even four generations were found under the same roof: like plants, they grew, and seeded, and decayed, and returned to earth upon the spot where they had sprung up. If this state of things be not favourable to commercial prosperity and the wealth of nations, it is far more conducive to individual virtue and happiness than the stage by which it is succeeded.

*Battle of  
Roliça.*

Upon this beautiful ground it was that the British troops were first to be tried against the soldiers of Buonaparte in the Peninsula. The strength of the enemy's position fully compensated for their inferiority in numbers. The way by which the assailants had to ascend was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men, so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal, in some parts overgrown with briars, and in others impeded by fragments of rock. Three of these

dry water-courses, which appeared the least difficult, were attempted; that in the centre was the most promising, and this the 9th and 29th regiments attacked. They were protected in their advance by the fire of our artillery. The way would not admit more than three or four men abreast, in no place more than six. Near the top there was a small opening, in the form of a wedge, overgrown at the point with a thick coppice of myrtle, arbutus, arborescent heath, and those other shrubs which in this part of Portugal render the wild country so beautiful. An ambush of riflemen had been posted here, and here Colonel Lake, of the 29th, fell, with many of his men. When they had reached the summit, they were exposed to a fire from the vineyards, while they could not form a front to return it. The grenadier company, by a brave charge upon that part of the enemy who were in the open ground, won for them time to form; and though Laborde, with great promptitude, rallied the French as soon as they gave way, and brought them thrice to the charge, they kept their ground. This severe contention had continued two hours, when Brigadier-General Fane, with the light troops, appeared on the right, and Major-General Hill on the left. Laborde then deemed it necessary to abandon his first line and retire into the hamlet of Azambugeira, which was in the rear. Throughout the action this General had shown that the high military reputation which he enjoyed was well founded;

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all his movements were judiciously planned, and rapidly and well executed, men and officers giving good proof of skill and courage. The superiority of the British troops was therefore finely shown; for, from the nature of the ground, and from unavoidable circumstances, the force which on our side was actually engaged was by no means equal to that of the enemy. A gallant charge, under Major-General Spencer, drove them from this last position in the hamlet; the advantage could not be followed up for want of cavalry, and also because of the difficulty of bringing up cannon and more troops in time. Laborde therefore, making his last stand upon a height beyond Azambugeira, collected his troops on the plain ground behind, formed them into lines, and then retired toward Torres Vedras, leaving his guns upon the field.

*Abrantes  
occupied by  
the Portu-  
guese.*

The loss of the British, in killed, wounded, and missing, was nearly 500. The French\* acknowledge to have lost nearly 600. Laborde

\* General Thiebault affirms, that they had only 1900 in the field. An officer who was dying of his wounds, informed Sir Arthur Wellesley that their numbers were 6000. General Thiebault asserts also, that in a charge made by General Brénier with two companies in front of Azambugeira, the 29th regiment having lost its colonel, and many of its officers and men, surrendered *tout-entier*: but that *par-malheur* the firing did not cease, and the wreck of the regiment saved itself by a spontaneous movement,

leaving a major, eight officers, and fifty men, in the hands of the French. There is an official test by which the accuracy of this statement may be tried; and thereby it appears, that only four officers were missing in this action, and that there was no major among them. The loss of the English he states at more than 2000. The accuracy of our official lists of the killed and wounded is among those things relating to Great Britain which a Frenchman cannot understand.

was slightly wounded at the beginning of the action. Even during the action he was in hopes that Loison might arrive; but Loison, finding that the English were before him at Leiria, found it necessary to take the line of Torres Novas and Santarem, and so for Torres Vedras. The Portuguese had anxiously watched his movements, and no sooner was it ascertained that he had left Thomar, than they prepared to cut off the small garrison which he had left in Abrantes. Freire had ordered Bacellar to get possession of that city, with the aid of some Spanish troops under the Marques de Valadares, who had arrived at Castello Branco. Captain Manoel de Castro Correa de Lacerda had been sent forward to obtain certain intelligence of the enemy; and he finding circumstances favourable, and adventurers enough to join him, determined, with three priests militant, by name Captain-Father P. Manoel Domingos Crespo, Lieutenant-Father Lourenço Pires, and Ensign-Father José Nicolao Beja, to make the attempt without waiting for the Spaniards. They collected at Villa de Rei some three hundred men, armed with hunting-spears, and a few with firelocks; a considerable number of the *Ordenanças* joined them during the night on the heights of Abrançalha, which was the place appointed for their meeting; and early on the morning of that day on which the battle of Roliça was fought, they entered Abrantes, leaving Ensign-Father Beja with a party of spearmen in ambush to cut off the enemy if they



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should attempt to fly. The French, upon the first appearance of danger, retired into the old castle, and fired from the windows, . . . for there was no artillery there. Upon this Father Crespo stationed some sharp-shooters upon the roof of S. Vicente's church, which was opposite. The enemy, then knowing how impossible it was to hold out in their unprovided state, resolved to sally, and make for the river side, where they had four vessels laden with stores, about to fall down the stream for Lisbon; but before they could reach the shore, they were surrounded by such numbers, and lost so many men, that they laid down their arms. They who were on board the vessels, seeing their danger, leaped into the river; some perished in attempting to cross it, they who reached the opposite shore were pursued and hunted down like wild beasts; fifty-two were killed that day, and 117 taken prisoners; the few who escaped for the time had no place of safety near, and fell into the hands of the peasantry. The Corregedor-Mor at this time met with a miserable fate. Because of the office which he unfortunately held, the French had made him the instrument of their exactions: the same constitutional timidity which prevented him from resigning his post rather than obey their tyrannical orders, induced him now to fly, in the unworthy hope of securing himself under their protection. He therefore forded the river, and hid himself in a vineyard; there a peasant discovered him, to whom he immediately offered

200 milreis if he would conduct him to the French army; the villain took the money, led him to a solitary place, stabbed him in five places, then robbed him, and left him to expire. On the third day he was found by some women, still alive, and was carried to Abrantes; no care availed to save his life, and he died rather of inanition and loss of blood, than from the nature of his wounds; but he was able to relate what had passed, so that the murderer was apprehended and brought to justice.

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August.*Neves, v.*  
95—105.

Among the French effects which were taken at Abrantes were about 200 hides and 1000 bags of cotton, which the state of the intermediate country had prevented them from sending into France: they had carried on a gainful trade while the communication was open. But now they began to feel that the amount of their gains and of their plunder was in danger. In spite of all prohibitions and precautions, some intelligence still found its way to Lisbon. The British squadron and the transports had been seen from the heights, and though the French abated nothing of their high tone, the inhabitants were now well assured that their deliverance was at hand. As the only course which offered any hope of extricating himself, Junot resolved to collect the whole of his disposable force, and give the English battle before their reinforcements arrived, and before they should be ready to act on the offensive. The only places in which he left garrisons were Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche.

*Movements  
in Alcm-  
Tejo and  
Algarve.*

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*Alcacere do  
Sal and Se-  
tubal aban-  
doned by the  
French.*

Setubal had hitherto been occupied by a force under General Graindorge, who had succeeded Kellermann in the command there. His situation had not been tranquil, while Mestre had taken possession of Alcacere do Sal, and an English frigate was off the port. But Mestre was recalled in all haste to Beja, when that city, after the fate of Evora, apprehended a second visitation with fire and sword. The men whom he commanded gave on this occasion proof of that patient and uncomplaining spirit with which the Spaniards and Portugeze endure privations. They started fasting and without provisions, and after a long day's march reached the little town of Odivella, where no rations had been provided for them. Mestre and his adjutant then went from door to door, to beg bread, and with the bread which was thus obtained they were contented and cheerful. Aware of the alarm which Loison's operations had excited, Graindorge resolved to clear the neighbourhood, and the Juntas of Alcacere, Santiago de Cacem, and Grandola, fled at his approach. But when Beja was relieved from danger by Loison's movements to the north, Mestre, who had been dispatched toward Evora, was ordered to return upon Alcacere, and the same direction was taken by one body of men from Algarve, and by another under Lopes from Beja. Graindorge had now received orders to retire with his troops to Almada; Alcacere therefore was abandoned when the Portugeze arrived there, and Setubal also. Setubal had been singularly for-

tunate during a time of general rapacity. Perfect order had been maintained there while Solano and the Spaniards possessed it; and when Graindorge succeeded Kellermann, a Portuguese woman, who lived with him as his mistress, had influence enough to prevent him from delivering up that beautiful town to pillage, which his men required, and which, it is said, they had been promised. The Portuguese writers ought not to have passed over in silence the name of one who averted so much evil, and who, it may well be believed, was more to be pitied than condemned for her frailty.

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*Neves, iv.*  
173—179.  
*Observador*  
*Portuguez,*  
291.

About 300 men were left at Palmella. Graindorge had two régiments under his command at Almada and other places on the left bank of the Tagus. The forts at the Bugio, Trafaria, and St. Julien, were occupied by the French, and they had troops also at Cascaes and Ericeyra. Sufficient force was to be left in and near Lisbon, to keep down the inhabitants, by the presumed aid of the Russian squadron, whose presence in the river was of great importance to Junot at this time. The enemy had recourse also to their usual policy of circulating fabricated intelligence. They affirmed, that 20,000 French had arrived at Braganza, and they produced Badajoz Gazettes which must have been forged for the purpose, relating the defeat and consternation of the Spaniards, and the rejoicings with which Joseph had been received on his triumphant entrance into Madrid. Few persons were deceived by these artifices. On the 15th the Emperor Napoleon's

*Measures at*  
*Lisbon.*

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birthday was celebrated; the guns from the ships and fortresses were fired, Junot gave a grand entertainment to his officers, and appeared afterwards at the Opera in state; but meantime every thing was made ready for his departure. The night was passed in giving orders, and at day-break the reserve was in motion, with the staff, the military chest, containing a million francs, and the most precious and portable part of their plunder. The Comte de Bourmont, and some other French emigrant officers who had found an asylum in Lisbon during the horrors of the Revolution, on this occasion joined the French army, the Count at his own solicitation being placed upon the staff, to fight against a government by whose bounty they had been supported, and a people who had hospitably received them in their distress: and for this moral treason they have been extolled in their own country, with that perversion of principle and utter insensibility to honour, which equally characterise the schools of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte.

*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
406.  
*Thiebault,*  
187-8.

*Proclama-  
tion to the  
people of  
Lisbon.*

It had been proposed to form a national guard at Lisbon at this time, composed of all who had any property to protect; but this was rejected, less as being impracticable than as dangerous. The Lisbonians had too much reason to execrate their oppressors. Their sufferings, though not of that kind which give a splendour to history, and consecrate the memory of the sufferers, had been more pitiable, for they had been long continued and obscure. The French themselves

confessed, that they knew not how the people of Lisbon subsisted during the three months preceding the harvest; for it was known that the consumption of food in that great city was only one-third of what it used to be, and the numbers who had been expelled, who had emigrated with the court, or had found means of following it, were not greater than that of the foreign troops who had been introduced. Impossible as it was to conciliate a people upon whom they had inflicted such deep and irreparable injuries, the French deemed it politic at this time to take the most conciliatory measures in their power; if the popular feeling could be repressed or allayed only for a few days, by that time they should either have obtained a victory over the English, or have placed themselves by treaty under the safeguard of British honour. With these views Junot left a decree, that the heads of the tribunals, and the chief persons among the nobility and clergy, should be invited to assist at the council of government during his absence. He left also a proclamation to the inhabitants of Lisbon, saying, that he was departing from them for three or four days, to give battle to the English, and whatever might be the event, he should return. "I leave," said he, "to govern Lisbon, a general who, by the mildness and firmness of his character, has obtained the friendship of the Portuguese at Cascaes and Oeyras; General Travot will, by these same virtues, obtain that of the inhabitants of Lisbon. Hitherto you

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*August.**Thiebault,*  
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have been tranquil; it is your interest to continue so! do not stain yourselves with a horrible crime at the moment when, without any danger of your own, the lot of arms is about to determine by what power you are to be governed. Reflect for an instant upon the interests of the three nations who are contending for the possession of Lisbon. What the French desire is the glory and the prosperity of the city and of the kingdom, for this is the interest and the policy of France. Spain wishes to invade Portugal and reduce it to a province, that she may again make herself mistress of the Peninsula. And England would domineer over you for the purpose of destroying your port and your navy, and impeding the progress of industry among you. The English regard the magnificence of your port with envy; they will not suffer it to exist so near them, and they have no hope of preserving it. They know that a new French army has already passed your frontiers, and that if this should not be sufficient, another will come after it; but they will have destroyed your naval establishments, they will have caused the destruction of Lisbon, and this is what they aim at, and what they desire: they know that they cannot maintain themselves upon the Continent; but if they can destroy the ports and the navy of any other power, they are content. I depart full of confidence in you. I reckon upon all the citizens who are interested in the preservation of public order; and I am persuaded that it will be preserved. Call to mind the miseries

which must necessarily follow, if this beautiful city should compel my troops to enter it by force! The exasperated soldiers would not be then to be controlled; . . fire, sword, all the horrors of war which are practised in a city taken by assault, . . pillage, . . death, . . behold what you would draw upon yourselves! The thought alone makes me shudder. Inhabitants of Lisbon, avert from yourselves these terrible calamities!"

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August.*Observador  
Portuguez,*  
408.

The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated. Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however, for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and General Travot, though he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle.

*Prepara-  
tions on  
board the  
Russian  
squadron.**Observador  
Portuguez,*  
410.



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XI.1808.  
*August.**Junction of  
Loison, La-  
borde, and  
Junot.*

Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst, and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out, and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot. Each of Loison's long marches at this time is said to have cost him not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted, that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British army distinctly saw their columns in the line of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the 19th, and when General Thiebault arrived with the reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or 1500 horse.

*Early Cam-  
paigns, 18.**Thiebault,  
190—193.**The British  
advance to  
Vimciro.**August 18.*

Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the line by which the enemy retired would have led him from the sea. He

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was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow, when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the coast. His original intention had been to employ this General's brigade, and that of General Acland, in besieging Peniche, if that should be necessary; otherwise to land them in some of the bays near the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now to land General Anstruther's troops, and join them to the army. He proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and hazard. The boats were almost always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this

*General  
Anstru-  
ther's bri-  
gade lands.*

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*Arrival of  
Sir Harry  
Burrard in  
the roads.*

danger due precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.

The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur immediately went on board, informed him of what had been done, and of the present state of things, and laid before him the plan of operations upon which he had intended to proceed. His purpose was to march on the following morning, push his advanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main body about four or five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy's position at Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir Charles Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never been allowed a field whereon to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part of the country when he commanded the British troops in Portugal; it had not escaped him, that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion, the kingdom must be saved or lost; and his maps and papers were in Sir

Arthur's hands. The battle would thus be fought in a country of which he had adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the retreating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had formed, and orders for marching on the morrow had actually been issued, before Sir Harry's arrival.

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To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in himself and in his troops, no prospect could have been more encouraging; but the new commander did not behold it hopefully. The objections to a forward movement preponderated in his mind; he learnt that the artillery \* horses

*He alters  
the plan of  
the cam-  
paign.*

\* They were cast off cavalry, purchased in Ireland; and they were described as old, blind, and lame: some of them, it was said, had already at this time died of age, others of work, though they had been carefully fed: nearly a sixth part had thus perished on the way, and of the remainder a great number were not worth the forage which they consumed. Nine years after these poor horses had been delivered over to the dogs and wolves, a representation was made to me in their favour, and I feel myself bound to notice it, were it only for the singularity of the case. I am assured that the 300 horses (which Lord Castle-reagh good-naturedly called his countrymen) were selected with the greatest care, as well as knowledge, in horseflesh, from 1050 of which the corps was then composed; that they were in the very best condition and working order; they were drafts from a collection made by purchase in 1803, (that is, five years before, and therefore not young); or from the best

and most useful horses cast from dragoon regiments, as unfit for dragoon service generally, (the inferior description of such cast horses having been from time to time sold); that they had been always carefully groomed and well fed, and were in excellent condition for common draft, the service for which they were required. From the manner in which this representation was made to me, I have no doubt of its truth. The horses, when they began the campaign, had probably not recovered from the voyage; they were not accustomed to the food of the country, and were employed in much harder work than had ever fallen to their lot before, and upon much worse roads. And so, peace to their memory. I must not however omit to observe, that Captain Eliot, in his Treatise on the Defence of Portugal, says, these artillery horses, in the brigade to which he was attached, did their duty perfectly well at the battle of Vimeiro.

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were inefficient, that our men, for want of cavalry, were kept close to their encampments by the enemy's horse; and that it would not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced that Sir Arthur's intentions were expedient; the decision which he was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait for Sir John Moore's division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem, a position from whence it might intercept the enemy's retreat, whether they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent the precious time that would be lost before this division could be landed and become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of at once changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated as the two armies now were, it was impossible to

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avoid an action. If the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case they should turn the French position. But these representations were unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.

It was soon seen how well Sir Arthur had judged of the enemy's intentions. Junot was ill supplied with provisions; he could not venture long to be absent from Lisbon: situated as he was, it appeared to him that there would be less evil in an immediate defeat, than must arise from prolonged operations, though they should lead to a victory. His business, therefore, was to bring on an action as soon as possible, and to make the attack; and at the moment when Sir Harry Burrard, resolving upon delay, had countermanded the orders for advancing on the morrow, the French were in motion.

*The battle  
of Vimeiro.**Thiebault,  
194.*

Vimeiro, a name which was now to become memorable in British and Portuguese history, is a village situated nearly at the bottom of a lovely valley, about three miles from the sea, and

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screened from the sea breeze by mountainous heights, through which the little river Maceira winds its way. The village stands at the eastern extremity of these heights; and on the opposite side, separated from them by a deep ravine, are other heights, over which the road to Lourinham passes, a little town in the *Termo* or district of which the parishes of Vimeiro and Maceira are included. The western termination reaches the sea-shore. As the army had halted here only for the night, meaning to proceed early on the morrow, they were disposed of, not as expecting an attack, but as most convenient for the troops. Six brigades bivouacked on the height to the westward. The advanced guard was posted on a hill south-east of Vimeiro, to cover the commissariat and stores which were in the village: this height was entirely commanded by higher ground to the westward. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry were placed; and there were picquets of observation on the hills to the eastward.

Aug. 21.

The enemy, who had marched all night, and whom some accidents had impeded on their way, first appeared at eight in the morning, forming in strong bodies upon the heights toward Lourinham, thus threatening the advanced guard and the left, which was the weak part of the British position. Sir Arthur had visited the advanced posts early in the day, and had returned to his quarters before the first shots were exchanged

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with the enemy's advance. He now moved the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, successively across the ravine to the heights on the Lourinham road. General Anstruther's brigade took post on the right of the advanced guard, and Major-General Hill was moved nearer, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve, in addition to which our small cavalry force was in the rear of their right. The French army was in two divisions, . . the right, of about 6000 men, under General Loison; the left, about 5000, under Laborde. Kellermann had the reserve, which was intended to connect the two wings, but they were too distant from each other. General Margaron commanded the cavalry.

Laborde came along the valley to attack the advanced guard on the eminence or table hill; he had a column of infantry and cavalry to cover his left flank, and on his right one regiment marched in column to turn the defenders, and penetrate the village by the church; but this purpose had been foreseen, and part of the 43rd had been ordered into the churchyard to prevent it. The French advanced with perfect steadiness, though exposed to a severe fire of riflemen posted behind the trees and banks, and of seven pieces of artillery well directed. They advanced like men accustomed to action and to victory; but suffering more severely as they drew nearer, and especially from the Shrapnell shells, (then first brought into use,) they faltered, and opened



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a confused fire. Still they advanced, and arrived within a few paces of the brow of the hill, where the 50th regiment, under Colonel Walker, with a single company of the rifle corps on its left, stood opposed to them. That regiment poured upon them a destructive volley, and instantly charged with the bayonet, and penetrated the angle of the column, which then broke and turned. The regiment which was entering the village by the church, was attacked in flank by General Acland's brigade, then advancing to its position on the heights; and our cavalry, poor in number as it was, charged with effect. The discomfiture of this column was then complete; they fled, leaving about 1000 men on the ground, 350 prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery; and they were pursued for nearly two miles to the plain beyond the woody ground, where they were supported by a reserve of horse, and where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons, who particularly distinguished himself that day, fell, with many of his men, overpowered by a much superior force of cavalry. The secondary column, under General Brenier, which was to have supported Laborde in his attack, made a side movement to the left, in order to cross the ravine, and thus it was separately engaged by General Anstruther's brigade; and being charged with the bayonet, was repulsed with great loss. An aide-de-camp of Sir Arthur's coming up to tell this General that a corps should be sent to his assistance, he replied, "Sir, I am not pressed,

and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am able to beat them wherever I find them.”

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Loison's attack was made nearly at the same time as Laborde's: it was supported by a large body of cavalry, and made with the characteristic and imposing impetuosity of French troops. They drove in our light troops, but they were checked by General Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st, which formed the first line; after some close and heavy firing of musketry, the 82d and 29th came up, and the brigades of Generals Bowes and Acland. The enemy were then charged with the bayonet; this weapon is of French invention, but it was made for British hands. They came to the charge bravely, and stood it for a moment;... in that moment their foremost rank fell "like a line of grass before the mowers." This is not the flourish of an historian, seeking artfully to embellish details which no art can render interesting to any but military readers; it is the language of an actor in the scene, who could not call it to mind in after-hours without shuddering; for the very men whose superiority was thus decidedly proved, could not speak without involuntary awe, of so complete and instantaneous a destruction, produced as it was, not by artillery or explosions, but by their own act and deed, and the strength of their own hearts and hands. The bodies of about 300 French grenadiers were counted upon the field, who had fallen in this charge. The

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enemy were pursued to a considerable distance, and six pieces of cannon were taken in the pursuit. General Kellermann made a vigorous attempt, late in the action, to recover these from the 71st and 82d, which were halted in a valley where the guns had been captured. These regiments retired a little way to some advantageous ground, then faced about, fired, and advancing with the bayonet, drove the French back with great loss. Thus were they every where repulsed, though their whole force had been engaged, while not more than half the British army had been brought into action.

*Sir Harry Burrard takes the command.*

Before the action began Sir Harry Burrard and his staff left the ship; they soon heard the firing after they were on shore, and by the time they reached Vimeiro, which is about three miles from the landing-place, the armies were hotly engaged. They found Sir Arthur on the heights, and he explained in few words to the new Commander the position of the army, and the measures which he had taken for beating the enemy. Sir Harry was perfectly satisfied, and directed him to go on with an operation which he had so happily and so well begun. This he did not as giving up his command for the time, but as fulfilling one of the functions of a commander, by directing Sir Arthur to pursue measures which he approved, and holding himself as responsible for the event as if the plan had been originally his own. So far all was well. Toward the close of the action, when the French were

beaten on the left, and it was evident that they must be every where defeated, Sir Arthur went to him, and represented that this was the moment for advancing; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and pursue the beaten enemy with the left. By this movement upon Torres Vedras, the French would be cut off from the nearest road to Lisbon, or if they attempted it, they would find themselves between two bodies of our troops; there remained for them, as the alternative, the circuitous route by Alenquer and Villa-Franca; . . they were dispirited, beaten, and in confusion, absolutely, in his opinion, incapable of forming or of appearing again in the shape of an army, if they were followed even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy; and this he said, giving them full credit for discipline and great facility in forming after having been broken. There was plenty of ammunition in the camp for another battle, and provisions for twelve days. But neither these representations, urged as they were with natural and fitting warmth, nor the victory which was before his eyes, could induce the new Commander to deviate from his former opinion. He replied, that he saw no reason to change his purpose, and that the same motives which induced him yesterday to wait for reinforcements, had still the same weight. At this moment the enemy were retiring in great disorder, and most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur, grieved at seeing the irrecoverable opportunity go by, made a second at-

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tempt to convince the Commander that victory was in his hands. General Ferguson had sent his aide-de-camp to represent the great advantage of advancing, . . he himself could, in fact, have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Arthur took the aide-de-camp to the Commander. But this second representation was as ineffectual as the first. His Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Clinton, and Colonel Murray, his Quarter-Master-General, who had coincided in opinion with him the preceding evening, agreed with him now also. He had just heard from an officer who had passed through General Freire's troops; such an account of them and their proceedings, as precluded any hope of rendering them useful; the artillery horses seemed to him inefficient; but more especially the want of cavalry, he thought, incapacitated the army from following up its success. The 260 Portuguese horse which were with us had shown themselves nearly useless; the British were only 210 in number, and they had suffered severely in the action, . . this was known, though the extent of their loss had not yet been ascertained. These difficulties preponderated with him; he adhered still to his determination; and Sir Arthur, whose sense of military duty would not allow him to act in disregard of orders, as Nelson was accustomed to do, turned to one of his officers, and concealing the bitterness of disappointment under a semblance of levity, said, "Well, then, we have nothing to do, but to go and shoot red-legged

partridges,"..the game with which that country abounds. From that moment he gave up all hope of cutting the French off from Lisbon, inclosing them there, or preventing them, if they thought proper to attempt it, from protracting the campaign by retreating upon Elvas and Almeida.

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The loss of the enemy in this action was about 3000\* killed and wounded, thirteen pieces of artillery, and twenty-three ammunition waggons; that of the English little more than 700 killed, wounded, and missing. The British numbers in the field were 16,000, of which only half had been engaged; the French were about 14,000, including 1300 cavalry, and the whole of this force was brought into action. General Solignac was severely wounded; General Brenier wounded, and left on the field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French General, in gratitude for his preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to Colonel Pack, the French General could not help saying, "What sort of man is this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take the only reward which I can at present

\* According to General Thiebault, ten guns and 1800 men; but to make up the number of killed and wounded, he adds to the British loss, what he takes off from the French, and says, we had more than 500 killed and 1200 wounded.

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offer him!" Brenier no doubt contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacities and cruelties, it appears by the testimony of the Portugeze, that he had no share; when, therefore, Colonel Pack replied, "We are British soldiers, sir, and not plunderers," he must have deeply felt the disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay was immediately made a serjeant by Sir Arthur Wellesley's express desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name, received early in the action a dangerous wound in the thigh: he would not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down \* where his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till the end of the engagement. A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the donation, was voted him by the Highland Society.

Most of the wounded French who fell into the conqueror's hands were young, and of delicate appearance, . . apparently men whose lot would not have fallen in the army, under any other system than that of the conscription, though, having been forced into it, they had acquired the worst vices which have ever disgraced and

\* *Weel, my bru' lads, I can ing; but Deel ha'e my saul if ye gang nae farther wi' ye a-fight- sal want music, were his words.*

degraded the profession of arms. They were dressed in long white linen coats and trowsers, their firelocks were about six inches longer in the barrel than ours, their bayonets about three shorter, the locks of their pieces much better finished, and the pans so constructed, that the powder was not liable to fall out, . . an accident which at that time often happened to ours. A chaplain of the British army, as he was endeavouring to render assistance to some of them, while under the surgeon's hands, addressed himself to one in the language of commiseration, and uttered, at the same time, a natural expression of regret at the horrors of war: but the Frenchman fiercely answered him, with a mixture of pride and indignation, that he gloried in his wounds, and that war was the greatest happiness of life. During the whole day the armed peasantry prowled about the field, taking vengeance upon every wounded or straggling Frenchman whom they could find, for the manifold wrongs of their country, and the aggravated injuries which they had endured. So conscious indeed were the prisoners of the little mercy which they deserved at their hands, that they dreaded lest these men should break in upon them, and massacre them all; and a guard was stationed to protect them. The peasantry, however, passed the night in the field, carousing round a large fire, recounting to each other what they had done, and rejoicing over the day's work.

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August.*The French  
resolve to  
propose  
terms.*

In withholding the army from following up the great advantage which it had gained, Sir Harry Burrard knew how unpopular such a determination must be, and sacrificed his own feelings to his judgement. He thought it not allowable to risk much when the reinforcements which were at hand would make the British force so superior, that any further efforts of the enemy must be vain, and success would be obtained without hazard and with less loss. He erred in judgement; but this honourable testimony was borne to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley, the person of all others by whom that error must have been felt most keenly, that he decided upon fair military grounds in the manner which he thought most conducive to the interests of the country. The French failed not to profit by the respite which was thus allowed them; they formed a rear-guard of four regiments of cavalry, and retired \*at leisure, no attempt being made to harass their retreat. Junot, who is said to have exposed himself at the close of the action so as hardly to have been saved from the British cavalry, summoned Generals Laborde, Loison,

\* They remained, according to General Thiebault, long enough to dress 800 of their wounded upon the field, and send them all off for Torres Vedras. The attitude of the grenadiers with which General Kellermann had charged, the rapidity with which the infantry re-formed, and the movements of four cavalry regiments under General Margaron, he says, *concoururent efficace-*

*ment à contenir l'ennemi. Nous restâmes de cette manière, maîtres du champ de bataille, plus de trois heures après la cessation de l'action.* It is melancholy to observe, that the historical relations of this war which the French have published since its termination, are, generally speaking, as little to be relied on as their official accounts during its continuance.

Kellermann, and Thiebault, upon the field, and demanded their opinions, whether the army ought again to try the lot of arms, and if not, what course it should pursue. They agreed that they were neither in a condition to give battle, nor to stand one. Their troops were harassed, discontented, and discouraged; their ammunition would not last three hours longer; their provisions were failing, their horses already sinking for want of forage. Their losses were irreparable, whereas the enemy were looking for strong reinforcements; and, in fine, the slightest reverse would now leave them at the mercy of the English and Portuguese. Nothing remained but to preserve the best attitude they could, and retire to Lisbon, the possession of which was now their only safeguard. They retreated accordingly to Torres Vedras. A second council was held there on the morrow; and upon a full view of the difficulties and dangers\* of their situation, and the impossibility of effecting a retreat through so large a part of Spain as must be traversed before they could effect a junction with their countrymen, they resolved to try what could be done by negotiation. General Kellermann, therefore, was dispatched with a flag of truce to propose a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Meantime Sir Hew Dalrymple had

\* General Thiebault, who was present at this council, represents the force against them, independent of Lisbon, of 30,000 British, and 17,000 Spaniards, at more than 80,000 men, *auxquels rien ne manquoit!* In reality, every man in Portugal was their enemy; but except animosity and individual courage, the Portuguese at that time wanted every thing.

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*Arrival of  
Sir Hew  
Dalrymple.*

arrived and taken the command of the British army, which thus had three commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours.

Sir Hew Dalrymple had been expressly chosen for this command because of the zeal and judgement which he had displayed during the whole of those important transactions in the south of Spain on which so much depended, and in which he had acted upon his own responsibility. In a private letter from Lord Castlereagh, then minister for the war department, Sir Arthur Wellesley was recommended to his particular confidence, and a full persuasion expressed that that officer's high reputation would alone dispose Sir Hew to select him for any service which required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience; but, above all, that the habits of communication in which Sir Arthur had for a length of time been with his majesty's ministers, concerning the affairs of Spain, would point him out as an officer of whom it would be desirable for the commander-in-chief, on all accounts, to make the most prominent use which the rules of the service would permit. Sir Hew embarked at Gibraltar on the 13th; and learnt that night from Lord Collingwood, who was off Cadiz, that Sir Arthur's corps had either landed, or was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus on the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew's wish to supersede that

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General in a detached command for which he had been particularly chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the Commander-in-chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-de-camp on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned, bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate stood in for the shore.

None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed to him had been received; he landed therefore with no other information than what had been thus gathered upon the way, and

*He orders  
the army to  
advance.  
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entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach they were embarking the wounded for Porto; during the whole night the sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro, he found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day before, the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in removing the wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a military position, but merely as a halting-place, and it was now necessary to remove from it, because of the late action. Sir Hew therefore gave orders for marching the next morning at day-break toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his predecessor, he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous operation, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor any thing upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on their part the battle would be fought for existence, while the enemy, in case of defeat, would lose only what were killed or taken. But he differed from Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir John Moore's division, the arrival of which was extremely uncertain, and that he saw the necessity of pursuing active measures. The French, he knew, must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon, (a chance which he was willing to take, though

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they were superior in cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they would have the great advantage of choosing their ground;) or they would cross the Tagus.

Soon after mid-day an alarm was given that the enemy were advancing to renew the attack; the position was taken as on the preceding morning. It proved to be a body of cavalry with a flag of truce; and General Kellermann alighting at head-quarters, proposed an armistice, for the purpose of concluding a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Sir Hew immediately called for his two predecessors. He himself had no means of knowing, but from them, what the consequences of yesterday's battle really had been; the responsibility was his, but for the information upon which the agreement was to be founded, he trusted to them, and more especially to Sir Arthur. That General's plans had been completely defeated by the refusal to follow up the victory, and by the change which Sir Harry Burrard, before he landed, had made in the intended destination of Sir John Moore's corps. Considering, therefore, that in consequence of these errors the enemy had been allowed leisure to resume a formidable position between the British army and Lisbon, and could not now by any increase of the British numbers be prevented from crossing the Tagus, and occupying in strength the strong place of Elvas, with its stronger fort La Lippe, and Almeida; that the Tagus would not for some time longer be open

*Kellermann  
arrives to  
propose an  
armistice.*

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to the fleet, the army meantime depending upon the ships for supplies, and that its communication with them by the coast must at that season be most precarious: considering also how important it was that the troops should not be delayed by regular sieges in Portugal, but march as soon as possible into Spain, he thought it expedient that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them. They occupied at that time, in a military point of view, he thought, the whole of Portugal, having every strong hold in their hands; their present situation enabled them still to avail themselves of those possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and he was of opinion that an army which had its retreat open, and possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed such terms. He wished, however, to limit the suspension of arms to eight-and-forty hours. Sir Hew preferred that it should be unlimited, as it had been proposed; in this he had a view to the disembarkation of Sir John Moore's corps, which was not forbidden by the agreement.

*Terms of  
the armi-  
stice.*

An armistice accordingly for the purpose of negotiating a definitive convention was concluded upon \* these terms: That the river Si-

\* It is asserted by General Thiebault, that General Kellermann was sent to feel his ground, under pretext of a conference relating to the prisoners and wounded. Upon that General's

return he says, “ *On conçoit de quel intérêt étoient les nouvelles qu’il rapportoit, et combien elles parurent heureuses quand on sut à quel point il avoit réalisé tout ce qu’on avoit pu espérer. Il avoit*

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sandre should be the line of demarcation between the two armies, and that neither of them should occupy Torres Vedras; that the English general should bind himself to comprehend the armed Portuguese in the truce, and that their line of demarcation should be from Leiria to Thomar: that it was agreed that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should be transported to France with their arms and bag-

*été reçu avec la plus grande distinction; il avoit eu le talent de faire prendre aux Anglais l'initiative des propositions qu'il avoit à leur faire; sachant parfaitement l'Anglais, il avoit suivi la partie la plus mystérieuse de leurs conversations\*; il s'étoit fortifié de la certitude que, malgré l'énormité de leurs avantages, les Anglais, incertains de l'époque de l'arrivée des renforts, qu'ils attendoient, n'étoient pas tranquilles sur leur position: il étoit parvenu à traiter pour la flotte Russe en même temps que pour l'armée Française, et cela en faisant pressenter que les Russes alloient se joindre à nous: il étoit arrivé de cette manière à demander même que nous emmenassions la flotte Portugaise, non pour l'obtenir, mais afin d'avoir quelque chose à céder, dans le cas où des articles d'une haute importance seroient trop contestés; et c'est ainsi, que par autant d'habileté que de fermeté et d'adresse, il parvint à conclure et à signer un traité provisoire."*

This statement is sent into the world with General Kellermann's sanction, Baron Thiebault's Re-

lation having, as the preface states, been read to him. General Kellermann was so successful in this negotiation, that he can derive no additional credit from these additions to the plain facts. With regard to the initiative, he came declaredly to treat for an armistice preparatory to a convention for evacuating Portugal, and he produced a paper containing the wishes of the French Commander-in-chief; the deliberations upon his proposal, which he is said to have overheard, were not carried on in his presence, but in an inner room. (*Proceedings upon the Inquiry*, p. 57.) As to the demand that the French might carry away the Portuguese fleet, the French are certainly bold askers; and in this negotiation, as in many others, they proved that Fortune favours the bold; . . but he must have been more than bold, who could have made such a proposal. What was afterwards asked upon that score will appear hereafter.

\* Voici quelques-unes des phrases qu'il recueillit: *Notre position est délicate—Le corps de Sir John Moore n'est pas encore arrivé à Figuières—*

*La bonne intelligence des Russes et des Français doit nous donner des inquiétudes, &c.*



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gage and private property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever: that no individual, whether Portugueze, Frenchman, or of a nation allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct, but be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be in possession of the city and port, the Russian fleet should neither be disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart, nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their cavalry horses, should be transported to France.

A demur was, with good reason, made concerning the baggage and private property which the French were to carry off with them; and Kellermann explained, that the words were only to bear their strict grammatical meaning. The article regarding the Russians underwent more discussion. Sir Hew insisted, that this was a point referable to the Admiral, and that if he did not agree to it, it must be struck out; with this understanding on the part of the French negotiator that article was framed.

*Junot re-  
turns to  
Lisbon.*

While Kellermann was thus employed in the British camp, Junot occupied the positions of the Cabeça de Montechique and Mafra, and hastened himself to Lisbon. On the 20th official

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intelligence had been published in that city that Laborde had sustained an action with the English army, and though he had only 2000 men, had kept his ground against it; in the night he had taken a position conformably to his orders, for the purpose of joining the Commander-in-chief; their junction had been formed, the enemy were in a strait, and would be attacked on the morrow, when they would be made to see what the French could do: two English regiments had been destroyed in the action. The people, however, understood by reports more worthy of belief than any official statements of the enemy, that the English had been successful at Roliça. The news of the battle of Vimeiro also reached them at nightfall of the 22d; it was asserted, not only that Junot had been defeated, but that he was taken prisoner; the people openly congratulated each other in the streets, and the exultation and stir at the Ave Maria hour were such as to indicate an insurrection. None of the French deemed it prudent to appear, except General Travot, who relied, and not in vain, upon that personal good-will which he had obtained by a conduct always humane and honourable. At daybreak of the 23d, a letter from Junot was published, dated from the field of battle, at four in the afternoon. It stated that the English had been attacked at nine o'clock that morning, in the fortified position which they occupied, and that in an instant they had been dislodged from all their advanced points. The

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left of the French army had obtained from the first complete success; their right having to take a circuitous course, could not arrive in time to decide the action entirely; it had continued till two o'clock, and they should probably finish it on the morrow. At two they had taken a position, and were three leagues nearer the enemy than on the preceding day. The loss of the English had been great. "On our part," said Junot, "there have been 150 killed, and from 300 to 400 wounded. We are stronger now, fresh troops having reached me . . . to-morrow, therefore . ." there the sentence was broken off, and General Travot concluded the bulletin by saying, that many of the enemy's superior officers had been killed or wounded, that the Commander-in-chief was well, and in a few days would be in Lisbon. He arrived, in fact, that afternoon, with the reserve, and such of the wounded as could be removed. A royal salute was fired from the Castle, as if he had returned victorious; but the countenances of the French, even the generals themselves, belied this manifestation of success. It was soon rumoured that a capitulation had been proposed, and no doubt could be entertained concerning this when it was known that an English officer arrived that night in company with Kellermann, and that a boat had been sent off to the English fleet.

*Neves, v.  
151—154.  
Observador  
Portuguez,  
413, 417.*

*General  
Freire dis-  
satisfied  
with the  
armistice.*

The British army marched on the morning after the armistice was signed, and took a position near the village of Ramalhal, this movement

being made merely for convenience. The Portuguese General, Bernardim Freire, visited the Commander-in-chief there; and received a copy of the armistice: he was dissatisfied with it, and promised to send a confidential officer to communicate with him thereupon. Accordingly Major Ayres Pintode Sousa soon arrived at Sir Hew's head-quarters. His strongest objections related to that article which stipulated that no persons should be molested for their political conduct; that being a question, he said, which it was for the Portuguese government to decide. It appeared evident to Sir Hew, that General Freire was offended because there was no mention of the Junta of Porto in the armistice. His answer was, that the government of Portugal, to which the decision of this point would belong, nowhere existed; and moreover the measure was wholly military, and admitted of no delay; he desired, however, that General Freire would state in writing whatever observations he had to make, and promised that they should be most favourably considered in the progress of the negotiation.

There arose a difficulty now respecting the Russian fleet. Notwithstanding the preparations of defence which had been made on board their ships, the feelings of the Russians and of their Admiral were not with the French, and all Junot's endeavours to make their presence available for the increase of his own means were in vain. Sir Arthur Wellesley had learnt, when he visited the

*Difficulty  
concerning  
the Russian  
squadron.*

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British squadron off the Tagus, that it was Admiral Siniavin's intention to take no part in the contest between the two contending powers, but claim the protection of a neutral port. It was his opinion, that if they conducted themselves upon this principle, they ought not to be molested, and that it mattered not what became of their ships, so they were not allowed to return to the Baltic. In Sir Hew's judgement the Admiral was the best, if not the only judge of the question, and to him accordingly the stipulation in the armistice concerning them had been referred. Sir C. Cotton refused to ratify it; and upon this Sir Arthur recommended the Commander to put an end to the armistice, and lose no farther time in advancing, leaving it for Junot to renew the negotiation if he thought proper. The Commander was of a different opinion; good faith, he thought, required that the Admiral's sentiments should be communicated to General Junot; but he notified to him, at the same time, that the armistice must be at an end in forty-eight hours, and Colonel Murray, who was the bearer of this notice, was authorized to negotiate a convention.

*Convention  
of Cintra.*

The question concerning the Russians was adjusted between the two Admirals. It was agreed that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, to be restored within six months after the conclusion of peace between Russia and that power; and that the men should be conveyed to their own country at the expense of

the British Government, without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services. The definitive convention also was soon concluded. The terms were, that the French army should evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, not be considered prisoners of war, be furnished with means of conveyance by the English government, and disembarked in any of the ports between Rochefort and l'Orient, and be at liberty to serve on their arrival. They were to take with them all their artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun, all their equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; and all individuals of the army were to be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security for the purchasers. The horses of the cavalry and of the officers were to be embarked, those of the former not exceeding 600, those of the latter not exceeding 200; and as the means of conveyance for horses were very limited, facility should be given them for disposing of those which could not be embarked. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella, were to be embarked at Lisbon, that of Almeida at Porto, or the nearest harbour, and British commissaries were to provide for their subsistence and accommodation on the march. The sick and wounded who were not in a state to be removed were entrusted to the British army, their ex-

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penses while they remained to be discharged by the British Government, and reimbursed by France. Should doubts arise as to the meaning of any article, it was to be interpreted favourably to the French. From the date of the ratification of this convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in that country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, should be cancelled, all sequestrations upon their property removed, and the free disposal of the same restored to the proper owners. All subjects of France, or of powers in alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally there, should be protected, their property respected, and themselves at liberty either to remain in the country, or to accompany the French army. No Portuguese was to be held accountable for his political conduct; and all who had continued in office, or accepted it, under the French Government, were placed under the protection of the British commanders, and were to sustain no injury either in their persons or property, for it had not been at their choice to obey the French or not: if they chose to sell their property and remove, the term of one year should be allowed them for that purpose. The Spanish troops detained at Lisbon were to be given up to the British Commander, and he engaged to obtain from the Spaniards the release of such

French subjects, as, not having been taken in battle, nor in consequence of military operations, were now detained in Spain.

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That this convention, considered in a military point of view, was advantageous to Great Britain, was the opinion of all the British Generals. By effecting the immediate deliverance of Portugal, it left the British army at liberty to advance into Spain, and reach the main scene of action in time for the great struggle which was expected there. The details of the treaty were thought of inferior consideration. Kellermann had declared that the French would not submit to severer terms, but that if such were insisted on, they would retire to the strong fortresses in their possession, defend themselves there till the last extremity, and destroy Lisbon before they abandoned it. There was no reason to think that any compunction would withhold them from doing this; and though it might possibly have been prevented by bringing on an action, that action must have been fought in the immediate vicinity of Lisbon, perhaps in the city itself. Motives of humanity therefore had their weight with the Commander-in-chief in making such large concessions to an enemy, who, if they had met with sterner treatment, better suited to their deserts, would presently have lowered their tone, and been glad to accept of any terms which should secure them a safe embarkation.

The military advantages of the convention were not over-rated; it will indeed appear hereafter



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that they proved greater than had been foreseen. But some political errors were committed in framing it; and the British Generals did not assume that moral tone which the occasion justified, and which the soundest policy required. Buonaparte was designated in the armistice as his imperial and royal majesty, although Great Britain had never acknowledged him either as Emperor of the French or King of Italy. Junot was allowed to sign the convention as Duke of Abrantes, a title to which he had no better right than to the property which he had amassed in Portugal by rapine. Sir Arthur Wellesley had recommended, pending the negotiation, that some mode should be devised “for making the French Generals disgorge the church plate which they had stolen.” An article had been framed accordingly, specifying in direct terms that the property of churches, monasteries, and palaces should not be carried away. But this article was withdrawn, on the repeated representations of Kellermann that its introduction into a public monument would be reproachful to the French army. The Commander-in-chief, he said, was particularly desirous it should be omitted; and he was willing, on that condition, to pledge his word of honour that no property of this kind should be removed. Except in the case of some carriages which the court had left behind, and some beasts taken for the service of the army, he disclaimed all knowledge of any such appropriation of Portuguese property by the French

as was imputed to them ; and if there were any officers who had thus acted, he expressed a hope that they might reap no benefit from their misconduct. With regard to the churches, a contribution had been regularly levied on them for the public service, and its produce expended ; this of course the English could not mean to redemand. The confidence with which these representations were urged, imposed for a time upon honourable men, and the obnoxious article was withdrawn upon the very ground for which it ought to have been retained.

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The convention was concluded on the 30th of August, and ratified by the British Commander, not at Cintra, from which place it has been denominated, but at Torres Vedras. It was communicated immediately to General Bernardim Freire. The reply from that General was, that he was in some measure responsible to the Provisional Government for obtaining for the Portuguese whatever could be useful and honourable to the state ; but there was not in the whole treaty a single article relating to the Portuguese army. It became therefore his duty to inquire how far the engagement contracted with the French for the restoration of their civil officers who were in the hands of the Portuguese extended ? if the Provisional Government, taking advantage of his conduct in having taken no part in these arrangements, should order him to act in co-operation with the Spanish army in Alem-Tejo against the French, would the British army oppose any such

*Remon-  
strances of  
the Portu-  
guese Com-  
mander.*

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intention? and if the honour and dignity of the Portugueze nation, and the authority of the Prince, should seem to have been compromised by these arrangements, would the British Generals take upon themselves to answer for it? Ayres Pinto, when he delivered this reply, declared that he did justice to the friendship and loyalty of the British nation, and individually felt himself highly honoured by the manner in which Sir Hew had received him; “nevertheless,” said he, “your Excellency must well know that the public will judge of us not by our private conduct, but by that which bears an authentic character; and there is no other means of avoiding the ill will of the public than by obtaining from your Excellency a reply which may convince the Portugueze people that the General to whom the direction of their forces is confided, has yielded only to urgent circumstances, and to the absolute necessity of not compromising the army under his command.”

If the Portugueze General had not separated from the British army, contrary to the advice and request of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he would of course have been a party to the negotiation. Sir Hew, upon occasion of the armistice, had desired him to state his sentiments fully while the negotiations were in progress; not having received one word of comment during that time, he expressed his surprise at this late expostulation on terms to which the honour of the British Commanders was pledged, as far as their in-

fluence or power could be supposed to extend by the common and known laws of war. But to this it was replied, that Ayres Pinto had personally communicated the General's objections to the conditions of the armistice, representing that the Portuguese army and the Government were treated too cavalierly in this transaction; that some notice should be taken of them, were it only to prevent factious persons from raising injurious reports; that the French were not strong enough to deserve so much consideration; and that the Portuguese were now in a condition to demand account from them of the robberies, rapines, depredations, murders, and sacrileges of every kind which they had committed in that kingdom, and which called for exemplary vengeance. The Portuguese Commander now poured in his representations and complaints. It was his duty to declare, he said, that not having been consulted on, or privy to this negotiation, in which he supposed his country was concerned, he considered himself exempt from all responsibility for it. He complained that no notice had been taken in the armistice of the troops under the Monteiro Mor in Alem-Tejo, nor of the Spanish army of Extremadura which had entered that province. The British army, he affirmed, could not, and ought not to be considered in any other light than an auxiliary army; as such it had been applied for by the Provisional Government, and as such it was still to be regarded, let its strength be what it

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might. Under these circumstances any treaty with the French ought to have been made in conjunction with the Portuguese Government, and with its full approbation. He protested finally against the treaty in the whole and in its separate parts, .. in the whole, because it contained no consideration of the Prince Regent or the Government which represented him; in its parts, because no declaration was made that what places, stores, and ships were to be taken possession of should be restored to the Portuguese Government; because it stipulated for the impunity of individuals who had betrayed their country; and because it made no provision for the security of the people of Lisbon and its neighbourhood while the French continued there.

*Reply of  
Sir Hew  
Dalrymple.*

These representations were in some respects well founded; they were mingled with futile matter, and there was also a covert purport in them, which Sir Hew Dalrymple perfectly understood, of exciting a popular feeling in favour of the Junta of Porto, that body being desirous of prolonging and extending its authority, after the circumstances which alone rendered it legitimate had ceased. Leaving this question untouched, Sir Hew replied, with a courtesy and frankness that disarm resentment. It was not possible, he said, to engage the existing Government of Portugal in a negotiation purely military in its nature, and in which no reference was had either to the Governments of England or of France. With regard to the indemnity for

political offences, it was natural that the French should demand it; and to him it appeared that the treaty afforded a fair occasion for remitting punishments which, by keeping political animosity alive, would not have tended to the tranquillity and happiness of the country. There was little reason to suppose that persons who had thus rendered themselves obnoxious would venture to remain long after the French; if they did, they would of course be vigilantly observed, and their future treatment would depend upon their future conduct. It was not from any want of personal respect to General Freire that he did not enter into the discussion of points which it was only incumbent on him to explain to the Government of the country. But being aware of the calumnies which had been disseminated by the enemy in other countries, as now in this, he assured his Excellency, and would use the necessary means for giving publicity to the pledge, that he served in Portugal as the Commander of a force acting in alliance with the Sovereign of that country; and therefore considered himself bound by duty and honour to pay as strict a regard to the interests of the Prince Regent, the dignity and security of his Government, and the welfare of the nation of which he was the lawful ruler, as even his Excellency himself. But as touching the cessions, he did not see in what terms they could have been better framed. "The nominal Duke of Abrantes," said Sir Hew, "is not the guardian of the Prince Regent's interests;

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and if any pledge is necessary of the pure and disinterested views of the Sovereign I have the honour to serve, I do not think it was through the stipulations of a treaty with that General that it could most properly be conveyed." The manifest good faith and the temper of this reply produced their proper effect, and General Freire expressed his satisfaction in it as promising the most happy, prompt, and secure accomplishment of the object at which they aimed.

*The British  
flag hoisted  
in the forts.*

Before the British troops entered Lisbon the Russian Admiral wrote to Sir Hew to inquire what flag was to be displayed when the forts on the Tagus were delivered up, and whether, if the Portuguese flag were hoisted, the port would be considered neuter, and his squadron entitled to the benefit of that neutrality. Sir Hew replied, that if he felt authorized to interfere in a business which had been exclusively referred to Sir C. Cotton, he could easily anticipate the answer which that Commander would make. Contrary, however, to his expectation, when two regiments were landed from the fleet, and took possession of the ports on the river, the British flag was hoisted. The Portuguese were naturally hurt at this; but before their General could offer any representation on the subject, Sir Hew had ordered the Portuguese colours to be displayed in its stead. The negotiation concerning the Russian squadron had not been concluded when the question was proposed to the British General, and it was to settle in a sum-

mary way Admiral Siniavin's claim to the protection of a neutral port that the English flag had been planted by Sir C. Cotton.

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*Anarchy in  
Lisbon.*

During the negotiation Lisbon was in a dreadful state. Those wretches who, to the reproach of Christian states and civilized society, are bred in the corruption of all great cities, took advantage of the temporary dissolution of government as they would have done of a conflagration or an earthquake. The soldiers of the police, being Portuguese, had almost all gone to join their countrymen in arms; and the French while they went the rounds, suffered robberies to be committed in their hearing and in their sight, either not understanding the cries for help, or not choosing to interfere, now that their reign was at an end. They indeed themselves were in such danger, that they soon gave over patrolling the streets, and fired upon those who approached their quarters in the night. In this manner several Portuguese were shot; the French venturing upon this, not so much in the confidence of their own strength, as in full reliance upon the interference of the English to protect them.

*Observador  
Portuguez,  
420, 501-3.  
Neves, v.  
202.*

There had been a great error of judgement in not following up the victory at Vimeiro; and in the subsequent negotiations the British Generals had taken a lower tone than the enemy expected, or circumstances required. But they were more censurable for having failed to manifest that moral sense of the enemy's conduct which individually they felt, and yet collectively seemed for a time



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to have suppressed for the sake of professional considerations and courtesy, never more unworthily bestowed. The soldiers of Buonaparte in Portugal had forfeited all claim to those courtesies which honourable men will always delight in rendering to honourable enemies. They had disgraced their profession and their country, and it behoved the British, for the sake of theirs, to have testified their sense of this in the most decided manner. But instead of shunning any farther intercourse than was necessary for the execution of the treaty, they entered into social intercourse with the French, entertainments were mutually given, and British Generals sate at Junot's table in company with the men who were responsible for the horrors committed at Evora and Leiria. They were not fully informed of those crimes, and certainly did not believe Junot and his people to be so thoroughly destitute of honour as they soon found them. But proof enough of their wickedness had been given in public and official acts; and in thus appearing for a time to forget the real character of the cause in which Great Britain was engaged, a moral fault, as well as a political error, was committed.

*The French  
continue to  
plunder.*

Elated no doubt by this, as well as by their success in negotiation, the French continued that system of public and private robbery for which they seemed to think the convention had granted them entire impunity. General Freire complained to Sir Hew Dalrymple that they were plundering the treasury, the museum, public

libraries, arsenals, churches, and the houses and stores of individuals. The British commissioners for carrying the convention into effect, Major-General Beresford and Lord Proby, informed him, that except the military and naval stores there was no kind of public property which the French intended to relinquish; that they meant to carry off the valuables of the Prince, the plunder of the churches, and much of the property of individuals; that they had packed up the royal library, and most of the articles of the museum; that during the negotiation they had taken a sum of about £22,000 from the *Deposito Publico*, which was in fact a robbery of individuals, that money being deposited there till litigations concerning it should be decided; and that even after the terms were signed they had actually demanded the money arising from the revenues of the country. The merchants of Lisbon addressed a memorial to the British Commander, stating that Junot had exacted from them a forced loan of two million *cruzados*, promising that payment should be made out of the enormous war-contribution which he had imposed; they had not been paid, and it was now his intention to depart without paying them; they therefore prayed for redress, and likewise that some steps should be taken for recovering their ships and property which had been unlawfully sequestered in France.

There was something absolutely comic in the impudent persuasion of the French that they

*Question concerning baggage.*

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might continue to pillage, and carry off what they pleased, under protection of the British army. They proposed to take away the *Vasco da Gama* and some Portuguese frigates; the *Gama*, it may be remembered, was the ship wherein they had embarked great part of the treasure which they had collected. The reply was, that these vessels did not belong to them, and they were only to carry away their individual baggage. Junot actually demanded five ships to remove his own personal effects. Such a demand was of course pronounced to be inadmissible. Sir Hew declared he would not listen to any proposal which compromised his own honour and that of the British nation. He perceived, that owing to the shameless and open manner in which the French were preparing to carry off public and private property, popular indignation was strongly excited, and that because of the interpretation which they by their conduct affected to give the convention, this feeling was little less directed against the English than the French. He instructed the commissioners therefore to require the restoration of these plundered goods; “by this means,” said he, “affording a proof to the Portuguese nation that we at least act with good faith, and are therefore entitled to use the necessary measures, however vigorous, for the protection of those obnoxious persons for whose safety that faith is pledged.”

The commissioners exercised their charge with becoming firmness. The money taken from the

public deposit they compelled the French to promise to replace, . . a concession which was not obtained till after a very long discussion. The spoils of the museum and royal library were also reclaimed. They had been selected, General Kellermann said, by M. Guiffroi, a member of the National Institute: the objection, indeed, on the part of the English, he admitted to be well founded; nevertheless, he observed that these articles, consisting chiefly of specimens in natural history, and interesting manuscripts, were, in general, duplicates, . . that they were precious acquisitions for the sciences; . . the sciences were of all countries, and far from making war upon them, we ought to promote their communication. They wished, therefore, to select articles of natural history at their pleasure, and to leave for them such compensations as the English might think proper. Of course, the British commander returned a most decided negative, saying he could not sell articles which were not his, and would not allow them to be removed: and the French general was compelled to issue a general order, commanding all individuals of the French army, or administration, to make restitution of whatever they had taken from any public or private establishment, within four-and-twenty hours.

It was something to have wrung from them such a confession of robbery; yet within a few hours after this very order had been issued, Junot's first aide-de-camp, Colonel de Cambis, carried off the Prince Regent's horses from the

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*The French  
endeavour  
to carry off  
articles  
from the  
Museum.*

*They em-  
bark horses,  
carriages,  
and pic-  
tures, which  
are reco-  
vered.*

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royal stables, to embark them as General Junot's property. Having been compelled to restore them, this same officer the next day endeavoured in like manner to carry off two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex, and it was necessary to threaten him with being carried prisoner to England, if he persisted in this sort of conduct. It was ascertained that Junot had embarked a collection of pictures from the house of the Marques de Angeja; restitution was demanded, and he said they had been given to him. This was found to be false; and Junot then laid the affair upon a relation of his who was embarked with him, but who immediately endeavoured to conceal himself in one of the transports. A threat of detaining the General brought this person back; he was ordered on shore, to give an account of the transaction, and as he refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the commissioners, or to land, was compelled to do both, and to produce the pictures.

*They carry  
off large  
sums in  
money.*

But in other cases the commissioners were bound by the letter of a treaty, in which it now appeared that one party could not have presumed too little upon the honour of the other, nor one too much. All the money which these plunderers had collected they were allowed to carry off. Sir Hew observed, that this description of property could never come under the provisions of the treaty, and that it was impossible to identify it, or prove exactly from whom it was obtained. But Ayres Pinto had pointed out a

simple and satisfactory mode of proof: the French had brought no Portuguese money with them, consequently, whatever they possessed in it must have been the fruits of rapine. Yet the French carried off three months' pay for the whole army, in the general military chest, and, besides this, distributed large sums to the different regiments, to be carried off in their regimental chests. One regiment alone was said to have taken 100,000 crowns with it.

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The French had also a great quantity of silver in bars, into which they had reduced the pillage of the churches and palaces, for the sake of easier conveyance. Kellermann strenuously insisted that the convention guaranteed to them whatever was in their possession previous to the first day of the truce, and declared, most positively, that they never would concede this point. The commissioners, on the contrary, insisted upon the article which restricted them from carrying off other than military and personal baggage; and they declared that the Commander-in-chief would never consent to any other construction. At length they compromised the dispute: the French, though they would not acknowledge that, by the treaty, they were under any obligation, proposed to pay the debts of the army with this silver, for which purpose, they said, it had ever been expressly intended, and agreed, that if any remained after these debts were discharged, it should be delivered up. The commissioners acknowledged, that, by the convention, they could

*Question concerning the silver in bars.*

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*Further instances of dishonour in the French.*

scarcely require more; and Sir Hew pronounced that the offer was fair, and might be acceded to.

The commissioners, however, were soon convinced that concession was not the likeliest expedient for avoiding new pretensions. The ingenuity of man, they said, could not provide against French cavil, and ingenuity in misconstruction; and in consequence of the perpetual subterfuges and false promises of Kellermann, they insisted upon the establishment of a committee, to inquire into all the claims presented by the Portuguese, and to be invested with full authority to summon persons, and to order restitution. Property to a very great amount, both private and public, was recovered by these means. Information was obtained that fifty-three boxes of indigo were embarked as part of Junot's baggage: the indigo was found and seized: the French general, of course, disclaimed any knowledge of the transaction; and the commissioners, without hesitation, assured him that every officer in the British army would acquit him personally on this head, because it was impossible for him to inspect or know what was done in his name! A bold and well-supported attempt was made to avoid the repayment of the money taken from the Deposito Publico, and a compensation for articles taken from the public magazines since the convention, amounting in the whole to £40,000. The justice of this demand had been acknowledged, and immediate payment promised. Nevertheless, it had not been made when Junot

embarked, and when he was called upon to fulfil his agreement, Kellermann pleaded that the money remaining in the *Caisse Militaire* did not amount to the £60,000, which, by the explanation of the convention, was admitted to be a fair military chest, and therefore he considered the agreement to repay these sums as cancelled. The first division of the French had already sailed, but the commissioners applied to Sir Charles Cotton to detain the second, and the Commander-in-chief, till that point should be satisfactorily settled. Even after this instance of vigour, much litigation and discussion was permitted; and when, at length, Kellermann yielded to necessity, attempts were still made to put off the payment, till no means of enforcing it should be left. During the three last days that Junot remained in the river, orders were repeatedly given to the *payeur-general* to pay this money, and they were always evaded, under some frivolous pretext; till at last the commissioners ordered him and his baggage on shore to the arsenal, and then the Frenchman reluctantly refunded this part of the plunder.

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While the commissioners were thus recovering from the French a part of that wealth which they had collected by every means of oppression and violence, the strong interference of the British alone preserved these plunderers from the vengeance of the people. The popular feeling was partaken by all ranks. The Monteiro Mor, who had now advanced to Azeitam, addressed a pro-

*Protests of  
the Mon-  
teiro Mor  
and of the  
Juiz do  
Povo.*



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test to the British Admiral against the treaty, because the Prince and his Government had not been consulted; and because no attention had been paid to himself, who, without any foreign aid, had found means to expel the enemy from the kingdom of Algarve, and pursuing them, passing on to Alem-Tejo, and compelling them to evacuate all their posts, had taken a position with his army on the south bank of the Tagus. Such fanfaronade could only detract from his own deserts, and discredit the exertions and the sufferings of a brave and loyal nation. He accompanied this protest by a request, that, on account of the robberies and atrocities which the French had committed, the vessels employed to carry them home might be embargoed till the King of England and the Prince of Brazil should have resolved on what was best for the honour and interest of the two nations; and he required that their baggage should be rigorously searched by Portuguese and English commissioners, lest they should carry away with them the booty which they had so infamously obtained. The Juiz do Povo also presented a protest; though the convention had not been published, the people, he said, knew there was no mention made in it of the three states of the kingdom, and that it left them without satisfaction for the crimes both against divine and human laws, and without vengeance for the murders, robberies, and atrocities of every kind, which the usurpers had committed. “Our churches stript,” said he, “the

royal palaces damaged, the royal treasury plundered, the people reduced to poverty and misery, so that the streets and squares of the capital are rendered impassable by crowds of beggars, . . . nothing of this is taken into consideration : . . . yet the safety of kingdoms depends on not letting their rights be invaded without punishing the offenders, and the consequence of permitting such crimes with impunity will occasion incalculable misfortunes. The people and the officers of this tribunal declare their gratitude to the generous allies who have liberated Portugal, but they pray for the suspension of a convention so favourable to the French as this is said to be. It must be invalid after the abuses and hostilities which they have continued to commit in Almeida, and the contribution which they have since extorted; and this tribunal cannot consent to the return of the enemy to France, as they already threaten that they will come back to destroy what they have left."

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Such language from a magistrate whose name was never heard but in turbulent times, increased the popular ferment; and General Hope, who now commanded in Lisbon, found it necessary to issue a proclamation, prohibiting the Portuguese from entering the city with arms, or wearing them in the streets; and enacting that all places where wine was sold should be shut at six in the evening, and not opened before sunrise. To enforce these regulations, and maintain order, strong guards, picquets, and patrols,

*Danger of  
tumults in  
Lisbon.*

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were appointed to arrest every person who should break the peace. Nothing but this prompt vigilance prevented the people from gratifying their thirst for vengeance. It is said that all the houses in Belem in which the enemy were lodged were marked in the course of one night, and that lists of those Frenchmen and their adherents who were deemed most worthy of death were posted up. The English were loudly reproached for having protected men who deserved the most exemplary punishment; and there were not wanting persons unreflecting enough to assert, that sure as they were of the Spaniards, they could have exacted that punishment without any necessity for English aid. This feeling, however, was far from general. The English character was too well known in Lisbon, for the English name ever to be unpopular among a people not less retentive of kind and friendly feelings than of injuries. When the English soldiers went to occupy the arsenals and forts, refreshments were brought out for them along the way, and British officers were followed in the streets by applauding crowds; while the hatred which was manifested towards the French was so deep and general, that no people could possibly have incurred it unless they had deserved it to the utmost. Not only did the Portuguese refuse to purchase from them those things which they wished to convert into money, they refused to sell them any thing, even provisions for their hospital. If a Frenchman ventured to appear alone, trusting to escape dis-

covery, he betook himself, upon the first suspicious eye which was directed toward him, to an Englishman for protection. Kellermann came on shore one day after his embarkation to dine with a British officer, and being recognized on his return to the water-side, was attacked by the mob. Our sailors defended and saved him, but not before he had received some severe contusions. Loison, who was a more marked object of execration, was considered in so much personal danger, that four battalions were bivouacked near his quarters, and four pieces of cannon planted there for his protection. But toward those officers who had demeaned themselves humanely and honourably, the people testified nothing but respect and good-will.

The French were not sufficiently humbled to bear this meekly. The success which they had obtained in negotiation, in their minds more than counterbalanced the humiliation of their defeat, and of their present state. They denied that they had been defeated; they affirmed that they had dictated the terms; and Junot continued to occupy the royal box at the opera till his departure. The English generals respected, in this instance, the custom of the country, and after the Frenchman had resigned it, left it unoccupied, with the curtain down. But however much the enemy might console themselves with the confident hope of again becoming masters of the kingdom, their pride was bitterly wounded by the display of national feeling which met them

*Temper of  
the French.*

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*Thiebault,*  
219—222.

*Embarka-  
tion of the  
French.*

every where, and which they considered presumptuous in a people who were soon to be brought again under their iron yoke. They called it audacity in the Portugueze to wear the national cockade, which they still chose to denominate a badge of insurrection; and they complained that even in their sight lamps were prepared for illuminating the city upon their departure, and demanded in greater numbers than could be supplied.

The first division of the French embarked under protection of the second, the second and third were protected by the British troops from the fury of the Portugueze. Wholly to restrain it was impossible, but no serious injury was done. They embarked amid the curses of the people. Nine days and nights the rejoicings continued, not by any order from the magistracy, but by the voluntary act of the inhabitants, whose joy was in proportion to the misery from which they had been delivered. It was a joy which thousands whose fortunes had been ruined in the general calamity, partook; and which brought the last earthly consolation to many a broken heart. The enemy, while they lay in the river, were within sight of the illuminations and fireworks, and could hear the bells with which that great city rang from side to side. However brave in arms, however skilful in negotiation, they departed under circumstances more reproachful than had ever before attached to any army, or body of military men. As a last act

of baseness, one of their general officers called at the commissioners' office, while they were absent, just before he embarked, and carried off all the papers he could collect, in the hope of making it impossible for them to produce an account of their proceedings. But he was driven back to Lisbon by contrary winds, and compelled to restore them. The commissioners concluded the final report of their transactions by stating, that the conduct of the French had been marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and probity, publicly evincing their intention of carrying off their plundered booty, and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid. "Finally, said they, they have only paid what they were obliged to disgorge, and were not permitted to carry off. The British commissioners had represented to General Kellermann, that whatsoever the words, it could never be the spirit of any convention, that an army should, as a military chest, or otherwise, carry off public money, leaving public debts unpaid: they had called upon him, for the honour of the French army and nation, to act justly; and yet, unmindful of any tie of honour or of justice, the French army had taken away a considerable sum in the military chest, leaving its debts unpaid, to a very large amount."

Thus the courtesy which had been shown toward the French Generals in the course of the negotiation, had the effect of fixing upon them a deeper stigma; by bringing into full view a low chicanery, a total want of honour, and utter

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*Final re-  
port of the  
commis-  
sioners.*

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disregard of truth, which could not have been suspected, if it had not been thus officially proved, and placed upon public record. Had such charges been advanced by the enemy against the general officers of a British army, the strictest inquiry would have been instituted, and no rank, no influence, no professional merits, could have screened the offenders. They would have been dismissed with ignominy from the service which they had disgraced, and for ever excluded from all honourable society. There was a time when the highest eulogium which the French bestowed upon a soldier was to say, that he was without fear and without reproach; but under the system of Buonaparte nothing was considered reproachful in his soldiers, provided they feared nothing in this world or in the next.

*Addresses  
of thanks to  
the Bri-  
tish Com-  
mander.*

The good faith of the British, and their real regard for the interest and feelings of the Portuguese nation, were now apparent. The national flag was every where displayed, and the people were informed by a proclamation that no time would be lost in establishing their government upon the basis on which the Prince had left it, and substituting the civil for that military power which was continued only from necessity and for a few days. The magistrates and the clergy meantime, and all persons who possessed authority or influence, were called upon to co-operate in preserving order. Addresses of thanks came from the provinces; and the Juiz do Povo, who had protested in the name of the people of Lisbon

so strongly against the convention, now for those same people expressed their gratitude to the British Commander, the British Sovereign, and the British nation, requesting that their sincere thanks for this great deliverance might be made known to the smallest village as well as to the throne. Such was the proud situation of the British army at Lisbon. Some formalities had been forgotten in the negotiation, some minor interests had been overlooked, and the courtesies of war had been too liberally accorded to an enemy who should have been made to feel their moral degradation. But the unstained honour, the unsuspecting integrity, the open manliness, the plain dignity of the British character, had been manifested throughout the whole of these transactions; and this was felt and acknowledged by the Portuguese.

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Difficulties which could not have been foreseen arose concerning the delivery of Elvas. Galluzo, who commanded the army of Extremadura, and who had hitherto afforded no very efficient aid to the Portuguese, thought proper at this time, when he had been required by every civil and military authority to begin his march towards Castille, in contempt of those orders to enter Alem-Tejo, and besiege Elvas, as if no treaty for its surrender had been made. The French Commandant, Girod de Novillars, upon this required from the inhabitants an immediate loan of money, to the amount of 30,000 francs, and wine and provisions to the value of 20,000 more.

*Galluzo be-  
sieges  
Elvas.*



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Drained as they had been by repeated exactions, the people of Elvas were in no condition to obey this demand; the Bishop and the magistrates therefore easily obtained permission to go to the Spanish camp, and entreat Galluzo to suspend hostilities. That General, however, declared, that if the French did not surrender within six hours, he would open his fire against Fort La Lippe, and put the whole garrison to the sword. He had no time to lose, he said, but must hasten to assist his fellow-soldiers in expelling the enemy from the Peninsula; and the inhabitants must either abandon the city, or take arms against the French. From this dilemma they were delivered by the French themselves, who, during the night, withdrew into the forts, leaving about an hundred men in the hospital. An agreement was then made, with Galluzo's consent, that the city should remain neutral; and the Spaniards began an absurd fire against Fort La Lippe, which is the strongest fortress in Portugal. Things were in this state when Lieutenant-Colonel Ross arrived with letters from the French Commander, instructing M. Girod to give up the place to him in pursuance of the convention. A demur was made by the Commandant, till he could send an officer to Lisbon, and satisfy himself that the dispatches were authentic; and difficulties less reasonable in their kind were started both by the Spaniards and Portugeze. Galluzo argued that no agreement between the British and French Generals could be binding upon him. The Spa-

niards, he affirmed, had a right as besiegers to take possession of Elvas, and the Spanish arms were not to be defrauded of the splendour which this would give them. He threatened Girod that if any injury were offered to the city the prisoners should be put to death, and the garrison receive no mercy; and he insisted that they should march out and lay down their arms, and that the place should be entered and occupied by the Spaniards only. In his communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple he held rather a lower tone, saying that certainly he should not have besieged and cannonaded Elvas if he had known of the convention; but it had not been thought proper to announce it to him. He required only a joint surrender to the British and Spanish arms, leaving the place and the prisoners to his Excellency; but he had heard the garrison were not to be considered prisoners; that article, though the opinion was that it would not be executed, occasioned some uneasiness, and therefore he would make them lay down their arms, and swear not to bear them again against Spain or her allies.

Galluzo was at this time upon ill terms with the Portuguese. They complained that throughout the struggle in Alem-Tejo he had promised much and performed little; that the Spaniards had acted as masters in those fortresses which they had entered as friends, countermanded the orders of the Portuguese General, encouraged insubordination, appropriated to their own use money which ~~had been~~ raised for the national

*Difficulties  
concerning  
the surren-  
der of  
Elvas.*

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cause, and pillaged the country as they passed through it. On the other hand, Galluzo reproached the Portuguese with want of activity and energy, and with giving his people nothing but water when they went to assist them. His pretensions to Elvas, therefore, which under any circumstances might have given offence, were now peculiarly offensive; and it happened that the Junta of Porto, who were at this time not without hope of getting the government of the kingdom into their own hands, had ordered General Leite to march into Elvas and occupy it as soon as it should be evacuated. The General communicated their orders to Sir Hew, declaring that he felt it his duty to obey, and laying before him his complaints against the Spaniards. These difficulties were surmounted by a proper mixture of conciliation and firmness on the part of the British Commander. The first great object was, that British faith should be kept, and complete protection afforded to the French garrison. For this purpose those troops whom it was intended to canton in Alem-Tejo were immediately ordered thither, and stationed as near Elvas as possible. Colonel Graham was sent to Galluzo to bring him to reason; and if this were found impracticable, then to proceed to Madrid, and call for the interference of higher authorities. Colonel Ross was instructed to bear in mind, that as the French surrendered to no nation except the English, neither Spanish nor Portuguese troops were to appear when they marched out: that with re-

spect to the Portuguese, the feelings of the nation were to be gratified, and their flag every where displayed under a salute; but he was to hold the substantial power, even if he saw cause for allowing a Portuguese General to march in with a detachment of his men. Colonel Graham performed his difficult mission with great ability. Galluzo ceased from all farther interference, and was so gratified by the temper in which this affair had been carried on by the British Commander, and the services which had been rendered to the soldiers of Extremadura who had been released at Lisbon, that he ordered the black English cockade to be blended with the red Spanish one in his army, to mark his gratitude, as he informed Sir Hew, and denote the intimate alliance between the two countries.

All difficulties being at length removed, the forts were delivered up, General Leite entered the city, and the French garrison, between 1400 and 1500 in number, were marched to Aldea Gallega. No insults were offered them on the way; and they were joined by their comrades, who, having been wounded at Evora, had been left in that city, and treated with careful humanity by the inhabitants. *Elvas and Almeida given up.* The garrison of Almeida were not removed so easily. The Portuguese had kept up an irregular blockade of that fortress after Loison's departure; they borrowed fire-arms from the Spaniards of Ciudad Rodrigo, and were so little scrupulous in their mode of warfare, that a friar poisoned the water of a tank

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*Tumults at  
Porto.*

at which the cattle belonging to the garrison used to drink. Almeida might long have defied any efforts which the Portuguese or the Spaniards in that quarter could have made against it; it was, however, gladly delivered up, in conformity to the convention, and the garrison were marched to Porto, under a British escort, there to be embarked. On the day of their arrival, they employed themselves in converting as much of their plunder as possible into money: purchasers were not wanting, and their market continued the whole day and night, horses being the ostensible articles. Such a traffic excited the indignation of all but those who were profiting by it; and that indignation was excited to the highest pitch, when, on the following morning, as the baggage of the French was examined at the Castle of St. Joam da Foz, in presence of the governor and of Sir Robert Wilson, several rich church vestments were found in one of the boxes. The horror which the Portuguese feel at sacrilege is perhaps hardly conceivable by those who are not acquainted with them. The governor himself, on this occasion, joined the populace in their outcry, and immediately gave orders that no vessel should be permitted to pass the castle. The news soon reached Porto, exaggerated as it passed from mouth to mouth; a mob collected, bent upon putting the French to death; and some insults were offered the English for protecting them. The Bishop, Sir Robert Wilson, and many officers, Portuguese and English, used their utmost exer-

tions to quiet the tumult. They succeeded in restoring peace at St. Joam da Foz: but the crowd still continued on both sides the river; and at an early hour of the morning some thousand persons had assembled, with a determination to attack the French on board the transports: they placed artillery on both shores, and mounted guns on board the ships. Fortunately for the French, they were provided with sixty rounds each man, and one of the transports in which they were embarked was armed with six-pounders. The Bishop and Sir Robert Wilson again came down to mediate, and the latter was employed, without intermission, from nine in the morning till five in the afternoon in negotiating between the French General and the populace. It was in vain for the Frenchman to tell Sir Robert that he was bound to see the articles of capitulation executed to the very letter, . . . that was impossible: he had secured their lives, and this was the utmost he could do. The mob insisted that the French should be disembarked, their baggage examined on shore, and that they should leave their arms: there was no alternative, and they were compelled to submit. No sooner had they left the transports, than the rabble boarded them, and began to plunder in their turn: every thing was ransacked; the very provisions and wearing apparel of the ship-owners disappeared. Here, however, the tumult ended: the more riotous of the populace retired with their booty; the better classes were ashamed of

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*September.**The Spanish troops  
at Lisbon  
embarked  
for Cata-  
lonia.*

the disgrace which had thus been brought upon them; and every possible reparation was made, to the entire satisfaction of the British officers.

During the negotiation the French, who were not ashamed to propose any thing, proposed that an equal number of French prisoners should be set at liberty, in exchange for the Spaniards whom they had seized at Lisbon. This Sir Hew declared to be inadmissible; the Spaniards, he said, must be immediately set free, and not the interests alone, but the feelings of the Spanish nation were to be considered. He consented, however, to obtain for them, if possible, the release of such Frenchmen as had been arrested in Spain during the troubles, not having been taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations. Humanity induced him to this; and in communicating it to the Spanish authorities, he relied upon Spanish generosity for complying with his request for their deliverance. The scene at Lisbon, when arms, horses, and artillery were restored to the Spaniards who had been so long detained prisoners, was one of those spectacles at which the heart rejoices. They were about 3800 in number, some 2000 having effected their escape. The ceremony was made as public and impressive as possible, and the Spanish Commander distributed alms upon the occasion among the poor of Lisbon, which caused a general festivity. Applications for these troops were made from various parts of Spain. The Junta of Galicia required them; and some of the Spanish Generals

at Madrid wished them to be embarked for Santander, there to join Blake's army. Castaños, to whose judgement at this time that deference was paid which his great services had well deserved, was of opinion that they would be more serviceable in Catalonia than in any other part. For Catalonia therefore they were embarked in British transports, and Sir Hew advanced a loan of 90,000 dollars to purchase horses for them.

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It was sufficient for the British Commander in these transactions to follow the plain dictates of a humane and honourable mind. In settling a civil government, and thereby putting an end to the fearful anarchy which every where prevailed, he had a more delicate task. The Junta of Porto were intriguing to obtain a continuance of their power; and under a pretext that Lisbon would for some time be in a state of great confusion, they made their wishes known to Sir Hew, that the seat of the temporary government might remain at Porto, and that deputies from the other provinces, as they then did from the northern ones, should repair thither to transact business for those parts which they represented. The Bishop also observed, that an authority had been forced upon him, which he had accepted only in the hope of re-establishing the government of his lawful Prince; and that if it were thought expedient for him to retain it till the pleasure of the Prince was known, it must be under the condition of remaining at Porto, from whence the

*Intrigues of  
the Junta of  
Porto.*



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inhabitants would not permit him to depart, unless by a direct order of their Sovereign. Such an arrangement would be most beneficial to the kingdom in its present state; and that opposition to it which might otherwise be expected, would be obviated if Sir Hew Dalrymple would take upon himself to recommend it. This sort of finesse was little likely to attain its end with a British Commander. Sir Hew, who was better acquainted with the state of affairs in Spain than any other person at that time, had no such advantage in Portugal. But in politics, as in morals, there is a principle of rectitude which always leads us right, and that principle he followed. He neither lent himself to this intrigue, nor allowed the displeasure which it naturally excited to preponderate against the real services which the Bishop of Porto had rendered to his country, and the popularity which in consequence he then possessed. He replied therefore to the Bishop, that had there been no objection, the Council of Regency which the Prince had appointed at his departure, would now have resumed their authority of course; but seeing that some of its members were strongly suspected of being in the French interest, he felt himself authorized to state, that however desirous the King his Sovereign might be to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of Portugal, it was impossible for his Majesty, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to acquiesce in the return of those persons to power.

On the other hand, those members who had kept aloof from the interests of the enemy, and retaining their loyalty had retained the confidence of the nation, had an unquestionable claim to be reinstated in their situations. Declaring therefore that his instructions were to take measures for forming a Regency as soon as possible, composed of such persons of rank, character, and talents, as might be found ready to undertake, and qualified to discharge, the important trust, but with as few changes (particularly in the subordinate departments) as might be compatible with the public interests, in the fulfilment of this duty he naturally addressed himself to his Excellency and the Provisional Board of Government at Porto. "You," Sir Hew continued, "have already turned your thoughts to the great question now at issue, and are doubtless prepared to propose measures for completing the Council of Regency so as to merit the confidence of the nation, and to prevent any just cause of discontent in any other provisional government, or other respectable description of the people. For my own part, I have only been able, from the information I have received since my arrival in Portugal, to form one decided opinion on this subject; which is, the infinite importance to the public welfare that your Excellency should yourself hold a distinguished place in the proposed Regency."

The Bishop's reply was, that he should readily acquiesce in whatever might be determined upon,

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*The Council of Regency re-established.*

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except his own nomination to the Council; for he, better than any other person, knew what was necessary for the good of the public cause, and of the northern provinces, and therefore would not remove from the place where he had been stationed by God and by his Prince. It was soon, however, ascertained, that if this Prelate could not remain at the head of the government at Porto, he would not persist in refusing to accept a share in it at Lisbon. Sir Hew therefore, upon mature deliberation, and with the best advice which could be obtained, issued a proclamation, saying, that through the success with which Providence had blessed the British arms, the time was come when the re-establishment of the Portuguese government could be effected. He gave the people due praise for the exertions which they had made against the French; and saying that no views of interest or of national aggrandizement could be imputed to the liberal policy of Great Britain, declared, that the best manner in which he could fulfil the intentions of his Sovereign, and promote the welfare of Portugal, was by restoring that Council to which their Prince had delegated his authority when he preserved his royal dignity from the insults of an implacable enemy, and secured his American dominions. One of that Council had been unhappily sent away from his country; others had incurred imputations which rendered their restoration impossible at this time. The three, however, who had contracted no such

disability, the Monteiro Mor, D. Francisco Xavier de Noronha, and Francisco da Cunha e Menezes, he called upon to resume the administration, and with them the Desembargador Joam Antonio Salter de Mendonça, and Brigadier D. Miguel Pereira Forjas Coutinho, whom the Prince had named to succeed in case of vacancies. These persons assembled accordingly, and to fill up the number which the act of regency appointed, elected the Marquez daz Minas and the Bishop of Porto. The Junta of Porto then dissolved itself, declaring, however, that if the Regency should again be overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, (which they prayed God to avert,) or any other calamity, they should by that event enter again upon the full exercise of the authority which they now laid aside. The other Juntas were in like manner dissolved: the Regency was acknowledged throughout Portugal, and things resumed, as far as possible, their former course.

While Sir Hew Dalrymple was employed in carrying the terms of the convention into effect, putting an end to the anarchy which prevailed, and preparing with all possible speed to advance into Spain, an outcry which he little expected had arisen against him at home. The official account of the battle reached England a fortnight before the news of the armistice and convention: tidings came with it that the French had proposed to evacuate Portugal, and the news of Junot's unconditional surrender was looked for as what must necessarily ensue. When the terms

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against the  
Convention.*

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of the convention were received the Park and Tower guns were fired; but the public feeling was not in accord with this demonstration of joy, and never was any public feeling so unanimously and instantaneously manifested. The hopes of the nation had been raised to the highest pitch; their disappointment was in proportion, and it was expressed with a violence only to be explained by the deep and general abhorrence which the conduct of the French in Portugal had provoked. The capitulations of the Helder and of Buenos Ayres were remembered as less mortifying than the convention of Cintra. Nothing else could be talked of, nothing else could be thought of: men greeted each other in the streets with execrations upon those who had signed this detested convention; it kept them waking at night, or disturbed their sleep, like a misdeed or a misfortune of their own. The London newspapers joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence; on no former occasion had they been so unanimous. The provincial papers proved that, from one end of the island to the other, the resentment of this grievous disappointment was the same; some refused to disgrace their pages by inserting the treaty; others surrounded it with broad black lines, putting their journal in mourning for the dismal intelligence it contained; some headed the page with a representation of three gibbets, and a general suspended from each, cut in wood for the occasion.

What could be done? There were not want-

ing writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemy's discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might join the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends? for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no law of nations therefore could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was urged,

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had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was affirmed, might have gone far towards deciding the fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia, and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss was shown by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the Portuguese, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the tyrant's yoke!

The conditions which had been granted to the Russian Admiral were condemned with the same vehement feeling of disappointment. The intimate connexion which had so lately subsisted between the Courts of London and Petersburg, and the personal regard which the British Admiral entertained for Admiral Siniavin, had been adduced as reasons why an agreement acceptable

to both nations should be concluded. Certainly it became us to manifest every mark of personal respect toward the Russian officers, because, though the false policy of their government had engaged the two countries in war, there existed no angry feelings nor jarring interests between them; and the wishes of both were for a renewal of that long established intercourse which was beneficial to both. It also behoved us especially to show ourselves grateful for the protection which the Russians had afforded to the English and Portuguese refugees, and the facilities which they had given them of effecting their escape. These were personal favours, for which the obvious personal return should have been to have immediately sent home men and officers under an engagement not to serve against us or our allies, and to have shown towards them every courtesy and kindness by which the evils of hostility can be mitigated. But that personal regard should influence the terms of capitulation, was a thing as unheard of as the terms themselves. "Hold in deposit!" The phrase had never before been known in the British navy. They knew what it was to fight their enemies; they knew what it was to beat, capture, sink, burn, and destroy them, according to the spirit and letter of their instructions. This was said by the navy, and by the nation; and the bitter reflection arose, how would Nelson have received such a proposal!

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Such language as this arose from a right feel-



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ing; but the disappointment of well-founded and high-raised hopes had heated the public mind, and disqualified it for regarding the whole transaction dispassionately. The manner in which the Portuguese had been overlooked in the negotiation was aggravated in England by persons who supported the pretensions of the Junta of Porto; and undue stress was laid upon the neglect of formalities which could not have been overlooked if the Portuguese General had been acting with the British army as he ought. There had been one serious omission affecting the Portuguese, which was, in not insisting upon a stipulation that the troops of that nation who had been sent to serve in Buonaparte's armies should be restored to their own country; such a stipulation ought to have been required, though it would undoubtedly have been broken. The other oversights which were objected were merely frivolous, and the manner in which, through all the subsequent details, the feelings as well as interests of the Portuguese had been consulted, had already contented them, and made them grateful for the conduct of their allies. There was another cause which exasperated the English people: they compared the treatment of Junot's army with that of Dupont's, and were mortified by a comparison which ought rather to have elated them; for looking to what seemed advantageous, and not to what was just, they did not perceive that in deferring to a popular cry the Junta of Seville had broken a solemn engagement. The

strong disapprobation with which Sir Hew Dalrymple regarded that breach of faith, acted upon him, perhaps unconsciously, when he allowed the French the utmost which could be claimed upon the most liberal construction of the letter of the treaty in their favour.

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Meetings were convened in most parts of England to express the indignation of the people at the convention, and call for the punishment of those by whom it had been negotiated. The Common Council presented an address to the same purport, and were told in reply that it was inconsistent with the principles of British justice to pronounce judgement without previous investigation, and that their interposition was not necessary for inducing the King to institute a due inquiry into a transaction which had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. Accordingly the three Generals were recalled, and a Board of Inquiry was appointed, composed of the Earl of Moira, General Craig, Lord Heathfield, the Earl of Pembroke, Sir George Nugent, and Lieutenant-General Nicolls, with Sir David Dundas for president. Their decision, after a long and full investigation, was, that they could not pronounce, with confidence, whether the victory of Vimeiro ought to have been pursued or not; but, considering the extraordinary circumstances under which two new commanders arrived from the ocean, and joined the army, (the one during, and the other immediately after the battle, and these successively superseding each

*Board of  
Inquiry ap-  
pointed.*

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other, and both the original commander, within the space of twenty-four hours,) it was not surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second day after the action, from the necessity of the generals' being acquainted with the actual state of things, and proceeding accordingly. On a consideration of all circumstances, they were of opinion, that no farther proceeding was necessary; and, however some of them might differ respecting the fitness of the convention, it was their unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals.

As this was, in fact, delivering no opinion at all, the board was called upon, by the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, to resume its consideration of the armistice and convention, and pronounce decidedly whether they thought them adviseable. The armistice was disapproved by Earl Moira; the convention by the same nobleman, by the Earl of Pembroke, and General Nicolls: thus, six of the seven members approved the armistice, and four approved the convention. The dissentient members delivered in their reasons for the opinion which they gave. General Nicolls and Earl Pembroke confined themselves to a military point of view. Earl Moira took a wider scope, and argued ably against the moral and political effects of the treaty. The proceedings were concluded by a declaration from the King, adopting the unanimous opinion of the board, that no farther proceeding was necessary;

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but expressing his disapprobation of those articles of the convention in which stipulations were made, directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations. That disapprobation his Majesty had signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple when the treaty was first laid before him, and he repeated it, deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into military conventions, of articles of such a description. Nor could he forbear observing, that Sir Hew's delaying to transmit the armistice concluded on the 22d of August, till the 4th of September, when the ratified convention was transmitted at the same time, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience had, in fact, resulted therefrom. The King abstained from any observations upon other parts of the convention.

Thus the whole censure fell upon Sir Hew Dalrymple. But it was seen by the people that the great error of judgement had been committed at home, in not providing that the General by whom the campaign was planned should carry it to the end. And how often may it be observed in history, as in private life, that the course of events is better directed to the end desired, than if the persons most interested in the success could themselves have ordered it! So it was in this campaign, which at the time so severely disappointed the nation. A more splendid triumph

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might have been obtained in the field, a higher tone might have been taken in the negotiation; but in either of these cases Almeida and Elvas would have been left in possession of the enemy; and whatever efforts might have been made for reducing them, they could easily have held out till the dispersion of the Spanish armies. It would then have been a great object with the French to relieve the garrisons, and this would have brought them to Lisbon at a time when there were neither preparations nor means for resistance there.

## CHAPTER XII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF THE SPANISH TROOPS FROM DENMARK.

WHEN Castaños was informed of Sir Hew Dalrymple's appointment to the command of the British army, he declared that he regarded this nomination as the most fortunate event of his own life; so much advantage to the common cause did he anticipate from their confidence in each other, and the cordial co-operation which would ensue. In reality that influence which the confidence of a British commander would have given him, might have been of the most essential benefit to Spain at this momentous crisis.

1808.

*Necessity of  
a provision-  
al govern-  
ment.*

Such was the national character, that when the struggle commenced every man was ready to follow in the cause of his country; but so pitiable had been the state of education, and so successfully had the double despotism of the government and the inquisition shut out knowledge from their empire, that no man was fit to lead. There were now as many governments as there were Juntas, each acting with little regard to the others; and as these were every where filled

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by persons chosen because of their station, the government throughout Spain was delivered, or rather fell into the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, with a few clergy; a set of men whom their general want of information, their prejudices, and their previous way of life, in great measure disqualified for the task to which they were called. Among them were some persons who had formerly been in office at Madrid; but whatever advantage they might have derived from habits of business, was more than counterbalanced by the dilatory formalities acquired at the same time, and their attachment to the old routine with all its defects and evils. Wherever therefore such statesmen of the old school were found, the Juntas were less efficient than they might have been without them. The powers with which these bodies found themselves invested were neither limited in extent or duration: the people in their confidence (which at such times is as blind as their suspicion) never thought of proposing restrictions: and the Juntas, when once in possession of authority, thought only of making it as extensive, and retaining it as long as they could. Some of them passed decrees bestowing upon themselves the titles of Excellencies and Highnesses, and adopted uniforms of the gaudiest fashion. This was mere vanity; but serious injury was done, when, with as little decency as had been observed under the old system, they conferred commissions and commands, not upon those persons who had the fairest

claim, but upon their own friends and relations and dependents ; and thus, as the enrolment was general, the armies were filled with officers who had no other pretensions to rank and promotion than what they derived from favour.

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After the great success in Andalusia, the provincial Juntas, instead of exerting themselves to the utmost for completing the deliverance of the country, became jealous of each other. Where the rival authorities were far distant, this feeling impeded the public service ; greater evils were threatened when they bordered upon each other. Granada at this time refused to acknowledge the supreme authority which the Junta of Seville assumed, and had hitherto exercised with ability and good fortune. A warm contention ensued ; and Tilly, either from irritation, or worse motives, proposed that a division of the Andalusian army should be sent to enforce submission. Fortunately Castaños was present at the meeting in which this proposition was made ; he rose from his seat, and, striking the table, said, he should like to see the man who dared order a division of the troops under his command to march without his authority ! He knew no distinction of provinces ; he had the honour to command part of the army of Spain, and never would he suffer it to be made the instrument of civil war.

*Castaños prevents a contest between Granada and Seville.*

The occasion required, and therefore justified, this prompt assumption of a power, dangerous in its kind, and in nowise congenial to the unambitious temper of Castaños, a man whose only

*Plans for a government.*



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desire was to do his duty like a true Spaniard under any circumstances. It proved, however, the necessity of establishing a more legitimate authority than as yet existed. Lord Collingwood, in his first communications with Seville, had advised that a general Council, Cortes, or Congress, should be appointed, and invested with power from the several provincial Juntas to preside over and act in the name of the whole. The necessity of some such arrangement became every day more apparent. Some persons proposed to establish a military form of government, in which that vigour which the emergency required might be found; some were for assembling a Cortes; others recommended that a viceroy or lieutenant of the kingdom should be appointed, and to this Castaños was at one time inclined. His first thought before the struggle began had been to invite the Archduke Charles; but upon considering that the invitation could not be accepted while Austria continued at peace with France, and that if a war between those powers took place, the Archduke's services would be required at home, he then thought the Prince Royal of the house of Naples would be the fittest person to hold the regency till the fate of Ferdinand should be known; and this he proposed to the Junta. The Sicilian court from the commencement of the insurrection had directed their views to the same object: their minister in London had sounded the disposition of the British Government, and found it decidedly unfavourable

*Arrival of  
a Sicilian  
Prince at  
Gibraltar.*

to their schemes; and they sent a plenipotentiary to reside at Gibraltar, for the purpose of furthering the interests of the family. But Sir Hew Dalrymple happened to be informed of what had passed in London, and finding that the object of this mission was altogether disapproved by the British Government, and that the agent had papers which he intended to circulate without previously communicating their contents to him, felt it necessary to let him know that his residence in the garrison, under these circumstances, might be attended with inconvenience, and therefore he must return to Palermo for new instructions. This was about the middle of July; in the ensuing month, a few days before Sir Hew left Gibraltar to take the command of the army, Prince Leopold, second son of the King of the Two Sicilies, with the Duke of Orleans and a large retinue, arrived there in a British man of war. A more ill-judged step could hardly have been taken. Great Britain had scrupulously avoided any thing which could have the appearance of dictating to the Spaniards, or interfering with them in any other way than that of giving the most prompt and liberal support; but what a pretext would it afford those who were ever ready to malign the measures of England, if at a time when the Spaniards were deliberating concerning the settlement of their government, a Prince who claimed the regency should be received with royal honours at Gibraltar, and at the very juncture when a British army arrived

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upon the coast! Under these embarrassing circumstances Sir Hew acted with great firmness and discretion. Persisting in that upright and steady course of conduct which had in so great a degree contributed to win the confidence of the Spanish nation, he refused in any manner to support pretensions which he had reason to believe were not approved by his government; to that government he referred the Duke of Orleans, who accordingly resolved to go to England, and make his representations in person; the Prince was received into Gibraltar, and left there, when Sir Hew went to the army; if he were chosen Regent, any deputation duly appointed to announce that nomination was of course to be admitted, and considered as attached to his retinue; but no such deputation from any local or provisional government was to be received on such terms.

*Ambition of  
the Junta of  
Seville.*

There was at this time a report that the Junta of Seville had declared for a regency, and were hesitating between the Archbishop of Toledo, as the only remaining member of the Bourbon family in Spain, a Prince of the Neapolitan house, and the Conde de Montijo, the most intriguing, and then one of the most popular persons in Spain. As this individual had no pretensions to such a charge, except what his undeserved popularity might give him, the report was probably raised by himself as one means to bring about his elevation. Some members of that Junta were intoxicated with success; a few others cared for

nothing but their own interest: the latter wished for a Regent of their own appointment, under whose name they might possess the real power; the former were for retaining the authority which hitherto they had administered well, but which ceased to be legitimate when it became apparent that it was retained for ambitious motives. A paper from the Junta of Murcia, which expressed the opinion of Florida Blanca, had forcibly pointed out the necessity of a central government, and the inevitable ruin which a polyarchy of independent Juntas would bring on. It advised that the cities which had a seat in the Cortes should elect a council to govern in the name of Ferdinand, and that the military affairs should be entrusted to a council of generals. The Junta of Seville suppressed this paper wherever their influence extended; but a like measure was now recommended by an authority with which the Junta could not cope.

The Council of Castille had recovered some of its lost reputation by the tardy resistance which it opposed to the Intruder, and by exerting itself with authority to maintain order in the capital, after the retreat of the French. It published a justification of its own conduct, more elaborate than convincing, and dispatched a circular address to the provincial Juntas, declaring its readiness to co-operate with them in any plans of defence. With respect to measures of another kind, it said, which were necessary to save the country, all that belonged to that Council

*The Council of Castille advise a central Junta.*

*Aug. 4.*

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was to excite the authority of the nation, and assist it with its influence, advice, and knowledge.

Under circumstances so extraordinary it was not possible to adopt at once the measures indicated by the laws and customs of Spain; the Council therefore would confine itself to recommending that deputies should be appointed by all the different Juntas, who should meet together, and, in union with it, confer and determine upon this important object; so that all provisions proceeding from this common centre might be as expeditious as the end required.

*Project of  
the Junta  
of Seville.*

The better spirits in the Junta of Seville prevailed on this occasion, and that body, yielding with a good grace to the general opinion, seemed at the same time to direct it. They published an address, written with the ability which distinguished all their public papers. Hitherto, they said, the cause of the Spaniards had been prosperous, and nothing could frustrate their hopes of success, except a want of union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious to foment divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, might assist these evil designs, destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin of Spain. This they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God and man, that they wrote nothing but what was dictated by the love of their country, being ready to hear the opinions of other provinces, and to amend their own errors, whenever it should

be shown that they had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever might serve to sow disunion: of this nature were all discussions concerning the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well known; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this? Long live King Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers, heirs of the crown after his attested decease! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be necessary in default of them?

The second question which agitated the people was of a different nature: . . . Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? From the beginning they had been persuaded such a government was by all means necessary. Many Juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction of this truth, . . . a conviction arising from the necessity in every nation of a civil government, to which the military may be subordinate. Spain, deriving wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the Spanish name) had been the first to acknowledge a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people in the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which pecuniary resources had been placed at their disposal, the heroic

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loyalty wherewith the army had obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their civil administration, and of the military enterprises which they had directed, placed in the most conspicuous light, and established, beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political principle. But who was to create this supreme civil government? Who were to compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How might it be established, without producing disunion among the different provinces? These were the important questions to be examined.

It had been said that the Cortes ought to assemble, that the Council of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed under the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of Castille never possessed the right of convoking the Cortes, . . why then should they give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and defend? Because it had afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government convoked by an authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty of acts

which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes against their country? But the Council of Castille being thus excluded from all consideration, who was to convoke the Cortes? It was the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the King to summon them; the provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not unite: thus, therefore, there would be no Cortes, or, if a few deputies were to assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions, the very evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king and without a government, . . . a situation unknown in its history, and to its laws. The people legally resumed the power of appointing a government. They created Juntas without any regard to the cities which had votes in the Cortes. The legitimate power was therefore deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power they had governed, and still were governing, and had been, and still were, universally acknowledged and obeyed. Their situation had not changed; the danger still existed; no new authority had supervened: the lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which the people had confided it. It was therefore incontestable that the sole and exclusive right of electing those who were to compose the supreme government was vested in the supreme Juntas. And whom should they elect? Most certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derived their power from the people, and in them the nation had reposed



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entire confidence. Hence, if there were any province in which the military power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the people; for, under present circumstances, the government could not be legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent.

The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that the supreme Juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own members, two deputies; and the persons so elected, from that moment, be acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom. The supreme Juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the present state of things, being invested with the internal management of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal. If there were one of the Royal Family capable of presiding in the supreme government, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that office; but if there were no person of the royal blood, then it must elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all danger, the presidency should be only for such limited time as might seem best.

The Juntas would appoint a place for the seat of government, which the government might afterwards change, if it should see cause. It ought to be at a distance from the dangers of war, and to possess other local advantages. Seville possessed those advantages, but had no anxiety to be selected, and willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that city would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion, La Mancha was most convenient for the seat of government, and, especially, either the city of Ciudad-Real, or Almagro. But this point was to be decided by the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The paper concluded with a brief and dignified recapitulation of what the Junta of Seville had done for their country, disclaiming, on their part, any affectation or desire of superiority, and declaring, that whatever they had done was no more than their indispensable duty.

The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the plan of government thus recommended; and it is no light proof of its fitness, that schemes the same in principle and effect should have been suggested by persons who had no communication with each other, and whose views were in other respects so different. There were many in England who thought it would have been better to have at once convoked the Cortes, in the supposition that there was more resemblance between the Cortes and the English parliament than had ever really existed, and in the generous but mistaken hope that vigorous measures might

*The Provincial Juntas assent to it.*

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be expected from a free legislative assembly. The best and wisest of the Spaniards wished also for a Cortes, and looked to it for such judicious reforms as were conformable to the constitutional principles of the monarchy, and suited to the habits and feelings of the nation. But they saw that many points must be determined before the manner of assembling the Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of forming a central government was immediate and urgent. The plan therefore which the Junta of Seville proposed was assented to without opposition. Still it was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas to retain their power. That of Valencia drew up secret rules for its deputies, declaring that they were to follow the direction of their constituents, remain subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly with them, and in no instance depart from their instructions; and they reserved to themselves the power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This paper was made public; and it was known that other Juntas, that of Seville in particular, had pursued the same mischievous course.

*Unworthy  
choice of  
the Junta  
of Seville.*

The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this. In electing its deputies it chose two persons so notoriously unworthy of such a trust, that the only motives which could be assigned for the choice were a desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they would submit to any terms for the sake of the appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the one; he had been a creature of

Godoy's, and was so sensible of the estimation in which he was held, that he declined the charge, knowing his life would be in danger if he appeared in Madrid, where it was of course expected that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, the coadjutor of Seville, was then chosen in his place; and this was an unexceptionable choice. It was hoped and expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow Hore's example, in declining an appointment for which he was equally disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder stamp. A blasted character had not prevented him from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being utterly regardless of the means by which he brought about his ends, he was ready to venture for the highest stake in the game of revolution. Foul facts had been proved against him, and fouler were, upon no light grounds, imputed. He had found it necessary to fly from Madrid before the troubles, because he was implicated in the robbery of a jeweller. The murder of the Conde de Aguila was attributed to him, because it was certain that he might have saved the Count by the slightest interference in his behalf. A wretch who was notoriously his creature had been one of the most active instruments in Solano's death; and Reding would have been made away with by his means before the battle of Baylen, if the intention had not been disclosed to Castaños, and by him prevented.

This appointment was not perhaps what Tilly

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*The other  
members  
unexcep-  
tionable.*

would have chosen; for it was believed that he had no inclination to show himself at Madrid; but he trusted to his talents for intrigue, obtained a monthly allowance of 500 dollars, and looked for those opportunities which revolutionary times offer to insane and desperate ambition. It is to the honour of the Spaniards, that this was the only exceptionable person elected for the central Junta: perhaps in no country could an equal number of men, under similar circumstances, have been chosen more worthy of the trust reposed in them. To be elected to a situation of so great responsibility, in a time of unexampled difficulties, was no object of desire; in no instance was the appointment solicited, and in most it was reluctantly accepted. The persons deputed were thirty-five \* in number; of whom

## \* LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA..

For Aragon..D. Francisco Rebolledo de Palafox y Melzi, Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, and Brigadier in the army; D. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, Intendant of the army and kingdom of Aragon.

Asturias..D. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Knight of the Order of Alcantara, of the Royal Council of State, and formerly Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques de Campo-Sagrado, Lieutenant-General of the army, and Inspector-general of the troops of Asturias.

The Canaries..Marques de Villanueva del Prado.

Old Castille..D. Lorenzo Bonifaz y Quintano, Prior of the holy Church of Zamora; D. Francisco Xavier Caro, Professor of Laws at Salamanca.

Catalonia..Marques de Villel, Conde de Darnius, a Grandee, and Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Baron de Sabasona.

Cordoba..Marques de la Puebla de los Infantes, a Grandee; D. Juan de Dios Gutierrez Rabé.

Extremadura..D. Martin de Garay, Intendant of Extremadura, and Honorary Minister of the Council of War; D. Felix Ovalle, Treasurer of the army of Extremadura.

Gallicia..Conde de Gimonde; D. Antonio Aballe.

Florida-Blanca and Jovellanos were the most remarkable, for the offices which they had formerly filled, and the rank which they held in public opinion. Both were scholars as well as statesmen, both men of business, both high-minded and honourable Spaniards. Florida-Blanca had more of the spirit of his country, Jovellanos was more influenced by that of the age. The former had been an ambitious politician; the latter was

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Granada...D. Rodrigo Riquelme, Regent of the Chancery of Granada; D. Luiz Funes y Salido, Canon of the holy Church of Santiago.

Jaen...D. Francisco Castanedo, Canon of the holy Church of Jaen, Provisor and Vicar-general of that diocese; D. Sebastian de Jocano, of his Majesty's council, in the *Tribunal de Contaduria Mayor*, and *Contador* of the province of Jaen.

Leon...Frey D. Antonio Valdes, Bailey and Grand Cross of the Order of S. Juan, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, Captain-General of the Fleet, Counsellor of State, formerly Minister of the Marine, and acting Minister of the Indies; the Vizconde de Quintanilla.

Madrid...Conde de Altamira, Marques de Astorga, a Grandee, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., First Equerry, and Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; D. Pedro de Silva, Patriarch of the Indies, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., and formerly Camp-Marshal of the Royal Armies.

Majorca...D. Tomas de Veri, Knight of the Order of S. Juan, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Volunteers; Conde de Ayamans, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Palma Militia.

Murcia...Conde de Florida-Blanca, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, and formerly First Secretary of State, and acting Minister of Grace and Justice; Marques del Villar.

Navarre...D. Miguel de Balanza; D. Carlos de Amatria, Members of the Deputation of the kingdom of Navarre.

Seville...D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, Archbishop of Laodicea and Coadjutor of Seville; Conde de Tilly.

Toledo...D. Pedro de Ribero, Canon of the holy Church of Toledo; D. José Garcia de la Torre, Advocate of the Royal Councils.

Valencia...Conde de Contamina, a Grandee, Gentleman of the Bed-chamber; Principe Pio, a Grandee, Colonel of Militia.

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always a philosopher, in the true and virtuous meaning of that polluted word. As the despotic minister of an absolute king, Florida-Blanca had used his power vigorously to uphold the dignity of the kingdom, and improve its internal condition; most of his measures were wise, and all were well-intended; but if he had ever conceived a wish to correct the abuses of the state, it had never appeared in his actions: Jovellanos had unwillingly accepted office, because it placed him in a sphere uncongenial to his modest habits and better mind, and withdrew him from the task to which he had devoted himself, of improving his native province. Jovellanos's desire was to meliorate the government and the nation by recurring to the free principles of the old constitution; Florida-Blanca thought that if governments were administered as they ought to be, the strongest must be the best. Both, without hesitation \*, obeyed the call of their country, though Florida-Blanca, who was in extreme old age, would more willingly have passed the short remainder of his days in preparing and waiting for death; and

\* Llorente, under his name of Nellerto, (vol. i. 155,) asserts, that when Florida-Blanca was summoned to the central Junta he left a writing, addressed to the municipality of the city of Murcia, protesting that he acted under fear and compulsion, and in the full knowledge that his country was going to destruction; and adding, that he made this solemn declaration lest King Joseph should one day treat him as a criminal. This infamous

calumny, which by its own absurdity confutes itself, is advanced by the ex-secretary of the Inquisition upon no better authority than that of a Madrid journal, published under the Intruder's government. It is so palpably calumnious, that I should not have thought it worthy of contradiction, if it had not been doubtfully repeated by Col. Jones in his very able Account of the War.

Jovellanos, broken down, more by the infirmities which an unjust and cruel imprisonment had aggravated or induced, than by the weight of sixty-five years, desired for himself nothing in this world but tranquillity. The former brought with him little more than a venerable name; but Jovellanos was in full possession of his intellectual powers.

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Every effort had been made by Azanza, O'Far-  
ril, Urquijo, Mazarredo, and Cabarrus, to engage  
this excellent man in the Intruder's service. He  
had lived in habits of friendship with all these  
persons, more especially with the two last. Know-  
ing how inaccessible he would be to all unworthy  
inducements, they endeavoured to deceive him,  
as they would fain have deceived themselves,  
by representing that theirs was the only course  
which could secure the welfare of Spain; and  
that by no other means could the calamities with  
which it was threatened be averted; for they  
thought it absurd to imagine any effectual resist-  
ance could be opposed to the determined ambi-  
tion of Buonaparte. His reply was, that if the  
cause of their country were as desperate as they  
supposed it to be, still it was the cause of honour  
and loyalty, and that which a good Spaniard ought  
to follow at all hazards. Jovellanos held with his  
favourite author Cicero that friendship was to be  
preferred to every thing except honour and vir-  
tue; he had given proof of this by his former  
conduct toward some of these friends, and they  
found now, as they had then, that no considera-

*Jovellanos  
refuses all  
offers of the  
Intrusive  
Govern-  
ment.*



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tions could ever prevail in him over the sense of duty. It gave him no little pain that his name should be published in the Madrid gazette as one of Joseph's ministers; thus to appear a traitor even for a few days to those who knew him not, or knew not how decidedly he had refused the appointment, was an injury which he felt severely. This was one of Buonaparte's insolent acts; fallen as Urquijo and his colleagues were, they would not have thus outraged the feelings of a man whom it was not possible that they could ever cease to respect and admire. At length, the Intrusive Government having ascertained that he was really suffering under severe bodily infirmities, forbore to molest him with further solicitations. He was gradually recovering when news of the battle of Baylen refreshed his heart, and seemed to give him new life as well as hope. And when his appointment to the Central Junta was announced, though his first thought was of the ravages which age and affliction had made upon his debilitated frame, the sense of duty overcame all personal considerations, and he notified his acceptation without delay, at the same time declining a salary of 4000 ducats which had been assigned him.

*Jovellanos  
a sus Com-  
patriotas,  
p. ii. art. i.  
18—25.*

*Aranjuez  
chosen for  
the place of  
meeting.*

In little more than a week he joined the deputies for Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, at Madrid; and then two difficulties, which had not been anticipated, occurred. The first related to the instructions with which the Junta of Seville had fettered their members; instructions wholly

repugnant to the principle upon which the provisional government was formed. The inconsistency and the evils of this measure were represented to Castaños, who was then in Madrid with his army; that General's influence was never exercised unworthily, nor withheld when it might be useful; and in consequence of his remonstrance the obnoxious instructions were withdrawn, though it appeared afterwards that secret ones to the same tenour had been substituted. The other difficulty was concerning the place of meeting. Jovellanos thought that no place could be so proper as the metropolis: there, in the palace of their kings, the Central Junta would derive consequence and respect from the place; they would appear at the head of the first tribunals and chief magistracy; the public documents were upon the spot, and any advice or assistance which they might require at hand. The members who were at Madrid agreed in this opinion, which was supported also by Castaños: but the Junta of Seville were averse to any measure which might lessen their authority, and in this instance they were well served by Tilly for reasons which nearly concerned himself. He had stopped at Aranjuez, and succeeded in persuading Florida-Blanca, who was decidedly for fixing the government at Madrid, that it would be convenient to hold their first sittings where they were, and determine there upon the forms which they should observe in the capital. He gained time by this... always a great object for one who trusts to intrigue and

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fortune. So fully persuaded however were Jovellanos and his colleagues when they went to Aranjuez that they should speedily adjourn to Madrid, that they left orders for forming an establishment there.

*Installation  
of the Cen-  
tral Junta.  
Sept. 26.*

The greater part of the deputies having arrived, their installation was performed with as much ceremony as the place and circumstances would permit. The Archbishop of Laodicea performed mass, and administered an oath to his colleagues, first taking it himself, that they would preserve and extend the holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, defend their Sovereign Ferdinand, their rights, privileges, laws, and usages, and especially those relating to the succession in the reigning family, promote every thing conducive to the welfare and improvement of the kingdom, keep secret every thing which ought not to be divulged, maintain the laws, and resist the enemies of the country at all hazards. The oath having been taken, Te Deum was sung by the barefooted friars of St. Pasqual, and the assembly then adjourned to the hall chosen for their sittings. Florida-Blanca was appointed president, and his first act was to proclaim King Ferdinand from the great gallery of the principal front of the palace. The gates of the palace had not been opened till now since the departure of Charles for Bayonne; and the ceremony of thus proclaiming Ferdinand in the favourite residence of his ancestors, .. the scene of his own childhood, .. the spot where, six months ago, he had

been acclaimed King, . . he who was now prisoner in a foreign land, and in the power of the perfidious tyrant who had ensnared him, . . moved the venerable statesman to tears when he pronounced his name, and excited feelings of grief and indignation in the multitude, which heightened and hallowed the enthusiasm wherewith they repeated it.

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The Junta dispatched copies of the act and oath of installation to the different councils and tribunals, requiring their members to take the same oath, and issue orders to all the subordinate Juntas, provinces, magistrates, governors, and viceroys, for obeying the new government, as holding in deposit the sovereign authority for Ferdinand, the councils continuing in the exercise of their ordinary functions, but referring to the Central Junta all matters exceeding their powers, and upon which the Sovereign ought to be consulted. Other tribunals immediately signified their prompt and unreserved obedience; the Council of Castille alone delayed their answer. The mortification which they felt at not being incorporated with the provisional government, as they had proposed, was embittered by a consciousness that they had forfeited all claim to the confidence of the nation. Having, however, almost by accident, recovered so much authority, they strove to extend it, and after five days returned an answer, saying that, having given the subject their most serious consideration, they had resolved to take the oath, and

*Conduct of  
the Council  
of Castille.*

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circulate the necessary orders that the Central Junta should be obeyed in whatever was for the service of the King and of the public cause. But they added, that in discharge of their indispensable duty, they would hereafter communicate to the Junta the result of their consultations for the observance and maintenance of the laws. The reservation implied in this reply offended the Junta, and more especially the President Florida-Blanca, who had not been accustomed to tolerate delay or demur under his administration; and an answer was returned conveying reproof in the form of admonition, which reduced the Council of Castille to a quiet but malevolent submission.

*The Leonese  
deputies ar-  
rested by  
Cuesta.*

The Leonese deputies had been seized by General Cuesta on their way. One of them, the Bayley Valdes, notified his arrest to Florida-Blanca, who instantly perceiving what fatal consequences must arise from any serious dispute between the civil and military authorities, wrote mildly to Cuesta, requesting that he would release the deputies, prefer his charges against them to the Junta, and leave the decision to that body. At the same time Castaños, to whom the judicious part of the people in Madrid looked for some interference in their fear at this unexpected act of military violence, addressed a letter to the Castillian general, representing to him calmly, but forcibly, the surprise and alarm which this arrest had occasioned, at a time when the great object of forming a provisional govern-

ment was on the point of being happily effected; and asking what offence the deputies had committed, men as they were of high character, and the Bayley Valdes distinguished for the services which he had performed? what authority was competent to arrest and detain them? why, if they were delinquents, they had not been denounced to the Juntas of their respective provinces? why their crimes were not published in the face of the nation, and themselves accused before the Central Junta, then about to assemble?

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In his answer to Castaños, Cuesta declared, that as principal and sole chief of the provinces of Castille and Leon, he was not bound to give an account of his conduct to any other provincial authority, being independent of all till a general government or regency should be established; nevertheless, as his Excellency apprehended some uneasiness in the people of Madrid, and in the whole nation, concerning this transaction, he deemed it proper to satisfy his doubts. The Junta of Castille having been dissolved by the entrance of the enemy into Valladolid, he had increased the Junta of Leon by adding to it a deputy for every intendency or province of Castille, and had confirmed Valdes as their president, Valdes having promised to obey his orders in all things, without consideration of his own rank. But after the battle of Rio Seco, a few members of this Junta, seeing him pursued by the French, and forsaken by the Galician army, retired to Ponferrada, instead of Astorga, whither he had

*Cuesta's  
vindication  
of his con-  
duct.*

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directed them to repair: and there, under the influence of Valdes, treated clandestinely with the Junta of Coruña, to unite with them at Lugo, and from thence govern both Castille and Leon, independently of the captain-general, who, indeed, was to become subordinate to them. The Bayley had notified this to him, and at the same time ordered him to deliver up his cavalry to General Blake. Instead of obeying such orders, he had immediately annulled this fugitive Junta, and commanded the inferior Juntas to break off all communication with it, which they had accordingly done, except in those parts of Leon which were under the immediate power of the Galician general. The fugitive Junta persisted in its pretensions, and had elected Valdes and the Vizconde de Quintanilla as its representatives in the Central Junta. Let any impartial person then say whether he had not good reason to arrest them for insubordination! Not having been elected by any competent authority, they were not members of the Central Junta, and therefore no offence had been offered to that body in arresting them. Whenever that body should be assembled, he would be the first person to obey it, and submit to its high consideration the cause of Valdes and his accomplices: till then neither the rank of the Bayley, nor his assumed quality of member of the Central Junta, for the provinces of Castille and Leon, shall suffice, said the old General, to exempt him from my jurisdiction. The same answer he returned to Florida-Blanca,

and sent back the letter which that nobleman had addressed to Valdes, saying that the prisoner was in strict confinement, deprived of all communication.

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Castañõs, not receiving a reply as soon as he had expected, called upon the Council of Castille to interfere; and that tribunal, well pleased that its authority should be appealed to on so important an occasion in such times, wrote in consequence to Cuesta, remonstrating on the dangerous tendency of his conduct. But he returned for answer, that the imprisonment of these persons was the best means of preventing danger, as it would effectually preclude the contentions which might arise if a double set of representatives for Castille and Leon should present themselves; that neither prudence nor justice permitted him to overlook the infidelity, insurrection, and insubordination of a Junta which he had created; and that for these offences, as Valdes was a general, he would deliver him over to be tried by a council of war, composed of generals, unless a sovereign regency should first be established; in which case he would submit the whole proceeding to their judgement, and his own powers also, . . . powers which till then he considered independent of any other authority.

*The Council of Castille interfere.*

Upon this principle, and an assumption that the Juntas in Castille and Leon derived their authority from him and not from the people, Cuesta made the Junta of Valladolid, who had assembled in Leon, send a representative to the

*Cuesta is summoned before the Central Junta.*



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*September.*

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Central Junta. The assembly refused to admit him, and ordering Cuesta to set his prisoners at liberty, summoned him also to Aranjuez, that all parties might be heard. This was in effect removing him from the command of his army. Such an assertion of their power was well-timed, for Cuesta, making no secret of his hostile intentions against them, had declared to the British agent, Mr. Stuart, that two measures were necessary for the public good; first, the restoration of the authority of the Captains General and of the Royal Audiencias, (which would have ensured to him the continuance of his command); and, secondly, the exercise of military influence over the Junta, to make them elect an Executive Council, of three or five members, each of whom should be placed at the head of one branch of the government, and responsible to the nation only. But Cuesta, intemperate as he was, sincerely desired to serve his country; and he obeyed the summons without hesitation. Mutual accusations were made. The Junta of Leon reproached the General with his attempts to maintain order at the commencement of the insurrection, and thereby serving the Intrusive Government. They injured themselves more than Cuesta by this disingenuous attack; for his defence upon that point was full and satisfactory: what persons in authority were there throughout Spain, he asked, who had not endeavoured to suppress the first popular movement, knowing how great a force the enemy had in the heart of

the country, ready to act any where, and not knowing that the spirit of resistance was universal? As soon as that spirit was fairly manifested, he had taken the national side, had brought armies into the field, and had done his duty faithfully, if not fortunately. It was base indeed in the Junta to bring against him this accusation, which, if it had been taken up by the populace, or his own soldiers, might so easily have occasioned his murder. On the other hand, it was found, that in the affair of the deputies Cuesta's conduct had not been distinguished by that honest obstinacy which appeared in his own account, and which characterised his general conduct. He had not disapproved of the Junta's measures till they ordered him to send his cavalry to Blake, a measure which all the military men in Madrid considered of the utmost importance at the time. His opinion of the Bayley Valdes had been so favourable, that he had made known his intention to have him elected as his own colleague; and the immediate cause of this rash and intemperate proceeding was anger that he himself had not been chosen. So completely had this feeling mastered him, that instead of advancing with his army to Burgo del Osma, (as had been resolved in a council of war at Madrid at which he was present,) he had actually fallen back to Segovia to gratify his resentment by seizing Valdes. Valdes would now have terminated the dispute by giving in his resignation: this it was not thought proper to accept; the

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*September.**Declaration  
of the Cen-  
tral Junta.*

validity of his election was admitted, and the other points were referred to a competent tribunal, but the course of events soon put an end to all further proceedings.

The Central Junta, thus peaceably established, and unanimously recognized by the nation, began their administration with the fairest promises. They acknowledged the national debt, and took upon themselves the obligations contracted by the crown, which formed the patrimony of many families; and which they pledged themselves punctually to pay. That portion of the revenue which had formerly been swallowed up in the enormous expenses of the royal household, or engrossed by the favourite, would, they trusted, enable them to diminish the imposts laid upon the towns and villages; and great resources would be found in the property forfeited by those who had betrayed their country. The sum total of the funds arising from these sources, from the regular revenues, and from the donatives and contributions of Spain and the Indies, they promised annually to publish, with an account of its expenditure. They would simplify, as far as possible, the revenue system, gradually suppress useless offices, establish economy in all the branches of financial administration, and remove the abuses introduced into it by the old government.

The duties which they proposed to themselves, and the benefits which they promised the people, were farther explained in an address to the nation; for they affirmed, it became them to inform

the people of their situation, with a dignity becoming the Spanish character; and to establish, in a frank and generous manner, those relations of reciprocal confidence which ought to be the basis of every just and wise administration. A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the most incapable hands, had brought them to the very brink of perdition: the nation was alienated from its government by hatred or contempt: every thing favoured the perfidious plot which Buonaparte had formed against them, when they rose to vindicate their rights, and became at once the admiration of Europe. Their situation was unexampled in their history, unforeseen by their laws, and, as it were, opposed to their habits. Great and wonderful things they had accomplished; but all their enthusiasm and all their virtue were required for what remained to be done. Their armies were naked and unprovided with every thing. The French, collected behind the Ebro, were expecting reinforcements, and ravaging Upper Castille, Rioja, and the provinces of Biscay; Navarre and Catalonia were almost wholly in their power: they possessed the passes, and had made themselves, by what treachery was well known, masters of the strong frontier fortresses, and of Barcelona. The despot of France, deceiving, by the grossest impostures, the slaves who obeyed him, was striving to keep all other states in inactivity, that he might bring the whole enormous weight of his military force upon Spain. The continental powers were watch-

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ing the issue of this first struggle, desiring to declare themselves against the common enemy, but proceeding with the timid circumspection which they had learnt from past misfortunes. A confederacy against the tyrant was evidently their only means of preservation: for what state could now hold relations of amity with him? who could now give credit to the words and promises of Buonaparte, or trust to his good faith? The fate of Spain was at once a lesson and a warning to Europe, . . her resolution would serve as an example, her victories as an incentive; and the reprobate, who had trampled under foot the principles of justice, had placed himself in that fearful situation, that he must either become master of all, or perish in the struggle which he had so wantonly provoked.

But this co-operation would not be obtained till the Spaniards had given such earnest of success as rendered victory certain: they must therefore call forth all their means, as if they were singly to contend against the whole power of France. The Junta believed it would be necessary to maintain 500,000 men in arms, besides 50,000 cavalry, . . a force which, however disproportionate to their present situation, and to all former exigencies, was not more than the present times required. The power of their adversary was colossal, his ambition even greater than his power, and his existence incompatible with their liberty. His exertions were to be estimated by the barbarity of his character and the extremity

of his danger; but they were the exertions of a tyrant, and would be confounded, when opposed to the constancy of a great and free people.

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The last government . . if that might be called government which was one continued and monstrous dilapidation, had exhausted all the sources of prosperity. The resources which arose from the revenues of the royal household, from the enormous sums formerly devoured by the insatiable avarice of Godoy, from his collected rapine, and the confiscated estates, from a free trade, a well-arranged administration of the revenue, and regularly distributed contributions, had already been indicated. The succours already given so generously by England, and still to be expected from that nation, were to be added to these means. "But," said the Central Junta, "it is incumbent on us that these succours, which have been so opportunely given, and so gratefully received, and the effects of which have been so beneficial, should be hereafter recognized and recompensed with the reciprocity and decorum which become a great and powerful nation. The Spanish monarchy must not, in this respect, be placed in a state of inequality and dependence on its allies. The produce of these various means would be great but slow, and therefore insufficient for the urgent necessities of the state. Would they be sufficient to furnish for a time the ordinary supplies, discharge the great debt which must be incurred, and maintain the formidable army which must be kept up? If not, the go-

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vernment would at once have recourse to the nation, certain, from the fidelity with which its accounts would regularly be published, from the necessity and notoriety of the public wants, and the patriotism of the nation, that although to evils so extraordinary as the present remedies as extraordinary must be applied, its demands would neither be disregarded through distrust, nor detested as arbitrary.

“ The defence of the kingdom, and the means of providing for it, must necessarily be the first duty of the government; but it would fulfil only half its duties if it attended to this alone : other duties remained, to be the great reward of the virtue of the Spaniards and of their sacrifices. A little time only had passed since, oppressed and degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection against these evils, neither in the institutions nor in the laws, they had even regarded foreign dominion as less hateful than the wasting tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious, and most often unjust, had lasted too long : their patience, their love of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused : it was time that law, founded on general utility, should commence its reign. This was the desire of their good and unfortunate King Ferdinand; this was what he pointed out, even from the captivity to which a perfidious traitor had reduced him. The name of their country ought no longer to be a vague and idle word to the Spaniards; henceforward it

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was to import to their ears and to their hearts the sanctuary of laws, the theatre for talents, the reward of virtue. Such a country the Junta solemnly promised they should possess; and till the military operations, which must at first be slow, in order better to insure success, should furnish the leisure necessary for this great and solemn reform, the government would privately prepare for it. Instead of rejecting the advice of enlightened men, they desired and requested it. The knowledge and illustration of their ancient and constitutional laws; the changes which change of circumstances rendered necessary in their re-establishment; the reform which might be necessary in the civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects for improving public education, which was in Spain so greatly on the decline; a system of regulated economy for the distribution and collection of the public revenue, . . . these were subjects for the investigation of wise and thoughtful men, and on which the opinions of such men were solicited. The Junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a particular department, to whom all writings on matters of government and administration might be addressed: so that each contributing by his exertions to give a just direction to the public mind, the government might be enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain."

These were fair professions; nor were the intentions of the Central Junta less laudable than their language. Tilly alone excepted, the mem-

*Jovellanos proposes a Regency, and that a Cortes be summoned.*



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bers were upright and honourable men, worthy to represent a nation distinguished for its high sense of honour. But they were unacquainted with each other, and except the President, Jovellanos, and Garay, wholly unused to business: for a national assembly too few, and for an executive government too many. Jovellanos was of opinion that they ought immediately to appoint a regency of five persons, one of them being a dignitary of the church, to be installed on the first day of the ensuing year: that the Central Junta should then be reduced to half its original number, retaining one member only of each deputation, for the purpose of watching over the observance of the constitution entrusted to the regency, and corresponding with the provincial Juntas, which should thenceforward consist of four members each: these were to exist as long as the Council of Regency; and the Central Junta of Correspondence, as it was then to be called, only till the meeting of the Cortes, which Jovellanos maintained ought immediately to be announced as to assemble as soon as the enemy should have been driven out of Spain, or, at all events, in two years from the present time, if the delivery of the country should not be accomplished before. He proposed also that the Junta, before it resigned its powers, should appoint persons qualified for such a task to prepare plans of reform in the constitution, laws, finance, system of public instruction, army, and marine; . . these plans were

to be formed under the inspection and approbation of the Council of Regency and the Junta of Correspondence, and finally submitted to the Cortes. In delivering this advice, Jovellanos, to remove all suspicion of any interested views, repeated in writing the solemn declaration which he had before made by word of mouth, that he never would accept of any office or employment himself; the natural and invincible repugnance which he had ever felt for such preferment, the bitter price which he had paid for having once accepted it, in deference to a brother whom he respected like a parent, and the sad sense of decay both in his physical and moral powers, determined him to this resolution. The only duty which he would undertake to perform was the noble one of simply delivering those opinions which he thought most conducive to the good of his country, in discharge of the high trust wherewith his own province had honoured him.

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*Jovellanos  
Memoria,  
p. ii. § 33,  
34. Appen-  
dices, No. 5.*

Jovellanos expected the greatest benefit from a Cortes; but he apprehended great evil if it were hastily convoked, and without due preparation. That party who have since assumed the appellation of *Liberales* censured him for proposing to postpone it so long. They were then a very small, but active, minority, consisting chiefly of physicians, lawyers, and unbelieving priests, whose little knowledge, exclusively derived from prohibited French books, was worse than ignorance. These persons were for hurrying on to a jacobinical revolution, and were impatient for a

*Expecta-  
tions from  
a Cortes.*

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Cortes as the first great means of embodying that democracy which they expected to govern.

But there were also many of the best of the Spaniards who looked to the Cortes as the surest means of delivering their country, and restoring it to its former dignity and power; and the same views were very generally entertained in England, and by the British Government itself. In fact, the assembling of a Cortes had been proposed by our first authorized agent, Mr. Stuart, to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias. Some of the difficulties which would attend it were then perceived; the Asturians proposed that it should assemble at Oviedo, the Galicians at Villa Franca in the Bierzo, each Junta wishing that it should be convoked near their own place of abode; and for the purpose of retaining their power, they wished to enlarge the deputation, so that all their own members might be included. Though it was thus seen that the measure was not so easily accomplished as had been supposed, still the opinion prevailed in England, that if a free legislative assembly were established in Spain, the same blessings would ensue as the British people enjoy under the well-tempered constitution which has grown with their growth, and adapted itself to their circumstances. There are errors from which it is painful to be undeceived. Those persons were wiser in their generation, who, having the recent example of France before their eyes, believed that legislative assemblies, in countries unaccustomed to such modes of legislation, are

more to be dreaded than desired; that the re-  
 formation which is thus begun tends to certain  
 anarchy; and that where great and extensive im-  
 provements in the existing system are necessary,  
 the only means whereby they can be effected,  
 without inducing worse evils than those which  
 are removed, is by an upright and far-sighted  
 minister, under a strong government. Upon  
 this point Florida-Blanca judged more truly  
 than Jovellanos. Such, however, was the re-  
 spect with which the opinions of that admirable  
 man were at this time heard, that his proposal  
 would have been carried, if the Junta had come  
 to an immediate decision upon it; and it was  
 only by deferring the final discussion till Nov. 7,  
 being that day month, that the minority averted a  
 measure which shocked their prejudices as much  
 as it alarmed their fears.

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October.*Florida-  
Blanco  
averse to it.**Jovellanos  
Memoria,  
p. ii. § 35.*

The Junta were at this time full of hope; they  
 had just confidence in the national character; and  
 they were elated by the enthusiastic spirit which  
 had manifested itself, the splendid successes which  
 had been obtained, the apparent inactivity of the  
 enemy, and the promised co-operation of Great  
 Britain, which had already effected the delivery  
 of Portugal. They had also encouraging advices  
 from Catalonia. After relieving Figueras, the  
 French dispatched a force from that fortress to  
 get possession of Rosas, but failed in the at-  
 tempt. Ill armed, and worse disciplined as they  
 were, the Catalans displayed that unconquerable  
 spirit which in all ages has distinguished them.

*State of Ca-  
talonia.**July 16.*

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July.

In no other province were such great and continued exertions made against the invaders: and in no other province were the people left so entirely to their own resources. They made the most urgent solicitations to the Junta of Seville for a supply of artillery, which could have been spared in abundance from the arsenals of Seville and Cadiz, and which Lord Collingwood offered them the means of conveying; but they could obtain none, and were fain, therefore, to use the trunks of trees, bored, and hooped with iron. The want of cavalry was even more severely felt in all the level part of the country; . . no substitute could be found for this, nor was it possible that their volunteers and newly-raised levies could resist the well-disciplined horse-soldiers upon plain ground. They had, however, been eminently successful where the ground favoured them; and confiding in their numbers, they occupied the right bank of the Llobregat from San Boy to Martorell, in order to distress the enemy in Barcelona. From thence they were dislodged by General Lechi, who, marching out by night with 2500 men, forded the river in several places at daybreak, drove them from their batteries, sacked the towns and villages along the line, set fire to them, and returned in triumph, bearing as trophies the banners of the churches which had been plundered. Duhesme then resolved to undertake the siege of Gerona, having concerted it with Reille, who was to co-operate with him from Figueras. It was an object of great importance; for while

*Duhesme  
resolves to  
besiege  
Gerona.*

Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards, they would be able greatly to molest, if not wholly to interrupt, the communication by land between Barcelona and France. Materials of every kind were found in the well-stored arsenals and magazines of Barcelona, and the horses, mules, and carriages of the inhabitants of that city were put in requisition for conveying them. So sure of success was Duhesme, and so exasperated by his former failure, that he is said to have declared he would arrive before the city on one day, attack it the next, take it on the third day, and on the fourth destroy it.

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July.

*Cabañes, p.*  
*i. 80—85.*

He began his march on the 10th of July, with about 6000 men. From Barcelona to Gerona is a journey of twenty hours; but Duhesme had not calculated upon the obstacles which he was to encounter on the way. The road for two-thirds of the distance lies always within sight of the sea, and in great part along the coast; the Catalans, under D. Francisco Milans, had broken it up, and annoyed him with great activity on his left, while an English frigate, and some smaller vessels, brought their guns to bear upon him from the sea; these impediments delayed him five days between Caldetas and San Pol. On the 19th he divided his troops; one part crossed the wild mountains of Vallgorguina to S. Celoni, and endeavoured by a sudden attack to get possession of Hostalrich. Twice they attempted to escalate it, and were repulsed with loss by the acting governor D. Manuel O'Sullivan.

*Difficulties*  
*on the*  
*march.*

CHAP. XII. The other division continued the coast road, losing many guns and much of its ammunition

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July.

*Cabañas, i.  
85—87.*

there. They rejoined on the way to Gerona, and arrived before that city on the 22nd, where they were met on the following day by Reille with 2000 men from Figueras; but Duhesme had suffered so much on the march, that he was in no condition for active operations, and the remainder of the month was employed in preparing for the siege.

*Troops  
from Mi-  
norca land  
at Tarra-  
gona.*

On the very day that the French General appeared for the second time before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, with 4600 regular troops from Minorca, landed at Tarragona. Many officers, who had hitherto remained in Barcelona, and several magistrates, escaped now from that city to join it. The first measure of the Marques was to strengthen the line of the Llobregat, which the Somatenes and Miquelets, undismayed by their late defeat, had again occupied. The Conde de Caldagues was sent with a detachment upon this service, and the garrison, who made a vigorous attempt to dislodge him immediately on his arrival, were repulsed. The Catalans were now in high spirits, and with the assistance of Lord Cochrane, in the Imperieuse frigate, made a successful attack upon the Castle of Mongat, a small fort on the coast, about nine miles from Barcelona, which the French had strengthened, as a point of support for their plundering incursions to the eastward. About an hundred prisoners were taken there, seven pieces of can-

non, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores. The enemy could no longer maraud in that direction, and feeling great present inconvenience, began to apprehend serious consequences from the blockade of Barcelona: the British cruisers watched it effectually by sea, and in the only part of the land now open to them, which was the mountainous country in their immediate vicinity, between the Llobregat and the Besos, they had to contend with an armed and exasperated peasantry; for even those persons who would have remained quiet were driven to despair by the system of fire and sword which Duhesme pursued.

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August.

*Barcelona  
blockaded.*

*Cabañes, p.  
ii. 3—25.*

Barcelona, with its fort Monjuich, is one of the strongest places in Europe. It is remarked by Swinburne, that the citadel was calculated to overawe the inhabitants at least as much as to protect them from a foreign enemy. For this in fact it was built, when six hundred houses were demolished for its site; and to the same purpose it was now applied against the family which built it, when Buonaparte's perfidy had made the Bourbons as popular in Catalonia as they had been hated there during the war of the succession. Every house in Barcelona lies exposed to Monjuich, which stands singly on the south-west. A new fortress had been erected there early in Charles the Third's reign, and it had that completeness and magnificence which characterised public works in Spain. On the sea side it was considered impregnable, so admirably had the

*Barcelona.*



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natural strength of the situation been improved by art; and toward the land the glacis had been sloped at an incredible expense in such a manner that no approaches could be made under shelter. The population of Barcelona in 1797 was 130,000, and if the increase since had been in proportion to that of the ten years preceding, it must have amounted to 150,000 at this time. Yet this population, than which a braver and nobler-minded people were no where to be found, was kept under control by 4000 French, Lechi having been left with no greater force. The city was so completely at the mercy of the citadel and Monjuich, that the invaders had nothing to fear from open attacks. Their only danger was from stratagems or famine. Against the former they were always on their guard; and it was to open the communication for supplies and reinforcements from France that Duhesme had undertaken the expedition against Gerona.

*The Junta of Catalonia remove to the head-quarters.*

The Marques del Palacio arrived in Catalonia without treasure or provisions, and there was no government to which he could look for either. The contributions which had been raised had already been expended, and nothing was to be obtained by way of loan. A temporary resource was found in the confiscation of French property; for in these calamitous times the numerous French families who were settled in Spain bore their full share in the general misery and ruin. These funds, however, could not long suffice; and for the better establishment of some

permanent system, it was agreed that the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, which had hitherto resided at Lerida, should remove from that inconvenient situation, and accompany in future the head-quarters. The Junta was newly constituted accordingly, and the Commander-in-chief was chosen president. The Marques would now have marched to raise the siege of Gerona; but such means as he would have deemed adequate were wanting; he had no cavalry, the little which there was in Lerida and Tarragona was unfit for action, and perhaps he reasonably distrusted his troops if they were led against a well-disciplined army. Caldagues, however, was sent to harass the enemy and interrupt the siege, with four companies of regular troops, 2000 Miquelets and Somatens, and three pieces of artillery. He was joined at Hostalrich by more of these new levies, making his whole number 4300 men, and he received two cannon from that fortress. They advanced to Castella, passing within sight of the French encampment; some officers came out of the city to confer with the Count, and a joint attack upon the enemy's batteries was concerted for the following morning.

CHAP.  
XII.1808.  
August.*Caldagues  
sent to in-  
terrupt the  
siege of Ge-  
rona.**Cabañes, ii.  
30—32,  
52—55.*

This was on the night of the 15th; Duhesme had been so harassed in his operations, and so slow in them, that though he arrived before Gerona on the 19th of July, it was not till the morning of August 13 that his batteries began their fire. It was directed chiefly against the Castle, which, like that at Barcelona, bears the

*He attacks  
the enemy's  
batteries  
with suc-  
cess.*

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1808.  
*August.*

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name of Monjuich, and which, with all the other forts around Gerona, had been neglected, and was in a state of great dilapidation. On the 15th a considerable breach had been made. The garrison was then strengthened with 900 men, who were ordered to be ready at daybreak, and to sally as soon as the relieving troops should be ascending the hill of Monjuich; but instead of waiting for this, they sallied as soon as they saw them marching down the distant heights of St. Miguel and Los Angeles. The execution therefore was as rash as the plan, and certainly few attempts in war have ever been made in which there was so little reasonable prospect of success. The besieging army consisted of 11,000 men, of which 1000 were cavalry, all disciplined soldiers, upon whom their officers could rely. There were 4700 regular troops in Gerona, who, for want of discipline, were not to be relied on in the field; and of the force which Caldagues had now collected, amounting to 6000, there were but 300 regulars. But Duhesme was at this time too much dispirited by the general prospect of affairs in Spain, and the reverses which he himself had suffered, to be sensible of his own superiority, or to profit by the errors of his opponents. One battery was taken at the point of the bayonet in this premature sally, and presently set on fire. A second also was stormed; the French, who had been driven from it, recovered it, being reinforced by a Swiss battalion; but a column of the Spaniards arrived in time to assist their coun-

trymen, and it was again taken, and the carriages burnt. D. Henrique O'Donell, who held the rank of *Sargento Mayor* in the regiment of Ultonia, distinguished himself greatly in this part of the action. The destruction of these batteries was the object for which Caldagues had hazarded an attack upon an enemy so greatly superior in strength. His own troops, meantime, drove the French from the heights of S. Miguel to the village of Camp-Dura; from thence they, in their turn, were driven back to the heights, and being there reinforced, made the enemy again give way before them, dislodged them from Camp-Dura, and pursued them till they crossed the river Ter to Sarria.

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August.

*Cabañes, ii.*  
55—62.

Caldagues dispatched news of his victory from the field of battle to Tarragona, saying that the enemy's batteries were demolished, and all the artillery taken with which they had battered Monjuich in breach. All that he had hoped, and more than he could reasonably have expected, had been obtained; and when his troops, flushed with success, would have exposed themselves in the plain to the French cavalry, he restrained them, ordered them to fortify themselves upon the heights, and exerted himself to repair the breach in Monjuich, lest it should be attacked in the morning. Duhesme indeed might have recovered in the night the positions which he had lost, so little discipline was there among the Spaniards, and so little watch or order was observed, notwithstanding the strict injunctions of

*Duhesme*  
*raises the*  
*siege.*

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August.

*Marshal  
Gouvion  
St. Cyr,  
Pieces Jus-  
tif. No. 3.  
Cabañes, ii.  
62—81.*

*Unpopu-  
larity of  
the com-  
mander  
in Cata-  
lonia.*

the Commander. But Duhesme appears to have been one of those men who lose their powers of mind when good fortune forsakes them; and Caldagues, when day broke, and he was expecting a formidable attack, discovered, to his astonishment, that the enemy had disappeared. They had fled, rather than retreated, in the night, and in such haste, that they left several hundred barrels of powder which they might with ease have rolled into the river. Reille returned to Figueras with little loss, there being no impediment in that direction; but Duhesme, who did not venture a second time upon the coast road, when he reached Calella took a line between the high mountains and the sea, throwing his artillery down the precipices, and abandoning great part of the baggage and stores, and even leaving the sick and wounded who were not able to sit on horseback. The retreat was made with such precipitation, that Milans, who pursued, did not come up with them till they were within seven miles of Barcelona, on the heights of Mongat. But Lechi being, fortunately for them, apprised by a spy of their approach, met them there with part of the garrison, at a time when a small Spanish force might have completed their destruction.

An outcry was raised against Palacio because he had not intercepted the enemy in their retreat, nor was he ever forgiven by the unreasonable people for not having done what it was impossible to do. When the account from the field of

battle reached him at Tarragona, the French were half way to Barcelona; and before he was apprised that they had broken up the siege, they were already in that city. The command which he had undertaken was no enviable one. The repulse of the enemy at Valencia, their losses in Andalusia, and the heroic defence of Zaragôza, had raised hopes which nothing but the most brilliant success could satisfy; the service in which he was engaged required great steadiness and military skill; the best of his troops were wanting in both, and the great body of them fit only for irregular war. The Junta of Catalonia had decreed that an army of 40,000 men should be raised; and because there were no officers to command, and no time for disciplining them, they determined that the whole force should consist of Miquelets. This class of irregular troops was originally called \* Almogavares; but when they began to alter their savage appearance and barbarous mode of warfare, they took their present name from one of their favourite commanders, Miquelot de Prats, a notable partizan who attached himself to Cæsar Borgia. The name was popular among the Catalans, the Miquelets having distinguished themselves whenever the country was invaded, and especially in

CHAP.  
XII.1808.  
August.*Cabañes*, ii.  
101.*Difficulties  
of the ser-  
vice.**D. Fr. Ma-  
noel Hist.  
de Cataluña,  
l. iv. p. 90.*

\* An account of them may be found in the notes to the Chronicle of the Cid, pp. 141 and 418. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr says of the present Miquelets, that they are the best light troops in Europe (p. 54.) But Cabañes ar-

gues that they cannot possibly be so efficient as they were when war was carried on less scientifically, and he regrets that it was not possible to raise regular regiments in their stead. P. i. 90.

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*Cabañes, i.*  
90—93.

the succession war. It was intended to raise forty *tercios* of a thousand men each, and this might have been done in a few days, such was the national spirit, if equipments of every kind had not been wanting. A great bounty was given to these Miquelets, but this prevented recruiting for the line, and the regular troops were disgusted at seeing that men received larger pay for engaging in a service where they had more liberty, and were subject to less discipline. On the other hand, the Miquelet officers received less pay than those of the army, and were less esteemed, their rank being only during the war. The force which was thus defective in its constitution, was also ill armed. Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon whom pressing demands for arms were made from all that side of the peninsula, could allot but few to Catalonia; and the abundant supplies which had been sent out by England were dispatched to other parts, where they were neither so much wanted nor so well bestowed; for Barcelona was the great arsenal of the province: 50,000 firelocks had there fallen into the enemy's hands, whereas the manufactory at Ripoll could furnish the Catalans with not more than 150 per week. Palacio therefore ordered pikes or partisans to be made, with which he armed the two foremost ranks of the Miquelets, who, as upon the old system, were drawn up three deep. In hands that can be trusted with the bayonet the pike would be a weapon hardly less efficient; but for these raw troops the want of

fire-arms lessened the little confidence which they felt in themselves when they were brought to encounter soldiers as well disciplined as armed. Even the regular troops knew their own inferiority in the art of war. They were incapable of manœuvring in the face of an enemy; for so greatly had their discipline been neglected while no danger was apprehended, that they had gone through none of the rehearsals by which soldiers are prepared for real action; mere drilling seems to have been all the instruction they had received.

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*Cabañes, ii.*  
130—132.*Cabañes, i.*  
78.

With this force, as ill officered as it was ill provided in all other respects, the Marques removed his head-quarters to Villa-franca, to maintain the line of the Llobregat, and take advantage of any opportunity for recovering Barcelona while the blockade was kept up. An expectation that something would be attempted by the inhabitants seems to have influenced the Spaniards to this measure, otherwise ill judged. The recovery of Barcelona was indeed an object of the greatest importance; but weakened as Duhesme then was, a few thousand Miquelets, with the armed population, would have sufficed to prevent the incursions of the garrison, and the Spaniards should have taken their post on the Pluvia instead of the Llobregat, with the Ter for their second position, and Gerona and Hostalrich to support them, . . . there they could best have impeded the efforts which the French would make for relieving and securing to themselves the

*The Mar-  
quis ap-  
proaches  
Barcelona.  
Sept. 1.**Marshal  
Gouvion  
St. Cyr,  
280.*



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*British  
troops or-  
dered from  
Sicily, but  
detained  
there by the  
commander.*

*Cubañes, ii.  
129.*

strongest place in Spain. A British force might here have rendered the most essential service. Deputies from the Junta of Catalonia were sent to Madrid, to consult with the Council of Generals there upon the affairs of the province; and in the hope of obtaining British aid one of them proceeded to Lisbon to confer with Sir Hew Dalrymple. All that could be done in that quarter was effected; the Spanish troops in Lisbon were embarked for Catalonia; and the British Government, sensible of what might be effected there by timely measures, ordered thither 10,000 men from the army at that time stationed in Sicily. But a feint of invading Sicily was made by Murat, who had succeeded Joseph Buonaparte as Intrusive King of Naples; and the troops were detained in an inactive and unworthy service, when they ought to have been co-operating for the most important ends with one of the finest and bravest people in the world. At no other time or place during the whole war could such a body of English troops have been employed to so much effect as at this time in Catalonia. Some petty jealousies or idle forms had hitherto deprived the Catalans also of cavalry when it might have been most useful. There was a regiment of hussars in Majorca, for which the Junta repeatedly applied, and its applications were earnestly enforced by the British officers who were in communication with that island; but it was not till after a series of frivolous and vexatious delays that they were embarked at length in the

beginning of October; and a detachment of them had not reached the Llobregat more than twenty-four hours before they were led to intercept the enemy at S. Culgat, on their return to Barcelona from a marauding expedition. Not expecting to be attacked by cavalry, the French were taken by surprise; they suffered a considerable loss, and from that time confined their incursions within narrower bounds. The troops from Portugal soon afterwards arrived; reinforcements also came from Valencia and Majorca; Palacio was removed from the command, because of the unpopularity which he had incurred, and was succeeded by D. Juan Miguel de Vives.

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*September.*

*Cabañes, ii.  
161.*

The want of military knowledge and military talent was never more severely felt in any country than in Spain at this momentous crisis. It could not be doubted that Buonaparte was preparing to bring against the Spaniards that tremendous force which none of the continental powers had hitherto been able to withstand. If he seemed to delay, it was only that the preparations might be more complete; sure, meantime, that neither Spain nor England knew at that time how to profit by the interval, and that very probably disunion might arise among the Spaniards themselves, of which he might take advantage. The French had paid dearly for the error of dividing their forces, and advancing where they had no point of support; they were now in strong positions, receiving reinforcements from time to time, and waiting in security till

*Bilbao occupied by  
the French.*

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Buonaparte should come in person to complete the subjugation of Spain, which they, as well as the tyrant himself, believed could not be averted by any human interference. About the middle of August they sent a detachment to take possession of Bilbao, a beautiful but defenceless city, commanded on every side by its hanging gardens. The inhabitants, inferior in number, ill armed, and without any works to protect them, made a brave resistance, in revenge for which the French committed great enormities when they entered the town: had they arrived a few hours later, they would have got possession of arms, ammunition, and money from England, which were just entering the harbour.

*Difficulties  
in bringing  
the Spanish  
armies into  
the field.*

A full sense of their danger, when the whole wrong which was intended them was avowed, had roused the Spaniards to their first great and successful exertions. After their victorious troops had entered Madrid, they were less alive to the danger, and more sensible of the embarrassments of their situation. Sudden efforts, directed by the emergency which called them forth, would no longer avail. Foresight and combination were required for extensive operations; and these were thwarted by selfish views, and still more by capricious or obstinate tempers, which in this state of general insubordination there was nothing to restrain. The Galician army under Blake, having the plains of Castille before them, could not advance without cavalry in the face of an enemy who had from three to five thousand dragoons;

and Cuesta would not send his cavalry to act under Blake, because of his quarrel with that General and with the Junta of Galicia. The Extremaduran army, from a similar feeling of pride, was kept vapouring before Elvas, while it was called for by all the authorities at Madrid. A more vexatious impediment was interposed by the Junta of Seville. That Board had thought proper, when the army in Andalusia was first raised, for one of its members to accompany the Commander-in-chief, that no injury might arise from delay in consulting the civil authority, and perhaps also to rid themselves of Tilly, who was the person appointed. When, to their disgrace, they elected this man to the Central Junta, D. Andres Miñano was deputed to the army in his stead, with a salary of a thousand dollars per month; but public opinion at Seville was so strongly expressed against this misapplication of the public money, and supported by so many members, especially by the Archbishop, that the allowance was reduced one half. The whole was a needless expense, for the Junta was still so tenacious of their authority, that this representative was a mere agent to execute their pleasure, and not to determine upon his own judgement. They sent positive orders that the army of Andalusia should not advance beyond Madrid; and knowing that Castaños had delivered his opinion strongly upon the impropriety of regarding any army as belonging to its own province instead of the kingdom at large,

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they let him know, that if these instructions were disobeyed he should not be supplied with money.

At this time the French had driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and pushed forward to Borja; the troops which were opposed to them in that quarter falling back upon Zaragoza. Pressing demands for support came from Palafox: the Generals who were at Madrid saw that the Andalusian army ought to advance without delay, and this it could not do without money. This matter was taken up warmly by the British agents at Madrid and Seville; and as the Junta of that city had received two millions of dollars from the British Government, a strong remonstrance was presented to them upon their present conduct, and they were called upon to apply it to the public service without delay. Their reply, which, like all their papers, was written with great ability, would have been satisfactory, if they had not passed over in silence their orders that Castaños should not advance. They argued, that after all that Andalusia had done, it was to be expected that La Mancha and the other provinces which the Andalusian army was gone to protect, would provide for it while it was employed in their service. The sums which they had received from Great Britain had been sent expressly to them, as other sums had to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias, who had neither incurred such expenses, nor contributed such aid to other parts of Spain. But upon this matter they waived all discussion; . . they answered the

bills which an English agent at Madrid had negotiated for the use of their army, authorized Castaños to draw on them according to his wants, and immediately sent forward 200,000 dollars. This was just before the meeting of the Central Junta: the Andalusian army was then advanced to Soria; the Valencian under General Llamas moved to Zaragoza, and Blake toward Miranda upon the Ebro.

One of the first things which Castaños had requested after he had opened a communication with Gibraltar was, that dispatches might be forwarded to Romana, who commanded the Spanish troops in the Baltic. He expressed the greatest anxiety concerning him and his army, who had been thus treacherously removed to so great a distance from their own country, but at the same time the fullest confidence in them and their Commander. He judged of the men as Spaniards, of the General by his individual character. D. Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marques de la Romana, was a man whose happy nature had resisted all the evil and debilitating influences of the age and country and rank in which he was born. His public career was begun in the navy; but having attained the rank of *Capitan de Fragata*, he quitted that profession for the land service, a change not unfrequent in Spain. During the French revolutionary war he served under his uncle, D. Ventura Caro, who commanded on the Biscayan frontier; and having distinguished himself there, was made General of division in the

*The Mar-  
ques de la  
Romana.*

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army of Catalonia, under Urrutia, where he continued to be conspicuous for his good conduct.

When that miserably miscondacted war was concluded by a scandalous peace, Romana devoted part of his leisure to the theory of his profession, which he was the better able to study as having received an excellent education, and made the best use of it. And so evenly did he steer his course, that without in the slightest degree courting the favour of Godoy, or sullyng himself by any condescension, he never became an object of his persecution; a singular instance of good fortune in those disgraceful times, or rather of what may be effected by undeviating rectitude and good sense. For he possessed a rare union of frankness and perfect prudence; and while his own breast wore no disguise, and needed none, could read with unerring intuition the characters of others. There was in his manners that simplicity which is the sure indication of generosity and goodness, and which wins confidence while it commands respect. Spain, where honour is the characteristic virtue of the nation, where so many heroic and illustrious men have arisen, has never produced a man more excellently brave, more dutifully devoted to his country, more free from all taint of selfishness, more truly noble than Romana.

*Distribution of his troops in the Baltic.*

The force under his command consisted of about 14,000 men. They were marched to Ham-  
burgh in Aug. 1807, and quartered there, along  
the Elbe and at Lubeck, as part of the army under

Marshal Bernadotte, then Prince of Ponte Corvo. It was reported that this army was to invade Sweden, in conjunction with the Danes, and the Spanish division was put in motion accordingly about the middle of March. But when the vanguard, having safely crossed the Little Belt to the Isle of Funen, was preparing for the passage of the Great Belt, they were prevented by the appearance of an English frigate and brig between Nyeborg and Corsoer, at a season when it was thought no enemy's vessels would venture into those seas. The remainder of the troops therefore were of necessity ordered to halt, and were quartered in Sleswic, till they should be able to effect the passage. The Prince Christian Frederick, of seventy-four guns, was sent to clear the Great Belt of these enemies, but falling in with the *Statelý* and the *Nassau*, was captured, after a severe action, close to the shore of Zealand. Bernadotte, who had crossed to that island a few hours only before the English cruisers appeared, was now, in order to return to his headquarters at Odensee, obliged to go round the Isles of Falster and Laland, land in Sleswic, travel to Kolding, and from thence cross the Little Belt. Watching their opportunity, as they could during the months of April, May, and June, some of these troops got to the Isle of Langeland; and some succeeded in effecting by night the passage of the Great Belt from Funen to Zealand, the greater number still remaining in Funen, or upon the coast of Jutland.



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*Their conduct when the oath of allegiance to Joseph was proposed.*

The French journals affirmed that these troops had taken the oath of allegiance to the Intruder with unanimous enthusiasm. No man who knew the Spanish character believed this falsehood. They were in a situation where they were cut off from all communication with their own country, and where no intelligence could reach them but what came through the French press, or other channels equally under the control of the French government. Nevertheless in these garbled and falsified accounts they saw enough to convince them that their countrymen were not submitting to a foreign dominion so easily as the tyrant endeavoured to represent. This opinion was confirmed when a dispatch arrived from Urquijo to Romana, requiring the army to take the oath to the Intrusive King, that dispatch being the only paper which the courier brought; . . it was plain, therefore, that private letters were intercepted, and that something must have occurred of which it was important that they should be kept in ignorance. When the oath was proposed, it was taken without much demur by the troops in Jutland under D. Juan Kindelan, the second in command. Those in Funen, with the Commander, refused it vehemently at first, but took it at length conditionally, that is to say, with a protestation that it was to be null if the changes which had occurred in Spain were not confirmed by the general consent of the nation. The regiments of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which were in Zeeland, were less placable; being under the

immediate command of a Frenchman, General Frerion, they attacked his house, killed one of his aids-de-camp, and wounded another, and he himself only escaped with life by disguising himself, and flying to Copenhagen. The men then planted their colours, knelt round them, and swore to be faithful to their country.

The British Government meantime had not been inactive. The first difficulty was how to communicate with the Spanish Commander. A Roman-catholic priest, by name Robertson, was found willing to undertake this dangerous service, and qualified for it by his skill as a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other credentials might probably have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote connected with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission. During Mr. Frere's residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was an accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gestes of the Cid, as the most animated and highly poetical, as well as the most ancient and curious poem in the language. One day he happened to call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a conjectural emendation in one of the \* lines; Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated with his friend the British Ambassador. Mr.

*An agent  
sent to com-  
municate  
with him.*

\* Aun vea el hora que vos *merezca* dos tanto. V. 2348, p. 318. Mr. Frere proposed to read *merezcades*.

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Mackenzie was sent with Robertson to Heligoland, there to provide means for landing him on the continent, and to make farther arrangements as circumstances might direct.

*He asks for  
a force to  
cover his  
retreat.*

The war with the Northern powers, and the interdict against British goods, had given the miserable island of Heligoland an importance at this time which it had never before possessed. Upon Mr. Mackenzie's arrival, an embargo was placed on the shipping there, and Robertson was dispatched in a boat to land on the nearest shore; but so vigilant a watch was kept wherever this might have been possible, that after three days he returned to the island, convinced there was no hope of accomplishing his errand unless he were provided with a passport. Fortunately a vessel belonging to the port of Bremen had recently been captured, and carried into Heligoland. Mr. Mackenzie sent for the master, and proposed to liberate him and his ship if he would engage to procure a passport for Robertson at Bremen. It happened to be in the man's power to redeem himself and his property upon these easy terms, for he had a near relation in office in that city. The engagement was faithfully performed; and Robertson, whose appearance was quite German, and who assumed the character of a schoolmaster, found his way to Romana. That noble Spaniard was greatly agitated at learning the real situation of his country; the success in Andalusia, the deliverance of Zaragoza, and the retreat of the Intruder from Madrid, were

not known in England at the time of Robertson's departure; but he did not hesitate a moment. Their conversation was in Latin; and Robertson was sent back with a request that Mackenzie would proceed to the Baltic, and procure the assistance of as many troops as might be necessary to cover the retreat and embarkation of the Spaniards. Ten thousand British troops, under Sir J. Moore, had been sent to Gottenburg in the month of May, to co-operate with the Swedes. It was this aid that Romana required.

This information was immediately communicated to the British Government, and within a week Mr. Mackenzie received letters for Sir John Moore, directing him to employ the troops in this service. Instead of sending these dispatches, he thought it better to carry them, and confer with that Commander in person, but when he reached Gottenburg the expedition had sailed for England. Having left Heligoland without permission, he now attempted to return thither, and for that purpose embarked in the packet. A gale of wind drove it on the Danish coast. A privateer, carrying sixteen guns, and well manned, came out, expecting an easy capture; inferior as the English were, both in men and guns, a fight of four hours was supported, till the Dane put his ship about, and the packet returned to Gottenburgh in a shattered state. Baffled in this intent, he thought his better course would be to make for the fleet in the Baltic, and acquaint the Admiral with the disposition of the Spaniards.

*Sir Richard  
Keats goes  
upon this  
service.*

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Travelling therefore with all speed to Ystad, he there found a Swedish vessel, which conveyed him to Sir James Saumarez's ship the Victory; and upon his representations Sir James, without waiting for instructions, ordered Admiral Sir Richard Keats, with part of his squadron, to the Great Belt, there to act in concert with Romana. While they were preparing, orders for the performance of this service arrived. A Spaniard attached to the embassy in London came out with the dispatches, bringing letters from the Junta of Galicia, and from individuals to Romana and the second in command.

*Plan for  
collecting  
the Spanish  
troops.*

It was of great importance that Romana's determination should be kept secret as long as possible, lest the French and the Danes, who were but too ready to have acted with them, should overpower his dispersed forces. A young Spanish officer crossing from Zeeland to Langeland was taken by this squadron; the letters were intrusted to him, he was secretly put on shore in Langeland, and from thence crossed to Funen. Such a messenger, it was thought, would not excite suspicion. Admiral Keats proposed that the troops in Funen should secure themselves in a peninsula on the north side of that island, from whence, if necessary, they might be removed to the small island of Romsoe. The Danish gunboats would be rendered inactive if Romana was able, and should think proper, to seize on the town and port of Nyborg; but this the Admiral thought would endanger the troops in Zeeland

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and Jutland, by provoking the Danes to act as enemies, when otherwise it might be hoped they would be disposed secretly to favour the quiet removal of the Spaniards, or at least to make no serious efforts for impeding it. There was little probability that any negotiation for their peaceable departure would be successful, subservient as the court of Denmark was to the policy of France; but after the movement should have commenced, a declaration of the honourable and unoffending object in view might be advantageous. The two regiments in Zeeland, it was proposed, should attempt to force their way to the peninsula near Corsoer; if they succeeded in this, they might probably defend the isthmus there, till they could be removed to the little island of Sproe, half way between Corsoer and Nyborg. There were four regiments in Jutland, distributed at Aarhus, Ebeltoft, Greenaae, Randers, Hobroe, Mariager, and some as high as Aalborg on the Gulf of Limefiord. Orders were sent to these that they should take possession of such vessels as they could find at Randers, Aarhus, Fredericia, and Snogoe, and make their way to Funen.

It was scarcely possible that these movements could be concerted without exciting suspicion, prepared as the French officers and the Danish Government were to expect some such attempt, and especially after the manner in which the regiments in Zeeland had expressed their national feeling. The French Commandant in Langeland

*Romana  
takes pos-  
session of  
Nyborg.*

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discovered that the officer who had passed from thence to Funen had communicated with the English ships. When Romana understood this, he doubted not but that the French in Holstein and Sleswic would be brought up by forced marches; and as there were more than 3000 Danish troops in Funen, he thought it necessary to take possession of Nyborg without delay. The garrison were too weak to resist, and no violence or incivility was offered: the concerted signal was then made to Admiral Keats, who had hoisted his flag the preceding day in the *Superb* off that town; and he dispatched a letter to the Governor, assuring him, that notwithstanding the state of war between England and Denmark, it was his wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, provided no opposition were made to the embarkation of the Spaniards. While this was going on, he must co-operate with those troops, and consequently often communicate with the town of Nyborg; but the strictest orders had been given that all under his command should observe the utmost civility toward the inhabitants. If, however, the Spaniards were opposed, he must, however reluctantly, take measures which might occasion the destruction of the town.

*The entrance of the British squadron is resisted.*

The Danish garrison had yielded to circumstances; but an armed brig and cutter, which were moored across the harbour, rejected all the pacific offers both of the Spaniards and English, and even the remonstrances of their own coun-

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trymen; such small vessels and boats as could be collected were sent against them, and they were captured after half an hour's resistance and some waste of lives. Romana had been careful that no act of hostility should be committed by his people, except what was absolutely necessary for securing their embarkation; but some of them, now irritated at the obstinacy with which their friends and deliverers were opposed, fired a few shots at the Danish ships from the batteries before they struck. Admiral Keats then wrote a second time to the Governor, saying, that as his entrance into the harbour had been resisted, he was bound by no law or usage to respect the property of the inhabitants. The Spaniards had occasion for some of the vessels in that port, and unless the masters and crews would assist in equipping and navigating them, he could not secure them from injury; if they would, he pledged himself to do so, and to grant them passports to return in safety, after the short service for which they were required should be ended.

On the same day that Nyborg was thus taken possession of, the Spaniards, who were at Svendborg, which is at the southern extremity of Funen, got possession of some gun-boats, that might otherwise have prevented their passage, and crossed to Langeland. The regiment of Zamora on the same day also arrived from Ebeltoft and Greenaae at Middlefahrt; and starting from that place at ten on the same night, performed the

*Arrival of  
some of the  
regiments  
from Jut-  
land.*



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march to Nyborg in twenty-one hours, a distance of more than fifty English miles. The regiment which made this prodigious exertion for the sake of returning to assist in the deliverance of Spain, was one of those which the French papers described as having displayed the greatest satisfaction at the accession of the Intruder! The troops which were at Hobroe and Mariager, and those at Aarhus, succeeded also in embarking, and arrived safely in the port of Nyborg. The two regiments in Zeeland were unable to escape; three of the battalions had previously been disarmed for their conduct when the oath was proposed to them, and the others were now surrounded by Danish troops: and there still remained three cavalry regiments and one of infantry, in Jutland, of which, and of the officers sent to them, no account had been received. While the troops were embarking on board such vessels as were in the port of Nyborg, one of these regiments arrived.

*They leave  
the Isle of  
Funen.*

The British Admiral had been at first of opinion, that if the troops in Langeland felt themselves safe, it would be better to land all the others there, from whence they might be removed at leisure. The possession of Langeland had now been secured, but Nyborg was an insecure position; it was reported that some thousand French had collected upon the shores of the Little Belt; and these, with the Danes in Funen, and the garrison of Nyborg, might seriously impede the embarkation from that town,

or perhaps succeed in cutting off the rear-guard. It was judged expedient, therefore, to spike the guns there, and remove the troops to a neck of land called Slipshavn, about a league distant; and from thence they were shipped with as much expedition as the unfavourable weather permitted.

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Two of the regiments which had been quartered in Funen were cavalry, mounted on the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses. It was impracticable to bring off these horses, about 1100 in number; and Romana was not a man who could order them to be destroyed lest they should fall into the hands of the French: he was fond of horses himself, and knew that every man was attached to the beast which had carried him so far, and so faithfully. Their bridles, therefore, were taken off, and they were turned loose upon the beach. As they moved off, they passed some of the country horses and mares, which were feeding at a little distance. A scene ensued such as probably never before was witnessed. The Spanish horses are not mutilated, and these were sensible that they were no longer under any restraint of human power. A general conflict ensued, in which, retaining the discipline that they had learnt, they charged each other in squadrons of ten or twenty together; then closely engaged, striking with their fore-feet, and biting and tearing each other with the most ferocious rage, and trampling over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and dis-

*Fate of the  
horses.*

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abled. Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance; and they no sooner heard the roar of the battle than they came thundering down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness, plunged into the fight with equal fury. Sublime as the scene was, it was too horrible to be long contemplated, and Romana, in mercy, gave orders for destroying them; but it was found too dangerous to attempt this; and after the last boats quitted the beach, the few horses that remained were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual \* destruction.

Aug. 11.  
*The Spaniards are landed in the Isle of Langeland.*

On the second morning all were safely on board, but the wind detained them in the harbour; and there, on the evening of that day, the regiment from Aarhus joined them, in four vessels, which they had seized. The one at Randers did not succeed in making its escape. The south part of Langeland was in possession of the Spaniards. As soon as the wind permitted, their fellow-soldiers were landed there. The whole number was about 9000 men, with some 230

Aug. 13.

women and children. Stores and water were to be laid in for their voyage to Gottenburg. The Danish Governor, General Ahlefeldt, agreed not to molest them, and withdrew his troops to the northern part of the island, promising, that if any French were known to arrive in Funen, he

\* I give this remarkable story (vol. i. 294,) where it is related from that very meritorious journal, 'The Plain Englishman,' by the editor on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself.

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would then deliver up their arms. It was thought necessary to demand them the ensuing day, upon a rumour that this had occurred; and also because a body of Danish cavalry had appeared as if observing the Spaniards for some military view; and because the escape of the French Commandant had been facilitated by the General. Some of the troops refused to obey, a detachment was therefore marched against them to enforce obedience, and this demonstration of force was sufficient. They took the horses also, having only about 200 of their own, which had been brought from Svendborg; but they voluntarily promised that these arms and horses, and whatever else belonged to the Danes, should be left upon the beach at their departure. Some robberies, which a few of the men committed, were instantly punished, and restitution made; and a just price was fixed for the provisions which were demanded: they were supplied, therefore, without reluctance. Meat was in abundance, but there was a difficulty in obtaining bread; and the water lay at a distance from the shore, . . . a thousand men, and all the carriages that could be procured, were employed in conveying it. Their situation was still an anxious one: an attack was to be apprehended from the opposite port of Svendborg; it was known that the Danes could collect as many as four-and-twenty gunboats there, and the channel would not admit of frigates to defend it: a flotilla, indeed, came out from thence one night, and kept up an idle can-

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nonade upon the Spanish encampment. It was reported that French troops had arrived there, and of this no certain information could be obtained, for not a peasant in Langeland could be induced by the offer of any reward to go and ascertain the fact; an instance of national honour which may more than counterbalance the unworthy conduct of the Danish Government at this time. That the French were not inactive was certain. Proclamations from Bernadotte were introduced into the camp, endeavouring to deceive the Spaniards with regard to the state of affairs in their own country, to excite suspicion of the English, and to make them arrest their leaders; but these papers provoked only the contempt which they deserved.

*They sail  
for Gotten-  
burg, and  
there em-  
bark for  
Spain.  
Aug. 18.*

On the sixth day after their landing Admiral Saumarez arrived, and in three days more, every thing being ready, the troops were re-embarked. The arms and horses which they had taken from the Danes were left in the batteries. Before they departed a flag of truce was sent to Copenhagen, requiring, on the part of their Commander, that the regiments which were detained should be allowed to depart. The vessels from Aarhus, being manned by Danes, were supplied by the British Admiral with stores for eight days, and released. Those from Nyborg were manned from the fleet, and an offer was made to send them back from Gottenburg with the crews of two Danish vessels which had been captured, provided the Danes would release an equal

number of British prisoners in exchange. But these measures were not met with a corresponding temper by the Danish Government, and the convoy was fired at as it passed the battery of Slipshavn. They reached Gottenburg in safety; and the Spaniards there received the first intelligence of the successes which their countrymen had obtained. They were landed, for the sake of health and comfort, upon the islands in the harbour; transports from England arrived in a few days, and this little army then sailed for their own country, full of ardour, . . . to lay down their lives in its defence.

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While the convoy proceeded on its voyage to Coruña, Romana landed in England, for the purpose of consulting with the British Government. It was there determined that his force should be disembarked at Santander, to be incorporated with the Galician army; and to avoid all immediate difficulty concerning its support, the existing armies in the present disorganized state of Spain being raised and subsisted by their respective provinces. Great Britain undertook to pay and feed it for two months, by which time it was supposed the Central Junta would be ready to perform this part of its duties. These were troops on whose discipline and courage entire reliance might be placed; and Romana's intention was to triple the infantry, by forming upon each battalion a regiment of three. And as it was designed that a British army should advance to bear its part in the first brunt of the great contest, the intention

*Romana  
lands in  
England.*

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*Error of  
the Span-  
iards in  
not appoint-  
ing a Com-  
mander-in-  
chief.*

*Difficulty  
of feeding  
their  
armies.*

was, that, if possible, it should act with Romana on the left flank, and Castaños on its right. With both these officers it was justly thought the service might proceed in the true spirit of confidence and good will; the reputation of both stood deservedly high, and their disposition was even of more importance, when operations were to be carried on by concert between the generals, not by a paramount and controlling command. For, by a strange error, the Spanish Government had resolved to make the commands independent of each other. This error seems to have been committed less from want of judgement than in deference to the provincial Juntas, and in fear of offending them; yet at that time public opinion would have supported them had they appointed Castaños commander-in-chief.

It was not, however, the abilities of any single general, however pre-eminent, which could have saved the Spanish armies, constituted as they then were, from inevitable defeat, unless a strong British force had been ready to have acted with them. Preparations upon an adequate scale had been promised and intended by the Central Government; but when they had raised men and embodied them, the difficulty of maintaining them occurred, a difficulty which has at all times been greater in Spain than in any other civilized country. Our own commissariat was then far from effective; for great experience, as well as great activity and talents, are required in the business of providing an army: it is not then

to be wondered at that the Spaniards, under their complicated embarrassments, should have been grievously defective in this main branch of the military art; but this was one cause why the number of their armies fell far short of their computed force, many young recruits returning to their homes, when they saw how miserably they fared in the camp. It would have been most desirable to have followed up the first successes with vigour, and have attacked the enemy while the impression made upon them by so many humiliating failures was fresh, and before farther reinforcements should enable them to resume the offensive. But this had not been possible. The French were strongly posted, and well provided with all the means of war; and their cavalry gave them complete command of the plains of Castille. They had ravaged the land from Burgos to Astorga, and driven in contributions from the very gates of the latter city. Blake could oppose no resistance to them in that open country without cavalry, and for want of that essential arm was obliged to alter his intended plan of operations, and pursue, at considerable risk, a different course. He resolved to take a position between Bilbao and Vitoria, and menace the right flank and rear of the French, while the army of Aragon should act on their left.

Bilbao had remained a month in possession of the enemy; it was then retaken by the Marques de Portazgo, and if his advanced posts had not

*Bilbao  
taken and  
retaken.  
Sept. 20.*



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begun to fire too soon, the garrison might have been surprised and made prisoners. After an action of three or four hours they effected their retreat, losing some 400 men. But considerable bodies of French had now passed the Pyrenees; and Marshal Ney, who came at this time to take the chief command till Buonaparte himself should arrive, feigning to retreat upon Vitoria for the purpose of deceiving Portazgo, suddenly marched with the centre of his army upon Bilbao. The Marquis drew off in time, without losing a man or a gun, and took up a position at Valmaseda. There he was joined by a detachment of the Galician army, and Blake immediately made preparations to recover the city; but General Merlin, whom Ney had left to command there, knew that the place was not tenable against a superior force, and evacuated it on the night of Oct. 11.

*Position of  
the armies  
in October.*

The French force at that time amounted to about 60,000; and the Spanish Generals knew, by an intercepted dispatch, that 72,000 more would enter Spain before the middle of November. The Spaniards were nominally 130,000, but the effective number was very far short of this. With the left or western army Blake occupied a line from Burgos to Bilbao. The eastern army, that of Aragon and Valencia, under Palafox, was stationed, part near Zaragoza, and part was as far advanced as Sangüessa, on the left of the enemy, outflanking them on that side, as Blake did on the west. The head-quarters of the central army,

under Castaños, were at Soria; .. so that the whole formed a crescent. The Spaniards now began to experience the ruinous effects of that false policy which had exaggerated their successes and their strength, and had represented the final deliverance of the country as an event soon and certainly to be looked for. This delusion made the people clamorous for the accomplishment of their expectations, and the government itself either partook or yielded to this impatience. The wise precautions with which the Junta of Seville began the war were disregarded, and the Central Junta called upon the Generals to hasten their operations. However strong, they said, might have been the reasons for delay, loss of time had already proved injurious, and must be more so if the enemy should receive their expected reinforcements. An end therefore must be put to this inactivity. And, as if dissatisfied with their generals, they appointed D. Francisco Palafox to go as their representative to the armies, with the Marques de Coupigni and the Conde de Montijo under him. He was to be received with the same honours as a Captain-General of the army, to confer with the Commanders, concert operations with them, and himself decide upon the plan of attack. Another reason for this mission was, that Castaños and Palafox differed totally in opinion concerning the measures which ought to be pursued. The latter was eager for action, because he believed that every thing might be accomplished

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October.*Commissioners sent  
to the Spanish  
armies.*

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*October.*

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by zeal and courage; the former understood the art of war better, and knew how little these qualities alone were to be trusted in the open field against an enemy strong in cavalry, equal in numbers, and superior in discipline. The commissioners were sent to determine between them. Of all the measures of the Central Junta this was the worst. It was taken a few days before Romana arrived in Spain. Had he been present, his authority, coming in aid of the opinion of Castaños, which was decidedly but warily expressed, might have prevented so preposterous a mission, and averted the evils which were thus precipitated.

## CHAPTER XIII.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. CONFERENCE AT ERFURTH. PROPOSAL FOR PEACE. BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN.

It had always been Buonaparte's system, and <sup>1808.</sup> therein it was that the strength and wisdom of his policy consisted, to ensure success, as far as the end can be rendered certain by the employment of adequate means. Having stripped Spain of its best troops, introduced his armies into the heart of the country, seized the most important fortresses, inveigled into captivity the whole Royal Family, and extorted from them a formal renunciation of the crown in his favour; the people, he thought, if they dared attempt any partial opposition, would be effectually intimidated by the first slaughter, and the military executions which should follow it. His calculation was erroneous, because the Spanish character, and the strength of good principles, had not been taken into the account. He had never dreamt of a national resistance; and the defeat of armies, till that time irresistible, affected him the more deeply, because he felt that the measures which had drawn on these disasters were as infamous as he now perceived that they were

*Buonaparte is deeply affected by the reverses in Spain.*

*Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, 18.*

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impolitic. The reverses which befell him in the latter part of his bloody career he bore with the coldest insensibility; but he was distressed by these, and all but cast down.

*He conceals  
them from  
the French  
people.*

But it was too late to recede; the infamy was indelible, it remained only to secure the prize, and this he believed there would be no difficulty in effecting. His first care was to conceal from the French all knowledge of the mortifying failure his arms had experienced, till he should have secured the subserviency of the other continental powers, and collected fresh armies to pour into the peninsula. His system of government was founded upon falsehood as well as force. While all Spain was in arms, the French papers represented it as joyfully welcoming its new sovereign. “The disturbances,” they said, “which broke out in a few provinces were completely quelled: they had been occasioned only by the common people, who wished to pillage the rich: the disaffected had got together some bands of smugglers, opened the prisons, and put arms into the hands of the felons: these wretches had committed great excesses upon their peaceful countrymen, but every thing was now quiet. The captains-general, the magistrates, and the polished part of the nation, displayed the best sentiments, and the greatest repose and best state of mind prevailed. At Cadiz the public tranquillity did not experience a moment’s interruption; the inhabitants of that interesting city had

resisted all the insidious offers of the English. Throughout the peninsula, indeed, only a few insignificant individuals had been led astray by the spies of England. But the Council of Castille, and the most respectable persons, had exerted their influence with all ranks, to crush the seeds of sedition before they should shoot forth; and their efforts had been completely successful.”)

Over great part of France and of the continent these accounts would be believed; wherever, indeed, a vigilant tyranny could keep out all information except its own. But at Bayonne it was not possible that the truth could be concealed; and by the falsehood which was officially circulated in that part of the country, it seems that the general opinion there was strongly against a war, provoked solely for the aggrandizement of the Buonaparte family. M. Cham- *June 8.* pagny addressed a note to the prefect of the Gironde, informing him, that the Emperor had just received advices from his brother the King of Holland, saying the King of England was dead, and that the first act of George IV. had been to make a total change of ministers. This was not given as a report, but as an authenticated fact, officially communicated: “and may this event,” it was added, “be the presage of a general peace, . . the object of the Emperor’s wishes, to the want of which Europe is so sensible, and which would be so advantageous to the commerce of Bourdeaux in particular!” The same falsehood was repeated in that number of

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the Madrid \* Gazette which contained Buonaparte's proclamation of Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies. Buonaparte endeavoured also to keep his allies as well as his subjects ignorant of the real state of things. The Russian Ambassador at Madrid could find no means of communicating to his court an account of what was passing in Spain, all his letters being intercepted in France, till at the end of August, when some British officers were in Madrid, an opportunity was afforded him of sending his dispatches through England; he then confided to the honour of a hostile power what could no longer be trusted to an unprincipled ally.

*Statement  
of the  
French  
govern-  
ment.*

*Sept. 6.*

It was not till two months after the capture of the ships at Cadiz, and five weeks after the flight of the Intruder from Madrid, that any account of the affairs of Spain appeared in the French papers, except assurances that all was well. A long narrative was then published, written with the usual falsehood of the French government, but not with its usual skill. The insurrection was ascribed entirely to the artifices and bribes of England, assisted by the monks and the Inquisition, . . the Inquisition, which had lent its whole authority to the usurpation! Great stress was laid upon the excesses which the patriots had committed; whereas the list of persons who were here claimed as martyrs in the Intruder's

\* June 14. *Se sabe de oficio que ha muerto el 26 de Mayo el Rey de Inglaterra; y que su sucesor ha mudado todo el ministerio, eligiendo sugetos decididos por la paz.*

cause did not equal in number the victims of one *noyade* in the Loire, scarcely exceeded that of one day's allowance for the guillotine in Paris. The military detail, which was called a correct abstract of the events of the campaign, was composed with studied and inextricable confusion; all order of time and place was inverted and involved, and facts, exhibited thus piecemeal, were still farther disguised by suppression, exaggeration, and falsehood. At Valencia, it was said, French intrepidity overcame every obstacle: twenty pieces of artillery were taken; the suburbs were carried, and the streets strewed with dead bodies: . . . this indeed was true; but they were the bodies of the French. At Zaragoza, fourteen cloisters, which had been fortified, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all the magazines were in their possession. That unfortunate city was almost ruined by fire, the bombardment, and the explosion of mines. Not a hint was given of the event of that memorable siege. The loss of the fleet was not mentioned. Dupont was so spoken of, as to make it evident, that, if he returned to France, his life would atone for his failure. After a series of events which could not be described, because they ought to be a subject of judicial inquiry, he had committed the triple fault of suffering his communication with Madrid to be cut off, of letting himself be separated from two-thirds of his army, and then giving battle in a disadvantageous position, after a forced night-march; and, mani-

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festing an equal deficiency of political as of military talent, he had allowed himself to be deceived in negotiations. This unexpected event, the numerous descents of the English upon the coast of Galicia, (where no English had landed, except a few officers,) and the excessive heat of the season, had induced the King to assemble his troops, and place them in a cooler climate than that of New Castille, and in a situation possessing a milder atmosphere, and better water: therefore, he left Madrid, and the army went into cooler cantonments. The bodies of insurgents scarcely deserved to be mentioned: they defended themselves behind a wall or a house; but a single squadron of cavalry, or a battalion of infantry, was sufficient to put many thousands of them to the rout. “All that the English papers have published,” said Buonaparte’s gazetteer, “is unfounded and false. England knows well the part that she is acting; she also knows well what she is to expect from all her efforts. Her only object is to involve Spain in confusion, that she may thereby make herself mistress of such of its possessions as best suit her purposes.”

*Report of  
M. Cham-  
pagny.*

At the same time, two reports from the minister of foreign affairs were laid before the French senate. The first of these bore date from Bayonne, so far back as the 24th of April. Hitherto the modern powers of Europe had always thought it necessary to hold forth some decent pretext for engaging in hostilities, however iniquitous might be the latent motives . . but the

semblance of moral decorum was now contemptuously laid aside; and in this state-paper Buonaparte was advised to seize upon Spain, for the purpose of carrying on the war against England more effectually, every thing being legitimate which led to that end. No state in Europe was more necessarily connected with France than Spain: she must be either a useful friend, or a dangerous enemy; . . . an intimate alliance must unite the two nations, or an implacable enmity separate them. Such an enmity had in old times become habitual: . . . the wars of the 16th century proceeded as much from the rivalry of the nations as of the sovereigns: the troubles of the League and the Fronde had been excited and fomented by Spain; and the power of Louis XIV. did not begin to rise, till, having conquered Spain, he had formed that alliance with the royal family which ultimately placed his grandson on the throne. That act of provident policy gave to the two countries an age of peace, after three ages of war: but the French revolution broke this bond of union; and the Spanish Bourbons must always, through their affection, their recollections, and their fear, be the secret and perfidious enemies of France. It was for the interest of Spain, as well as of France, that a firm hand should re-establish order in her affairs, now when a feeble administration had led her to the brink of ruin. A king, the friend of France, having nothing to fear from her, and not being an object of distrust to her, would appropriate all the re-

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sources of Spain to her interest, and to the success of that common cause which united Spain to France and to the continent. Thus would the work of Louis XIV. be re-established. What policy suggests, said the report, justice authorises. The increase of the Spanish army before the battle of Jena was really a declaration of war: the laws of the customs were directed against French commerce: French merchants were aggrieved, while the ports were open to the contraband trade of England, and English merchandize was spread through Spain into the rest of Europe: Spain, therefore, was actually in a state of war with the Emperor.

Even M. Champagny, however, had not the effrontery to press this conclusion. Exclusive of this, he said, existing circumstances did not permit the Emperor to refrain from interfering in the affairs of Spain. He was called upon to judge between the father and the son. Which part would he take? Would he sacrifice the cause of sovereigns, and sanction an outrage against the majesty of the throne? Would he leave on the throne a prince who could not withdraw himself from the yoke of England? In that case, France must constantly keep a powerful army on foot in Spain. Would he reinstate Charles IV.? This could not be effected without overcoming a great resistance, and shedding French blood. And should that blood, of which France was prodigal for her own interests, be shed for a foreign king, whose fate was of no

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consequence to her? Lastly, would he abandon the Spanish nation to themselves, and while England was sowing the seeds of trouble and of anarchy, leave this new prey for England to devour? This was not to be thought of. The Emperor, therefore, occupied, of necessity, with the regeneration of Spain, in a manner useful to that kingdom and to France, ought neither to re-establish the dethroned king, nor to leave his son upon the throne; for in either case it would be delivering her to the English. Policy advised, and justice authorized him to provide for the security of the empire, and to save Spain from the influence of England.

Thus was the principle, that whatever is profitable is right, openly proclaimed by the French government, . . . a principle which the very thief, on his career to the gallows, dares not avow to himself. The other report from the same minister was of four months later date, though the former had plainly not been written till it was thought expedient to publish it: for the Tyrant needed no adviser in his conduct at Bayonne; and if his usurpation had been passively submitted to by the Spaniards, Spain would have been represented as the brave and faithful ally of France, and the new dynasty exhibited as the reward of her loyalty, which was now to be the means of curbing her hostile disposition. This second report began by proposing to the Emperor that he should communicate to the Senate the treaties which had placed the crown of Spain

*Second report.**Sept. 1.*

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in his hands, and the constitution, which, under his auspices, and enlightened by his advice, the Junta at Bayonne, after free and mature deliberation, had adopted, for the glory of the Spanish name, and the prosperity of Spain and its colonies. He had interfered with Spain, it said, as a mediator; but his persuasive means, and his measures of wise and humane policy, had not been successful. Individual interests, foreign intrigues, and the influence of foreign corruption had prevailed. The disturbances in Spain were occasioned by English gold. Would, then, his Majesty permit England to say, "Spain is one of my provinces! My flag, driven from the Baltic, the North sea, the Levant, and even from the shores of Persia, rules in the ports of France?" No, never! To prevent so much disgrace and misfortune, two millions of brave men were ready to scale the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the peninsula. If the French fought for the liberty of the seas, they must begin by wresting Spain from the influence of the tyrant of the ocean. If they fought for peace, they could not obtain it till they had driven the enemies of peace from Spain. If they fought for honour, they must promptly inflict vengeance for the outrages committed against the French name in Spain. The probability of meeting the English at last, of fighting them man to man, of making them feel the evils of war themselves, . . evils of which they were ignorant, having only caused them by their gold, was represented as

no small advantage. They will be beaten, said M. Champagny, destroyed, dispersed, or, at least, they will make haste to fly, as they did at Toulon, at the Helder, at Dunkirk, in Sweden, . . . wherever the French armies have been able to find them! But their expulsion from Spain would be the ruin of their cause; it would exhaust their means, and annihilate their last hope. In this contest the wishes of all Europe would be with France!

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These reports, with the two mock treaties of Bayonne, were laid before the Senate, and, at the same time, a report of the war-minister was presented. France, it was said, had never possessed more numerous or better appointed armies, neither were they ever better kept up, or better provisioned. Nevertheless, the events which had taken place in Spain had occasioned a pretty considerable loss, in consequence of an operation, not less inconceivable than painful, of the division under General Dupont. His Majesty had notified his resolution of assembling more than 200,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, without weakening either the armies in Germany or that in Dalmatia. A levy of 80,000 was therefore indispensable, and these could only be taken from the four classes of the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, and 9, which, exclusive of the men who had married within those years, might furnish 600,000. In levying 80,000, only one conscript out of seven would be called out, and the vacancies in the armies would thus be filled up with soldiers of 21, 22, and 23 years of age,

*Report of  
the war-  
minister.*

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that is, with men fit to undergo the fatigues of war. “It is true, Sire,” said the war-minister, “that the custom observed of late years might, to a certain degree, induce a part of your subjects to consider themselves released from the duty of the conscription, as soon as they had furnished the contingent required for the year; and, under this point of view, what I propose might appear to require from your people a sacrifice. But, Sire, there is no one but knows, that, by the words of the law, your Majesty would be authorised to call to your standard the whole of the conscription, not only of the last four years, but even of the antecedent years: and even were there question of a real sacrifice, what sacrifice is it that your Majesty has not a right to expect from the love of your subjects? Who among us is ignorant that your Majesty wholly sacrifices yourself for the happiness of France, and that upon the speedy accomplishment of your high designs depend the repose of the world, the future safety, and the re-establishment of a maritime peace, without which France can never enjoy tranquillity? In proposing to your Majesty to declare, that henceforth no retrospective call shall take an antecedent conscription, I only participate, Sire, in your paternal wishes. I think it expedient, at the same time, to propose to your Majesty to order out the conscription of the year 1810, determining the amount of it, from the present instant, at 80,000 men..to furnish the means, as occasion may

require, of forming camps of reserve, and of protecting the coast in the spring time. This conscription would be raised only under the apprehension of a war with other powers, nor would it be called out before the month of January next."

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Thus, then, it appeared that those persons who had escaped from the conscriptions of four years were again to stand the hazard of this dreadful lottery, and that of the unmarried men, between the ages of 21 and 23, one in seven was to be sent to the armies! . . . and this draught upon the morality, the happiness, the vital strength, the flesh and blood of the French people . . . was required, because their Corsican master had thought proper to appoint his brother to be king of Spain! The promise that no retrospective conscription should again be called for, shows plainly what the feelings of the nation were at such a measure, when Buonaparte thought it necessary to soothe them, by declaring, that it was not to be repeated. This was not all: one year's conscription had already been anticipated, another year was to be levied in advance, and 80,000 men, whose services, by these baleful laws, were not due till 1810, were now to be called forth. This was necessary, the report said, because England and Austria were increasing their armies; and it was an evil inseparable from the present state of Europe, that France must increase hers in the same proportion. A suspicion of the intentions of Austria was now intimated.

*Suspicion of  
the views of  
Austria.*



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Its armaments, the war-minister declared, had often excited his solicitude. He had been told by the minister for foreign affairs, that the best understanding prevailed with the court of Vienna; but though it did not belong to his department to dive into the views and interests of states, and explore the tortuous labyrinths of politics, it was his duty to neglect nothing for preserving to the French armies, at all points, that just superiority which they ought to possess. The plan which he had proposed would give the army of Spain 200,000 men, without weakening the other armies; and the conscription of 1810 would increase the armies of Germany, of the North, and of Italy, by more than 80,000. From such a force what could be expected but the speedy re-establishment of tranquillity in Spain, of a maritime peace, and of that general tranquillity which was the object of the Emperor's wishes? Much blood would be spared, because so great a number of men would be ready to shed it... Here the tyrant's principle is right: and grievously was that parsimony of strength on the part of his mightiest enemy to be lamented, which, by never sending a force sufficient to insure its object, so often wasted what it sent.

*Message  
from Buonaparte to  
the Senate.  
Sept. 4.*

A message from Buonaparte accompanied these reports, when they were laid before the Senate. He mentioned his firm alliance with Russia, and said, that he had no doubts of the peace of the continent, but that he ought not to rely upon the false calculations and errors of other courts;

and since his neighbours increased their armies, it was a duty incumbent upon him to increase his: he therefore imposed fresh sacrifices upon his people, which were necessary to secure them from heavier, and to lead them to the grand result of a general peace. "I am determined," said he, "to carry on the war with Spain with the utmost activity, and to destroy the armies which England has disembarked in that country. The future security of my subjects, a maritime peace, and the security of commerce, equally depend upon these important operations. Frenchmen, my projects have but one object in view . . your happiness, and the permanent well-being of your children; and if I know you right, you will hasten to comply with this new call, which is rendered necessary by the interests of the country."

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In the first of Buonaparte's three constitutions for France, the affectation of Roman titles, and the false taste with which they were applied to offices essentially different, were equally to be remarked. The name of Senate, however, was well retained under his imperial government, just such a Senate having existed during those disgraceful ages of the Roman empire, when a despotism, similar to that which he had established in France, was degrading their country, and preparing the way for the universal barbarism and misery which ensued. The baseness of those wretches who sanctioned the iniquities and cruelties of Tiberius and Caligula was equalled by the

*The Senate  
approve his  
measures.*

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obsequious senators of Buonaparte. On the day after his message had been presented, they voted an address, echoing the gross and palpable falsehoods of his assertions, applauding his measures, and appropriating to themselves, and, as far as the crimes of a government can be imputed to the people, to the French nation also, the guilt of his conduct towards Spain. “Your Majesty,” said they, “desires to defend solemn and voluntarily concluded treaties; to maintain a constitution freely discussed, adopted, and sworn to by a national junta; to suppress a barbarous anarchy, which now covers Spain with blood and mourning, and threatens our frontier; to rescue the true Spaniards from a shameful yoke, by which they are oppressed; to assure to them the happiness of being governed by a brother of your Majesty; to annihilate the English troops, who unite their arms with the daggers of the banditti; to avenge the French blood, so basely shed; to put out of all doubt the security of France, and the peace of our posterity; to restore and complete the work of Louis XIV.; to accomplish the wish of the most illustrious of your predecessors, and particularly of him who was by France most beloved; to extend your great power, in order to diminish the miseries of war, and to compel the enemy of the continent to a general peace, which is the sole object of all your measures, and the only means for the repose and prosperity of our country. The will of the French people is, therefore, Sire, the same

as that of your Majesty. The war with Spain is politic, just, and necessary.".. If the transactions which are the subject of this history had passed in remote ages, and such a narrative as is here presented had been preserved to us, it would scarcely be possible, when we found the Senate of a great nation, like France, thus solemnly approving and ratifying the conduct of its Emperor, not to suspect that the history had been handed down in an imperfect state; that some facts had been suppressed, and others distorted; for, however credible the usurpation itself might appear, as the act of an individual tyrant, that it should, with its attendant circumstances of perfidy and cruelty, be thus represented as a just and necessary act, by a legislative assembly, and made the ground of a national war, is something so monstrous, that it would startle our belief; and, for the honour of human nature, we should hesitate before we trusted human testimony.

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The conscription for which the tyrant called was decreed without one dissentient voice, by an assembly constituted for no other purpose than that of executing his will and pleasure. His other measures had already been taken. About the middle of August he had ordered General Gouvion Saint Cyr from Boulogne, to repair to Perpignan, and there collect an army, with which to enter Catalonia, as soon as Buonaparte himself should enter Spain on the other side. He gave him no other instructions than that he should

*March of  
the troops  
toward  
Spain.*

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*September.*

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use all efforts to preserve Barcelona: "if that place be lost," said he, "to recover it will cost me eighty thousand men." The troops from Prussia and Poland were recalled; they consisted not of Frenchmen alone, but of Germans and Italians, Poles, Swiss, and Dutch, Irish, and Mamelukes, men of all countries and languages, of all religions and of none, united into one efficient body by the bond of discipline. They cared not whither they were ordered, so it were only to a land which produced the grape, . . upon what service, or in what cause, was to them a matter of indifference; war was their element, and wherever they went they expected to find free quarters, and no enemy who could resist them. Not a few of them when they heard, as they had so often heard before, that they were now to give the last blow to the tottering power of England, believed they were about to march to England by land through Spain; the desert, they said, had separated them from that country when they were in Egypt, and when they were at Boulogne there was the sea; but they should get there now. As soon as these troops had crossed the Rhine, they were received with public honours in every town along the line of their march. Deputations came out to welcome them, they were feasted at the expense of the municipality, and thanked at their departure for the honour they had conferred upon the place. This was Buonaparte's policy. But the conduct of the soldiers showed what an enemy might expect from them,

when their own countrymen, upon whom they were quartered, did not escape ill usage. They treated them as they had done the Germans; and the allied troops took the same licence which they had seen the French exercise among an allied and friendly people. Under the imperial government every thing was subject to the sword.

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*September.*

*Rocca, 9, 12.*

Buonaparte reviewed them at Paris. “Soldiers,” said he, “after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have passed through Germany by forced marches. I shall now order you to march through France, without allowing you a moment’s rest. Soldiers, I have occasion for you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let your aspect terrify and drive him from thence! Let us carry our conquering eagles even to the pillars of Hercules: there also we have an injury to avenge!” The capture of the French squadron at Cadiz had never been published in France, and this hint is the only notice that ever was publicly taken of it. “Soldiers,” he pursued, “you have exceeded the fame of all modern warriors. You have placed yourselves upon a level with the Roman legions, who, in one campaign, were conquerors on the Rhine, on the Euphrates, in Illyria, and on the Tagus. A durable peace and permanent prosperity shall be the fruits of your exertions. A true Frenchman can never enjoy any rest till the sea is open and free. Soldiers, all that you have already achieved, and that which remains to be

*Speech of  
Buonaparte  
to the troops.*

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Conferences  
at Erfurth.

done, will be for the happiness of the French people, and for my glory, and shall be for ever imprinted on my heart.”

The preparations for war were answerable to the arrogance of this harangue. All the roads to Spain were thronged with troops, marching from all parts of France and its dependencies toward the Pyrenees. While they were on their march, Buonaparte set out for Germany, to meet his dependent German princes, and the Emperor Alexander, at Erfurth. Some of the performers of the *Theatre Française* had orders to precede him, that these potentates might be provided with amusement. An opportunity was taken of giving Alexander a momentous hint of the superiority of his new friend: . . . Buonaparte took him to the field of Jena: a temple, dedicated to Victory, was erected on the spot where the French Emperor had past the night previous to the battle: tents were pitched round it; and, after a sumptuous breakfast, he was led over every part of the ground which the two armies had occupied, and left to make his own reflections upon the spot where Prussia received the reward of its long subserviency to France, and of its neutrality when the fate of the continent was upon the hazard. The immediate consequence of the meeting was a proposal for peace to Great Britain.

Overtures of  
peace from  
Erfurth.

These overtures were made in the customary diplomatic forms; but they were accompanied by a joint letter from the Emperors of France

and Russia to the King of England. Having been brought together at Erfurth by the circumstances of the continent, their first thought, they said, had been to yield to the wishes and wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the remedy for the common miseries of Europe. The long and bloody continental war was at an end, and could not possibly be renewed. Many changes had taken place, many states had been overthrown. The cause was to be found in the evils arising from the stagnation of maritime commerce. Still greater changes might yet occur, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace was their interest, as well as the interest of the continent. We unite, therefore, said they, in intreating your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, how to conciliate all interests, and by that means to preserve the powers which still exist; and to insure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us. The official notes stated, that Russian plenipotentiaries would be sent to Paris, there to receive the answer of England; and that French plenipotentiaries would repair to any city on the continent, to which the King of Great Britain and his allies should send theirs. It was added, that the King of England must, without doubt, feel the grandeur and sincerity of this conduct on the part of the two Em-

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October.

Oct. 12.



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October.*Reply to the  
Russian  
minister.  
Oct. 28.*

perors ; that their union was beyond the reach of change ; and that it was formed for peace as well as for war.

In answer to the Russian minister, it was stated, that however desirous his Majesty might be to reply directly to the Emperor Alexander, the unusual manner in which his letter was drawn up deprived it entirely of the character of a private and personal communication, and it was impossible to adopt that mark of respect towards him, without, at the same time, recognizing titles which the King of England never had acknowledged. This was a needless demurral. We had sent ministers to treat with Buonaparte since he had been Emperor of France, ..surely this was, to all intents, an effectual recognition of his title. It was weakening the moral strength of our cause, to rest, even for a moment, upon a point of punctilio. In every other respect, the correspondence on the part of England was worthy of the cause. An immediate assurance that France acknowledged the government of Spain as party to any negotiation, was declared to be absolutely necessary : that such was the intention of the Emperor of Russia, it was added, his Majesty could not doubt. He recollected the lively interest which that Emperor had always manifested for the dignity and welfare of the Spanish monarchy, and wanted no other assurance that he could not have been induced to sanction, by his concurrence, or by his approbation, usurpations,

the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all lawful sovereigns.

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The letter of the two Emperors was fully and most ably answered in an official note. The King's readiness and desire to negotiate a peace on terms consistent with his own honour, and with the permanent security of Europe, were again declared. If the condition of the continent were one of agitation and of wretchedness, if many states had been overthrown, and many more were still menaced with subversion, it was a consolation to the King to reflect, that no part of those convulsions could be in any degree imputable to him. Most willing was he to acknowledge that all such dreadful changes were indeed contrary to the policy of Great Britain. And if the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although he could not be expected to hear with unqualified regret that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments, yet it was neither in his disposition, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined against him. He anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent. The war in which he was engaged was entered into for the immediate object of national safety; but, in its progress, new obligations had been

*Reply to the  
overtures.*

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imposed upon him, in behalf of powers whom the aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to make common cause with him, or who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication of their national independence. The interests of Portugal and of Sicily were confided to his friendship and protection; and he was connected for peace, as well as for war, with the King of Sweden. To Spain he was not yet bound by any formal instrument, but he had, in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon his mind than the most solemn treaties. He therefore assumed, that, in an overture made to him for entering into negotiations for a general peace, his relations subsisting with the Spanish monarchy had been distinctly taken into consideration, and that the government acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which he was invited to engage.

*Reply of the  
Russian and  
French  
ministers.  
Nov. 8.*

The answer of the Russian minister was, that the admission of the sovereigns in alliance with England could not be a point of any difficulty; but this principle by no means extended to the necessity of admitting the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish insurgents, and the Emperor Alexander could not admit them. He had already acknowledged King Joseph Napoleon; he was united with the Emperor of the French; and he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of that monarch. But Count Romanzoff added,

he saw, with pleasure, that, in this difference of opinion respecting the Spaniards, there was nothing which could either prevent or delay the opening of a congress; because his Britannic Majesty had himself admitted, that he was bound to no positive engagement with those who had taken up arms in Spain. Count Romanzoff did not intend to insult a British King, by telling him he might violate his word and honour, because he was not bound to keep them by any formal instrument; . . but M. Champagny's reply was intentionally insulting. "How," said he, "is it possible for the French government to entertain the proposal which has been made to it, of admitting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation? What would the English government have said, had it been proposed to them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them promises, and has frequently sent them succours." The writer did not perceive what warning this utterly irrelevant argument held out to the disaffected in Ireland, by thus plainly informing them, that however Buonaparte might promise them support, he was at all times ready to abandon them, whenever it might suit his views. Menacing language was then introduced. England, we were told, would find herself under a strange mistake, if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still entertained the idea of contending successfully, upon the continent, against

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the armies of France. What hope could she have, especially when France was irrevocably united with Russia? France and Russia could carry on the war till the court of London recurred to just and equitable dispositions; they were resolved to do so; and the English were admonished not to lose sight of the inevitable results of the force of states.

Dec. 9.

*Final answer of the British government.*

Mr. Canning's replies were equally decided and dignified. To Count Romanzoff he expressed the King's astonishment and regret, that it should be supposed he would consent to commence a negotiation by the previous abandonment of the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain, in deference to an usurpation which had no parallel in the history of the world. He had hoped that the participation of the Emperor Alexander in these overtures would have afforded a security to him against the proposal of a condition so unjust in its effect, and so fatal in its example. Nor could he conceive by what obligation of duty or of interest, or by what principle of Russian policy, his Imperial Majesty could have found himself compelled to acknowledge the right assumed by France, of deposing and imprisoning friendly Sovereigns, and forcibly transferring to herself the allegiance of loyal and independent nations. If these were indeed the principles to which the Emperor had inviolably attached himself, to which he had pledged the character and resources of his empire, and which he had united himself with

France to establish by war, and to maintain in peace...deeply did the King of England lament a determination by which the sufferings of Europe must be aggravated and prolonged: but not to him was to be attributed the continuance of the calamities of war, by the disappointment of all hope of such a peace as would be compatible with justice and with honour. To the French minister Mr. Canning said, he was especially commanded to abstain from noticing any of those topics and expressions insulting to his Majesty, to his allies, and to the Spanish nation, with which the official note of M. Champagny abounded. The King of England was desirous to have treated for a peace which might have arranged the respective interests of all the belligerent powers on principles of equal justice, but he was determined not to abandon the cause of the Spanish nation, and of the legitimate monarchy of Spain; and the pretension of France, to exclude from the negotiation the central and supreme government, acting in the name of his Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., was one which he could not admit, without acquiescing in an usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world.

As soon as this correspondence was concluded, the rupture of the negotiation was made known in England, by a declaration which, while any sense of honour remains in the English nation, may always be recollected with pride and satisfaction. The continued appearance of a negotiation, it said, when peace was found to be utterly

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*British de-  
claration.*

*Dec. 15.*

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unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy. It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who were combined to resist her oppression; and if, among the nations which were groaning under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintained against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any who were balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin . . . to nations so situated, the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed, by the vain hope of returning tranquillity, or their purpose shaken, by the apprehension of being left to contend alone. That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted from Erfurth, his Majesty entertained a strong persuasion. But at a moment when results, so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or war, he felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies. It was difficult for him to believe that the Emperor of Russia had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his Imperial Majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of Spain. He therefore met the seeming fair-

ness and moderation of the proposal with fairness and moderation on his part real and sincere, expressing his just confidence that the Spanish government, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., was understood to be a party to this negotiation. The reply returned by France to this proposition cast off at once the thin disguise, which had been assumed for a momentary purpose, and displayed, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation was described by the degrading appellation of the Spanish insurgents, and the demand for the admission of its government as a party to any negotiation was rejected, as inadmissible and insulting. With astonishment, as well as grief, he had received from the Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, although less indecorous in tone and manner. The King would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation which might have afforded any hope or prospect of a peace compatible with justice and with honour. He lamented an issue by which the sufferings of Europe were prolonged; but neither his honour nor the generosity of the British nation would admit of his consenting to commence a negotiation by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who were contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man, and whose exertions, in a cause so unquestionably just, he had solemnly pledged himself to sustain.

Such an answer was consistent with the ho-



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*Buonaparte  
departs for  
Spain.*

Oct. 25.

nour, the principles, and the feelings of the British people. Buonaparte anticipated it: his proposals might have that effect which the English cabinet had foreseen, upon the powers which he oppressed, and they might deceive the French people; at least they gave a popular topic for his sycophants in the Senate, and those whose office it was to mislead the public mind. He himself knew what the result must be, and had not for a moment suspended or slackened his preparations. Before a reply could be made to the first overture, he returned to Paris, and, in his address to the legislative body, informed them that he should depart in a few days, to put himself in person at the head of his army, and, with God's help (such was the expression of the blasphemer), to crown the King of Spain in Madrid, and plant his eagles on the forts of Spain. It was a distinguished favour of the providence, he said, which had constantly protected his army, that passion had so far blinded the English councils, as to have made them abandon the defence of the seas, and at last produce their army on the continent. His vaunts and his impieties were, of course, echoed by those whom he addressed: but their flattery was far exceeded by the language of some deputies from the new Italian departments, who had audience on the same day. The destinies of the whole world, they told him, were confided by the Almighty to his impenetrable views, to the supreme power of his genius, to the miraculous exploits of his

arms. Hence a new order of things, already written in the books of the Eternal, was prepared for their country. In the necessity in which he was to overthrow, to destroy, to disperse all enemies, as the wind dissipates the dust, he was not an exterminating Angel; but he was the Being that extends his thoughts, and measures the face of the earth, to re-establish its happiness upon a better and surer basis. He was destined before all ages to be the Man of God's right hand; the Sovereign Master of all things. Language of more idolatrous adoration was never listened to by the frantic Caligula, nor uttered by the infatuated followers of Sabatai Sevi. It was not, however, too gross for the tyrant to whom it was addressed; and he applauded it in his reply. Immediately after this scene he left Paris, reached Bayonne on the 3d of November, and, five days afterwards, put himself at the head of his army at Vitoria.

## CHAPTER XIV.

**BUONAPARTE ENTERS SPAIN. DEFEAT OF THE  
SPANISH ARMIES. SURRENDER OF MADRID. THE  
SPANIARDS ENDEAVOUR TO RALLY AT CUENCA,  
AND ON THE TAGUS.**

1808.  
October.

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*Pasley on  
the Military  
Policy of  
Great Bri-  
tain, p. 34.*

AN old prophecy was at this time circulated in Paris, importing that the disasters which would lead to the overthrow of the French empire were to originate in Spain. It had probably been sent abroad in the days of Louis XIV. when his designs upon that kingdom were first manifested, and the resistance which they would provoke from the powers of Europe was foreseen. The persons by whom it was now reproduced apprehended that the English would land a strong force in the north of the peninsula, so as to cut off the French armies from their communication with Bayonne. Like all desponding or discontented politicians, they overrated the wisdom and the power of the enemy. If indeed, when an expedition was sent to Portugal, this had been done at the same time, the issue can hardly be deemed doubtful. We had disciplined soldiers, ships to transport them, and means of every kind in abundance; but vigour was wanting in our councils, and in offensive war we had every thing

to learn. It was, however, intended that an army little short of 40,000 men should take the field with the Spaniards; and had such an army been in the field, under an able and enterprising commander, subsequent events have given an Englishman right to affirm, that no force which could have been brought against it in one point, would have been able to defeat it. But this intention was frustrated as much by the precipitance of the Spaniards as by the dilatoriness of the British movements.

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By the latter end of October not less than 100,000 troops had crossed the Pyrenees from the side of Bayonne, to reinforce their countrymen. The head-quarters were at Vitoria, where they had continued since Joseph arrived there on his flight from Madrid. The left wing, under Marshal Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano, was posted along the banks of the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla; Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen, had his head-quarters at Guardia; Marshal Bessieres, Duke of Istria, at Miranda, with a garrison at Pancorbo; Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, occupied the heights of Durango, and defended the heights of Mondragon from the threatened attack of the Spaniards. Blake had posted the main body of his army in front of Lefebvre's force, and occupied with the rest the debouches of Villarcayo, Orduña, and Munguia. He hoped that the Asturian General, Azevedo, would cut off the communication between Durango and

*Movements  
against  
Blake's  
army.*

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Vitoria by Ochandiano, and that, by possessing himself of the heights of Mondragon, and thus getting in the rear of the enemy's advanced guard, he might be enabled to strike a great blow. The plan was good, if it could have been executed in time; but Blake persisted in it after he knew that the French had received strong reinforcements. Some trifling advantages, and the confidence of the Spanish character, encouraged him to this imprudence, by which he exposed himself to be entirely cut off. It was Buonaparte's intention to take the advantage which was thus offered him; and Lefebvre therefore had been ordered to content himself with keeping the Spaniards in check till the Emperor should arrive; but his flanks were so much annoyed by Blake, that this delay became inconvenient, and on the last day of October the French attacked him. After a long and well-contested action of nine hours the Spaniards retreated in good order by Bilbao and Valmaseda to Nava, without losing colours or prisoners. No artillery had been used, the country being too mountainous for it. The enemy entered Bilbao the next day; and the corps of Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, arriving at this time, was directed by Munguia and Amurrio to Valmaseda, to fall upon the flank of the Galician army.

*Blake falls  
back to Es-  
pinosa.*

Blake's intention had been to fall back till he could concentrate his whole force; but the second division, and a part of the Asturians under Azevedo, had their communication cut off; and as

the French were strengthening themselves at Arancadiaga and Orrantia to prevent the junction, he prepared to attack them. They retreated during the night of the 4th; but on the following day a division of his army came up with 7000 of the enemy near Valmaseda, and drove them from thence with considerable loss. Having thus effected the junction, he attacked the enemy again on the 7th at Guéñes, and turned their left wing, but his own centre was unable to advance; and perceiving that the French had received very considerable reinforcements that day from Bilbao, his own men too being exhausted by hunger and fatigue, he deemed it prudent to retire to Espinosa de los Monteros, where he hoped to refresh and feed his men, and draw artillery and supplies from Reynosa. Seldom indeed have any troops endured greater hardships. From the 23rd of October they had been continually in the open air, among the mountains of Biscay, during rainy nights and the most inclement weather: they were all without hats, great part of them half clothed, and barefooted, and they had been six days without bread, wine, or spirits; indeed, without any other supply of food than the sheep and cattle which were to be found among the mountains. There had been a considerable desertion among the young recruits; but from those who remained not a murmur was heard under all these privations: they manifested no other wish than that the sacrifice of their lives might contribute to the

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destruction of the enemy, and the deliverance of Spain.

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*November.*

*Battle of  
Espinosa.*

The system of the French was to beat this army down, as their increasing numbers enabled them to do, by repeated attacks. Blake intended to remain some days at Espinosa, for the purpose of giving his men some rest. But having arrived on the 9th, his rear-guard, under the Conde de San Roman, one of the officers who had escaped from the Baltic, was attacked on the following day, by a far superior force. He immediately posted his army in front of the town; Azevedo, with the Asturians and the first division, on a height to the left, covering the road to S. Andero; the second division on a hill to the right; the third and the reserve in the centre. The van-guard was posted on a little hill close in the rear of the centre, with six four-pounders. The enemy were successful in their first attack, and drove the Spaniards from a wood which they had occupied; they returned, however, to the charge, being reinforced with the third division, and the action became general, except on the left of the Spanish position. It continued for three hours, till evening closed in; and Blake thought the advantage was on his side, though the enemy had gained possession of a wood and ridge of hill in front of his centre and right. The contest had been very severe, and a very great proportion of the Spanish officers had fallen, San Roman among them, and the Galician General Riquelme, both mortally wounded. The

men lay on their arms that night, and Victor, who commanded in this battle, brought up fresh troops from his rear to the ridge. At daybreak, when the main attention of the Spaniards was drawn towards this point, he made his great attack upon their left, commencing it with a strong body of sharp-shooters; they were twice repulsed; meantime one of their large columns, under General Maison, came up and formed in line; the sharp-shooters, being reinforced, returned to the charge, and General Ruffin, with his division, attacked the centre. There the enemy were well resisted; but on the left they succeeded, owing, in great part, it appears, to the system which on this and the preceding day was practised, of marking out the officers. Azevedo, and the two Asturian Generals who were next in command, fell; this threw the men into confusion, and when they saw themselves cut off from the road to S. Andero, and that the French were advancing to occupy a height in rear of the town which commands the road to Reynosa, they gave way, and nothing remained but to order a general retreat. They had to retire by a bridge over the Trueba and a defile; and instead of attempting to save the guns, which would necessarily have impeded the retreat of the army, Blake thought it better to employ them till the last moment; this was done with great effect, and they were spiked when the enemy was close to them.

Blake was one of those men who would have

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been thought worthy of the chief command if they had never been trusted with it. His talents were considerable; he understood the theory of his profession well, and could plan an action or a campaign with great ability; but he was deficient in that promptitude and presence of mind which are the first qualifications of a commander. His own game he could play skilfully, but when the adversary disconcerted it by some unexpected movement, he was incapable of forming new dispositions to meet the altered circumstances. By persisting against a superior and continually increasing force in operations which had been calculated against an inferior one, he exposed himself to the imminent hazard of being entirely cut off; and by advancing so far into a country which had been stripped of its provisions, and with no commissariat to follow him, he exhausted his men. Under every privation he indeed set them an example of cheerfulness, and let them see that he fared as hardly as themselves; but this could not counteract the effects of inanition. They were in a state of famine when they arrived at Espinosa, and would have found nothing there to relieve them if 250 mules, laden with biscuits, had not most opportunely arrived, sent by Major-General Leith, who was forwarding partial supplies toward them by every possible way. But men thus hungered, and enfeebled also by long continued exposure to cold and rain, were ill fitted for close action, in which much depended upon personal strength. Another and more

lamentable error was, that the troops from the Baltic, the only thoroughly disciplined part of his force, were brought into action after the first defeat, and exposed by single battalions to bear the brunt of every conflict; and thus they were sacrificed in detail, giving melancholy proof, by the devoted courage with which they stood their ground, of what they could have effected, if, as a body, they had been brought into some fair field of battle.

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Blake attempted with the remains of his army to make a stand at Reynosa; his principal magazine and his park of artillery were there; it is one of the strongest positions in that strong country, and had it been occupied in time, the event of the campaign might have been different. But the forlorn hope of collecting his scattered forces there was soon defeated. Victor was pursuing him closely from Espinosa; Lefebvre from the side of Villarcayo. And from the side of Burgos, where a fatal blow had now been struck, Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, marched upon Reynosa. No alternative was left him but to retreat toward S. Andero, and the dispersion was so complete, that there no longer remained any force on this side to oppose the enemy. Yet in justice to this ill-fated army it should be said, that no men ever behaved more gallantly, nor with more devoted patriotism. Without cavalry, half clothed, almost without food, they fought battle after battle against troops always superior in number, and whose losses were always filled

*Dispersion  
of Blake's  
army at  
Reynosa.*

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*Buonaparte  
arrives in  
Spain.*

up with reinforcements. Nor did any circumstance of disgrace attend their defeat; there was no capitulation, no surrender of large bodies, or of strong places; the ground on which they fought was won by the French, and that was all, as long as any body of the Spaniards remained together. The magazines at Reynosa now fell into their hands, and they entered S. Andero. The Bishop saved himself in an English ship, and General Riquelme expired as his men were lifting him on board. They had borne him thither from Espinosa; for, routed as they were, they would not leave him to die in the hands of the enemy. Here, and in some of the smaller ports, the French found a considerable booty of English goods.

When Buonaparte arrived in Spain he was not pleased at finding that Lefebvre had opened the campaign; his hope had been to march a strong force in the rear of Blake's army, and thus place it in a situation where it must either have been destroyed or have laid down its arms. In crossing the mountains near Mondragon he had nearly lost one of his favourite Generals, Marshal Lasnes, Duke of Montebello; the ground was covered with frozen snow, his horse fell with him, and in attempting to rise fell on him. He was carried to Vitoria in a state of great danger, his body covered with those discolorations which show that the small vessels of the skin are ruptured, the abdomen swoln, the extremities cold, suffering acute pain, and with all the symptoms of

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inflammation in the intestines, from the shock and the pressure. M. Larrey, who attended Buonaparte in all his campaigns, had learnt a remedy from the savages of Newfoundland, applied by them to some sailors whose boat had been broken to pieces and themselves dashed by the waves upon their coast. A large sheep having been first stunned by a blow on the neck, was immediately flayed, the reeking skin was sown round the Marshal's body, while his limbs were wrapped in warm flannels, and some cups of weak tea were given him. He felt immediate relief, complaining only of a painful sense of formication, and of the manner in which the skin seemed to attract every part wherewith it was in contact. In the course of ten minutes he was asleep. When he awoke, after two hours, the body was streaming with perspiration, the dangerous symptoms were relieved, and on the fifth day he was able to mount on horseback and follow the army.

*Larrey,  
Campagnes  
et Me-  
moires, t. iii.  
243—246.*

Buonaparte reached the head-quarters at Vittoria on the 8th, and immediately pushed forward a corps under Soult against the Extremaduran army in his front. Bessieres commanded the cavalry, which had before proved so fatal to the Spaniards at Rio Seco, and which had now been greatly reinforced. This army, under the Conde de Belveder, had been intended to support Blake, and keep up a communication between his army and that of Castaños. It consisted of about 13,000 men; and their Commander, a young man, al-

*Defeat of  
the Extre-  
maduran  
army at  
Burgos.*

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though aware that a superior force was advancing against him, waited for the attack in an open position at Gamonal. He had with him some of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and a few regiments of the line; the rest were new levies, and among them a corps of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon. These youths, the pride and the hope of many a generous family, were in the advanced guard. They displayed that courage which might be looked for in men of their condition, and at that time of life: twice they repulsed the French infantry, and when Bessieres with the horse came upon their flank, fell almost to a man where they had been stationed. The loss in killed was estimated at 3000, nearly a fourth of this brave army; the victorious cavalry entered Burgos with the fugitives, and the city, which was entirely forsaken by its inhabitants, was given up to be plundered. Bessieres pursued Count Belveder, while Soult turned aside toward Reynosa, to complete the destruction of Blake's army. One corps of the French marched upon Palencia, another upon Lerma; from the latter place the Count retreated to Aranda; there also Bessieres pursued, and the wreck of the army collected at Segovia; the piquets of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry covered the plains of Castille.

*Proclamation excluding certain Spaniards from pardon.*

On the second day after the defeat of the Extremaduran army Buonaparte established his head-quarters at Burgos, and issued a proclamation, granting, in the Intruder's name, a pardon

to all Spaniards who, within one month after his arrival at Madrid, should lay down their arms, and renounce all connexion with England. Neither the members of the Juntas nor the general officers were excepted: but wishing, he said, to mark those, who, after having sworn fidelity to Joseph Buonaparte, had violated that oath; and who, instead of employing their influence to enlighten the people, had only used it to mislead them: wishing also that the punishment of great offenders might serve as an example in future times to all those, who, being placed at the head of nations, instead of directing them with wisdom and prudence, should mislead them into disorders and popular tumults, and precipitate them into misfortunes and war: for these reasons he excepted from this amnesty the Dukes of Infantado, Híjar, Medina Celi, and Ossuna, the Marques de Santa Cruz, Counts Fernan Nunez and Altamira, the ex-Minister of State Cevallos, and the Bishop of S. Andero; declaring them traitors to the two crowns of France and Spain, and decreeing that they should be seized, brought before a military commission, and shot. Those persons who had sworn homage to the Intruder, compulsory as that homage was, had unquestionably exposed themselves to its possible consequences: they had been forced into a situation in which the only alternative was to become traitors to him, or traitors to their country: but by what law or what logic were they traitors to France, a country to which they owed no allegiance, and with which they had contracted no obligation?

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*November.**Movements  
against  
Castaños.*

From Burgos Marshals Ney and Victor were dispatched with their divisions to act on the rear of Castaños, and cut off his retreat, while Lasnes, with 30,000 men, should attack him in front. This last remaining army of the Spaniards is represented by the French as consisting of 80,000 men, of whom three-fourths were armed. But the nominal force of the conjoined armies under Castaños and Palafox was only 65,000, and the effective soldiers hardly more than half that amount. Many of the Andalusian troops had returned to their homes after the first success, and many more had remained at Madrid, so that though some thousands (mostly from Valencia) had joined Castaños, his force was little more numerous than it had been at Baylen. His own opinion was decidedly against risking an action in which there could be no reasonable hope of advantage; but the commissioner, D. Francisco Palafox, to whom the power of overruling the General had been madly entrusted by the Central Junta, determined that a battle should be fought, and Castaños therefore was compelled to fight, lest he should be stigmatized as a traitor, and murdered by his own men, or torn to pieces by a mob. Already the Conde de Montijo, who left the army at this time, was every where accusing him of treachery, because he had warmly opposed a determination, the fatal consequences of which he certainly foresaw.

*Battle of  
Tudela.*

The plan of the French against this army was the same as that which they had practised against Blake's; they meant to rout it by a

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powerful attack in front, and to destroy the fugitives by intercepting them with a second force in their flight. Their destruction was considered to be as certain as their defeat, but Ney was less expeditious in his movements than had been calculated; and Castaños hearing on the 21st that this corps was advancing upon Soria, while Lasnes and Moncey approached from the side of Logroño and Lodosa, abandoned Calahorra and fell back upon Tudela. On the 22d Lasnes entered Calahorra and Alfaro, and at day-break on the following morning he found the Spaniards drawn up in seven divisions, with their right before Tudela, and their left extending along a line of from four to five miles upon a range of easy heights. The Aragonese, who had joined only a few hours before by forced marches, were on the right, the Valencians and the troops of New Castille in the centre, the Andalusians on the left. Their line was covered by forty pieces of artillery. Situations were chosen by the enemy for planting sixty pieces against them; but upon seeing their own relative strength, and the confusion which was observable among the Spaniards, they preferred a more summary mode of attack. General Maurice Mathieu, with a division of infantry, forced the Spanish centre; and General Lefebvre, with the cavalry, passing through, wheeled to the left, and coming in the rear of the Aragonese, at a time when that wing, having withstood an attack, supposed itself victorious, the fate of the battle was decided. At the same



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time Lagrange, with his division, attacked the left; a brave, and in some part a successful resistance was opposed; and the action, which began in the morning, was prolonged on this side till darkness enabled Lapeña's division to fall back from Cascante to Tarazona, where the first and third divisions were stationed, and had not been engaged. There too the second division arrived, which had been ordered to support Lapeña; but though it received these orders at noon, and the distance which it had to march was only two leagues, either from incapacity in the leaders, or want of order, it did not arrive till night, after the action was decided.

*Retreat of  
the defeated  
army.*

According to the French 4000 Spaniards fell in this battle, 3000 men, 300 officers, and thirty pieces of cannon were taken, their own loss not amounting to 500. The right wing, dispersing and escaping how it could, assembled again at Zaragoza, with some of the central division also, there to prove that their failure in the field had not been for want of courage. As soon as the wreck of the left had collected at Tarazona, Castaños ordered them to begin their march by way of Borja to Calatayud. It was midnight, and at the moment when they were setting forward a chapel, which served as a magazine, blew up. Many shells went off after the explosion; this occasioned an opinion that an enemy's battery might be playing upon them, and the Royal Carabineers, in the midst of the confusion, fancying that the chapel was occupied by the French, pre-

sented themselves sword in hand to charge it. Presently a cry of treason was set up; it spread rapidly; misfortune in such times is always deemed a proof of treachery; those troops who had not been engaged could not understand wherefore they were ordered to retreat, and at such an hour; a general distrust prevailed; some corps dispersed, and they who remained together were in a fearful state of insubordination. They retreated however through Borja and Ricla, without stopping in either place, and on the night of the 25th reached Calatayud.

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On that same day Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit, .. too late to make any prisoners. Ney arrived on the day following. He had been ordered to reach Agreda on the 23d, which, if he had done, the wreck of this army must have been destroyed; but he found a pretext for delay in the fatigue of his men, and a cause in the pillage of Soria. The people of that city, unmindful of the example which the Numantines had set them upon that very ground, opened their gates to the enemy. This did not save them from being plundered. Their church, and their rich wool-factors, afforded good spoil to the French; and for the sake of this booty, and that he might extort all he could from the inhabitants, Ney remained there three days, not because his men had been over-marched. But this delay enabled Castaños to reach Calatayud. He had thus escaped the danger of immediate pursuit, and men and officers had leisure now to feel the

*Their de-  
plorable  
condition  
at Cala-  
tayud.*

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whole wretchedness of their situation. There were neither magazines nor stores here; the system of supplying the troops, which before had been miserably incomplete, was at an end, and the military chest, containing two million *reales*, had been conveyed to Zaragoza. Desperate with hunger, the men broke through all restraint, and the inhabitants fled from their houses, hardly less dismayed at the temper of their own soldiers than at the vicinity of the French. The muleteers attached to the baggage and artillery could obtain no payment, nor food either for their animals or themselves; such as could find opportunity threw away the baggage, mounted their beasts, and rode away; others abandoned them altogether, cursing their ill fortune, and yet glad to escape with their lives. The soldiers, having nothing else to stay the cravings of hunger, devoured cabbage leaves, or whatever crude vegetables they could find, and many literally dropped for want.

*They are  
ordered to  
approach  
Madrid.*

Here Palafox and the Aragonese army expected that Castaños would have rallied, have made a stand, and, acting on the offensive as circumstances permitted, have saved Zaragoza from a second siege, or at least have delayed its evil day. They who formed this expectation did not reckon upon the activity of the enemy, and imputed to their own government a promptitude and power which it was far from possessing. Had the defeat of the central army been apprehended in time, and measures

taken for supporting it, one of the first objects would have been to have strengthened this point. There had been no such foresight. The French were in pursuit, and orders arrived from Morla, who was one of the council of war, requiring Castaños to hasten with his army to the defence of the capital. He consulted accordingly with the chiefs of division, and they resolved to march by way of Sigüenza; from whence they might either repair to Somosierra, if that strong position should still be retained, or to Madrid, if such a movement should be more advisable. In that direction, therefore, they recommenced their retreat, after one day's rest.

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The Central Junta, mean while, was occupying itself with measures ill adapted to such times. While Blake's army was fighting, day after day, without clothing, without food, and without reinforcements to recruit its ranks, they passed a decree for the establishment of a special tribunal, to try all persons accused of treason; its object being not more to bring such as were guilty to deserved punishment, than to rescue from suspicion and danger those who were unjustly suspected; for, under the existing circumstances of Spain, they said, the people having suffered so much from treachery, would naturally suspect all those whose conduct it did not fully comprehend. The tribunal, which was composed of members from each of the great councils of state, was to have a jurisdiction over persons of all ranks: but not to carry into execution any sen-

*Measures of  
the Central  
Junta.*

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tence of death, confiscation, or dismissal from office, till they laid the whole case before the Supreme Junta. A certain number of its members might carry on the ordinary business, but a writ for the arrest of any person, or the sequestration of his goods, must be issued by the whole. Especial provisions were made to prevent secret arrest, or long confinement; and the papers of the accused were not to be detained, as soon as it was ascertained that they contained no relation to the matter with which he was charged. No proceedings were to take place upon anonymous information, nor was any informer to be admitted, who would not consent to let his name be known. The humanity of these provisions is in such direct opposition to the practice of the holy office, that it seems to have been the intention of the framers of this tribunal to render their state inquisition as unlike as possible to that curse and disgrace of their country. The tribunal was particularly charged to inquire into the conduct of those persons who had gone as deputies to Bayonne, or who had submitted to the Intruder at Madrid; endeavouring carefully to distinguish between what was compulsory and what was their own act and deed; and proceeding with the caution and prudence required, where, on the one hand, the public safety was at stake, and, on the other, the reputation of many good and honourable citizens. And when their investigations had established the innocence of any one, they were to consult with the Supreme

Junta upon the means of restoring to him all the credit and respectability which he had formerly enjoyed.

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By another decree, dated on the day when Castaños was defeated at Tudela, they resolved that honorary militias should be formed in all towns which were not in the scene of war, in order to prevent disorders, and to arrest robbers, deserters, and ill-disposed persons. A more remarkable measure related to the Ex-Jesuits: their banishment was repealed, and they were permitted to return to any part of Spain, and there enjoy their pensions. The reason assigned was, that it was a miserable thing for them to be expatriated, to live far from their friends and kin, and be abandoned to the mercy of strangers; that it was now become difficult to furnish them with the pensions assigned to them by the crown; and that the sums thus allotted were so much withdrawn from the circulating specie of the kingdom, to increase that of foreign and even of hostile countries. This late act of humanity to the poor survivors of an injured community, is not at any time to be censured; but it is extraordinary that at such a time it should have occupied the attention of the Junta.

Of these measures, all would have been unexceptionable, and even praise-worthy, had they been well-timed; but the Central Junta still pursued the fatal system of deceiving the people as to the extent and imminence of their danger.

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**Nov. 21.**

They addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, saying, that they had taken all the measures in their power for defeating the enemy, who, continuing his attacks, had advanced to the neighbourhood of Somosierra; and that the number of the French there hardly amounted to 8000 men. The enthusiasm with which the soldiers were preparing to beat the enemies of their country, they said, and their confidence in their valour, was not to be expressed; and the English were ready to march from the Escorial, to reinforce the position chosen by the able general whom the Junta had appointed, and to support the operations of the van, who, by that time, were already engaged with the slaves of the tyrant.

With such representations did the government endeavour to deceive the people of Madrid, and lull them into a feeling of security, when its duty was, to have told them the whole extent of their danger, and manfully roused them to those exertions which the emergency required. But they themselves still in some degree partook the delusion which they inspired. Their confidence in the Spanish character was too well founded ever to be shaken; and they relied, with little reflection, upon the natural strength of the country. Their present hope was upon the pass of the Somosierra. D. Benito San Juan, a judicious and able officer, of high reputation, was stationed there with the remains of the Extremaduran army, which had with great prompti-

tude been reinforced. The Junta did not call to mind with how little difficulty Vedel had forced the stronger passes of the Sierra Morena.

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Buonaparte continued at Aranda till the 29th, when his head-quarters were removed to Bocaguillas, a village upon the skirts of the Somosierra. There he learnt that about 6000 men were entrenched upon the heights of Sepulveda, and that a stronger body occupied the pass. The advanced guard was attacked without the success which the French expected; but the Spaniards, instead of being encouraged by this advantage, forsook their entrenchments and dispersed. On the following morning the enemy, under M. Victor, attempted the pass. Sixteen pieces of cannon had been well placed to flank the ascent, and some attempts had been made to break up the road; but this easy means of defence had been so imperfectly performed, that the pass was won by a charge of Polish lancers. They were favoured in their approach by a thick fog; but the Spaniards must have strangely neglected the advantage of the ground, when they suffered a strong mountain defile to be taken by a charge of light horse. The men, fancying themselves betrayed, betrayed themselves by their own fears; they threw away their arms, and dispersed among the hills, leaving all the artillery and baggage to the enemy. And now the way to Madrid was open.

*Pass of the  
Somosierra  
forced.*

*Nov. 30.*

During the series of disasters which thus rapidly succeeded each other, there had been no



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*November.**The Central  
Junta retire  
from Aran-  
juez.**Jovellanos's  
Memorial,  
p. ii. § 44.*

time for the Junta to think of removing their residence to the capital, still less for them to take into consideration, on the appointed day, the plan for forming a Regency, and convoking the Cortes. They began now to feel themselves insecure at Aranjuez; . . already advanced parties of the French had approached the Tagus; wherever they went there was no armed force to oppose them; they had appeared at Villarejo on the 28th, on the 30th at Mostoles; and if at this time two or three hundred horse, with a few infantry, had pushed on to Aranjuez, they might with perfect ease have surprised the Junta, and by depriving Spain of its government, have inflicted upon it a more dangerous injury than all which it had hitherto suffered in the field. This opportunity was overlooked by Buonaparte; and the Junta, sensible of their danger when the consequences of the defeat at Tudela and the rout at Somosierra were known, deliberated whither to retire. Florida-Blanca, who was sinking under the burthen of years and the anxieties of his situation, was for removing at once to Cadiz, and a few others agreed with him. Jovellanos, who added to his other virtues that of perfect calmness and intrepidity under any danger, represented that this would be sacrificing too much for safety; and that the honour of the government, as well as the public service, required that it should establish itself as near as possible to the theatre of war. . Toledo was named, and rejected,

as having nothing but its situation to defend it. Cordoba and Seville were proposed, but liable to the same objection; and Badajoz, which was the place that Jovellanos advised, was chosen: the provinces every where were open to the enemy, but Badajoz was a strong place, from whence the Junta might correspond with the British army, and with that which Romana was now re-forming in the northern provinces from the dispersed troops of Blake and the Conde de Belveder. There they could take measures for raising new armies in Extremadura and Andalusia; and if the French should overrun those provinces, which there was now nothing to prevent them from doing, they might thence pass through Portugal to those northern parts where the founders of the Spanish monarchy had found an asylum from the Moors; and where its restorers, animated with the same spirit, might, in like manner, Jovellanos thought, maintain the independence of their country. They were to halt at Toledo on the way, and there take such measures as circumstances might require.

Two days before the passage of the Somo-

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*December.*

*State of  
Madrid.*

sierra orders had been given to arm and embody the people of Madrid. The people were ready and willing, but this measure had been too long delayed; nevertheless a permanent Junta was formed, to maintain order, and provide for the defence of the capital; and the latter object was especially entrusted to Morla and to the Marques de Castelar. Now indeed was the time for that

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city to have emulated Zaragoza, and the spirit was not wanting in the inhabitants, had there been one commanding mind to have directed them. Priests and regulars came forward to bear arms, and old men, and women, and boys offered themselves for the service of their country; . . for this purpose leaving their houses open, and their property to take its chance, they employed themselves in opening trenches, erecting batteries, and barricading the streets. The pavements were torn up, and women and children carried the stones to the tops of the houses, to be used from thence against the enemy. Parapets were made on the houses, and the doors stopped with mattresses. Whatever arms were in the possession of individuals were brought forth, and about 8000 muskets were distributed. The troops who were in the city, and the armed inhabitants, were now assembled in the Prado, that they might be distributed to their appointed stations; the first step for establishing that order without which all efforts in defence of the city would be ineffectual. Great confusion prevailed, and when the people called out for cartridges, Morla coolly replied, that there were none. Happy had it been for Morla, if the indignation which this proof of negligence excited had been directed against himself; had he then perished under the hands of the mob, the treachery which he was preparing would never have been known on earth, and he would have escaped perpetual infamy. But his character stood so high, that no

suspicion pointed towards him. It happened that among those cartridges which had been delivered in the morning some were found containing sand instead of gunpowder; they had probably been made by some dishonest workman, or mischievous lad; but in such a time of feverish irritation and imminent danger, the fact was of course imputed to a deep-laid scheme of treason, and the Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime was laid. The Duque del Infantado was informed that a mob was hastening toward the house of this unfortunate nobleman, and that he and his family were in the greatest peril. Infantado himself seems to have thought there was guilt somewhere; he repaired instantly to the spot, meaning to deliver over the suspected persons to a proper tribunal, by which they might be tried; but before he arrived Perales\* had been pierced with wounds, and his dead body dragged upon a mat through the streets, the rabble accompanying it, and exulting in what they believed his deserved punishment.

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December.*Marques de  
Perales  
murdered  
by the po-  
pulace.*

The permanent Junta, who held their sittings at the post-office, as the most central point, taking into consideration the proximity of their danger, thought that more reliance was to be placed upon succour from without, than on any exertions of the inhabitants. These persons were in truth

*The Duque  
del Infan-  
tado sent to  
the central  
army.*

\* M. Nellerto (Llorente) kills him twice: Once on the flight of the Intruder from Madrid, preliminarily, (t. i. p. 143); and secondly and definitively on this occasion. T. i. p. 159.

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*Manifiesto  
del Duque  
del Infantado, i. 10.*

*Madrid  
summoned  
to surren-  
der.*

unequal to the arduous situation in which they were placed; even the example of Zaragoza had not taught them what wonders might be effected in a civic defence; and they did not consider, that as the first insurrection, and the consequent massacre at Madrid, had roused all Spain to arms, a greater impulse would now be given if the capital opposed a determined resistance. They agreed therefore to content themselves with such efforts as might prevent the enemy from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant terms of capitulation. If by this means time could be gained for a diversion to be effected, or a successful attempt made in their favour, it would be well; but if not, their minds were subdued to this. They counted upon succour from San Juan's troops, many of whom were now arriving, and they dispatched Infantado to meet the remains of the central army, and bring it with all speed to the relief of Madrid. On the 2d of December, therefore, early in the morning, the Duke set out on this forlorn commission, accompanied by the Duque de Albuquerque and a small escort.

Only an hour or two after their departure, Bessieres, with the French cavalry, came within sight of Madrid, and took possession of the heights. Buonaparte arrived at noon on the same day, being the anniversary of his coronation. There were not more than 6000 troops in the city, but there were ten times as many men ready to lay down their lives in its defence; and

the sight of the enemy excited indignation, not dismay. It was apparent that there was a total want of order among the people, but that they were in a state of feeling which might render them truly formidable: the bells of all the churches and convents were sounding, and from time to time the shouts of the multitude were heard, and the beat of drums. Preparations had been made which evinced at once the zeal and the ignorance of those by whom they were directed; the batteries were so low, that it was easy for the French to plant their guns where they could completely command them; and they were so near the wall, that there was scarcely room to work them, and the men would suffer more by the broken stones than the direct effect of the enemy's shot. Buonaparte thought it easier to force the city than he would have found it; but though insensible to any humane considerations, policy made him desirous of avoiding that extremity. Such a catastrophe might inflame the continent as well as Spain, by proclaiming to all Europe how utterly the Spaniards abhorred the yoke under which he had undertaken to subject them. An aide-de-camp of Marshal Bessieres was therefore sent to summon the town in form; he was seized by the people, and would have been torn to pieces if the soldiers had not protected him. No communication could be opened that day with those who wished to deliver up the capital. In the evening the French infantry came up; arrangements for an attack in

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*December.**Infantado,*  
*p. 4.*

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the morning were made by moonlight; and at midnight a Spanish Colonel, who had been taken at Somosierra, was sent with a letter from M. Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to the Marques de Castelar, exhorting him not to expose Madrid to the horrors of an assault. Castelar replied, that he must consult the constituted authorities, and ascertain also how the people were affected by their present circumstances before he could give an answer; and he requested a suspension of arms for the ensuing day.

*Morla  
treats for  
a capitula-  
tion.*

This reply was sent on the morning of the 3rd. Before it arrived an attack had been commenced upon the Buen Retiro, the favourite palace of Philip IV. which had been fortified with some care, as a point from whence the city might be commanded. Thirty pieces of cannon soon made a breach in the walls, and the place was carried, after a thousand Spaniards had fallen in defending it. The other outlets which had been fortified were won also, but the French were repulsed from the gates of Fuencarral and Segovia. Some shells were thrown, in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants. In the forenoon of the ensuing day Berthier sent in a second summons. “Immense batteries,” said he, “are mounted, mines are prepared to blow up your principal buildings, columns of troops are at the entrances of the town, of which some companies of sharp-shooters have made themselves masters. But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories, suspends the attack till two o’clock. To

defend Madrid is contrary to the principles of war, and inhuman towards the inhabitants. The town ought to seek protection for its peaceable inhabitants, and oblivion for the past." The firing ceased, and at five in the afternoon Morla and D. Bernardo Yriarte came out to Berthier's tent. They assured him that Madrid was without resources, and that it would be the height of madness to continue its defence, but that the populace and the volunteers from the country were determined to persevere in defending it. They themselves were convinced that this was hopeless, and requested a pause of a few hours, that they might make the people understand their real situation.. Hopeless, and without resources, when threescore thousand men were ready to defend their streets, and doors, and chambers! This would not have been said if Palafox had been in Madrid.

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These unworthy deputies were introduced to Buonaparte, and one of those theatrical displays ensued in which he delighted to exhibit himself. *Speech of Buonaparte to the deputies.* "You use the name of the people to no purpose," said he; "if you cannot appease them, and restore tranquillity, it is because you have inflamed them, and led them astray by propagating falsehoods. Call together the clergy, the heads of convents, the Alcaldes, the men of property and influence, and let the city capitulate before six in the morning, or it shall cease to exist. I will not withdraw my troops, nor ought I to withdraw them. You have murdered the unfortunate



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French prisoners who fell into your hands; and only a few days ago you suffered two persons in the suite of the Russian Ambassador to be dragged through the streets, and killed, because they were Frenchmen. The incapacity and the cowardice of a General put into your power troops who capitulated on the field of battle, and that capitulation has been violated. You, M. Morla, what sort of an epistle did you write to that General? Perhaps it becomes you, Sir, to talk of pillage; you, who, when you entered Rousillon, carried off all the women, and distributed them as booty among your soldiers. Besides, what right had you to use such language? the capitulation precluded you from it. See what has been the conduct of the English, who are yet far from piquing themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They cried out against the convention of Portugal, but they have fulfilled it. To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilization; it is placing generals on a footing with the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you then presume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and ill faith always recoil upon the guilty! I had a fleet at Cadiz, it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks; and rather than disarm it, I would have seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced to precipitate it afterwards down the rocks at Espinosa. I

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would rather have seven thousand more enemies to fight than be wanting in honour and good faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o'clock in the morning; come back at that hour, if you have to announce the submission of the people; otherwise you and your troops shall be all put to the sword." Had there been a Spaniard present to have replied as became him in behalf of his country, Buonaparte would have trembled at the reply, like Felix before the Apostle.

The enemy had now been three days before Madrid, and the ardour of the people was deadened by delay and distrust. Deserted and betrayed as they were, they knew not in whom to confide, and therefore began to feel that it behoved every one to provide for his own safety. During the night the strangers who had come to assist in the defence of the capital, and such of the inhabitants as had been most zealous in the national cause, left a scene where they were not allowed to exert themselves; and at ten o'clock on the morning of the 5th the French General Belliard took the command of the city. Morla's first stipulation was, that the catholic apostolic Roman religion should be preserved, and no other legally tolerated. No person was to be molested for his political opinions, or writings, nor for what he had done in obedience to the former government, nor the people, for the efforts which they had made in their defence. It was as easy for the tyrant to grant this, as to break it whenever he might think proper. The

*Surrender  
of Madrid.*

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fifth article required that no contributions should be exacted beyond the ordinary ones. This was granted till the realm should definitely be organized; and, with the same qualifying reserve, it was agreed, that the laws, customs, and courts of justice should be preserved. Another article required, that the French officers and troops should not be quartered in private houses nor in convents. This was granted with a proviso, that the troops should have quarters and tents furnished conformably to military regulations, . . regulations which placed houses and convents at their mercy. The Spanish troops were to march out with the honours of war, but without their arms and cannon: the armed peasantry to leave their weapons, and return to their abodes. They who had enlisted among the troops of the line within the last four months were discharged from their engagements, and might return home; the rest should be prisoners of war till an exchange took place, which, it was added, should immediately commence between equal numbers, rank for rank. It was asked that the public debts and engagements should be faithfully discharged; but this, it was replied, being a political object, belonged to the cognizance of the assembly of the realm, and depended on the general administration. The last article stipulated, that those generals who might wish to continue in Madrid should preserve their rank, and such as were desirous of quitting it, should be at liberty so to do. This was granted; but their pay was only

to continue till the kingdom received its ultimate organization.

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*Decrees  
issued by  
Buonaparte.*

Notwithstanding the formality with which the soldiers were included in this capitulation, very few of them remained to be subject to its conditions. Castelar and all the military officers of rank refused to enter into any terms, and, with the main body of the troops and sixteen guns, marched out of the city on the night of the 4th, and effected their retreat. The Council of Castille, which had already suffered the just reproaches of their country, had now to endure the censure of the tyrant whom they had supported while his power was predominant, and disowned when the tide turned against him. He issued a decree, whereby, considering that that Council had shown, in the exercise of its functions, as much falsehood as weakness, and that, after having published the renunciation of the Bourbons, and acknowledged the right of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne, it had had the baseness to declare that it had signed those documents with secret reservations, he displaced them, as cowards, unworthy to be the magistrates of a brave and generous nation. Care, however, was taken to except those who had been cautious enough not to sign the recantation. At the same time another decree was passed, abolishing the Inquisition, as incompatible with the sovereign power, and with the civil authority. Its property was to be united to the domains of Spain, as a guarantee for the public debt. A third de-

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cree reduced the number of existing convents to one-third. This was to be effected by uniting the members of several convents in one; and no novice was to be admitted or professed till the number of religioners of either sex should be reduced to one-third of their present amount. All novices were ordered to quit their respective convents within a fortnight; and those who, having professed, wished to change their mode of life, and to live as secular ecclesiastics, were permitted so to do, and a pension secured to them, to be regulated by their age, but neither exceeding 4000 reales, nor falling short of 3000. From the possessions of the suppressed convents, a sum was to be set apart sufficient for increasing the proportion of the parish priests, so that the lowest salary should amount to 2400 reales; the surplus of this property should be united to the national domains; half of it appropriated to guarantee the public debt, the other to reimburse the provinces and cities the expenses occasioned by supplying the armies, and to indemnify the losses caused by the war. Provincial custom-houses were abolished, and all seignorial courts of justice; no other jurisdiction being permitted to exist than the royal courts; and another decree, premising that one of the greatest abuses in the finances of Spain arose from the alienation of different branches of the imposts, which were, in their nature, unalienable, enacted, that every individual in possession, either by grant, sale, or any other means, of any portion of the civil

or ecclesiastical imposts, should cease to receive them.

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Buonaparte now addressed a proclamation to the Spaniards. What possible result, he asked them, could attend even the success of some campaigns? Nothing but an endless war upon their own soil. It had cost him only a few marches to defeat their armies, and he would soon drive the English from the peninsula. Thus, to the rights which had been ceded him by the princes of the last dynasty, he had added the right of conquest: that, however, should not make any alteration in his intentions. His wish was to be their regenerator. All that obstructed their prosperity and their greatness, he had destroyed; he had broken the chains which bore the people down; and, instead of an absolute monarchy, had given them a limited one, with a free constitution. The conclusion of this proclamation was in a spirit of blasphemy, hitherto confined to the barbarous countries of Africa or the East. "Should all my efforts," said he, "prove fruitless, and should you not merit my confidence, nothing will remain for me but to treat you as conquered provinces, and to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then set the crown of Spain upon my own head, and cause it to be respected by the guilty; *for God has given me power and inclination to surmount all obstacles.*"

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*Proclamation to the Spaniards.*

But though Buonaparte had thus easily dispersed the Spanish armies, and made himself

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*Change in  
Buona-  
parte's  
views con-  
cerning  
Spain.*

*De Pradt,*  
180.

*Rocca, 24.*  
55.

master of Madrid, his triumph was not without alloy. He now perceived with what utter ignorance of the national character he had formed the scheme of this usurpation, and he complained of having been deceived, when, in reality, he had turned a deaf ear to all who would have dissuaded him from his purpose. Till he arrived at Madrid, the people, as well as the armies, had disappeared before him; the towns and cities were abandoned as his troops approached. Twelve months before there was no other country wherein his exploits were regarded with such unmingled admiration; they had a character of exaggerated greatness which suited the Spanish mind, and as he had always been the ally of Spain, no feeling of hostility or humiliation existed to abate this sentiment: now, it was not to be disguised from himself that he was universally detested there as a perfidious tyrant. But policy, as well as pride, withheld him from receding; unless he went through with what he had begun, he must confess himself fallible, and let the world see that his power was not equal to his will, and then the talisman of his fortune would have been broken. He had committed the crime and incurred the odium; wherefore then should he not reap the benefit, and secure the prize, not for a brother, whom he began to regard with contempt as the mere puppet of his pleasure, but for himself? This was a feeling which he did not conceal from those who possessed his confidence; and Joseph, and the unworthy ministers

who had abased themselves to serve him, were made to perceive it, by the manner in which Napoleon, regardless even of appearances, issued edicts in his own name, as in a kingdom of his own. The obstinacy of the Spaniards in refusing to acknowledge his brother, he thought, would give him ere long a pretext for treating the country as his own by right of conquest. Meantime no interval was to be allowed them for collecting the wreck of their forces to make another stand.

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*De Pradt,*  
222. 225.

Three days before the battle of Somosierra, Castaños, with his broken army, recommenced their retreat from Calatayud. Some ten miles west of that city, near the village of Buvierca, the high road to Madrid passes through a narrow gorge, where the river Xalon has forced or found its way between two great mountain ridges. When D. Francisco Xavier Venegas, with the rear-guard, consisting of 5000 men, reached this place, he found instructions from the Commander-in-chief, requesting him to suspend his march, and take measures for defending the pass, on which, he said, the safety of the other divisions depended; and he desired him to place the troops whom he selected for this purpose under such officers as would volunteer their services, promising to reward them in proportion to the importance and danger of the duty. Venegas was too well aware of its importance to trust the command to any but himself, and he replied, that he would halt there till the rest of

*Retreat of  
the central  
army.*



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the army was beyond the reach of pursuit. Early on the 29th the French came up, 8000 in number, under Mathieu. They commenced an attack at eight o'clock, which continued for eight hours: the Spaniards suffered severely; but they maintained the pass, and they effectually disabled this part of the French army from pursuing. On the evening of the following day the army reached Sigüenza with all the artillery which they took with them from Tarazona, notwithstanding the bad state of the roads and the fatigue of the men, who had been allowed no rest upon this last march. Here Castaños received a summons from the Central Junta, and resigned the command to Don Manuel de Lapeña.

*Lapeña  
succeeds to  
the com-  
mand.*

The situation to which this general succeeded was deplorable. The artillery had indeed been saved, and the pass of Buvierca most gallantly maintained; nevertheless the army had suffered during its retreat from all the accumulated evils of disorder, insubordination, nakedness, and cold, and hunger, and fatigue. Sometimes when the rear-guard had been on the point of taking food, the enemy came in sight, and the ready meal was abandoned to the pursuers; this, though it was the effect as much of panic in the soldiers as of any want of conduct in their commanders, gave new cause for dissatisfaction and distrust. The men themselves were ready to fly at sight of the French, because they suspected their leaders, yet they accused their leaders of treachery for not always turning and making head against the

enemy, . . not reflecting, that the officers in like manner, though from a different motive, could place no confidence in their men. Many dropped on the way, overmarched, or foundered for want of shoes; others turned aside because they considered the army as entirely broken up: they were ready to die for their country, but it was folly, they thought, to squander their lives, and, under the present circumstances, their duty was to preserve themselves, and recover strength for future service. The loss at Buvierca, too, had been considerable. Before they reached Siguenza the four divisions had thus been wasted down to 8000 men.

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It was on the evening of the last day of November that they reached this point. Here message after message arrived, requiring them to hasten with all possible speed to Somosierra. They set forward again the following day, the infantry by Atienza and Jadraque, the horse and artillery by Guadalajara, in order to avoid the bad roads, leaving the river Henares on their right. This plan was soon changed; advices reached them in the middle of the night at Jadraque, that the pass of Somosierra had been lost. It was now determined that the whole army should march for Guadalajara, for the defence of Madrid; information of this movement was dispatched to the Marques de Castelar, in that city; and persons were sent, some to ascertain the position of the enemy, others to learn whither San-Juan had retreated, in order that

*They arrive  
at Guada-  
laxara.*

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*Dec. 2.*

some operations might be concerted with him.

The next day, when the foremost troops entered

Guadalaxara, they found some detached parties

of the enemy in the town, whom they drove out :

the first and fourth divisions, the horse and the

artillery, arrived there that night; here the news

was, that Madrid was attacked, and the con-

tinual firing which was heard confirmed it. Poor

as the numbers were which they could carry to

the capital, they were eager to be there; and if

Madrid had been protected, as it might have

been, by a British army, or defended as the in-

habitants, had it not been for treachery, would

have defended it, 8000 men, who stood by their

colours under so many hopeless circumstances,

would have brought an important succour. The

inhabitants relied with great confidence upon this

reinforcement; . . they expected hourly that these

brave men would appear, and take post beside

them at their gates, and in their streets; and

one of the most successful artifices by which

the traitors who made the capitulation depressed

their zeal, was by reporting that a second battle

had been fought, in which the army of the centre

had been entirely defeated by Marshal Ney, so

that no possible succour could be expected from

it. At the very time when this falsehood was

reported, a part of this brave army was only nine

leagues from Madrid, impatient to proceed to its

assistance. They were, however, compelled to

remain inactive the whole of the next day, wait-

ing for the second and third divisions and the

van, which did not come up till the day following.

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*The Duque  
del Infantado joins  
them.*

On that day the Duque del Infantado joined them, having passed safely through the advanced posts of the French by favour of a thick fog. A council of war was held; the urgent danger of the capital was represented by the Duke, and low as his hopes had fallen, when he saw the deplorable state to which the remains of the army were reduced by fatigue and hunger, it was nevertheless determined that an effort should be made, not to attack the besiegers, for this would have been madness, but to collect as large a convoy of provisions as they could, and endeavour to enter with it under cover of the night by the Atocha gate. The Duke, however, knew but too well the situation of the metropolis; and at his suggestion a letter was sent to the French General who commanded before the walls, reminding him that a great number of French were in the hands of the Spaniards, and would be held responsible with their lives for any ill treatment which might be offered to the inhabitants of Madrid. Both the officer and the trumpet were detained prisoners by Buonaparte's orders.

The troops were now mustered, and it was then perceived what they had lost in number, and how severely they had suffered during this fearful retreat. From 6000 to 7000 infantry, and about 1500 cavalry, were all that could be brought together; men and horses alike exhausted by fatigue and hunger; many indeed

*Condition  
of the  
troops.*

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had fallen and perished by the way. Here for the first time they found something like relief, great numbers not having tasted bread for eight days: they had now sufficient food, and there was cloth enough in the manufactory there to supply every man with a *poncho*, the rude garment of the Indians about Buenos Ayres, which the Spaniards have adopted for its simplicity and convenience. Meantime the French were collecting in their neighbourhood; they occupied Alcala and the adjoining villages, and some skirmishes took place at Meca. Buonaparte had been informed of their movements, and as soon as Madrid capitulated, Bessieres was dispatched to Guadalaxara with a considerable force of horse, and Victor followed with infantry. The first business of Lapeña was to disencumber himself of his superfluous artillery, for they had brought off no fewer than sixty pieces of cannon. Forty of these, to preserve them from the enemy, were sent across the Tagus at Sacedon, and these were safely forwarded to Carthagená. The van, under Venegas, which had saved the army at Buvierca, arrived on the night of the 4th. Its losses had been replaced by drafts; the post of honour and of danger had been assigned it during the whole of this retreat, and it continued to cover the movements of the other divisions. Two of them were leaving Guadalaxara when it arrived, the second and third followed the next noon, in two columns, proceeding by two roads to Santorcaz: this division began to follow them, but before it

was out of one gate, the advanced guard of the enemy entered at another.

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Venegas perceived the importance of a position to the south of the city, lying directly between the two roads to Santorcaz, and he immediately occupied it. The battalions (*tercios*) of Ledesma and Salamanca, which formed the rear of the third division, perceived his intention, and turned back and joined him; their commanding officers, D. Luis de Lacy and D. Alexandre de Hore, being ambitious of bearing part in the action which they expected. The French were in great force opposite on the right bank of the Henares; some of their detachments forded both on the right and left of the Spaniards' position; but light troops had been stationed on both the flanks, who skirmished with them, and repelled them till night. The position was judged too formidable in front to be attacked, and the main body of the French halted during the whole evening, not choosing to cross the river. Having thus obtained time for the army to perform its march, which was all he hoped or wanted, Venegas broke up three hours after the darkness had closed, and continued his retreat in good order without the loss of a single man. The Commander now took up a position at Santorcaz, a little village about two leagues east of Alcala, between the rivers Henares and Tajuna. There he learnt the fate of Madrid. The French now evacuated Alcala, and extended themselves along the heights at the back of Meca, and along the

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*They retire  
towards the  
Tagus.*

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banks of the Jarama, pushing their advanced parties to Arganda, Morata, and other places in that neighbourhood. The plan of Lapeña and his officers under these circumstances was, to cross the Tagus at Aranjuez, and take shelter, if necessary, among the mountains of Toledo. With this intent they marched to Villarejo de Salvanes. A few poor soldiers, who dropped behind at Nuevo-Bastan, were sabred by the French with that cruelty which at this time so frequently characterised and disgraced their armies.

*Passage of  
the Tagus.*

On the 6th, when they were about to proceed to Aranjuez, tidings came that the French were in possession of that place, and this was confirmed by an express from General Llamas, who had vainly attempted to resist the enemy there with a few armed peasantry, and a few soldiers who had escaped from Madrid. New difficulties now presented themselves to the remnant of this harassed army. To look towards Toledo was become hopeless: it was equally hopeless to make for Andalusia, for the French General, Ruffin, as soon as he had obtained possession of Aranjuez, crossed the Tagus, and, pushing on as far as Ocaña, cut off their retreat in that direction. Nothing remained but to cross the Tagus by boats at Villamanrique, Fuenteduenas, Estramera, and other places where there were ferries, and make for the Sierras of Cuenca. There it was hoped they might be able to rest, rally the stragglers, and again unite in numbers sufficient to take vengeance for all their sufferings. Ha-

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zardous as it was to cross the river in this manner, with an enemy so near at hand, it was effected with rare good fortune; the French had not foreseen the attempt, and not a man nor a gun was lost. Having gained the left bank of the river, they hastened on their retreat, and headquarters were established on the 7th at Belinchon. The second division, under General Grimanest, which crossed at Villamanrique, was the only one which was endangered. This having effected the passage, took up a position at Santa Cruz, between Aranjuez and Ucles, where it was attacked on the night of the 8th by a corps of Bessieres' division, under General Montbrun. Finding themselves unable to maintain the position against a force which was superior to their own, they abandoned it before they sustained any loss.

The first and fourth divisions mutinied on their march to Yedra, where they were to be stationed. *Some of the troops mutiny.* This was ascribed to the intrigues of some traitorous agents, as well as to the unprincipled ambition of a few officers, desirous, in these times of insubordination, to exalt themselves by flattering the soldiers and slandering their commanders. It was easy to inflame the men, who imputed all their misfortunes to treason, and were already in a state of great insubordination. They insisted upon marching to Madrid, that they might attack the enemy there; an artillery officer was at their head; and the guns were planted to prevent the troops from proceeding in the direction where they had been ordered. A difference of



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opinion among themselves prevented the execution of this mad purpose; some were for hastening to Despeñaperros, to take their post in the passes of the Sierra Morena for the defence of Andalusia. This afforded opportunity for the General to reason with them, and pacify them for a while. In consequence of this circumstance, the difficulty which daily increased of subsisting the troops, their increasing wants, and the rapid desertions which were naturally occasioned by privations, want of hope, and total relaxation of discipline, Lapeña assembled his general officers at Alcazar de Huete. The Duque del Infantado, and Llamas, who had joined them at Villarejo, were present at this council, and it was determined, on Lapeña's proposal, that the Duque should take the command. One reason for appointing him was, that he was president of the Council of Castille, and in that character was entitled to require provisions and all things necessary from the people, . . . such being the respect paid to the old authorities and established forms, even at a time when necessity might have superseded all laws, as paramount to all.

*Infantado  
chosen com-  
mander.  
Dec. 9.*

*They retire  
to Cuenca.*

No command was ever accepted under more painful and disheartening circumstances. The troops were in a state of mutiny: the enemy within three leagues, preparing to complete their destruction; they had neither stores, supplies, nor treasure, nor other means of obtaining any than by the obedience which the people might pay to his authority; and upon any panic which

might seize the soldiers, or any suspicion that should arise among them, the General would be the first victim; it had too fatally been proved, that no character, however unimpeached, no services, however eminent, afforded any protection against the ferocity of a deluded multitude. With a full sense of these dangers, the Duke accepted a command which it might have been even more dangerous to refuse. His rank, his affable manners, the part which he had taken against the Prince of the Peace, and the share which he was supposed to have had in bringing about the downfall of that worthless minion, had made him one of the most popular persons in Spain; and though he had lost something by accompanying Ferdinand on his miserable journey to Bayonne, still he stood high in the opinion of the nation. The new appointment was announced to the army in a short proclamation; and the Central Junta ratified it afterwards, approving Lapeña's resignation, and dispensing with an informality, which the dangerous and peculiar state of things rendered prudent. The immediate good which had been expected from this measure was produced; for the soldiers confided in their untried General, and order was re-established among them. On the 10th they entered Cuenca, there concluding a retreat of nearly four hundred and fifty miles. The position of that city enabled them to receive supplies from La Mancha, Valencia, and Murcia; there they rested for a while, discipline was re-

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stored, and three persons, who had been most active in the mutiny, were brought to trial and executed. The troops were clothed, funds were raised for paying and supporting them, and hospitals established. The stragglers having recovered that strength, for want of which they had fallen behind, rejoined their corps; new levies were raised; and it was manifest that, notwithstanding all their disasters, notwithstanding the mighty power of the enemy, the treachery of some leaders, and the misconduct of others, which had been hardly less injurious, the spirit of patriotism was still unimpaired, and the people, by whom alone a country is to be saved, had not abated one jot of heart or hope.

*Arrival of  
the Conde  
de Alache's  
corps.*

Five days after their arrival they were joined by a corps which it was supposed had been cut off among the mountains of Rioja. The history of its escape is equally honourable to the men and to the Conde de Alache D. Miguel Lili, who conducted them. They formed originally a part of the army of Old Castille, under the Conde de Cartaojal, which had been broken up after the position of Logroño was lost. At the end of October, Castaños stationed it along the skirts of the Sierra de Cameros, extending from in front of Logroño to Lodosa; the last division of this force, which formed the left flank of the army, was posted at Nalda under Lili. During the first three weeks of November, this division sustained repeated and almost daily attacks; vary-

ing its position as circumstances required, and having, like Blake's army, to endure the severest privations; nevertheless it carried off fourteen pieces of artillery, from Nalda to Ausejo and Calahorra, in sight of the French, and by roads which had been thought impracticable. On the night of the 21st, Lili received intelligence that a considerable force of the enemy had moved from Logroño towards Ausejo; the next day he learnt that the Spaniards, who were stationed there and at Tudelilla, had fallen back upon their right, and that 5000 French infantry and 1000 horse had moved from Najara, giving out that they were going for Calahorra. He was thus in imminent danger of being surrounded. Immediately he left the banks of the Iregua, and fell back to Venta de Codes, four leagues in the rear of Nalda, where, in the course of the night, a messenger from Cartaojal reached him with instructions written at Tudelilla, on the 21st, saying, that the French were in great force at Ausejo, and that Castaños ordered him to retreat by the Sierra to Agreda, whither Cartaojal himself was going with all his troops to oppose the French on the side of Almazan.

For Agreda, therefore, Lili began his march *Nov. 23.* at daybreak. By two in the afternoon he had reached Villar del Rio, five leagues from the place which he had left, eight from that to which he was bound; but here he met intelligence of fresh disasters and new dangers. Agreda, it was said, had already been abandoned by the Spa-

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niards; 1200 French cavalry, with a small body of foot, were on their way to that town from Soria, which had opened its gates to the enemy; other columns from Soria and from Almazan were to follow in the same direction. Fugitives now arrived every hour, with tidings that the enemy were sacking one place, or approaching another, all their parties tending to the one point of Agreda. Lili perceived, that if Cartaojal had not already retired from that town, he inevitably must, and that for himself, if he continued his march, it would be to run into the midst of his enemies. He did not hesitate, therefore, to disobey orders which would have involved him in certain destruction; and, acting upon his own judgment, he marched the next morning in a contrary direction, to Lumbreras, and the day afterwards to Montenegro, thinking that a more defensible point, and for the sake of receiving certain intelligence from the side of Agreda. The report that that town had been evacuated on the 23d was premature; and Lili received a letter from Cartaojal, written from thence on the 24th, and regretting that he had fallen back to Lumbreras upon erroneous information; to have joined him at Agreda, he said, was the proper movement, and almost the only means of safety; but it was no time to consider what might have been done, and, as things were, he must now follow his own discretion, with that zeal which it was not doubted he possessed. Whatever regret Lili might have felt at receiving this reproof, was

effectually counteracted by the report of the messenger who brought it; for at the very moment when Cartaojal dispatched him, news arrived that the enemy were beginning to attack the town. In fact, he was compelled speedily to abandon it, and, marching by way of Borja to Calatayud, joined the wreck of the army of the centre, and accompanied them in their retreat.

Perilous as Lili's situation now was, he had yet to receive intelligence of events which rendered it more desperate. On the 27th he learned at Salas de los Infantes, by some stragglers who had escaped from the action at Burgos, that that capital was now in the hands of the French. His spies brought him information, that the Intruder was with a great force at Aranda; that the enemy occupied all the bridges and fords of the Duero; and that the Somosierra was threatened: finally, to crown the distressing news of the day, a full account reached him of the battle of Tudela. On every side he was surrounded; to move in any direction seemed equally perilous, and he was utterly ignorant what course had been taken by the relics of the army which he wished to join. In these difficulties his first measure was to march to Canales, four leagues from Salas, where, in the very centre of the mountains, he might hope to remain concealed from the enemy, or resist them to the best advantage if he were attacked. There, amid those difficult and inclement heights, from whence the Arlanza flows toward Lerma, the Duero toward the plains of Castille, the

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Tiron, the Najerilla, and the Iregua toward Rioja, he remained six days. During this time he obtained sufficient intelligence of the movements of the French to direct his own, and then proceeded towards New Castille, in search of Castaños's broken army. On the 5th he reached Quintanar de la Sierra, on the 6th San Leonardo. His men travelled the whole of the following day and night, and crossed the Duero at Berlanja. On the 9th they entered Atienza, and here the information which they found served only to occasion new perplexity; for here Lili learned that the central army had passed through, and been pursued by the French; that they had afterwards abandoned Guadalaxara and the heights of Santorcaz: of their farther movements nothing was known. Lili, however, considering all circumstances, was convinced that they must have retreated upon Cuenca, and he directed his march towards the same point. On the 11th, at day-break, he crossed the great road from Zaragoza to Madrid, at an opportune and happy hour, passing between the last division of the French and their rear-guard, then on the way from Calatayud; and on the day that the Duke del Infantado reached Cuenca, he arrived at Villar de Domingo Garcia, from whence, on the 16th, he passed to the head-quarters of the Commander. During this whole retreat, which was over a tract of nearly four hundred miles, through the most difficult and untravelled ways, this corps had constantly been surrounded by the enemy, who

were seldom more than ten or twelve miles distant from them. Food they had none, but what they could procure upon the way; most of the men were barefoot, many of them nearly naked, but their spirits never failed.

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If ever during the contest there was a time when Spain might have been irretrievably subjected, it was now, if a dissolution of the government had taken place. The Central Junta had been slow in perceiving the danger, but when it came upon them they acted with promptitude and wisdom. Before they left Aranjuez a commission of six members was appointed to transact business during their journey, and official intelligence of their removal was communicated to the foreign ministers. Their escort was so insufficient, that a small body of cavalry might have surprised them; they travelled in parties, but assembled at Talavera; three members were left there to collect and re-organize the soldiers who were coming in great numbers to that point. From thence proceeding to Truxillo, there they again met, dispatched orders to the provinces, and sent some of their own members to those places where they might be most useful. That city afforded an opportunity of reconsidering where they should fix their abode, whether at Badajoz, as had been determined, or at Cordoba, the road to either place being open: Seville was preferred to either, and they assembled there on the 17th of December. Before this removal it had been concerted by Jovellanos, with some members

*Retreat of  
the Central  
Junta from  
Aranjuez.*



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of the Royal Council and of the Council of the Indies, that eleven members of the former, and nine of the latter, including their presidents, should follow the Central Junta, and with two members from each of the other tribunals, form a *Consejo reunido*, or united Council. The other members were commanded to leave Madrid, and retire either to their own places of abode in the provinces, or whither they would, there to receive their salaries, assist the government with their advice and services when called upon, and promote by all means in their power the national cause. Too many of these persons were found wanting in the hour of trial, some in weakness submitting to the Intruder rather than endure the ills of honourable poverty, others taking an active and infamous part in his service. The proposed Council was formed of those who repaired to Seville; and those who, from whatever cause, arrived at a later time, found from the Junta an indulgence which would not have been granted them by the people, less charitable, and perhaps less just; they were received with respect, and their salaries continued to them.

*Their address to the people of Madrid.*

The agents of the Intruder knowing how desirable for their views it would be to bring the national government into disrepute, reported that the Junta had sanctioned and approved the capitulation of the capital. This the Junta contradicted in a manly proclamation, and they exhorted the inhabitants of Madrid to bear in mind that the temporary occupation of their buildings

by the enemy was of little moment, while he was not master of their hearts. "Continue to resist him," said they, "in the very bosom of your families; place no confidence in the promises of the French; remember that they have promised happiness to every people, and have made every people miserable. Keep alive your hope, retain your fortitude, and your deliverance will be glorious in proportion to the greatness of the danger which you have encountered." They made no attempt to conceal the extent of their disasters; but they attributed them to the inexperience of their troops, and denied that the monarchy was comprehended within the narrow precincts of the metropolis. "Were you to believe the enemy," said they, "our armies have vanished like the smoke of the battle, and Spain has neither forces wherewith to oppose her invaders, nor authority to regulate her councils, nor resources to save her from destruction. All this is false. The government which has been chosen by the people never attracted more respect, never felt more strongly the strong principle of union, and never found more ardour in the public cause. The provinces have redoubled their exertions at its voice, and new enlistments, new contributions, and new sacrifices have already filled the void occasioned by our losses." A splendid instance of patriotism in one of the nobles was at this time made public; the Duke of Medina Sidonia, whose property had just been confiscated in Madrid by the intrusive government, had from the commencement of the

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struggle made a free gift every month of 2500 dollars, in addition to his share of the public burthens, and to various donations of necessaries for the army.

*The French  
enter To-  
ledo.*

While the Junta was making exertions which were well seconded by the zeal of the people, the whole of those extensive plains, which form the centre or table-land of Spain, lay at the mercy of the invaders. On the 11th of December Victor had his detachments in Aranjuez and in Ocaña; on the 19th he occupied Toledo. The surrender of this ancient and famous city, after its professions of determined patriotism, was one of those circumstances for which the Spaniards were reproached, by those who had depreciated their exertions, and despaired of their cause. Yet if the Toledans did not signalize themselves by heroic sacrifices, like the Zaragozans, there was no want of a right spirit, nor had they been deficient in their duty. In the spring of the preceding year Dupont and Vedel entered that city with their divisions, and raised a most oppressive contribution. But no sooner had they proceeded on their way to Andalusia, than a Junta was formed, consisting of the most respectable citizens: they could not raise forces themselves, being surrounded by the enemy, and having no military means; but they ordered as many of the districts in that kingdom as could exert themselves to act under the instructions of the Junta of Badajoz; they contributed large sums of money; and they refused obedience to four

successive orders which enjoined them to proclaim the Intruder, though it was announced, that, if they continued in their disobedience, 5000 French would come, and perform the ceremony sword in hand. The evacuation of Madrid relieved them from this danger. And when the victorious army of Castaños was on its way to the capital, Toledo supported 10,000 men of that army for three weeks, made a donation of 300,000 reales to them on their departure, equipped many of their officers, and clothed a great proportion of the men. This was not all. In two months it raised and equipped two regiments of infantry, and a corps of 700 horse; for which funds were raised by a subscription, all persons, from the archbishop to the poorest peasant, contributing according to their means. The university also raised a corps of students; and after the siege of Zaragoza the pectoral of the archbishop, valued at 150,000 reales, was converted into money to relieve the inhabitants of that heroic city. After the defeat at Burgos, the Toledans applied to government for arms to defend their walls. This was the mode of warfare to which the Junta, if they had rightly understood the nature of their own strength, should have resorted; and this system of defence was advised by the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, than whom no man judged more generously, nor more wisely, of the Spanish character and the Spanish cause. But this essential precaution had been neglected; and when the Toledans applied for

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artillery and ammunition, disaster followed so close upon disaster, that there was no leisure for attending to their request, urgent as it was. What then could be done? They sent off their moveable property to Seville; 12,000 swords also were dispatched to the same place, from that fabric which for so many centuries has been famous, and which probably owes its original celebrity to workmen from Damascus. The Junta, the legitimate authorities, and all the most distinguished inhabitants, left the city; neither the threats nor promises of the Intruder could induce them to return: they retired to the free part of the peninsula, submitting to poverty with that dignified composure which resulted from the consciousness of having discharged their duty. This was the fate of the parents, while their sons, in the corps of students, fought and bled for the independence of Spain. It is plain, therefore, that though the gates of Toledo were opened to the enemy, that same spirit still existed within its walls which, during the war of the Commons of Castille, rendered it the last hold of Spanish liberty.

*Defence of  
Villacañas.*

From Toledo, from Aranjuez, and from Ocaña, parties of French cavalry overran the open and defenceless plains of lower La Mancha, foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far as Manzanares. The La Manchans, relying, like the government, too confidently upon the resistance which regular armies and the modes of regular warfare could oppose to

such a military power as that of France, had made no preparations for defending themselves; some places were deserted by the inhabitants; all left open to the enemy, who scoured the country at their pleasure. The little townlet of Villacañas afforded a single and honourable exception. A party of 60 horse entered it on the night of the 20th of December, being a detachment from a much larger force which had quartered itself in Tembleque. The people caught up such arms as they could find, and drove the invaders out; they began immediately to dig trenches and throw up barricadoes, .. the adjoining peasantry came to their assistance, .. a few persons of high quality fled; but, with these few exceptions, the utmost zeal and alacrity were displayed by all ranks, and ready obedience was paid to some old soldiers, who took upon themselves the command. During five successive days the French renewed their attacks, and were constantly repulsed; their plundering parties had no artillery with them, and the means of defence, therefore, as long as the Spaniards took care not to expose themselves to a charge of horse in the open country, were equal to those of attack. Weary at length of repeated failures, and unwilling to incur farther loss in an object of no other value than what the plunder of the place might be worth, the French desisted from any farther attempts, and Villacañas remained safe and uninjured, while all the country round was ransacked. The example was deservedly thought of such importance, that the

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whole details of this little siege were published by the government in an extraordinary gazette. Whatever contributions were due to the state by the inhabitants of this townlet were remitted to them, and those persons who had taken the lead were rewarded by other privileges. "This," said the government, "is the kind of war which our perfidious enemy feareth most, and which is the most advantageous for ourselves. Let the people of every village arm themselves, entrench themselves in their very houses, break up the roads, lay ambushes upon every height and pass, intercept his provisions, cut off his communications, and make him perceive that at every step he will find the most obstinate resistance. Thus we shall waste his forces; thus we shall show to the world that a great and generous nation is not to be insulted with impunity, not to be conquered when it fights for its king, for its liberty, and for its religion."

*Prepara-  
tions for  
defending  
the Sierra  
Morena.*

Meantime the Juntas of Ciudad Real, (the capital of Upper La Mancha,) and of the four kingdoms of Jaen, Granada, Cordoba, and Seville, which compose the province of Andalusia, formed a Central Assembly in La Carolina, where two deputies from each province met to consult upon speedy measures for fortifying the gorge of Despeñaperros, this pass of the Sierra Morena being considered as the Thermopylæ, where the progress of this new barbarian might be withstood. Here an army was necessary, and there was none: the Marques de Palacio was sent by the Supreme

Junta to form one under his command. The Juntas of Andalusia and La Mancha raised new levies; and officers and men who had deserted from the central army, many of them scattering alarm and sedition where they fled, re-entered into this new establishment. The marine battalions and brigades of artillery were ordered hither from Cadiz, leaving only 300 men in that city, besides the volunteers. Fourteen pieces of cannon had been fortunately stopped at Manzanares, on their way to Madrid. These were now mounted upon the works which were thrown up to defend this important position. Another road also, by which the enemy might have passed the Sierra, was occupied by a detachment of 500 men. Before the middle of December, 6000 foot and 300 horse had assembled at La Carolina, and their number increased daily. But it was not towards the Sierra Morena that Buonaparte was looking; his attention was chiefly fixed upon the English army, and the road by which he thought to reach Andalusia was through Extremadura, hoping to overtake the Supreme Junta in their flight; having reached them at Truxillo, his armies might divide, one marching to take possession of Lisbon, the other to take vengeance for Dupont at Seville and Cadiz.

There was no force in Extremadura which could oppose any obstacle to this plan. When the pass of Somosierra was lost, San Juan, who commanded there, cut his way sword in hand through a squadron of Poles, and by by-roads.

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reached Segovia, where he found the troops who had retired from Sepulveda. From thence he marched to Guadarrama, united with the Extremaduran troops under General Heredia, and descended to the Escorial, because he was without provisions in the pass. There they received orders to hasten to Madrid, and enter that city by the gate of Segovia. On the way exaggerated reports were spread of the strength of the enemy; suspicion increased the insubordination of the soldiers; the artillery and baggage-men forsook their charge and fled, and several corps broke up. The whole of Heredia's van-guard dispersed in this manner, in spite of all San Juan's efforts to detain them; they would rally, they said, at Talavera: this word went through the army, and served as a pretext for every one who chose to fly. The two generals had only a handful of men with them when they approached Madrid, and then they discovered that the city had been betrayed. No other course remained for them than to repair to Talavera, in the hope of rallying what would still form a considerable force. The rabble of the army, sufficiently faithful to their appointment, bent their way to that city, plundering as they went along; and there San Juan met them, unhappily for himself. The wretches who had been foremost in subverting discipline, and instigating the troops to break up, began to apprehend punishment if the army should again assume a regular form; and this was likely to be the case immediately, for many thousands

(many having escaped from Madrid) were now collected there, and the government had already begun to take measures for re-equipping them. It was easy for these villains to raise a cry against San Juan: all men knew the importance of the position at Somosierra; but there were few who knew with what insufficient means the general had been supplied. Mobs never reason, least of all when they are under the influence of fear; and the Spanish troops had suffered so much from incapacity, that when any person was denounced as a traitor, it seemed like a relief to themselves, and an act of justice to their country, to vent their vengeance upon him. The cry against San Juan became general: a friar went at the head of a party to the convent of the Augustines, where he had taken up his quarters, and they cried out that they were come to put Benito San Juan to death. San Juan attempted to expostulate, but in vain. He drew his sword to defend himself, and immediately he was pierced with their bullets. The rabble dragged the body to a gibbet, and hung it there; next they sought for Heredia, that they might kill him also; but he eluded their search. As soon as their fury was allayed, the instigators of these excesses secured themselves by flight; and the troops, who had been misled, perceived the consequences of their lawless conduct. If San Juan had indeed been a traitor, they felt that they ought to have delivered him up to the proper tribunal; .. by taking vengeance into their own

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hands they had made themselves obnoxious to the laws. Whom too could they trust, whom were they to obey? Instead, therefore, of forming a new army, as they had designed, at Talavera, they dispersed again, not having now any rallying place appointed, but each man going whither he thought best. Some took the road to Andalusia, some to Avila: the Extremadurans, who were the most numerous, went to their homes.

*Edict  
against  
deserters.*

The dispersion of the soldiers called forth a severe edict. It began by stating, that the martial laws of Spain had affixed no punishment for officers who deserted their colours or stations, it never having been supposed that men of such rank could possibly be guilty of such a crime. But now it had unhappily been seen that many officers, forgetful of all honour and duty, had fled, scattering disorder and terror wherever they went, and pretending treason in their generals as an excuse for their own conduct; whereas they themselves had been the worst enemies of their country, by abandoning their generals in the most critical moments. The Junta, therefore, pronounced sentence of death against every officer who absented himself from his colours without permission, and confiscation of his property for the relief of the widows and orphans of soldiers in his parish. Soldiers were made liable to the like penalty; any person who harboured a deserter was to be punished by confiscation of his property, and the same penalty was denounced against all magistrates who suffered

deserters to remain within their jurisdiction. But all who, within fifteen days, should present themselves to the nearest authority in order to rejoin the army, were exempted from the pains in this decree.

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Four days after the murder of San Juan, and the dispersion of his army, two divisions of French cavalry, under Milhaud and Lasalle, entered Talavera. They found the body of the Spanish General still on the gibbet, and this murder furnished Buonaparte with a new subject of invective against the Spaniards; though this, and the thousand deaths, and all the untold crimes, and all the unutterable miseries with which the peninsula was filled, were the consequences of his own single conduct, the fruits of his individual wickedness. Lasalle fell in with sixteen Englishmen upon the road, stragglers from General Hope's detachment, and it was related in the bulletins\* of Buonaparte, as an exploit worthy of remembrance

*A few English stragglers butchered by the French cavalry.*

\* This part of the bulletin was officially transmitted by Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, with the following instructions:—"His Majesty cannot overlook this account, descriptive, according to the obvious sense of it, of the murder of some unresisting stragglers of his army, although his Majesty is disposed to disbelieve a transaction, however sufficiently recorded, which is so utterly repugnant to the usual laws of war, and to every principle of humanity. His Majesty therefore desires that you will take the earliest means of ascertaining the truth of the fact so recorded, and the circumstances

under which it was perpetrated, if perpetrated at all. If it shall upon investigation appear to be founded, I am to desire you will cause a protest to be made by you to the nearest head-quarters of the French army, and that you will take such measures as shall appear to you most expedient for the protection of the troops under your orders against conduct so barbarous and so disgraceful."—No such measures were taken, in consequence of Sir John Moore's retreat. This instruction, however, exculpates the British government from any charge of indifference upon the subject.

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*The French  
take possession of the  
Escorial.*

and commendation, that a division of French cavalry, falling in with sixteen Englishmen who had lost their way, put them to the sword. This was but a small part of the force which was destined to proceed in this direction. As soon as Madrid had been delivered up, Lefebvre was ordered to advance from Valladolid towards Lisbon. First he advanced to Segovia, which he entered unresisted. The people were dispirited by the panic and flight of their armies; but it should not be forgotten for their exculpation, that the more generous and heroic spirits, having flocked to their country's standard among the foremost levies, had already received their crown of martyrdom, or were clinging to the wreck of the two great armies of the north and the centre, or were consummating the sacrifice of duty in Zaragoza. In one place only between Valladolid and the capital did this part of the French army experience any opposition. The pass of Guadarrama was open to them: General Hope had been stationed there, but was recalled by Sir John Moore, and there were no native troops to supply his place. But when the enemy descended upon the Escorial, and proceeded to take possession of that palace, the magnificent monument of a victory which Spain had achieved over France in open, honourable war, and in a fair field, they found the peasantry assembled to defend the seat and sepulchres of their kings. Undisciplined as they were, ill-armed, and with none to direct their efforts, they stood their

ground till they were overpowered by practised troops, superior in numbers as well as in arms; and the French, after the slaughter of these brave peasants before the gates, took up their quarters in the palace of the Philips. He who founded that stately pile, could he then have beheld from his grave what was passing around him, would have seen the consequences of that despotic system which he and his father established upon the ruins of the old free constitution of Spain.

It was a noble feeling which led these peasants to sacrifice themselves in defence of the Escorial, and the action did not pass unnoticed by those able and enlightened Spaniards whose patriotic writings at this time did honour to themselves and to their country. “Nothing,” said Don Isidro de Antillon, “is more worthy of public interest, and nothing will more excite the admiration of posterity, than a deed like this. If indeed we had only armies to oppose to Buona-  
parte, infallibly we should become his slaves; the victory would be the usurper’s beyond all resource. But it is the collective strength of our inhabited places, the defence of our walls, the obstinate and repeated resistance of the people in the streets and gateways, along the roads and upon the heights, wherever they can cut off or annoy the detachments of the enemy, . . . the universal spirit of insurrection, now become as it were the very element of our existence; this it is which disconcerts his plans, which renders his

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the French.*

victories useless, and after a thousand vicissitudes and disasters, will finally establish the independence and the glory of Spain."

Lefebvre entered Madrid on the 8th of December. Buonaparte reviewed his division in the Prado, and dispatched it to Toledo, while Sebastiani with another division marched for Talavera. In that city, by the 19th, about 25,000 French were assembled, including 5000 cavalry. The wiser inhabitants fled before their arrival, preferring the miseries of emigration to the insults and atrocities which they must otherwise have endured: for the exaction of heavy contributions, which reduced half the people to beggary, was the least evil those towns endured that fell under the yoke of the French. Every where the soldiers were permitted to plunder; no asylum could secure the women from their unrestrained brutality; churches and convents were profaned with as little compunction as dwelling-houses were broken open; and in many instances, the victims were exposed naked in the streets. The Spanish government exclaimed loudly against these enormities. "In other times," they said, "war was carried on between army and army, soldier and soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle; and when courage, combined with fortune, had decided the victory, the conquerors behaved to the conquered like men of honour, and the defenceless people were respected. The progress of civilization had tempered the evils of hostility, till a nation which so

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lately boasted that it was the most polished in the world, renewed, in the 19th century, the cruelty of the worst savages, and all the horrors which make us tremble in perusing the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like tygers, these enemies make no distinction in their carnage, .. the aged, the infants, the women, .. all are alike to them, wherever they can find blood to shed."

This appeal could be of no avail against a tyrant who, in the very origin of the war, had shown himself dead to all sense of justice, humanity, and even of honour, which sometimes supplies their place; nor against generals and officers who could serve him in such a cause. Such men could be taught humanity only by the severest retaliation. The language which the government addressed to their own subjects might be more effectual. "What resource have you," said they, "in submission and in cowardice? If by this abasement you could purchase a miserable existence, that perhaps with base minds might exculpate you. But you fly to your houses to perish in them, or to be idle spectators of the horrors which these ruffian soldiers are preparing for you! Yes! wait for them there, and they will not tarry long ere they come and shed before your eyes the blood of the innocent victims whom you will not defend. Old fathers, wretched mothers, prepare to receive your daughters released from the arms of an hundred barbarians only when they are in the act of death! or if



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they recover life, to curse it in the bitterness of unextinguishable shame; tell them to reproach those cowardly husbands, those base lovers, who are content to live, and see them plunged in this abominable infamy. But they will not be suffered to live; hand-cuffed and haltered, they will be dragged out of their country; they will be made soldiers by force, though they would not become so from honour and a sense of duty; there they will be exposed in the foremost ranks to the fire of the enemy; there they will not be able to fly; . . the toil, the danger, and death will be theirs; the glory and the spoil will be their conquerors', and the crowns which they win will be for the tyrant, the cause of all this misery."

*Galluzo collects the fugitives in Extremadura.*

It had been happy for Spain if the government had always acted as energetically as it wrote; but it should be remembered in justice to the Spaniards, that the dispersion of the troops was in many instances an act of self-preservation, so utterly were they left without supplies of food or clothing, by the inexperience and incompetence of every military department. Even against the testimony and the reproaches of its own government, the Spanish nation stands acquitted. Never did men suffer more patiently, or fight more bravely, than Blake's army. There was no want of courage at Tudela; and of the remains of the army which fought there, a large proportion was at this very time defending Zaragoza with a heroism unexampled in modern times, upon any other soil. Wherever, indeed, a new

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army was to be collected, soldiers were not wanting. After San Juan's death, Galluzo was appointed to the command; he took his post at the bridge of Almaraz to defend the left bank of the Tagus; and in a few days had collected about 8000 soldiers, . . many of them were without arms, . . most of them bare-footed, and now unhappily accustomed to flight and desertion. Nevertheless they assembled; for every man felt individually brave, and it was only the want of discipline, which, by preventing them from feeling confidence collectively, made panic contagious in the moment of danger. The province of Extremadura immediately provided money for these troops; this province, though the least populous in the peninsula, had particularly distinguished itself by its exertions; it had raised and equipped, wholly at its own expense, 24,000 men, and had supplied ammunition and arms of every kind from Badajoz to the other provinces.

There are four bridges between Talavera and the confluence of the Tietar with the Tagus; the Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop's, the Puente del Conde, or the Count's, the bridge of Almaraz, and the Puente del Cardinal, or the Cardinal's. With his present feeble and inefficient force Galluzo had no other means of protecting Extremadura than by breaking down, or defending these bridges; if he could effect this, the province would be secure from an attack on the side of Talavera. Almaraz was the most important of these points; here he planted

*He prepares  
for the de-  
fence of the  
Tagus.*

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ten pieces of cannon and two mortars, and stationed 5000 men. The more surely to prevent the enemy from winning the passage he mined the bridge; but so firmly had this noble pile been built, that when the mine was fired, the explosion only served to injure it without rendering it impassable. Don Francisco Trias was sent with 850 men to the Puente del Arzobispo; on his way he met the engineer, who had previously been dispatched to break it down, but who had been prevented from attempting it by the enemy, so that this bridge was already in their power. Trias, therefore, took his position with the view of checking the incursions of the French on this side, and ordered Don Antonio Puig, with such assistants as he could procure from the magistrates of Talavera la Vieja, to destroy the Puente del Conde, and provide for the defence of that point, and of three fords upon the same part of the river. When this officer arrived he had neither a single soldier under his command, nor arms for the peasantry; the latter want was soon supplied; the peasantry were zealous, and some of the stragglers joined him.

The bridge of the Cardinal was assigned to the keeping of a battalion of Walloon Guards and a squadron of the volunteers of Extremadura, under Brigadier Don Francisco Durasmiel. Galluzo also stationed his reserve at Jaraicejo, under Brigadier Don Josef Vlazquez Somosa, and sent another field officer to Truxillo to collect and organize the stragglers who might either volun-

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tarily join him, or be detained by the patroles. While the General was making these dispositions for the defence of the province, the Junta of Badajoz made the greatest exertions to supply the wants of this new army, and its efforts were well seconded by the Extremaduran people. Half a million of reales was raised in loans and free gifts within a week; all the cloth of Torremocha and of other clothing towns was applied to the use of the army, . . no other work was carried on in the monastery of Guadalupe than that of making earthen vessels for their cookery; and commissaries were sent to the sixteen villages nearest the bridge of Almaraz to see that rations of bread for 5000 men were daily delivered there. These measures were so effectual, that the troops were soon comfortably clothed, and after the first day they had no want of any thing.

It was, however, scarcely to be hoped that so small and ill-compacted a force could maintain its ground, in a country which offered them no advantages for defence against such an army as the French had assembled in Talavera. After some skirmishes with the advanced guard at Almaraz, and some slight attacks upon the Puente del Conde, which were designed chiefly to keep the Spaniards on the alarm, and divert their attention from the side where the real attack was intended, Sebastiani crossed the Puente del Arzobispo on the 24th of December, and attacked Trias in front and on his right flank with superior numbers. The Spaniards did not yield till after

*The French  
cross the  
river.*

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a vigorous resistance ; and then retreated by the Sierra to Castanar de Ibor. On the same day, about two hours after noon, the Puente del Conde was attacked, and the fords. The bridge was bravely defended by Don Pablo Murillo, whose distinguished talents were now first displayed. Puig guarded the fords, and they repelled the enemy every where till night ; when, being informed of the defeat of Trias, and that Sebastiani had proceeded by Peralera de Garbin and Bohonal towards Almaraz, Puig perceiving that he must be taken in the rear if he continued in his present position, retreated to Peralera de Garbin behind the French, and from thence to Castanar de Ibor.

*Galluzo  
retreats to  
Jaraicejo.*

The news of these disasters reached Galluzo at night. Immediately he apprehended that the object of the enemy, who were marching by Valdecaza, Valdecañas, and other points, to Romagordo and Miravete, was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he ordered all the artillery, except four pieces, which formed a battery on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo, for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aide-de-camps and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining battery under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked on the following morning by the French ; the battery was ill-placed, and Hore perceived that the ammunition-carts were within reach of the enemy's fire. He ordered them to be removed

behind a bank which would shelter them; .. the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight, than they cut the traces, and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct of some infantry who took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, .. though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken bridge, and pass in sufficient number, most of the Spaniards effected their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas.

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Galluzo's first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almaraz had been forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat. His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village something less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious easily believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order, but the army, before it reached Truxillo, was in a state of total disorganization. Galluzo,

*Dispersion  
of his army.*

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confounded at the first approach of danger, (for if he had deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Miravete would have been the place which he would have chosen, after the bridge was forced,) called a council of war; it was agreed that the defence of Extremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine, was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight, excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now became a rout; . . most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the General were no longer under any restraint; they went through Miajadas, Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above an hundred miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and here Galluzo found himself with not more than a thousand men. Nothing could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; . . some sold their muskets, . . some threw them away, . . houses were broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found, . . a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some of them active themselves in pillage; it is probable, in-

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deed, that had they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their object: though without an escort, they lost only two pieces of cannon, and carried seventeen to Miajadas, . . from whence part were sent to Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. Trias also effected a far more dangerous retreat than his commander in good order. He set forward from Castanar for Fresnedoso, and when within a mile of the place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of Almaraz. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach Jaraicejo. After a day's march he found that the French were there also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved discipline in his little troop, and that preserved confidence; instead of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought there.

Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly manifested, it had been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta in his place. This General, as an arrested person, followed the Junta on their retreat from Aranjuez. It so happened, that while he was at Merida, some soldiers belonging to the scattered army of Extremadura gathered together in that

*Galluzo is  
superseded  
by Cuesta.*



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city, and the owner of the house in which Cuesta lodged persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were by acclamation. The Junta of Merida upon this sent up a representation to the Central Junta, requesting that Cuesta might be appointed to the command. It was replied, that this ought not to be done without the approbation of the Junta of Badajoz, which had made such signal exertions in the patriotic cause, and was not willing to supersede Galluzo, whom it had appointed. But now, after this disorderly flight, he was immediately deprived of the command, and put under arrest, and Cuesta was nominated to succeed him. Cuesta's errors were overlooked, because no doubt of his motives was entertained; and at a time when the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was sufficient to break up an army, it was an object of considerable importance to find a leader in whom the men would confide. At this moment the whole of Extremadura to the very walls of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the Junta trembled for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and co-operate with Cuesta in covering Andalusia on that side. These means of defence would have been as ineffectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south.

## CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR  
JOHN MOORE.

IN all the bulletins and proclamations of Buona-  
 parte the English were held up to the Spaniards  
 for indignation and contempt: they were a people,  
 he said, who fomented war every where, and dis-  
 tributed arms like poison, but who shed their  
 own blood only for their own direct interest. At  
 this time it is probable that he sincerely despised  
 the English as a military nation. Can any thing  
 be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that Eng-  
 land should pretend to struggle with her land  
 forces against France? she will realize the fable  
 of the frog swelling itself to rival the ox, till it  
 burst. "The day," said Buonaparte, "wherein  
 we succeed in seeing these English will be a day  
 of jubilee for the French army. Oh, that they  
 may dye with their blood this continent, which  
 they have desolated with their intrigues, their  
 monopolies, and their frightful selfishness! Oh,  
 that they might be met with to the number of  
 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that  
 English mothers might feel the evils of war, and  
 the English government cease to sport with the  
 lives and blood of the continental nations. All  
 the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict the

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*Buonaparte  
reproaches  
and insults  
the English.**14th Bul-  
letin.**Gazeta de  
Madrid,  
Dec. 18.**Do. Dec. 24.**14th Bul-  
letin.**12th Bul-  
letin.*

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*14th Bul-  
letin.*

human race, come from London." He represented the Spaniards as complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing, but had sent troops only to excite them, lead them astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger, when 40,000 British at Espinosa or Tudela might have balanced the fortune of the war. . . That number of British troops would at either place have turned it.

Great Britain possessed at that time men, means, and generals equal to any service; but the nation did not yet understand its own strength, nor had the government yet learnt either to direct it wisely, or to make exertions commensurate to the end whereat they aimed. The lessons which books and history might teach had been neglected, and experience therefore was to be purchased at a heavy price.

*The British  
army from  
Portugal  
enters Spain.*

As soon as the campaign in Portugal was ended, Sir Hew Dalrymple began to prepare for entering Spain: on the 6th of October Sir John Moore received his appointment to the command; the preparations meantime had not been relaxed, and in eight days afterward part of the troops were in motion. Difficulties and doubts had occurred at the very outset. The infantry were to go either by sea or land at the Commander's discretion; the voyage at that season was thought too precarious; and the Junta represented, that if they went by sea, half the army would be unable to leave the coast for want of necessaries, there being scarcely means at Coruña for forwarding

10,000 men who were to land there under Sir David Baird, and join the Commander wherever he should appoint. The land-journey therefore having been chosen, the Spanish Commissary-General was consulted concerning the means of subsisting the army on the great road by Elvas; but the quantity of meat which was required astonished him; and he computed that in three months all the oxen in the country would be consumed, and very few hogs left. There was no want of food in the north of Portugal, but it was said that artillery could not be transported across the mountains. British officers were sent to examine the roads, and they confirmed this assertion of the natives. It was ascertained when too late, that bad as the ways were, they were practicable for cannon; but in consequence of this error, it was deemed necessary to divide the army, and this led to serious evils. General Hope, with the artillery, cavalry, and four regiments of foot, was to go by the Madrid road; General Paget, with two brigades, by Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved through Almeida; two brigades, under General Beresford, by way of Coimbra; three, under General Fraser, by Abrantes, crossing the Tagus there, and recrossing at Villa Velha, . . a point which, in former wars, has been considered the key to Lisbon. These were to unite at Salamanca, and General Hope and Sir David Baird to join them either there or at Valladolid.

If the people of England had been required to

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*Former  
services of  
Sir John  
Moore.*

name the general who should be employed on this important occasion, Sir John Moore would certainly have been their choice, so generally was he respected as an officer and as a man. He was born at Glasgow in 1760. From the eighteenth to the twenty-third year of his age he was on the continent with his father (a physician and a distinguished man of letters, then travelling with the young Duke of Hamilton), and soon afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the army. He served with distinction in Corsica, the West Indies, the Helder expedition, and in Egypt; had often been wounded, and given proofs of professional skill as well as of personal gallantry, for he was fond of his profession, and had studied it well. But the constitution of his mind led him to look at the dark rather than the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his farther misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of their Emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always labouring to produce, for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their country.

*His care to  
maintain  
discipline.*

Before the troops began their march Sir John Moore warned them in his general orders that the Spaniards were a grave, orderly people, extremely sober, but generous, and easily offended by any insult or disrespect; he exhorted them to accommodate themselves to these manners, to meet

with equal kindness the cordiality wherewith they would be received, and not shock by their intemperance a people worthy of their attachment, whose efforts they were come to support in the most glorious cause. His resolution to maintain order and proper discipline was farther evinced by punishing a marauder upon the march with death: the offender was one whose character gave no hope of amendment, and the General took that opportunity of declaring his determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders, in other words, to thieves and villains. Farther to gratify the Spaniards, the army, upon entering Spain, were ordered to wear the red cockade in addition to their own.

On Nov. 13, Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca. Before he entered the city, he learnt the defeat of the Extremaduran army at Burgos, and on the second night after his arrival, was awakened by an express, with news that the French had possession of Valladolid, . . . twenty leagues distant. He had only three brigades of infantry with him, and not a single gun. His first thought was to fall back upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but he soon learnt that the French had retired to Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos: he therefore sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope, to concentrate their divisions, and join him with all speed. Every day now brought with it intelligence of new disasters. Blake's army was dispersed, and Buonaparte might either turn his force against Castaños, or march against the

*Ill prospect  
of affairs  
when he ar-  
rives at Sa-  
lamanca.*

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English, to prevent their junction. He, meantime, placed nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, which were approaching from different points, was compelled to remain inactive. Perceiving what he thought the supineness of the Spanish government, and indignant at discovering the weakness of the Spaniards, he began to despair of their cause. He saw nothing around him but an inactivity, which he mistook for torpor and indifference. They had not, he said, shown themselves a wise or a provident people; their wisdom was not a wisdom of action. Yet still he felt that they were a fine people; that they had a character of their own, quite distinct from that of any other nation; and much, he thought, might have been done with them. He erred in thinking that they would not do much for themselves.

*Sir David  
Baird ar-  
rives at  
Astorga.*

Sir David Baird had formed a like opinion. The expedition under his command reached Coruña on the 13th of October; and such were the idle forms and the negligence of the Spanish authorities, that the troops were kept on ship-board till an order for their landing could be received from the Central Junta. This General had been accustomed to an Indian army, with its train of slaves and sutlers, elephants and palanquins; he had now to march through a country where it is not without difficulty that a party of travellers can obtain food, and which had already been drained by its own troops; and his commissaries were not only inexperienced in the business of their department, but ignorant of the language

of the people. Dividing his army into small detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance, he arrived at Astorga, Nov. 19th, and there learning the defeat of Blake's army, and anticipating that of Castaños's, he consulted with his general officers, and informed Sir John Moore of their unanimous opinion, that he ought not to advance till his whole force was assembled there, which would not be before the 4th of December. Sir John Moore's opinion of the hopelessness of affairs was thus confirmed by Sir David Baird. "I see my situation," he said in his journal, "as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; yet I am determined to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle."

It was not long before intelligence arrived that Castaños was defeated, and his army dispersed. This event the British Commander had expected; it had always been his opinion that the south of Spain ought to have been the scene of action; that Cadiz, not Coruña, should have been chosen for the disembarkation of the English army, and Seville or Cordoba the place of their junction. He now determined to retreat upon Portugal. . . "Thus," he said, in a letter to the English ambassador, Mr. Frere, "he should fall back upon his resources, cover a country where there was a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detached

*Sir John Moore resolves to retreat upon Portugal, and embark from Lisbon. Nov. 28.*



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a force against him, and be ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible. That such circumstances would occur he had no expectation. The French, he thought, would have little more to do to subdue the country than to march over it, though, after the conquest, they might have troublesome subjects." And, in his letter to Sir David Baird, ordering him to fall back upon Coruña, and sail from thence for the Tagus, he directed him to write immediately to England, and order that transports might be sent to Lisbon; "they will be wanted," said he; "for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended." He had written a few days before this to Lord Castlereagh, saying, that he had ordered a depôt of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed at Almeida, and perhaps the same should be done at Elvas; in that case, the progress of the enemy might be checked, while the stores were embarking at Lisbon, and arrangements made for taking off the army. Beyond this, the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of. In communicating his resolution of retiring to the British government, he wrote in the same spirit of utter despondency. "If the French," said he, "succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. Portugal could not be defended against a superior enemy; the Spaniards, however, might rally in the south, and the English might still be of use, if they were landed at Cadiz. But it

was impossible to be very sanguine on this subject, after what had been seen.”

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When this intention of retreating was made known to the army at Salamanca, murmurs against it were heard in every quarter, and from men of all ranks. Even the staff officers lamented the resolution of their Commander. In his letter to Mr. Frere, written before the defeat of Castaños was known, Sir John Moore had proposed as a question, what the British army should do, in case of that event; whether he should retreat upon Portugal, or march upon Madrid, and throw himself into the heart of Spain, thus to run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation? “This movement,” he said, “would be one of great hazard, as his retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain, and he should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards; but perhaps it was worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain were thought to have still sufficient energy, and the means to recover from their defeats.” “The question,” said Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, “is not purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. You are perhaps better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they

*He asks the  
opinion of  
the British  
Ambassu-  
dor.*

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upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion." Mr. Frere knew that what the Spanish government most deprecated was, a retreat of the English upon Lisbon. It would sink the hearts of the whole country, and would make them believe that England, after an ineffectual effort, had relapsed into the old limited system of protecting Portugal. If, therefore, a retreat were determined upon, as absolutely necessary, he thought the army should fall back upon Galicia, and the strong country about Astorga. But he said, in his reply to the General, that Leon and the two Castilles (with the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid) were the provinces least distinguished for a military, patriotic, or provincial spirit in all Spain: the people had been passive during the late events, and had seen their country successively occupied by the strongest party. It was difficult to blame them: living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms and without horses, they had neither the means of defence or escape. That country must necessarily belong to the party which was superior in cavalry; . . yet even there there was no want of a right feeling; the towns were abandoned at the approach of the enemy; not a single magistrate had been brought over to take the oath of al-

legiance to the Intruder, nor had the French been able to enlist a single soldier. The other provinces were possessed by the most ardent and determined spirit. There was no doubt of the people. The government was new, and had hitherto been too numerous to be very active; but there was hope that that inconvenience would soon be remedied. "They are resolute," said Mr. Frere, "and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at least set the example, which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited, of weakness and timidity."

Great advantages, the ambassador thought, would result from advancing speedily to cover Madrid. It was a point of great moment for effect in Spain, and still more in France, and in the west of Europe. The people of the town were full of resolution, and determined to defend it, in spite of its situation; and nothing could be more unfavourable to the claim of the Intruder than a siege of the capital. The first object of the English, therefore, he thought, should be to march there, and collect a force capable of resisting the French, before farther reinforcements arrived from France. There were reports that the resistance to the conscription had been much more obstinate than usual, and a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Carcassone seemed to prove that these reports were not wholly without foundation. An advantage obtained over the French now would be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it

*Mr. Frere  
wishes him  
to advance  
for the de-  
fence of  
Madrid.*

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would render a conscription, for a third attempt upon Spain, infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. But if, with their present forces, they were allowed to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of the conscription, they would pour in forces, which would give them immediate possession of the capital and central provinces, and the war would then be reduced to an absolute competition between the two countries, which could stand out longest against the waste of population.

If, however, Mr. Frere said, this view of the subject should not appear sufficiently clear or conclusive to the Commander-in-chief, to induce him to take this step, which he, the Ambassador, was well convinced would meet with the approbation of his Majesty's government, he would venture to recommend retaining the position of Astorga. A retreat from thence to Coruña (as far, said he, as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country which he has travelled over) would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England: the army would thus be enabled to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castille. . . Before this letter arrived, the General's resolution had been taken, in consequence of the news of Castaños's defeat. It was not shaken by the reasoning of the Ambassador, whose opinion he had asked, and he waited only

for the junction of General Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal. CHAP.  
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The Junta had wished it had been possible for Sir John Moore to have conferred personally with them at Aranjuez, or with the military council at Madrid, and he himself had formed the same wish, believing that unless prompt and efficacious measures were taken, the defeat of the Spanish armies and the ruin of their cause were inevitable. But as this could not be, the Captain-General of Granada, with another officer, selected for his reputation and military experience, were deputed to consult with him at Salamanca. These Generals, in representing the resources of the Spaniards, enumerated the force under San Juan, and relied upon the pass of Somosierra; but Colonel Graham had just arrived before them with news that the pass had been won; and Sir John considered them personally as weak old men, and officially as having no information upon which any plan could be concerted. Mistaking, as he did, the spirit of the nation, and undervaluing its strength, he gave no ear to their urgent desire that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby draw off the enemy from Madrid, nor to their declaration that his retreat, if he persisted in that intention, would immediately occasion the destruction of Spain.

On the 5th of December, a dispatch arrived from Castelfranco and Morla, informing him that about 25,000 men, of the central army, were falling back on Madrid; that 10,000 from So- *Morla and the Military Junta urge him to advance.*

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*Two Spanish Generals sent to confer with Sir John Moore.*

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*December.*

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mosierra were coming thither; and that nearly 40,000 would join them. With that number of troops, the French army, which had presented itself, was not to be feared. But the Junta, apprehending an increase of the hostile forces, hoped he would be able to unite with their army, or fall on the rear of the enemy; and they did not doubt that the rapidity of his movements would be such as the interests of both countries required. This letter was written on the second, and the men who signed it had then determined to betray their country, . . but though they might have wished and designed to draw on the British army to its destruction, the proposal that it should advance came not from them alone, but from the civil and military Junta also, and was such as true Spaniards would have given. While Sir John was considering this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, and denizened in England, arrived, with dispatches from Mr. Frere. Colonel Charmilly was in Madrid on the night of the first, when the inhabitants were working by torch-light at the trenches, breaking up the streets, and barricading the houses. He had seen the Duque del Infantado, who told him there were provisions and ammunition in Madrid; that more than 30,000 men had that day enlisted themselves as volunteers; and that it was of material importance to the common cause that the British commander should make a diversion, which would compel the French to divide their forces, and thus afford

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some relief to Madrid. This he requested Charmilly to communicate to Sir John Moore, as he himself had been an eye-witness of the spirit of the people, and the preparations which they were making for resistance. By another Grandee he was requested to say to Sir John Moore, that he must make use of this moment to save Spain, by making conditions with the Junta for a better government; but especially that he should require the Spanish army to be put under the orders of the British Commander-in-chief for the time being, as it had been under Lord Peterborough.

When Charmilly reached Talavera, on his way, he found that Mr. Frere had just arrived there, following the Central Junta, who were retiring from Aranjuez to Badajoz. To him he communicated what had passed with the Duque del Infantado; and the Ambassador requested him, as a colonel in the British service, to take charge of a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat, as a measure which would have the worst effect upon the Spanish cause, and be of the greatest injury both to Spain and England. But thinking that, having begun the retreat, Sir John might suppose himself engaged to go on with it, Mr. Frere entrusted Colonel Charmilly with a second letter, to be delivered in case the General persisted in his determination. The purport of this letter was to request that the bearer might be examined before a council of war; and the reason for this measure was, that

*Col. Charmilly sent to Sir John Moore by the Duque del Infantado and Mr. Frere.*



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the decision of a council of war would exonerate the Commander-in-chief from the responsibility by which he might otherwise feel himself fettered. Charmilly reached Salamanca while Sir John was deliberating upon the dispatch from Morla and Castelfranco. He delivered the Ambassador's first letter. The state of Madrid, Mr. Frere said, so much exceeded every thing which he had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that he could not forbear representing to the General, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the Spanish people by all the means which had been entrusted to him for that purpose. "I have no hesitation," he added, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice, as I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you may adopt. I say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success." Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly's communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired, however, to reflect upon what he had heard. His instructions directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and the British Ambassador with the utmost deference and attention: . . both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of

the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various quarters. He was persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming him to fly at such a time ; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be necessary.

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Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of resistance had arisen too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and unsteady ; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir David to return to Astorga. “ We must be at hand,” said he, “ to aid and take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.” But he added, “ I mean to proceed bridle in hand ; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.” These were ominous words. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong the country ; it was apparent also, that, while these

*Sir John Moore resolves to advance.*

CHAP. impressions weighed upon him, he looked on  
XV. with apprehension to the opinion of the English  
1808. public, and that in deference to that opinion he  
*December.* was sacrificing his own.

While Sir John was dispatching these instructions, it was not known at Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating : officers and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The General, not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered him to quit Salamanca. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had not deserved such treatment. The General replied that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence ; but he repeated the order, and it was obeyed. Sir John Moore, in his resentment for what he conceived the improper interference of the Ambassador, soon, however, recollected what was due to him as the King's minister. He told Mr. Frere, therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. " I certainly," said he, " did feel and express much in-

dignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed the Minister that every thing should be done, for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such an army as he commanded, . . but he could not make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was much too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.

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On the following day, Sir John received a letter from the Junta of Toledo, telling him they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies there, and defend the city to the last. He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain; and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from Talavera, with tidings that these men had

*News of the  
surrender of  
Madrid.  
Dec. 7.*

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surrendered Madrid. The number of the French there was computed at between 20,000 and 30,000 men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no sooner approached than it was surrendered to him. These circumstances did not induce the British General to alter his plan: his object was to threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat, as an event which would soon be unavoidable; in his dispatches home, dissuaded the government from sending out reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon, and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to evacuate the peninsula.

Having determined, in this inauspicious state

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spondence  
with Ro-  
mana.*

of mind, upon advancing, he wrote to Romana, who was then at Leon, collecting and refitting the remains of Blake's army. Sir John complained to him that he had been put in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, had been kept perfectly in the dark with respect to their movements, the plans of their generals and their government, and that while his army was on the march to assemble and unite itself, he had been left exposed, without the least support. Therefore, though his wish had always been to co-operate with the Spaniards, it became necessary for him, finding that he was left to himself, to think of himself alone. Under that feeling he had ordered the corps at Astorga to fall back on Coruña, and meant himself to retire upon Portugal, there to be ready for the assistance of Spain whenever their affairs were better managed, and an opportunity offered for doing them any good. Perhaps this opportunity had now occurred; and as his retreat had been reluctant, so he had stopped it the moment a chance of acting to advantage presented itself. His wish now was to unite with the Marques, for whose character he had the highest respect, and who would always find him ready to undertake whatever was practicable for the service of the Spanish nation. The account which Romana gave of his army in reply was far from encouraging. He had 20,000 men under arms, but they were almost all without haversacks, cartridge boxes, and shoes, and at least two-thirds were without clothing,

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from head to foot. Their spirits however were good, and if they were well fed they would do their duty. Their dispersion in Biscay had been wholly owing to the want of subsistence. He should not doubt of uniting with Sir John, and concerting a decisive attack upon the troops which surrounded Madrid, were it not for a division of 8000 or 10,000 men, extending from Sahagun to Almanza, whose apparent object was to check his army. As long as they remained in that position, he could not abandon his, because it would leave them a free way into Asturias; they would take possession of the country from whence he drew large supplies, and they would threaten the passage into Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird might oblige them to fall back upon Reynosa, and then it would not be difficult to form a junction.

*First skirmish at Rueda.*

From the beginning Sir John Moore had thought so poorly of the Spaniards, that this account of the force with which he was to co-operate could make no alteration in his views. It was perfectly understood by him that he must stand, or fall, by his own means. He left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day, Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and General Stuart surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French in Spain; and the prisoners declared it was uni-

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versally believed that the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. He would have no English in front, it was said; for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone; and when they had retired, the Emperor thought Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared from this letter, that Soult had two divisions with him at Saldaña; that Junot was collecting another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso), had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.

Sir John had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and unite his army there, Sir David Baird doing the same at Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before that General should be reinforced. While the head-quarters were at Toro, a member of the Junta arrived there with Mr. Stuart. After

*Head-  
quarters re-  
moved to  
Toro.*



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*The com-  
mand of the  
Spanish  
armies  
offered to Sir  
J. Moore.*

the manner in which Colonel Charmilly had been dismissed, Mr. Frere had little reason to hope that any thing would induce Sir John Moore to alter his determination of retiring from the country in despair. The Spanish Government had, however, pressed him to make one effort more: if that determination were persisted in, they said, it would bring on the most dreadful consequences. The measures which alone could save Portugal and Spain would be completely disconcerted, and England would have afforded them succour only to make them rely on an effective aid, and then to withdraw it at the critical moment when it was most needed. In reality, the enemy at this moment exposed himself to ruin by dividing his army to cover such an extended line. Romana would join Sir John Moore with 14,000 men, and the Junta had taken such measures that within a month 30,000 would be raised in Leon, Galicia, and Asturias. Mr. Frere inclosed this note to the British Commander, and reminding him of the immense responsibility with which he charged himself in adopting a measure which must be followed by immediate if not final ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was entrusted, expressed a hope that Mr. Stuart, who was personally esteemed by the General, would by that advantage be enabled to urge this argument with the warmth of regard. "I am unwilling," he pursued, "to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must

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be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence; which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose. . . That the defence of Galicia should be abandoned, must appear incredible." . . This letter arrived too late to have any influence upon Sir John's movements; he had advanced, but it was with a heavy heart: and when the Deputy from the Junta, D. Francisco Xavier Caro, at this time offered him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, he refused it. He would not have done this if he had had any hope of acting with success against the enemy, or any intention of making a stand against them: for at this time he learnt that Romana was beginning to retire on Galicia, and felt how inconvenient it was that the army which was to co-operate with him should be independent of him. He therefore wrote to the Marques, saying, he had looked for the assistance of such part of his corps as was fit to move; and had expected also that the road to Coruña would have been left open for the British army, as that by which it must receive its supplies, and the only one by which it must retreat, if compelled so to do. Romana replied, that he should have had

**CHAP.** no thought of retreating had it not been for the  
**XV.** intelligence which he received from Sir D. Baird;  
**1808.** that he was ready to act with Sir John; and that  
**December.** this was the moment, not for retreating, but for  
 trying what could be done against the enemy,  
 and drawing him from the capital.

*Junction  
 with Sir D.  
 Baird  
 formed.*

The junction with Sir D. Baird was formed at Mayorga on the 20th; the united force amounting to something more than 28,000 men, of whom 2450 were cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed forward, and having learned that some of the enemy's cavalry were posted at Sahagun, Lord Paget endeavoured to cut them off. The alarm was given, and they had time to form in a favourable position; but they were out-manceuvred, charged, overthrown in a moment, and dispersed in every direction, with the loss of many killed, and 157 prisoners, including two Lieutenant-Colonels. In this affair about 400 of the 15th Hussars encountered nearly 700 French; and the British felt and proved their own exceeding great superiority. Head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun on the 21st. The weather was severe; the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the troops had suffered from forced marches, they halted there for a day, and there a co-operation with Romana was finally concerted, the Marques engaging to move with from 9000\*

\* The French historian of and Romana had from 25,000  
 Marshal Soult's Campaigns in to 30,000; their united force  
 1808-9, affirms that Sir John amounting thus to more than  
 Moore had 27,000 effective men, 60,000!



to 10,000 men, being that part of his force which was sufficiently clothed and armed to take the field. Pitiabie as their condition appeared when they were compared to troops so admirably equipped as the English, it was, nevertheless, evident, even to a desponding observer, that they might be brought into action as auxiliaries, to occupy part of the enemy's force, and to complete his destruction in case of victory.

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According to the information which Romana could obtain, Soult's corps consisted of about 9000 infantry and 1000 horse; but that General, apprehending that some attempt would be made against him, had applied for reinforcements, and without waiting for them, called to his assistance the nearest troops; he had thus brought together about 18,000 men, who were posted behind the river Carrion. Every arrangement was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, . . . never more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun were prepared for the reception of the wounded; and the soldiers confidently anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was less sanguine. "The movement I am making," he said to Mr. Frere, "is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not

*They advance  
against M.  
Soult.*

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abandon it until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us." The truth is, that nothing had been done; but he was disgusted with the Spanish Government, and he had no faith in the people: his own judgement would have led him to fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what would be the feelings of the English nation, if its army had retired without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr. Frere, for having given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the suggestion of that Minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy of consideration. It was at once rejected, as futile; and he advanced against this detachment of the French, "bridle in hand," as he himself said, and expecting to "have a run for it," . . not thinking that any possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking a reason which might appear valid to the people of England for abandoning the peninsula, and for leaving Spain and Portugal to their fate. . . "It was necessary to risk this army," he said, "to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. With respect to the cause, it will probably have no effect. Even if I beat Marshal Soult, it will be attended with no other effect than the character it will attach to the British arms."

At the hour appointed, the whole force was under arms; the right column had begun its

march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting the word of command: . . . just at this time came a letter from Romana, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by day-break next morning be again under arms. "In my life," says one who was present, "I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures! A few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart and hope." The next morning General Hope fell back to Mayorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own division and with General Fraser's. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river Ezla at Valencia de San Juan: on Christmas-day the Commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve on the 26th. When Sir John Moore apprized Romana that he should fall back, he told him that if he were pursued he should stop and offer battle: and in a second communication from Sahagun he said, that if he were pressed after

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*December.**The French  
endeavour  
to surround  
the British  
army.**Dec. 23.**Sir J. Moore  
begins his  
retreat.*

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crossing the Ezla, he should have no objection to try an action. But he had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage, and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst, he could defend himself, and, with Romana's aid, defend Galicia. "You may rest assured," he added, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted. . . You will find no inclination in me to abandon the Spanish cause." But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th, show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously entertained, was soon abandoned; and as for the reinforcements, he had already countermanded them in his feeling of despair. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000; Romana could not have above 8000. The troops moving against him he estimated at not less than 50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming, with 10,000 of his guards. His real purpose was not to stop longer at Astorga than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villafranca, where he had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated to him, some time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia by this route, but Sir John begged it

might be left open to the English, being the only communication they had for their retreat or supplies.

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From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made his army superior to the British. Junot, with the army which had been transported from Portugal to France, had advanced to Palencia, and threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening from Madrid, with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Lefebvre was counter-ordered from the road to Badajoz, and directed toward Salamanca. The retreat of the British upon Portugal was thus cut off. Of the numbers advancing against him Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the prisoners; and they were accordingly stowed in covered wagons. A thaw came on the day when they first fell back; on the following it rained without intermission: the soil in that part of the country is a heavy loam, and the roads were above a foot deep in clay. The proclamations of the French travelled faster than the British army: these were, as usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility and a fanatic priesthood. All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken them, speedily returned, should receive



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*December.**Ill conduct  
of the troops.*

no injury; but otherwise, whatsoever belonged to them should be confiscated. Unhappily, the conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills. The soldiers were indignant with the Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken their mules, and run away in the night, because the movements of a retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened, in want of rest and food, disappointed in their confident hopes of victory, and indignant at turning their backs upon an enemy whom they would so eagerly have met in the field, it was a relief for them to vent these feelings, in the shape of anger, upon the only objects within their reach. In this temper they began to plunder and commit havoc wherever they went; and the officers, many of whom already murmured at the rapidity of the retreat, and were discontented with the total silence which the Commander-in-chief maintained respecting his future measures, did not exert themselves as they ought to have done, to prevent these excesses.

*Passage of  
the Ezla.  
Dec. 26.*

Sir David Baird, who took the shorter line to Astorga, by way of Valencia de S. Juan, effected his march without molestation. The sick and wounded, following the same track, halted at the latter place, to pass the night.

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Hardly had they been provided with the necessary food, and laid to rest, before the alarm was sounded, and they were again hurried into the waggons. The night was cold, misty, and exceeding dark, and the Ezla was to be crossed some little distance from the town. They were not provided with pontoons. The ford is dangerous, because of the rapidity of the stream, occasioned by two narrow banks of shingles, which form an angle in the middle; and at this time the river was fast rising, from the melting of the snow upon the mountains. A serjeant's guard had been left by Sir David on the opposite bank, to assist the waggons in passing, and skuttle two ferry-boats, when they had effected their passage. They kindled a fire with grass and rushes, for the sake of its light, but the materials were wet, and the wind soon extinguished it. A Spanish muleteer attempted to guide them over the ford: his mule tripped in the mid stream, he was thrown, and saved by a soldier, when just in the act of sinking. Perilous, however, as the ford was, the passage was accomplished, without other loss than that of some baggage-waggons, which broke down.

Sir John Moore, meantime, with the other division of the army, reached Benevente, and there found it necessary to issue general orders, which reflected severely upon the conduct both of his men and officers. “The misbehaviour of the column which had marched by Valderas exceeded,” he said, “what he could have believed

*General orders issued at Benevente. Dec. 27.*

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of British soldiers. He could feel no mercy towards officers who neglected, in times like these, essential duties, nor towards soldiers who disgraced their country, by acts of villany towards the people whom they were sent to protect." Alluding then to the discontent which was manifested at the hurry of the retreat, and the mystery which was thrown over their proceedings, he said, "it was impossible for the General to explain to his army the motives of the movements which he directed; he could, however, assure them, that he had made none since he left Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, as far as he was a judge, they had answered the purposes for which they were intended. When it was proper to fight a battle he would do it, and he would choose the time and place which he thought most fit. In the meantime, he begged the officers and men to attend diligently to discharge *their* parts, and leave to *him*, with the general officers, the decision of measures which belonged to them alone." Strong as this language was, it had no effect, and the havoc which had been committed at Valderas was renewed at Benevente. The castle there is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; we have nothing in England which approaches to its grandeur: Berkley, Raby, even Warwick and Windsor are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open galleries, where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of por-

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phyry and granite; cloisters, with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns and tessellated floors, niches, alcoves, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna; and the splendour of old times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls. They proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them: their indignant feelings broke out again in acts of wanton mischief; and the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation. Every thing combustible was seized, fires were lighted against the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps, of the greatest Spanish masters, and of those other great painters who left so many of their finest productions in Spain, were heaped together as fuel. The archives of the family fortunately escaped.

The soldiers had, however, here an opportunity of displaying a spirit more becoming them as Englishmen. Soon after the rear of the army had marched into the town, an alarm was given that the enemy were on the opposite heights. In an instant all was on the alert; every man hastened to his place of rendezvous; the cavalry poured out of the gates:..the plain in the op-

*Affair of  
cavalry on  
the Ezla.**Dec. 28.*

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*Dec. 29.*

posite direction was covered with fugitives, and the streets were filled with women bewailing their fate, and calling upon the Saints and the Virgin for protection. The French, seeing with what alacrity they would be encountered, looked at our men from the heights, and retired. It was towards evening, and as the enemy were so near, orders were given to destroy the bridge. This was effected about daybreak the following morning; and it was supposed that their progress was for a while impeded. The troops again continued their retreat, and the whole of the infantry and heavy artillery had departed, when intelligence arrived that the French were again appearing, and that their cavalry were in the act of passing the Ezla:..they had found a ford about three hundred yards below the bridge. Lord Paget and General Stewart were still in the town. The picquets of the night, under Lieutenant-Colonel Otway and Major Bagwell, were sent down; the cavalry were ordered to repair to their alarm posts; and many volunteers came forward. Lord Paget hastened to the spot: he found four squadrons of imperial guards already formed and skirmishing with the picquets; other cavalry were in the act of passing. The 10th Hussars were sent for: as soon as they arrived, General Stewart placed himself at the head of the picquets, and charged the enemy. The French gave way, and repassed the ford more expeditiously than they had crossed it. They formed again on the other side, and threatened a second attempt; but three pieces

of horse artillery, which now came up, were stationed near the bridge, and opened a fire upon them, that did considerable execution. About seventy prisoners were taken; among them General Lefebvre Desnouettes, Commander of the imperial guard of cavalry. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained: it was variously guessed, from 60 to 200. Ours was about 50 in killed and wounded. It was reported that Buonaparte was on the heights during this action.

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The ardour of the French was manifestly damped by this fresh proof of British valour; and they continued their pursuit at such respectful distance, that the rear of the army, which had been engaged with them, reached Bañeza that night unmolested. The next day the Commander-in-chief reached Astorga. This was the rallying point, and here they found about 5000 men of Romana's army. That army was literally half naked and half starved; a malignant typhus fever was raging among them, and sixty or seventy were sent daily to the hospitals. About this number, however, were fit for service. Romana arrived there the same day. The first intimation that the French were advancing to interpose between Portugal and the British army had been received from him; but it was his opinion that that information ought to have produced no change in Sir John Moore's intentions. The intended attack, he thought, ought still to have been made; Soult might have been beaten in time to fall upon the corps which was coming

*Sir John  
Moore  
reaches  
Astorga.*

*Dec. 30.*

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at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of. Two brigades under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense, to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned. General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with orders to proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the coast. “With respect to me and the British troops,” said the Commander, in his official letter, “it has come to that point which I have long foreseen. . . From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. . . We must all make forced marches, from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us.”

It appears evident, from these expressions,

among them, and long fatigue, privations, and disease, made them appear more like an ambulatory hospital than an army. Under such circumstances it might have been supposed they would have sought to secure their retreat under protection of the British to Coruña and Ferrol. But Romana and his forlorn band were too high-minded to attach themselves as a burden upon those allies with whom they had so lately expected to co-operate in honourable and hopeful enterprise; and they assented without hesitation to the British General's desire. Romana only requested that the British troops might no longer be permitted to commit disorders which even in an enemy's country ought never to be allowed; it must have been painful indeed for Sir John Moore to have heard of such excesses, and still more painful to feel, that in a retreat so hasty as this was intended to be, it was impossible to prevent them.

The troops had been assured, at Benevente, that they were not falling back upon Coruña, but that their march was only to secure a more favourable position: . . . no affirmations could make the soldiery believe this: and when Sir John Moore reached Astorga, and issued his orders, it was too manifest that they were not retreating, but flying, before the enemy. Ammunition wagons were burnt here, and an entire dépôt of entrenching tools abandoned, so that the army was thus deprived of a most important means of impeding the enemy's progress. The position

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*Sir John  
Moore pursues his  
retreat.*



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at Villa Franca, which the Commander-in-chief had formerly mentioned in his dispatches, was no longer thought of. Two brigades under General Craufurd, were detached, by way of Orense, to Vigo, to which port Sir John had ordered empty transports to be sent for him, supposing it to be the best point of embarkation. This detachment preceded Romana in the line which he expected was to have been left for him; and when he and his forlorn band, after halting only one night, took their way toward Orense, they found the country stripped of the means of subsistence upon which they had reckoned. General Fraser and his division were immediately sent forward, with orders to proceed to Lugo; he was followed by General Hope and Sir David Baird, and their instructions were to make forced marches to the coast. “With respect to me and the British troops,” said the Commander, in his official letter, “it has come to that point which I have long foreseen... From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. . . We must all make forced marches, from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy, who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us.”

It appears evident, from these expressions,

that Sir John Moore was not well informed of the nature of the country through which he was about to retreat. Westward of Astorga, two great ranges of mountains trend from north to south: Puerto del Rabanal, Cruz de Ferro, and Foncebadon, are those of the eastern branch; those of the western are the Puerto del Cebrero, Puerto del Courel, and Puerto del Aguiar; they meet, on the south, with the Sierra de Sanabria, the Sierra de Cabrera, and the Montes Aquilianos. The tract which these mountains enclose is called the Bierzo: from summit to summit it is about sixteen leagues from north to south, and about fourteen from east to west. The whole waters of this amphitheatre have but one opening; they are collected into the river Sil, and pass, through a narrow gorge, into the Val de Orras, in Galicia. . . The centre is a plain of about four square leagues. There is scarcely in Europe a more lovely tract of country, certainly no where a more defensible one. The main road, one of the finest in Europe, is that of Manzanal; that of Foncebadon also leads into the Bierzo; there is no third ingress, and from Villa Franca toward Coruña the only way is that of the Puerto Cebrero; both the former passes lead along defiles, where, as Romana observed three months before this miserable retreat, a thousand men might stop the march of twenty times their number: and beyond Villa Franca there is no lateral road. Sir David Baird's army had travelled this road; they supposed that it could not possibly be in-

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tended to fall back beyond that point. But the Commander saw no security till he should reach the coast; there he hoped to find transports ready, or to take up some defensible position till they arrived. The same difficulties which affected him must affect his pursuers. It was not probable that all the numbers which were now marching against him would follow him the whole way; and once on the coast, it was his determination not to be molested by any thing like an equal force: . . . “it is only while retreating,” said he, “that we are vulnerable.” His sole object now was to bring off the army, . . . to effect this he had already destroyed great part of the ammunition and military stores, and now left behind many of the sick.

*Disorders  
committed  
by the  
troops.*

The mountain-tops were covered with heavy clouds, and the roads knee-deep in snow. Provisions, in a country where the natives are not rich enough at any time to lay by a store, can never be abundant, and what there were, had already been exhausted by the repeated march of troops, English and Spaniards. The little order with which such food as could be found was issued out, occasioned waste, and thereby increased the evil. The men, half famished, half frozen, and altogether desperate, were no longer in any subordination. They forced their way into the houses where their rations should have been served, seized it by force, frequently spilling the wine, and destroying more than they could carry away. This was not all: . . . pillage

could not be prevented. Houses and villages were burning in all directions ; but when they thus acted as enemies, they were treated as such ; and many of them were put to death by the peasantry, in revenge, or in self-defence.

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Buonaparte pursued in person no farther than Astorga : he left Marshal Ney with 18,000 men to keep that part of the country in subjection ; and assigned to Marshal Soult, with 23,000, what he called the “ glorious mission of destroying the English army, . . pursuing them to their point of embarkation, and driving them into the sea.” Marshal Soult’s was an easy task : he had only to follow the English just close enough to keep them at the pace at which they set out, and not come near enough to make them turn and stand at bay ; fatigue would do his work more surely than the sword. From Astorga to Villa Franca del Bierzo is fifteen leagues, about sixty English miles ; the road for the first four leagues is up the mountain, but through an open country. Having reached the summit of Foncebadon, you enter into some of the strongest passes in Europe. It would scarcely be possible for an invading army to force their way here, against a body of determined men. These passes continue between two and three leagues, nearly to the village of Torre ; from thence, through Benvibre and Ponferrada, nothing can be finer than the country, and the circle of mountains which binds it in. But never, in the most melancholy ages of Spanish history, had a more miserable scene

*Buonaparte  
stops at As-  
torga.*

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been represented, than was now to be witnessed here. The horses of the retreating army began to fail, and this, in great measure, for want of shoes and shoe-nails. There was no want of iron to hammer new ones: there are iron-works near Villa Franca, and enough might have been procured, had there been time allowed. As soon as these noble animals foundered, they were shot, lest the enemy should profit by them. The rain continued pouring, . . the baggage was to be dragged, and the soldiers were to wade through half-melted snows, . . the feet of the men as well as of the beasts began to fail, . . more waggons were left behind, . . more ammunition destroyed along the way; and when the troops reached Villa Franca, they were in such a state, that several experienced officers predicted, if this march against time were persevered in, a fourth of the army would be left in the ditches, before it was accomplished. More magazines and carriages were here destroyed. Some of the men abandoning themselves now, as knowing that if they proceeded they must die of cold, hunger, and weariness; they got into the wine cellars, and, giving way to desperate excess, were found dead when the French entered the town. When the General marched with the reserve from Ben-  
vibre, he left a detachment to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers of their danger, and drive them out of the houses, . . for the place was filled with them, near a thousand men of the preceding divisions having re-

mained there, all abandoned to despair, and most of them to drunkenness. A few were prevailed upon to move on; the greater number were deaf to threats, and insensible to danger, till the rear-guard was compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still covered them, and did not quit the town till the enemy approached, and then the road was filled with stragglers, armed and unarmed, mules, carts, women, and children. . . Four or five squadrons of French cavalry compelled the detachment in the rear to retire, and pursued them closely for several miles, till General Paget, with the reserve, repulsed the pursuers. As the French dragoons galloped through the long line of these wretched stragglers, they slashed them with their swords to the right and left, . . the men being so insensible with liquor that they neither attempted to resist nor get out of the road. Some of these men having found their way to the army, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks, to show their comrades the miserable consequence of drunkenness at such a time.

The Spaniards at Villa Franca would not believe that the French were advancing; through so strong a country, and in so severe a season, they thought it was impossible. Sir John Moore, however, well knew that he was pursued, and he was afraid of halting, lest the enemy should get in his rear, and intercept him at Lugo; an apprehension which could not have been entertained, had he been acquainted with the country.

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*Skirmish at  
Cacabelos.*

CHAP. XV. The troops, therefore, were hurried on: the artillery and head-quarters went foremost; General Baird's column, and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, covered the rear. The advanced guard of the enemy, under General Colbert, were close at their heels: Merle's division joined them on the 3d, and on the afternoon of that day they ventured to attack the rear-guard at Cacabelos. They were repulsed by the dragoons and riflemen. General Colbert received a ball in his forehead, and fell; he was an officer of great promise, and of so fine a person, that Canova is said to have called him the modern Antinous. Having thus once more shown the enemy what they could do in battle, the rear of the army, reluctantly and almost broken-hearted, continued their retreat.

*Retreat continued from Villa Franca.*

From Villa Franca to Castro is one continued ascent up Monte del Cebrero for about fifteen miles, through one of the wildest, most delightful, and most defensible countries in the world. The road is a royal one, cut with great labour and expense in the side of the mountain, and following all its windings; . . for some part of the way it overhangs the river Valcarce, a rapid mountain stream, which falls into the Burbia near the town, and afterwards joins the Sil, to pass through the single outlet in the gorge of the Bierzo. Oaks, alders, poplars, hazels, and chestnuts grow in the bottom, and far up the side of the hills: the apple, pear, cherry, and mulberry are wild in this country; the wild olive, also, is

found here; and here are the first vineyards which the traveller sees on his way from Coruña into the heart of Spain. The mountains are cultivated in some parts even to their summits, and trenches are cut along their sides, for the purpose of irrigating them. Even those writers whose journals were written during the horrors of such a flight noticed this scenery with admiration. It was now covered with snow: . . there was neither provision to sustain nature, nor shelter from the rain and snow, nor fuel for fire, to keep the vital heat from total extinction, nor place where the weary and foot-sore could rest for a single hour in safety. All that had hitherto been suffered was but the prelude to this consummate scene of horrors. It was still attempted to carry on some of the sick and wounded: the beasts which drew them failed at every step; and they were left in their waggons, to perish amid the snow. "I looked round," says an officer, "when we had hardly gained the highest point of those slippery precipices, and saw the rear of the army winding along the narrow road . . I saw their way marked by the wretched people who lay on all sides expiring, from fatigue and the severity of the cold: . . their bodies reddened in spots the white surface of the ground." The men were now desperate: excessive fatigue, and the feeling of the disgrace there was in thus flying before the enemy, excited in them a spirit which was almost mutinous: . . a few hours' pause was what they desired, an opportunity of facing the French, the



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chance of an honourable and speedy death, the certainty of sweetening their sufferings by taking vengeance upon their pursuers. A Portugeze bullock-driver, who had faithfully served the English from the first day of their march, was seen on his knees amid the snow, with his hands clasped, dying in the attitude and act of prayer. He had at least the comfort of religion in his passing hour. The soldiers who threw themselves down to perish by the way-side gave utterance to far different feelings with their dying breath: shame and strong anger were their last sentiments; and their groans were mingled with imprecations upon the Spaniards, by whom they fancied themselves betrayed, and upon the generals, who chose rather to let them die like beasts than take their chance in the field of battle. That no horror might be wanting, women and children accompanied this wretched army: . . some were frozen to death in the baggage-waggons, which were broken down, or left upon the road for want of cattle; some died of fatigue and cold, while their infants were pulling at the exhausted breast: . . one woman was taken in labour upon the mountain; she lay down at the turning of an angle rather more sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which drifted along; . . there she was found dead, and two babes, which she had brought forth, struggling in the snow: . . a blanket was thrown over her, to cover her from sight, . . the only burial which could be afforded, . . and the infants were

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abandoned.*

given in charge to a woman who came up in one of the bullock-carts, . . to take their chance for surviving through such a journey.

While the reserve were on this part of the road, they met between thirty and forty waggons filled with arms, ammunition, shoes, and clothing, from England, for Romana's army. There was no means of carrying them back ; . . such things as could be made use of were distributed to the soldiers as they passed, and the rest were destroyed. Indeed, the baggage which was with the army could not be carried on : nearly an hundred waggons, laden with shoes and clothes, were abandoned upon this ascent. The dollars, too, could no longer be dragged along : had the resolution of sacrificing them been determined upon in time, they might have been distributed among the men : in this manner, great part might have been saved from the enemy, and they who escaped would have had some little compensation for the hardships which they had undergone : . . they were now cast over the side of the precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal them from the French : . . many men are supposed to have been lost, in consequence of having dropped behind, for the hope of recovering some of this money. Dreadful as this march appeared to those who beheld the wreck of the army strewing its line of road, it was perhaps still more so for them who performed it in a night stormy and dark, wading through sludge and snow, stumbling over the bodies of beasts and

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men, and hearing, whenever the wind abated, the groans of those whose sufferings were not yet terminated by death.

From the summit of this mountain to Lugo is nearly twelve leagues. There are several bridges upon the way, over glens and gills, which might have impeded the pursuit, had they been destroyed. One, in particular, between Nogales and Marillas, is the most remarkable work of art between Coruña and Madrid. This bridge, which is called Puente del Corzul, crosses a deep ravine: from its exceeding height, the narrowness of its lofty arches, and its form, which, as usual with the Spanish bridges, is straight, it might at a little distance be mistaken for an aqueduct. Several of those officers who knew the road relied much upon the strength of the ravine, and the impossibility that the French could bring their guns over, if the bridge were destroyed. Grievous as it was to think of destroying so grand a work, its destruction was attempted; but, as in most other instances, to no purpose; whether the pioneers performed their office too hastily, or because their implements had been abandoned upon the way.

*The army  
collects at  
Lugo.*

The different divisions had been ordered to halt and collect at Lugo. Sir John Moore was now sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, . . the distance was double that to Coruña, the road was said to be impracticable for artillery, and the place itself offered no advan-

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tages for embarking in the face of an enemy. The brigades, however, of Generals Craufurd and Alton had marched for that port; and General Fraser, with his division, had been ordered to follow and join them. A dispatch was sent to stop him: the dragoon who was entrusted with it got drunk on the way, and lost the letter; and these troops, in consequence, had proceeded a full day's journey on their way towards Vigo before the counter-order reached them, and they were marched back. Thus, instead of having two days' rest at Lugo, as had been designed, they returned to that place excessively harassed, and with some diminution of number, occasioned by fatigue. When the horses entered Lugo, many of them fell dead in the streets, others were mercifully shot; . . . above four hundred carcasses were lying in the streets and market places; . . . there were none of the army who had strength to bury them; the towns-people were under too painful a suspense to think of performing work which it seemed hopeless to begin while the frequent musket-shot indicated so many fresh slaughters; there therefore the bodies lay, swelling with the rain, bursting, putrifying, and poisoning the atmosphere, faster than the glutted dogs and carrion birds could do their office. Here the retreating army might have rested, had the destruction of the bridges been effected; but this attempt had been so imperfectly executed, that the French came in sight on the 5th, and, collecting in considerable

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offers battle  
at Lugo.**Jan. 6.**Jan. 7.**Jan. 8.*

strength, took up a good position opposite our rear-guard, a valley dividing them.

On the following day they attacked the outposts, opening upon them with two Spanish pieces of ordnance, which they had taken on their march. The attack was made with great spirit; but it was received, says an officer, “with a steadiness which excited even our own wonder;”.. for at the sight of the enemy, and the sound of battle, the English recovered heart, and derived from their characteristic and invincible courage a strength which soon made them victorious. On the 7th another attack was made, and in like manner repelled. The prisoners reported that Marshal Soult was come up with three divisions. Sir John Moore, therefore, expecting a more formidable attempt, drew up his whole force on the morning of the 8th. It was his wish now to bring the enemy to action; he had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and perceived, also, that, unless he crippled his pursuers, there was no hope of embarking unmolested. Order and discipline were instantaneously restored by this resolution to fight, and the men seemed at once to have recovered from their sufferings. The French were not equally eager for battle; the trial which they had made of their enemies on the two preceding days was not such as to encourage them; and Soult was waiting for more troops to come up. The country was intersected with inclosures, and his position was thought too strong to be attacked by an inferior force. But,

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in reality, the French at this time were less numerous than the English. Another reason assigned for not attacking the enemy was, that the commissariat had only provisions for two days: delay, therefore, was judged as disadvantageous as retreat. It was afterwards known, that the French expected to be attacked, that they had no confidence in the strength of their position, and that their ablest officers apprehended their advanced guard would have been cut off. They frequently spoke of this to those English who were left in their power at Lugo, and exulted that Sir John Moore had contented himself with offering battle, instead of forcing them to an engagement. After waiting till the afternoon, during a day of snow and storms, Sir John ordered large fires to be lighted along the line, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and continued his retreat during the night.

Before the reserve left Lugo, the General once more endeavoured to repress the irregularity of the march. He warned the soldiers that their safety depended entirely upon their keeping their divisions, and marching with their regiments; and that those who stopped in villages, or straggled in the way, would inevitably be cut off by the French cavalry, .. "who have hitherto," said he, "shown little mercy even to the feeble and infirm who have fallen into their hands. The army has still eleven leagues to march; the soldiers must make an exertion to accomplish this: the rear-guard cannot stop; and they who fall

*Retreat to  
Coruña.*

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behind must take their fate." These representations were ineffectual: . . . it was, indeed, impossible to obey them: many of the men were exhausted and foot-sore, and could not keep their ranks: . . . others, who had totally broke through all discipline, left them for the love of wine, or for worse motives. So irresistible was the temptation of liquor to men in their state, that it was deemed better to expose them to the cold and rain of a severe night, than to the wine-houses of Betanzos, the next town upon their march. When the Royals reached that place, they only mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants, and three privates: the rest had dropped on the road; and many of those who joined did not come up for three days. There was a memorable instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might have been accomplished by discipline and presence of mind. A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two squadrons of the enemy's cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among them: he made an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor men, then halted, rallied round him such as were capable of making any resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could. This party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.

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January.*Sir John  
is advised  
to propose  
terms.*

Jan. 11.

The partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which he had been exposed of a general one, checked Soult in his pursuit; and he was too sensible of the danger which he had escaped, to trust himself again so near the British, without a superior force. The British army, therefore, gained twelve hours' march upon him, and reached Coruña with little farther molestation; they obtained implements from Coruña for destroying the bridge over the Mero, and thus impeded the enemy's progress. At Coruña, if the General had not represented the cause of Spain as hopeless, they might have found reinforcements from England, which would have enabled them to turn upon their pursuers, and take ample vengeance for the sufferings and the shame which they had endured. But, instead of reinforcements, he had directed that empty transports should be sent; and, for want of due knowledge of the country, had ordered them to Vigo, instead of Coruña. That order had been countermanded as soon as the error was discovered; but contrary winds detained the ships, . . happily for the honour of their country, for otherwise the troops would have quitted Spain as fugitives. It was apparent now that they could not escape unless they gained a battle. Coruña was a bad position. Had they been numerous enough to have occupied a range of hills about four miles from the town, they could have defended themselves against very superior numbers, . . but these heights required a larger force than the English army, of



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which not less than a fourth part had been foundered by the way. Both flanks would have been liable to be turned: it was therefore necessary to relinquish them to the enemy, and be content with occupying a second and lower range. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this situation, that some of our general officers advised the Commander to propose terms to Soult, for permitting the army to embark unmolested. In communicating this to the Government, Sir John said he was averse to make any such proposal, and exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect, . . but whatever he might resolve upon this head, the Ministers might rest assured that he would accept no terms which were in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. Happily for his own memory, upon farther consideration, he rejected the advice. It is sufficiently disgraceful that such advice should have been given; and deeply is England indebted to Sir John Moore for saving the army from this last and utter ignominy, and giving it an opportunity of displaying to the world that courage which had never forsaken it, and retrieving the honour which, had this counsel been followed, would irretrievably have been lost.

*Preparation for battle.*

Arrangements, therefore, were made to give the enemy battle. One division, under General Hope, occupied a hill on the left, commanding the road to Betanzos: the height decreased gradually to the village of Elvina, taking a curved

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direction. At this village General Baird's division commenced, and bent to the right: the whole formed nearly a semicircle. On the right of Sir David Baird, the rifle corps formed a chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser's division, which was drawn up about half a mile from Coruña, near the road to Vigo. The reserve, under General Paget, occupied a village on the Betanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. On the outside of the British posts was a magazine, containing 4000 barrels of gunpowder, which had been brought from England, and left there, while the Spanish armies were without ammunition! It was now necessary to blow it up:..the explosion shook the town like an earthquake; and a village near the magazine was totally destroyed.

The French made their appearance on the morning of the 12th, moving in force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position near the village of Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the houses along the river. Their force was continually increasing. On the 14th they commenced a cannonade, which was returned with such effect, that they at last drew off their guns. In the evening of this day the transports from Vigo hove in sight. Some slight skirmishes took place the following morning. Preparations meantime were making for the embarkation. Sir John finding that, from the nature of the ground, much artillery could not be

*The artillery embarked.*

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employed, placed seven six-pounders and one howitzer along the line, and kept four Spanish guns as a reserve, to be advanced to any point where they might be wanted: the rest of the artillery was embarked. The sick and the dismounted cavalry were sent on board with all possible expedition. A few horses also were embarked, . . but there was little time for this: most of them were completely disabled; another slaughter, therefore, was made of them: and the beach was covered with their bodies. Some of these animals, seeing their fellows fall, were sensible of the fate intended for them: they became wild with terror, and a few broke loose.

*Battle of  
Coruña.*

The preparations for embarking were completed on the morning of the 16th, and the General gave notice, that he intended, if the French did not move, to begin embarking the reserve at four in the afternoon. This was about mid-day. He mounted his horse, and set off to visit the out-posts: before he had proceeded far, a messenger came to tell him that the enemy's line were getting under arms; and a deserter arriving at the same moment, confirmed the intelligence. He spurred forward. Their light troops were pouring rapidly down the hill on the right wing of the British, and the advanced picquets were already beginning to fire. Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d, and 50th regiments, maintained this post. It was a bad position, and yet, if the troops gave way on that point, the ruin of the army was inevitable.

The guards were in their rear. General Paget was ordered to advance with the reserve, and support Lord William. The enemy opened a cannonade from eleven heavy guns, advantageously planted on the hills. Two strong columns, one advancing from a wood, the other skirting its edge, directed their march towards the right wing. A third column approached the centre: a fourth advanced slowly upon the left: a fifth remained half way down the hill, in the same direction. Both in number and weight of guns they had a decided superiority; and they fired with such effect from the commanding situation which they had chosen, that the balls in their bounding reached the British reserve, and occasioned some loss there.

Sir David Baird had his arm shattered with a grape-shot as he was leading on his division. The two lines of infantry advanced against each other: they were separated by stone walls and hedges which intersected the ground: but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body of the enemy was observed moving up the valley to turn it. Marshal Soult's intention was to force the right of the British, and thus to interpose between Coruña and the army, and cut it off from the place of embarkation. Failing in this attempt, he was now endeavouring to out-flank it. Half of the 4th regiment was therefore ordered to fall back, forming an obtuse angle with the other half. This manœuvre was

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excellently performed, and they commenced a heavy flanking fire: Sir John Moore called out to them, that this was exactly what he wanted to be done, and rode on to the 50th, commanded by Majors Napier and Stanhope. They got over an inclosure in their front, charged the enemy most gallantly, and drove them out of the village of Elvina; but Major Napier, advancing too far in the pursuit, received several wounds, and was made prisoner, and Major Stanhope was \* killed.

The General now proceeded to the 42d. “Highlanders,” said he, “remember Egypt!”.. they rushed on, and drove the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall: Sir John accompanied them in this charge. He now sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the 42d. The officer commanding the light infantry conceived, at this, that they were to be relieved by the guards, because their ammunition was nearly expended, and he began to fall back. The General, discovering the mistake, said to them, “My brave 42d, join your comrades: ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets!” Upon this, they instantly moved forward. Captain Hardinge returned, and pointed out to the General where

\* He was shot through the heart, and died so instantaneously, that the smile with which he was regarding the conduct of his men was fixed upon his cheek. They buried him at the entrance of the bivouac which he had occupied the preceding night; and as his brother leant

forward to look upon the body for the last time, a rifle-shot passed through his cloak, and struck his side; its force was broken by the folds of the cloak, otherwise the blow must have been fatal, and he would have fallen into the grave upon his brother's corpse.

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the guards were advancing. The enemy kept up a hot fire, and their artillery played incessantly on the spot where they were standing. A cannon-shot struck Sir John, and carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. He fell from his horse on his back, his countenance did not change, neither did he betray the least sensation of pain. Captain Hardinge, who dismounted, and took him by the hand, observed him anxiously watching the 42d, which was warmly engaged, and told him they were advancing; and upon that intelligence his countenance brightened. Colonel Graham, who now came up to assist him, seeing the composure of his features, began to hope that he was not wounded, till he perceived the dreadful laceration. From the size of the wound, it was in vain to make any attempt at stopping the blood; and Sir John consented to be removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him up, his sword, hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs: Captain Hardinge began to unbuckle it; but the General said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a distinct voice, "It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the field with me." Six soldiers of the 42d and the guards bore him. Hardinge, observing his composure, began to hope that the wound might not be mortal, and said to him, he trusted he might be spared to the army, and recover. Moore turned his head, and looking

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steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, replied, "No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible."

As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them frequently turn round, that he might see the field of battle, and listen to the firing; and he was well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A spring-waggon came up, bearing Colonel Wynch, who was wounded; the Colonel asked who was in the blanket, and being told it was Sir John Moore, wished him to be placed in the waggon. Sir John asked one of the Highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket was best? and the man said the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. So they proceeded with him to his quarters at Coruña, weeping as they went.

General Paget, meantime, hastened with the reserve to support the right wing. Colonel Beckwith dashed on with the rifle corps, repelled the enemy, and advanced so far as nearly to carry off one of their cannon; but a corps greatly superior moved up the valley, and forced him to retire. Paget, however, attacked this body of the enemy, repulsed it, and pressed on, dispersing every thing before him, till the enemy, perceiving their left wing was now quite exposed, drew it entirely back. The French then advanced upon Generals Manningham and Leith, in the centre, and there they were more easily repelled, the ground being more elevated, and

favourable for artillery. The position on the left was strong, and their effort there was unavailing: but a body of them took possession of a village on the road to Betanzos, and continued to fire from it, till Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls attacked it, and beat them out. Night was now closing in, and the French had fallen back in all parts of the field. The firing, however, was not discontinued till it was dark.

Never was any battle gained under heavier disadvantages. The French force exceeded 20,000 men, the British were not 15,000. The superiority in artillery was equally great: . . the enemy had met English guns on the way, sent off, thus late, to the patriotic armies, and these they had turned back, and employed against the English. Our artillery was embarked; and the Shrapnell shells, which contributed so materially to the success at Vimeiro, were not used in this more perilous engagement. If the moral and physical state of the two armies be considered, the disadvantages under which our soldiers laboured were still greater: . . the French, equipped in the stores which they had overtaken upon the road, elated with a pursuit wherein no man had been forced beyond his strength, and hourly receiving reinforcements to their already superior numbers; . . the English, in a state of misery, to which no army, perhaps, had ever before been reduced till after a total defeat; having lost their military chest, their stores, their baggage, their horses, their women and children, their sick, their



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wounded, their stragglers, every thing but their innate, excellent, unconquerable courage. From 6000 to 7000 men had sunk under the fatigues of their precipitate retreat. The loss in the battle did not amount to 800; that of the \* French is believed to have exceeded 2000. If such a victory was gained by the British army under such circumstances, what might not have been achieved by that army when unbroken, with all its means at hand, in health and strength, in its pride, and in its height of hope!

The General lived to hear that the battle was won. "Are the French beaten?" was the question which he repeated to every one who came into his apartment; and he expressed how great a satisfaction it was to him to know that they were defeated. "I hope," he said, "the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice." Then, addressing Colonel Anderson, who had been his friend and companion in arms for one-and-twenty years, he said to him, "Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way... You will see my friends as soon as you can: . . . tell them every

\* The historian of Marshal Soult's campaigns in 1809 states the loss of the French at 150 killed and 500 wounded. They were successful on all points, he says; the victory was decided, and if the action had begun earlier, and if the ground had permitted the cavalry to charge, *c'en était fait de cette armée Anglaise*. These are modest mis-statements in an author who asserts that, in

the hope of impeding the French in their pursuit, the English conceived the horrible intention of blowing up the town of Betanzos, where the inhabitants had received them as allies; and that for this purpose they deposited six thousand weight of powder on the ground floor of the town-house, and set fire to the four quarters of the town!!

thing... Say to my mother"—But here his voice failed, he became excessively agitated, and did not again venture to name her. Sometimes he asked to be placed in an easier posture. "I feel myself so strong," he said, "I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness . . it is great pain. But, after a while, he pressed Anderson's hand close to his body, and, in a few minutes, died without a struggle. He fell, as it had ever been his wish to do, in battle and in victory. No man was more beloved in private life, nor was there any general in the British army so universally respected. All men had thought him worthy of the chief command. Had he been less circumspect, had he looked more ardently forward, and less anxiously around him, and on all sides, and behind, . . had he been more confident in himself and in his army, and impressed with less respect for the French Generals, he would have been more equal to the difficulties of his situation. Despondency was the radical weakness of his mind. Personally he was as brave a man as ever met death in the field; but he wanted faith in British courage, and it is faith by which miracles are wrought in war as well as in religion. But let it ever be remembered with gratitude, that, when some of his general officers advised him to conclude the retreat by a capitulation, Sir John Moore preserved the honour of England.

He had often said that, if he were killed in battle, he wished to be buried where he fell.

CHAP.  
XV.

1809.  
*January.*

The body was removed at midnight to the citadel of Coruña. A grave was dug for him on the rampart there, by a party of the 9th regiment, the aides-du-camp attending by turns. No coffin could be procured; and the officers of his staff wrapped the body, dressed as it was, in a military cloak and blankets. The interment was hastened; for, about eight in the morning, some firing was heard, and they feared that, if a serious attack were made, they should be ordered away, and not suffered to pay him their last duty. The officers of his family bore him to the grave; the funeral service was read by the chaplain; and the corpse was covered with earth.

Meantime, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, passed the night in embarking the troops. At ten o'clock he ordered them to march from the field by brigades, leaving strong picquets to guard the ground, and give notice if the enemy approached. Major-General Beresford, with a rear-guard of about 2000 men, to cover the embarkation, occupied the lines in front of Coruña. Major-General Hill, with a corps of reserve, was stationed on a promontory behind the town. Nearly the whole army was embarked during the night: the picquets were withdrawn and embarked also before day, little remaining ashore at daylight except the rear-guard and the reserve. The French, seeing this, pushed on their light troops to the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour, got up some cannon to a rising ground, and fired at the transports.

*Jan. 17.*

